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dc.contributor.authorFjeldstad, Odd-Helge
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-27T12:32:56Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:13:11Z
dc.date.available2008-02-27T12:32:56Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:13:11Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.isbn82-90584-60-1
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2436055
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, the "balance of power" between elected councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the "balance of power" with implications for accountability and democratic development. These results may explain why we observe widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 2000: 7
dc.subjectTaxation
dc.subjectGovernance
dc.subjectDevelopment aid
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.titleTaxation, coercion and donors. Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania
dc.typeWorking paper


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