

Taxation, coercion and donors

Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania

Odd-Helge Fjeldstad

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Summary

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Abstract:

This paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, the 'balance of power' between elected councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of donors' in a local authority may be crucial by changing the 'balance of power' with implications for accountability and democratic development. These results may explain why we observe widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities.

1. Introduction¹

In recent years there has been an increasing focus on the possible linkages between high levels of development aid and taxation in Africa. Without aid, governments would have to cut spending, raise taxes, or borrow from other sources. Thus, it is argued, high levels of aid may diminish a government's incentive to make full use of its domestic resources for revenue generation (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999; Moore, 1998).²

Some development agencies have responded to the critique levelled against them by introducing various incentive schemes to reduce the assumed free riding problems by recipient governments, and thereby increasing domestic tax effort. Thus, in many aid dependent African countries revenue targets have become a major component of the aid conditionality.³ For instance, the International Monetary Fund argues that African countries 'have significant potential for raising tax receipts by broadening the tax base, improving tax administration, and rationalising the tax system' (Hadjimichael et al., 1995:44). Furthermore, some donors' involved in district development programmes, have adopted matching schemes,

¹ This paper is based on research carried out in collaboration with Joseph Semboja whom I would like to thank for comments and advice. Thanks also to Hildegunn Nordås, Lise Rakner, Lars Sjørgard, Ole Therkildsen and Bertil Tungodden for constructive comments. Points of view and possible errors are entirely my responsibility. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway and the Collaborative Agreement between CMI and the School of Government, University of Western Cape, is gratefully acknowledged.

² The empirical evidence is, however, inconclusive on the actual impacts of aid on domestic revenue raising effort (White, 1994; Devarajan et al., 1998).

³ In 1997, aid represented 10 per cent or more of GDP in 21 African countries (World Bank, 1999).

which supplies aid only on the basis of matching funds from the local government (Catterson and Lindahl, 1998).

The rationale behind this policy is based on the perception that the current tax effort in most African countries is low.⁴ Some observers, however, question the premise behind this policy. Collier (1997:56), for instance, claims that tax levels in Africa are already high. He argues that high taxation retards the growth process and induces tax evasion. Thus, the build-up of the taxable base of the economy is delayed, and so is the time at which fiscal sustainability can be achieved. Accordingly, increasing tax effort would be “both ludicrous and self-defeating” (ibid, p. 54).

Recently, Moore (1998) has introduced a new element into the debate on taxation and aid. Moore focuses on the anti-democratic effects of aid dependency. He argues that by the means donors use to promote development in the poorest countries, they are undermining the values of democracy and good governance that they are otherwise trying to promote through ‘general’ political conditionality and specific aid interventions.⁵ Moore’s point of departure is the acknowledgement that bargaining over the budget and over tax policy is one of the primary ways in which different state and societal goals are reconciled in a democracy. For instance, in Europe over the past two centuries, taxation and disputes over the use of revenues stimulated the development of greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic institutions enforcing accountability and greater transparency in expenditures (Tilly, 1992).

Moore’s key proposition is that the more a state ‘earns’ its income through the operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the state needs to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens about provision of services and representation in exchange for tax contributions.⁶ Thus, the larger share ‘earned’ incomes represent of total revenues the more likely it is that state-society relations are characterised by accountability, responsiveness and democracy. In many cases, however, aid dependency may thwart these processes in Africa.

⁴ For instance, Heller (1997:39) calls the tax effort in most African countries ‘disappointingly low’.

⁵ Democracy in this context is understood as a sub-species of a broader concept: the accountability of state to society (Therkildsen, 2000). This political accountability is about those with authority being answerable for their actions to the citizens, whether directly or indirectly. Day and Klein (1987:26-27) make an important distinction between political and managerial accountability, the latter being about making those with delegated authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance.

⁶ Moore (1998:94) argues that the use of the concept ‘earned’ is a logical extension from the term ‘rentier’, since rentier is ‘unearned’ in the language of classical political economy.

African states have significant 'unearned' incomes in the form of foreign aid (Goldsmith, 2000:18). Aid alone now accounts for almost half the income of many governments of low-income countries. Therefore, many African governments seem currently to face more organised and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the international donor agencies than from their own citizens and parliaments (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1999).

The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible linkages between taxation and accountability in a poor aid dependent country. In particular, does the social contract argument that Moore uses appropriately specify the political and administrative problems of a poor country? Furthermore, who are the likely stakeholders involved in the domestic tax enforcement process, and how does the presence of donors influence their relative bargaining power? What impact will such presence have on domestic revenue generation? Local authorities interact more closely with the citizens than other organs of the state apparatus, and hence provide a good case for exploring these questions at a disaggregate level.

The paper draws on findings from research carried out in local authorities in Tanzania during the late 1990s. The fieldstudies were conducted in Kibaha District Council, Coastal Region, and Kilosa DC, Morogoro Region. The studies covered all three council levels; the district headquarters, the wards and the village levels. In addition, data on tax revenues for about 50 councils were collected from the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government.

The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents briefly the empirical background for the analysis. In section 3 we discuss why different levels of revenue raising effort may be observed in local authorities, which have very similar socio-economic characteristics. Section 4 examines the institutional set-up for tax collection, emphasising the roles of tax collectors and elected councillors in the tax enforcement process. Thereafter, in section 5, possible impacts of donors are explored. Finally, section 6 concludes.

2. The cases

Total tax revenues per capita reveal substantial differences between councils. In 1995, in a sample of 20 councils, reported revenues per person above the age of 18 ranged from TSh 344 in Lindi DC, to TSh 1,527 in Njombe DC. Some of these differences may be explained by different economic structures, revenue bases, population densities, incomes per capita, and the

level and quality of public services. However, we also observe variations in tax effort between councils that apparently have fairly similar socio-economic characteristics, such as Kibaha DC and Kilosa DC.⁷ How do we explain these observations?

We will use the experiences with the head tax, locally named 'development levy', as our frame of reference. Development levy is the single most important local government tax base in Tanzania. In 1997, for an average of 42 district councils development levy generated about 30 percent of the total reported local revenues. The levy is, in principle, levied on every person above the age of 18 years and ordinarily a resident in the area. Women are exempted in most councils. In district councils the tax is in general levied on a flat basis. In contrast to most other local tax bases that are based on agricultural outputs and, thus, may fluctuate according to annual rainfall (e.g., market fees and crop cesses), development levy is in principle a fairly stable revenue base. Therefore, it is an attractive tax base for local authorities.

The ratio between development levy revenues reported to the district treasury and projected revenues (based on population statistics) differs significantly between the two councils. For instance, in 1996 the collection ratio, referring to revenues collected in per cent of the estimated tax potential, was 26.7 per cent in Kibaha DC, compared to 45.6 per cent in Kilosa. Thus, although the statutory tax rate per head was the same in the two councils in 1996 (TSh 1,000), the effective rate, measured as revenues per eligible taxpayer, was more than 60 percent higher in Kilosa compared to Kibaha (table 1).

Table 1 Effective development levy rate (in TSh per eligible taxpayer).

<i>Council</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>
Kibaha DC	120	137	267
Kilosa DC	321	288	456

⁷ According to World Bank (1993:29) the poverty profiles in Coastal Region (including Kibaha DC) and Morogoro Region (including Kilosa DC) are fairly similar. This observation is based on a comparison of farming environments in different regions, since agriculture is the main economic activity in rural areas.

3. Coercion

How do we explain the different tax collection ratios between the councils? We suggest the following proposition:

Proposition 1:

Differences in tax effort between local authorities are due to variations in the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement.

The evidence supporting this proposition emphasises the importance of different tax enforcement regimes, and, thus, the relationship between the state apparatus and the citizens. Analytically, the relationship between a taxpayer and the (local) government contains at least two elements (Cowell, 1990; Levi, 1988):

- *The coercive element.*

This refers to the bureaucratic apparatus that the local authority deploys to collect revenues. It is represented by the enforcement activities of collectors and the penalties imposed on those detected for non-compliance, i.e., the organisational effort.

- *The element of fiscal exchange.*

This has to do with reciprocity, i.e., how far citizens are obtaining some reciprocal services in return for their tax contributions. Thus, taxation and the provision of public goods and services may be interpreted as a contractual relationship between taxpayers and the (local) government.

It should be noted that there is always a coercive element in taxation (Andreoni et al., 1998). However, to minimise the costs of enforcement and to maximise the output that can be taxed, the government has to create some kind of voluntary compliance.⁸ First, the government must create confidence in its ability and its capacity to deliver promised returns for taxes. Second, to reduce the problems of free-riding it must co-ordinate the actions of taxpayers so that each perceives others paying their share (Levi, 1988:53).

⁸ Levi (1988) uses the concept 'quasi-voluntary compliance'. It is 'voluntary' because taxpayers choose to pay. It is 'quasi-voluntary' because the non-compliant are subject to coercion – if they are caught. Thus, quasi-voluntary compliance is one aspect of what is generally labelled legitimacy.

Most taxpayers are of course not able to assess the exact value of what they receive in return from the government for taxes paid. However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has general impressions and attitudes concerning his own and others' terms of trade with the government. If this is the case, then it is reasonable to assume that a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his terms of trade with the government. Thus, if the system of taxes is perceived to be unjust, tax resistance may, at least partly, be considered as an attempt by the taxpayer to adjust his terms of trade with the government.⁹

Taxpayers in local authorities in Tanzania see few tangible benefits in return for the taxes they pay. Virtually no development activities are undertaken through councils' financial sponsorship, and even the existing capacities are not producing the expected services due to lack of operation and maintenance funds (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1992, 1995). The deterioration and in some cases non-existence of public services raises taxpayers perceptions of exploitation from an unequal contract with government, and promotes tax resistance.¹⁰

Taxpayers' perceptions of the quality of public services in Kilosa and Kibaha are presented in table 2. Dissatisfaction seems to be most widespread in Kilosa where 75 percent of the respondents considered the quality to be bad (compared to 66 percent in Kibaha). None of the respondents in Kilosa considered the public services to be good (compared to 6 percent in Kibaha). 77 percent of the respondents in Kilosa said the quality of the services today was worse than three years ago (the corresponding figure for Kibaha was 66 percent).

*Table 2 Perceptions on the quality of public services
(in percent of total number (N) of respondents)*

<i>Perception</i>	<i>Kibaha (N=128)</i>	<i>Kilosa (N=44)</i>
Good	6	0
Average	26	25
Bad	66	75
Don't know	2	0

⁹ Scott (1985) argues that one of the most important 'weapons of the weak' is the ability to withdraw compliance. This can take a passive form, such as shirking, or an active form, such as rebellion. Historically, unwillingness of the population to comply with a tax that is deemed unjust has been a catalyst for political action. The Boston tea party and the Thatcher poll tax are illustrative examples. Bates (1983) provides some examples from Africa.

¹⁰ Enemu (2000:181) reviewing the problems and prospects of local governance in Africa supports this argument.

Furthermore, 83 percent of the respondents in Kibaha DC answered that in their view taxes was 'only partly' or 'not at all' used to provide public services. The corresponding figure for Kilosa was 88 percent (the majority, i.e., 70 percent, answered 'not at all'). Taxpayers' perceptions were supported by the tax collectors interviewed.

Widespread tax resistance is observed in the study areas. People may take to the extreme to evade taxes, for instance, by literally hiding in the bush when tax collectors are approaching. In particular, the revenue administration in Kilosa DC relies heavily on simple physical coercion to obtain the resources they need from their subjects and to ensure compliance. Roadblocks, manned by the local militia or police, are frequently used as tools of tax enforcement. Taxpayers reciprocate sometimes in the form of violent 'counter-attacks' on collectors, burning tax offices, etc.. In 1996, for instance, the ward office in Chanzuru was destroyed during night and the Tax Register Books were burnt. Tax collectors avoided certain villages in Kilosa due to the high personal risk involved in tax collection. Other villages were only visited by collectors accompanied by the local militia.¹¹ In contrast, tax collection in Kibaha is characterised with more laxity.

The argument that tax resistance is correlated to deteriorating public services is supported by other studies. Bukurura (1991:91) refers to an investigation from 1987 by the *Tanzania News Agency* in Kigoma Town Council, which reported that 'many people were defaulting apparently because they thought the council was not doing its best to serve the residents'. Tripp (1997:154) describes non-payment of development levy as a form of popular opposition towards state policies. She argues (p. 8) that tax evasion may be understood as one of many forms of 'quiet strategies of resistance in the form of economic non-compliance'.

Thus, in circumstances where taxes are perceived to be unfair and people receive few tangible benefits in return from taxes paid, we will expect that only coercive methods of tax enforcement will generate tax revenues. The reciprocity or contractual relationship between taxpayers and the local government is absent.

¹¹ Cases of tax revolts are also reported from councils in other regions, including Kilimanjaro Region and Coastal Region. *Daily News* (28 November, 1997:5) reports that '[o]ver twenty Moshi Municipal Council workers who were on a special operation to net development levy defaulters were attacked by a mob at Mbuyuni Market on Wednesday afternoon and eight of them were injured, some seriously ..'.

4. The institutional set-up for tax collection

Why do the tax enforcement regimes differ between the two councils leading to substantial differences in the use of coercion? We suggest the following proposition:

Proposition 2:

Coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the 'bargaining powers' with respect to tax collection are in the favour of the council administration, and the elected councillors have no direct influence on collection.

The arguments and observations supporting this proposition focus on the stakeholders involved in tax collection, and their relative bargaining power. Local government tax collection is basically a council's staff affair and completely separated from the central government revenue authority (i.e., the Tanzania Revenue Authority). In district councils it is organised around three levels, namely the council headquarters, the ward and the village levels. At the sub-village level, the kitongoji leader is responsible for mobilising taxpayers.¹²

At the district headquarters the responsibility rests with the council treasury, headed by the District Treasurer (DT). At the ward level the responsibility for tax collection rests with the office of the Ward Executive Officer (WEO). The WEO also handles developmental and law and order functions at that level. For this purpose the local militia are to their disposal. In larger wards which may possess greater revenue potential there will also be a ward revenue collector (WRC) to spearhead revenue collection in the ward. At the village level, the responsibility rests with the office of the village executive officer (VEO). The VEO is also responsible for village developmental issues. The village executive officers are nominated to their position by the village governments, but appointed and employed by the district council. The system of nomination ensures that the VEO has to come from the villages. At the sub-village level the kitongoji leader assists in mobilising taxpayers.

This institutional set-up is characterised by at least three principals: (i) the administrative leadership (management team) of the local authority, (ii) local politicians and (iii) the central government administration (i.e., Ministry of Local Government). These stakeholders,

¹² District and urban councils are sub-divided into wards (kata). Currently there are about 2,400 wards in Tanzania, and more than 9,000 registered villages. Each village is supposed to have at least 250 households (kayas). Villages are sub-divided into vitongoji. On average there are about 3 vitongoji per village.

sometimes independent of each other and sometimes through collusion try to influence the revenue target and, thus, the actions of the tax collectors. Based on evidence from fieldwork, we present the following propositions about the stakeholders' objectives:

(i) The objective of *the management of the local authority* (the administrative leadership) is to generate enough tax revenues to pay the wage bill and allowances of the staff. This target seems to be a minimum performance requirement from the central government.¹³ This argument is supported by observations from Kibaha and Kilosa. The performance of tax collectors at the ward and village levels is related to their capability to collect enough revenues to cover their wage bills. In recent years, several village executive officers (VEOs) and some ward revenue collectors (WRC) have been fired due to poor performance.

However, since both revenue estimates and reports on revenue collection are based on information from the administrative staff, there is room for manufacturing numbers. These observations are consistent with Migdal's (1988:253) argument that political systems under pressure from the centre to produce certain development results are likely to exercise their own form of accommodation. The most common form is simply to pass false or inflated accounts of development results to superiors who are out of touch with local conditions. Thus, where supervision is lax, district leaders, including local bureaucrats, may use their budgetary discretion and the force at their disposal for personal gain.

(ii) One important objective of *local politicians* is to get re-elected (and thereby also to achieve sitting allowances when participating in council meetings). Politicians may say they want an efficient tax administration, - but only to the point at which voters begin complaining that they are being harassed. Councillors are, in general, reluctant to raise local taxes and charges, not only due to concerns about their popularity, but also because they may be major local landowners or businesspeople who consider higher taxes as having direct negative impact on them. As a result councillors try to intervene in revenue collection.

¹³ In the book 'Africans. The history of a continent' John Iliffe (1995:196) discusses the priorities of the colonial administration. He quotes a veteran native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia who remembered his duties as follows: 'Get to know your district, and your people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God's sake don't worry headquarters.' To some extent Iliffe's description from the colonial period reflects the present district official's approach in Tanzania: Don't worry headquarters, i.e., the central government. To achieve this it is necessary to collect enough revenues to pay the salaries of the local employees, otherwise complaints will be forwarded through the trade unions.

Indications on the impacts of political intervention in tax collection can be found in the councils' financial statements. For instance, many councils experience revenue shortfalls in election years, particularly with respect to development levy. In a sample of 48 councils, 31 experienced a drop in revenues in the election year 1995.¹⁴ This might be due to the influence of politicians (including local and central government politicians). In both Kibaha and Kilosa we were informed that CCM-politicians (the ruling party) tried to moderate the tax collectors' efforts to enforce taxes during election years by issuing statements such as 'don't harass taxpayers' or 'relax on tax collection'. Politicians from the opposition parties, in contrast, approached taxpayers directly and advised them 'not to pay taxes', since taxes, according to their view, were used to 'finance the CCM-government'. Such statements are said to be common during election years.

(iii) The objective of the *central government administration* (i.e., the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government) is vague with respect to taxation. However, a tax system is also a mechanism of political control. According to Moore (1998:105), it comprises two main elements: (1) the sets of information on citizens that a government otherwise might not collect and maintain; and (2) a network of public collection agents who use this information, and become 'repositories of knowledge' about what is going on in remote areas where the state elites have little direct influence and knowledge. Thus, the revenue itself may not be the most valuable product of tax enforcement. But active revenue raising may be an important means of keeping a state machinery alive and active at the local level. An indicator used by the central level to assure that this machinery is alive, is that the local authority generates sufficient revenues to cover its wage bill.

By and large, however, the central government is not much directly involved in matters of local government taxation. For instance, the tax by-law system gives local authorities in Tanzania quite a wide discretion to introduce new local taxes and to set tax rates, subject to ministerial approval. Due to lack of capacity and poor co-ordination between the central and local government only limited restrictions are in practice imposed by the central level on local governments' tax design. Therefore, the local revenue systems have developed without much interference from the central level.¹⁵

¹⁴ Based on data from the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government.

¹⁵ Lack of co-ordination between the central and local levels has led to duplication of taxes and inconsistencies between taxes imposed by local authorities and the national government's development policies (e.g., with

Social networks further complicate the picture outlined above. Such networks may play important roles on how tax enforcement is carried out in practice. In societies where family-, tribal- and ethnical relations are strong and important, it is expected that civil servants provide services to these. Tax collectors at the village level are, as mentioned above, recruited from the villages. Traditional networks may thus impose heavy constraints on the collector's actions, including who is targeted to paying taxes and who is to be exempted.

In our survey we found, for instance, that taxpayers who had migrated to the study areas from other regions in Tanzania were more compliant than people who were born in the area. Migrants seemed (not surprisingly) to be less integrated and had looser relations to local authorities, including tax collectors, compared to people born in the area. Furthermore, we found that migrants, in general, were relatively more wealthy than people from the area. Thus, we would expect that it is easier and probably more convenient for the tax collector at the village level (i.e., the Village Executive Officer), who lives in the village and is nominated to his position by the Village Council, to target migrants rather than people from the area who might be his relatives, neighbours or who are related to local politicians and authorities.

In contrast to the ambiguous motivations of the village level collectors, tax collectors at the ward and district levels seem to be driven by motivations to maximise revenues. Thus, tax collectors can report sufficient revenues that cover the wage bill and pocket whatever is left, with or without collusion with their superiors.¹⁶ The larger the amount collected, the larger the amount that can supplement their own meagre salaries.

To summarise, the various stakeholders involved in tax enforcement have divergent objectives with respect to tax collection. In particular, political pressure seems to be a major impediment to revenue collection. Political intervention sometimes results in conflicts between the revenue administration and local politicians. For instance, a general view

respect to export promotion). An illustrative example is the cess rate on cashew nuts, a major export crop, which in 1997 represented 20 percent of the price paid to producers in Kibaha DC, creating huge disincentives for export production. In border areas, smuggling has become extensive due to relatively high local cess rates on some crops, for instance on coffee. Thus, peasants dodge and manoeuvre to avoid the deprivation inflicted upon them by public policy.

¹⁶ Corruption is often embedded in the hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:49). Low-levels officials collect bribes and pass a share to those at higher levels. Conversely, higher-ups may organise and rationalise the corrupt system to avoid wasteful competition between lower levels. This system has some similarities with sharecropping systems in agriculture. Sharecropping is a land-tenure system where the

expressed by the tax administration in our study was that elected councillors obstructed tax collection and were talking 'cheap politics'. Such conflicts seem to be rooted partly in divergent objectives with respect to tax enforcement, and partly in lack of trust between administrators and politicians at the local level. Based on data from 14 district councils Jacobsen (1999) finds that there is a 'trust deficit' in the political-administrative relations at the local level in Tanzania. Furthermore, lack of trust seems to reduce the flow of information between politicians and bureaucrats.¹⁷

The conflict between the tax administration, including collectors, and local politicians is particularly evident in Kilosa DC. Local politicians have little influence on the tax enforcement process. Collection is facilitated through extortive and violent approaches that are mainly advocated and implemented by council administrators, with minimum support from local politicians. Thus, in the absence of democratic forms of accountability, tax collection in Kilosa has turned into a licence for collectors on-the-ground to more or less freely augment the local treasury and supplement their own salaries through extortion from local residents.¹⁸

Thus, in accordance with Mamdani's (1996:59) notion of 'decentralised despotism', financial autonomy has provided the framework in which lower-level officials resort to extra-legal enforcement and violence to extort money from the population. This argument can be illustrated by a few examples. For instance, the statutory voluntary period for paying development levy in Tanzania is from 1 January up to September 30. All tax payments made after the deadline are subject to a penalty equivalent to 50 percent of the tax rate. As from October 1 to December 31 development levy payment 'campaigns' are conducted, organised by the ward office and using state organs, such as the local militia and judiciary, to ensure compliance. Defaulters may be visited in their homes, or people may be required to show their tax receipts at roadblocks. Non-compliers who are caught are brought to court at the primary court or ward level. Due to widespread resistance, tax campaigns for development levy in Kilosa DC (involving the militia) start as early as in July, i.e., three months before the voluntary (and statutory) payment period expired. The district treasury staff argued that by waiting to the end

landlord gets a (percentage) share of agricultural output, and the tenant keeps the remaining output (Sah and Stiglitz, 1992).

¹⁷ Conflicts between council employees and local politicians are, however, not a new phenomenon in Tanzania. Dryden (1968:144-149), referring to the mid-1960s, describes some areas of conflict between these stakeholders.

¹⁸ Wunsch (1990:54) based on Hyden (1983) argues that in circumstances where national leaders were dogmatic on implementing comprehensive programmes, as Tanzanian leaders were during the late 1970s regarding

of September, taxpayers' would have spent their money and nothing would be left for taxation.

Furthermore, in Kilosa the village level has been excluded from collection, and tax enforcement has been taken over by the ward level. According to the district treasury staff, this was due to incentive problems connected with tax collection at the village level. One problem arises from the presence of two principals for the Village Executive Officers (VEOs), i.e., the village government as the nominating authority and the council as the appointing and employing authority, leading to divided loyalty. Another problem arises from VEOs operating within their areas of domicile. Lack of arm's-length-relationship between tax collectors and taxpayers introduces economics of affection into village tax collection. In many villages the kitongoji leaders also resist in mobilising people to pay taxes due to the unpopularity of taxation.

In Kibaha DC, too, tensions between the administration and councillors are observed, although much less pronounced than in Kilosa. In general, tax collection in Kibaha is characterised with more laxity compared to Kilosa due to the intervention of politicians. In some wards in Kibaha local politicians partly act as executives. A general view expressed by the tax collecting staff, reflecting their frustration on this intervention, was that councillors obstructed tax collection. The expected consequence of this intervention is reduced tax effort. Thus, this simple analysis suggests that tax effort depends on the relative 'bargaining power' between the elected councillors and the management of the council.

5. Donors

Why do the relative influence of the council administration and local politicians on tax enforcement vary between councils? We suggest the following proposition to explain these observed differences:

Proposition 3:

Donor presence empowers the managerial level in local authorities at the expense of elected councillors.

Ujamaa villagisation, bureaucrats have been reduced to authoritarian and coercive instruments of enforcing compliance.

