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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.contributor.authorWiig, Arne
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-04T08:21:20Z
dc.date.available2018-01-04T08:21:20Z
dc.date.issued2016-11-01
dc.identifieroai:www.cmi.no:6025
dc.identifier.citationBergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2016:9) 28 p.
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-8062-618-9
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2475200
dc.description.abstractDoes self-serving elite behaviour make citizens more politically active? This paper presents the results of a randomized field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about elite use of tax havens. Information provided in a neutral form had no effect on voting intentions. Information phrased in more morally charged terms led to a reduction in voting intentions. Additional evidence suggests that rather than increase the perceived importance of voting, charged information tends to undermine confidence in political institutions and the social contract. The effects are particularly pronounced among the less well off, indicating that increased transparency in the absence of perceived agency may not improve democratic accountability.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relationCMI Working Paper
dc.relationWP 2016:9
dc.relation.ispartofCMI Working Paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working Paper WP 2016:9
dc.relation.urihttps://www.cmi.no/publications/6025-how-do-voters-respond-self-serving-elite-behaviour
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.titleHow do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania
dc.typeWorking paper


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