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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.contributor.authorWiig, Arne
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-04T08:20:26Z
dc.date.available2018-01-04T08:20:26Z
dc.date.issued2015-08-01
dc.identifieroai:www.cmi.no:5607
dc.identifier.citationBergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2015:8) 28 p.
dc.identifier.isbn82-8062-552-6
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2475107
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relationCMI Working Paper
dc.relationWP 2015:8
dc.relation.ispartofCMI Working Paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working Paper WP 2015:8
dc.relation.urihttps://www.cmi.no/publications/5607-elite-behaviour-and-citizen-mobilization
dc.subjectElites
dc.subjectCitizens
dc.subjectPortfolio Investment
dc.subjectTax Havens
dc.subjectVoter Turnout
dc.subjectPolitical Economy
dc.titleElite behaviour and citizen mobilization
dc.typeWorking paper
dc.identifier.cristin1287070


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