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dc.contributor.authorFjeldstad, Odd-Helge
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-04T08:19:30Z
dc.date.issued2001-01-01
dc.identifieroai:www.cmi.no:873
dc.identifier.citationin The Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 39 no. 2 pp. 289-306
dc.identifier.issn1469-7777
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2475001
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state-society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the 'bargaining powers' with respect to tax collection favour the council administration, and the elected councillors have no direct influence on collection. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the 'balance of power' in favour of the council administration, with implications for accountability, responsiveness and democratic development. These results may explain why widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities are observed.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relationThe Journal of Modern African Studies
dc.relation2
dc.relation.ispartofThe Journal of Modern African Studies
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 39 no. 2
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 39 no. 2
dc.relation.urihttps://www.cmi.no/publications/873-taxation-coercion-and-donors
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.titleTaxation, coercion and donors. Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania
dc.typeJournal article
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022278X01003627


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