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dc.contributor.authorSuhrke, Astri
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-04T08:17:22Z
dc.date.available2018-01-04T08:17:22Z
dc.date.issued2011-01-01
dc.identifieroai:www.cmi.no:4468
dc.identifier.citationOslo: PRIO (PRIO Policy Brief no. 03/2011)
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-7288-397-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2474742
dc.description.abstractAs the US-led coalition prepares to extricate itself from a combat role in Afghanistan, it is useful to look back and reflect on the policy dynamic of the original involvement. How did the coalition – and more specifically NATO – become so deeply enmeshed in an out-of-area conflict that proved so difficult and where victory was so elusive? Was the engagement the result of deliberate policy or the cumulative and unwilled outcome of a series of small decisions? At what point were exit strategies considered, if at all? And, what are the implications of this for future engagement of the alliance in out-of-area conflicts? Taking a policy perspective as the point of departure, the author finds that the growing involvement in Afghanistan has been the result of a piecemeal decision-making process, self-perpetuating dynamics and a steady goal expansion that led the alliance into a protracted and controversial war.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherPRIO
dc.relationPRIO Policy Brief
dc.relation03/2011
dc.relation.ispartofPRIO Policy Brief
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPRIO Policy Brief 03/2011
dc.relation.urihttps://www.cmi.no/publications/4468-disjointed-incrementalism-nato-in-afghanistan
dc.titleDisjointed Incrementalism. NATO in Afghanistan.
dc.typeResearch report


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