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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-14T11:01:50Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:13:27Z
dc.date.available2007-08-14T11:01:50Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:13:27Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.isbn978-82-8062-172-6
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2436140
dc.description.abstractTwo types of models are dominant in the current resource curse literature. One type of model studies the selection of entrepreneurs into rent-seeking versus productive activities. The other type analyzes the use of patronage by politicians seeking re-election. The policy implications of the two models are quite different. The first model suggests that institutions governing the private sector ought to be improved. The second that institutions governing the public sector should be emphasized. This paper empirically tests the impact of the private versus public sector institutions on the resource curse, using cross-country data from Sachs and Warner (1997a) and Polity IV. The main result is that only improved private sector institutions ameliorate the resource curse.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working Paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 2007: 2
dc.subjectNatural resources
dc.subjectResource curse
dc.subjectInstitutions
dc.titleThe Resource Curse: Which Institutions Matter?
dc.typeWorking paper


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