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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-22T10:00:47Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:13:23Z
dc.date.available2008-02-22T10:00:47Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:13:23Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.isbn82-8062-044-3
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2436117
dc.description.abstractEvolutionary game theory provides the tools to analyze which strategies, or patterns of behaviour, emerge over time through a process of adaptation. Social norms can be defined as patterns of behaviour with certain characteristics. Evolutionary game theory thus provides one perspective on how social norms are formed and maintained. Prisoner’s dilemma games can be used to study the conditions under which cooperative norms emerge. Bargaining games can be used to address the formation of fairness norms. However, being more congenial to analyzing norms that somehow focus on material payoffs, it is not a given that evolutionary game theory can adequately address norms focusing on rights or virtues.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 2003: 1
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theory
dc.subjectSocial norms
dc.subjectJEL: C73
dc.titleThe evolution of social norms
dc.typeWorking paper


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