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dc.contributor.authorFjeldstad, Odd-Helge
dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.contributor.authorLange, Siri
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-25T08:19:04Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:13:20Z
dc.date.available2008-02-25T08:19:04Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:13:20Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.isbn82-8062-062-1
dc.identifier.issn0805-505X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2436103
dc.description.abstractThe report explores factors that explain the observed patterns of corruption within the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). In particular, the study discusses the key assumptions behind the revenue authority model and the relevance of these in an African context characterised by scarcity of qualified tax officers, accountants and auditors, as well as clientilistic networks between political, bureaucratic and economic agents. Based on this analysis and in light of existing political, economic and administrative constraints, the study identifies options available for sustainable tax administrative reforms in the two countries. Issues of particular relevance for foreign assistance towards fighting fiscal corruption and strengthening tax administration are highlighted.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch report
dc.relation.ispartofseriesR 2003: 9
dc.subjectCorruption
dc.subjectIncentives
dc.subjectSocial norms
dc.subjectTax administration
dc.subjectTax evasion
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.subjectUganda
dc.titleAutonomy, Incentives and Patronage. A Study of Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities
dc.typeResearch report


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