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dc.contributor.authorFjeldstad, Odd-Helge
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-10T07:35:30Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:13:11Z
dc.date.available2008-03-10T07:35:30Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:13:11Z
dc.date.issued1996
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2436056
dc.description.abstractThe primary concern of the paper is to discuss the role of various economic factors in explaining the mechanisms and degree of fiscal corruption and tax evasion in local governments in Tanzania. The emphasis is on how the incentive structure of the tax system affects the decisions of taxpayers and tax collectors to eng age in fraudulent behaviour. The paper stars with a set of research questions based on empirical observations, and examines the fundamental ideas, basic assumptions and limitations of possible theoretical approaches for answering these questions. The theory is presented in a "non-technical” way, emphasising the intuitive understanding of the arguments presented.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 1996: 14
dc.subjectCorruption
dc.subjectTax evasion
dc.subjectTax collection
dc.subjectTanzania
dc.titleTax evasion and corruption in local governments in Tanzania: Alternative economic approaches
dc.typeWorking paper


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