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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-21T12:19:07Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:12:22Z
dc.date.available2008-02-21T12:19:07Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:12:22Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.isbn82-8062-079-6
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2435821
dc.description.abstractA model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, and players receive noisy signals of the true location of their games, is reviewed. Sugden (1995) suggests that in such a model, there can be a stationary state of convention coexistence only if interaction is nonuniform across social space. This paper shows that an alternative definition of conventions, which links conventions to actions rather than expectations, permits convention coexistence when interaction is uniform. To assess robustness, the concept of a global mutant is introduced, to which certain states of coexistence are robust.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 2004: 3
dc.subjectConventions
dc.subjectCoordination game
dc.subjectEquilibrium selection
dc.titleWhat constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions
dc.typeWorking paper


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