Corruption and market reform

dc.contributor.author	Bjorvatn, Kjetil
dc.contributor.author	Søreide, Tina
dc.date.accessioned	2008-02-22T11:56:58Z
dc.date.accessioned	2017-03-29T09:12:01Z
dc.date.available	2008-02-22T11:56:58Z
dc.date.available	2017-03-29T09:12:01Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.identifier.isbn	82-8062-053-2
dc.identifier.issn	0804-3639
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2435728
dc.description.abstract	Market reforms in developing and transition economies have sometimes failed to deliver the desired welfare effects.Corruption may be an important reason for the inefficiency of market reforms, such as privatizationcampaigns. The present paper demonstrates howcorruption can affect the choice of buyer of a public asset. Our main result is that market reform in highly corruptsocieties is likely to result in less competition and lesseconomic efficiency than reform in less corrupt societies. We also demonstrate that the level of bribes in the sale ofpublic assets does not necessarily increase in thegovernment’s emphasis on bribes.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Chr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseries	CMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP 2003: 7
dc.subject	Corruption
dc.subject	Market reform
dc.subject	Privatization
dc.subject	JEL Codes: F23, L12
dc.title	Corruption and market reform
dc.type	Working paper