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dc.contributor.authorSumaila, Ussif Rashid
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-12T07:46:01Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-29T09:12:01Z
dc.date.available2008-03-12T07:46:01Z
dc.date.available2017-03-29T09:12:01Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.issn0804-3639
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2435727
dc.description.abstractA two-stage, two-player non-cooperative game model is developed under an irreversible capital investment assumption. The main aim is to predict the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock, given a non-cooperative environment and the fact that all players are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions obtained are then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii) the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleabilty of c ap aci t y is assumed implicitly; and (iii) available data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherChr. Michelsen Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCMI Working paper
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 1994: 2
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectFishery
dc.subjectFishery resources
dc.subjectCoastal vessels
dc.subjectCod
dc.subjectTrawlers
dc.subjectNorway
dc.titleNon-Cooperation in Fish Exploitation. The Case of Irreversible Capital Investment in the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Fishery
dc.typeWorking paper


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