



# Strengthening Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Action (STACA) Programme

## A Case Study Evaluation

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Conducted by Chr. Michelsen Institute in collaboration with REPOA

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, based on the information made available to them, and do not necessarily represent those of DFID.

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## List of abbreviations

AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
CAG	Controller and Auditor General
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DJSI&E	The Directorate for Judicial Services, Inspections and Ethics
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EABI	East African Bribery Index
FATF	Financial Actions Task Force
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer and the
JoT	Judiciary of Tanzania
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NAO	National Audit Office
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
PCO	Project Coordination Office
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
STRs	Suspicious Transactions Reports
STACA	Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Action programme
REPOA	Tanzanian Research for Poverty Alleviation
ToR	Terms of reference
U4	U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre
DFID	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

## Executive summary

This report summarises the findings of the independent evaluation of DfID's Strengthening Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Action (STACA) programme conducted by a team from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and the Tanzanian Research for Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). The Terms of Reference stressed that the purpose of the evaluation was to promote learning, so the approach differs from the typical end-of-term review in focussing on six cases rather than the programme in its entirety. This evaluation analyses the results achieved to date, the programme's theory of change, and the challenges and successes in making a complex anti-corruption and governance programme such as STACA work. STACA stands out as one of the first programmes delivered by the aid community that sought to go beyond support to individual law enforcement institutions and have a holistic vision for strengthening the anti-corruption sector. With this programme, the Department for International Development (DFID) showed ambition and that it had listened to expert advice when developing the early concept for the programme.

This evaluation shows that STACA has already proven its relevance and has been effective in reaching a number of key self-defined performance indicators such as an increase in conviction rates. However, the programme has not been effective in reaching its main outcome: better processing of criminal cases between the different law enforcement institutions in Tanzania. Some decisions involving the management of the programme lowered its efficiency. It is premature to fully assess the sustainability and impact of the programme when most activities have been in implementation mode for only 2-3 years, and the indications vary across cases. However, if the recommendations provided below are followed, STACA has the potential to bring about meaningful and sustainable impact in the fight against corruption in Tanzania. For that to happen, the theory of change needs revision, and more management and expert support needs to be supplied to ensure that it is implemented according to plan.

The STACA programme suffered from two issues related to its theory of change. First, there was a tension between the original vision of a programme focussed on overcoming bottlenecks in the law enforcement chain supported by DFID, and the vision that later emerged predominantly amongst government actors which viewed STACA more as a conventional programme to build capacity in the law enforcement sector. Work plans were drawn up and a large number of training activities conducted; sometimes with no direct link to the aim of improving collaboration between law enforcement institutions. Second, the programme underestimated how difficult, complex and time-consuming it would be to change collaborative practices among law enforcement institutions. An improved theory of change would recognise that success in enforcing anti-corruption laws is not solely influenced by organisational capacity and high-level political will. It requires certain critical preconditions as well: (a) trust between agencies (from top to bottom of organisation); (b) incentives to cooperate within and between agencies; and (c) changes in practices, procedures, and laws.

Moreover, linear progression and quick wins are not possible in many complex programmes. It often takes time to create meaningful, measurable change, and some setbacks should be expected. The STACA programme almost succeeded in facilitating a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on improving collaboration and case processing between four agencies. If the document had been signed and the standards enacted, it would have been a significant accomplishment for the programme.

However, this achievement is still within reach. In any case, the overall verdict is that the many individual training activities and the provision of equipment did not exceed the sum of their parts. Some activities had a clear rationale for improving the law enforcement chain; others did not. Key bottlenecks remain for effective investigation, prosecution and sanctioning and these will require measures other than training to remove them.

At the outcome-level, there are no visible signs that STACA has led to a more active enforcement of anti-corruption laws and systems in Tanzania. Given the programme's short duration, however, we feel it is premature to deliver a final judgement on the programme's performance. Moreover, the program lacked baseline data, and the team had difficulty in obtaining comprehensive data to gauge the extent of changes in effectiveness of anti-corruption and law enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, our recommendations centre heavily on improving the evaluability of any follow-on programme. More consistent and higher quality data would also help the programme's management.

Based on these findings, we recommend the following measures for any follow-on activity or other programmes that share STACA's original design features:

- Embed a central, independent data unit into the programme design that can collect, collate and make accessible data from the different agencies in a consistent, systematic manner.
- Include a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) team in the management structure that has the skills and resources to strengthen the programme's evaluability and help build M&E capacity in the individual agencies.
- Define success clearly, together with the key programme partners, from the outset of the programme. Then, working with an experienced evaluator, construct indicators and establish baselines. Track trends continuously and systematically. Ensure that basic record-keeping is done by all programme partners to provide the basis for future evaluations and general management oversight.
- Support production of reliable external statistics from Tanzanian research institutions, for example on public trust in government agencies/perceptions of institutional integrity.
- Do not rush the design phase. Spend adequate time on problem diagnostics, and on consultations with partners about the theory of change and the preconditions for mutual success.
- Have a longer implementation phase. Keep the pressure for results constant but acknowledge that problem-driven, iterative and adaptive approaches to complex issues will take some time.
- Focus on case-flow and removing the key bottlenecks in the law enforcement value chain. Training is often a precondition, and will still be needed, but should always be directly related to the main outcomes. Spin off or eliminate projects that do not relate to the main outcomes.
- Bring in more technical experts to help design and lead implementation of activities, international and national.
- Redesign the programme logic so it acknowledges that public accountability most often is best strengthened by involving both the state and civil society, for example by focusing on the role of whistle-blowers. Components A and B of the programme should not be isolated from each other. Component A would be stronger if the programme logic actively sought to link government and civil society activities. For example, the effects of sting operations on the levels of police corruption could most likely be enhanced by also empowering citizens to refuse to pay bribes.



## Introduction

In February 2012 the Department for International Development (DFID) launched its Strengthening Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Action (STACA) programme, a four and one-half year, £11 million programme to reduce the impact of corruption on the poor through more effective enforcement of anti-corruption laws.<sup>1</sup> Initially built around three components, in October 2013 the programme was redesigned and now consists of two components. Component A supports measures to enhance the performance of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), the National Audit Office (NAO), the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the Police and Judiciary, and Component B funds efforts to increase public trust and demands for action to curb corruption. Component B has been subject to delays, with most activities starting only recently. Thus, the evaluation is limited to Component A, the £9.3m support to the Government of Tanzania for improving the performance of the institutions most directly involved in fighting corruption.<sup>2</sup>

The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Research for Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) were commissioned by DFID and the Government of Tanzania to undertake this case study evaluation of the STACA programme. The evaluation was conducted between August and November 2015. The Terms of Reference (ToRs) provide the following purposes for the evaluation:

- To inform Government of Tanzania and DFID strategies for tackling corruption in Tanzania.
- To contribute to the international evidence base on successful and less successful approaches to tackling corruption through development assistance.
- To inform the design of a possible subsequent anti-corruption programme in Tanzania after the ending of the current programme in 2016.

The objective of the evaluation is to assess what worked, what didn't and why, for each of the six case studies, and to draw lessons at the overall programme level. The analytical focus is on the links between outputs and outcomes, not on the impact level. Specifically, two objectives were set:

- Gather information on challenges and successes in enhancing the performance of government institutions to tackle corruption; exploring how, why and in what contexts actions achieved, or not, their expected results.
- Test the theory of change for Component A.

The six case studies conducted as part of this evaluation evaluate the performance of selected STACA activities are:

- Train NAO auditors to improve their ability to detect corruption.
- Review of audit "red flags" by PCCB investigators.
- Sponsor joint inspections of corruption cases by officials from the DPP and PCCB.
- Raise awareness about anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws through financing workshops by the FIU.
- Support sting operations to reduce corruption within the police force.

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<sup>1</sup> See Business Case. Intervention Summary: 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> Component B centres on an Integrity Fund (£1.2m) which provides support to a range of non-government initiatives to strengthen integrity. The Integrity Fund is delivered through the Accountability in Tanzania programme, and will work with civil society partners to explore the anti-corruption impact of broader work to promote greater accountability. Support for a financial investigator from the UK's National Crime Agency (£0.5m) has also been given and, according to the ToRs, appears to also be included in Component B. Its purpose is to assist law enforcement agencies process complex international aspects of corruption cases by embedding an experienced investigator in the PCCB.

- Provide equipment to primary courts to improve their responsiveness to citizen requests.

The report is in two parts. The first analyses the programme's theory of change, presents the main conclusions at the programme level and judges the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of the intervention, and summarises the six cases. The second part provides the full reports with detailed analysis of the case studies.

## Methodology

This case study evaluation focuses on learning. A number of methodological choices had to be made to draw out conclusions that are useful both to the Government of Tanzania and to practitioners working to reduce corruption. The cases selected were originally suggested by DFID and the Government of Tanzania in the ToRs using purposive sampling. Selection criteria included:

- Activities relevant to the programme's theory of change which are most likely to lead to improved institutional performance.
- Activities which bring together different institutions in the law enforcement chain, for example the PCCB's review of NAO 'red flags' in audit reports, or the joint review of corruption cases by the PCCB and the DPP. This is because the programme focused on promoting more effective collaboration between institutions.
- One case study per institution.
- Activities for which it is feasible to gather the relevant information and data required within the time and budget constraints of the evaluation.

The selection of case studies was agreed to with the evaluation team during the inception process.

The case studies are explicitly compared and contrasted in order to draw out learning. STACA is a complex programme, and the cases are different in nature. The analytical approach uses a theory-based version of the law enforcement chain as a nodal point, applies a mixed methods approach, and triangulates different sources of data for all key evaluation questions. Each case study needed its own approach to data collection and analysis, and had its own limitations. In part 2, each of the full case studies presents the sampling strategy used for data collection, the individual data collection tools used, as well as the number, type and location of the people that were contacted in the development of the case study.

The evaluation suffered from a lack of programme data and baselines on key performance indicators. Moreover, administrative data from STACA partners was difficult to retrieve, and different agencies often provided different figures for the same activity. The lack of basic record-keeping, such as lists of attendees at STACA-sponsored trainings, made data collection a slow and cumbersome activity. The poor evaluability reduced the precision with which judgements could be rendered, in particular about the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme. Nevertheless, the extensive consultations undertaken during the evaluation period, and the efforts made to analyse administrative data, made it possible to provide some strong conclusions and valid recommendations.

Our mixed methods approach combines desk review of documents and qualitative, semi-structured in-depth interviews with key informants, focus group discussions, and an electronic survey.<sup>3</sup> Administrative data was retrieved from STACA partners and analysed alongside secondary data sources from international indices such as the Afrobarometer. These data sources are triangulated to strengthen the validity of the conclusions. In total 175 people were interviewed by the team individually or as part of focus group discussions across ten regions in Tanzania. The electronic survey

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<sup>3</sup> Bryman, A. 2006. "Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: How is it done?" *Qualitative Research* 6 (1): 97–113.

received 291 anonymous responses from STACA partner agencies' staff members. Data collection instruments were designed so that the views of different groups could be contrasted.

We understand triangulation as the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> Although the term is often used interchangeably with mixed methods, triangulation is actually a broader principle, focusing not just on design but also on the analysis and interpretation of data. Triangulation sheds light on issues from different angles to “overcome the problems that stem from studies relying upon a single theory, a single method, a single set of data [...] and from a single investigator.”<sup>5</sup> All methods benefit from having their findings triangulated, or cross-checked, with other data sources to increase the validity of evidence. Triangulation of indicators is done to improve the validity of the findings. Evidence is often stronger when supported by several methods (both qualitative and quantitative), and its validity reinforced when more than one relevant indicator measures it.

Thus, changes in perceptions, administrative data, observed behaviour, and significant outcomes are all considered appropriate evidence for this evaluation. However, behavioural change within organisations and clear indications of positive change for citizens (outcomes) matter more than perceptions and administrative data.

Finally, the case study approach has shaped the evaluation. A case study provides “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”<sup>6</sup> This report is not merely six mini-evaluations of the institutional performance of six different agencies. The focus is on lessons across cases. Cases have been selected to promote learning, which entails a positive bias. Data sampling also had a high risk of positive bias, as programme partners had to be relied upon to identify respondents in most cases. The team did achieve a good regional coverage and always sought to cross-check findings.

Consistency between interviewers was furthered by developing semi-structured questionnaire templates and conducting interviews in pairs, particularly at the beginning of the process. The data analysis was guided by the evaluation questions and indicators established at the inception phase (presented further below), to promote objectivity in the assessment and reduce bias.

## **Background: Corruption trends in Tanzania and trust in anti-corruption institutions**

The high level of perceived and reported corruption in Tanzania - and the low level of trust in the authorities to curb it - was the impetus for the STACA programme. The programme also explicitly sought to increase public trust in the police and the judiciary. In the following section, the overall trends of corruption and trust in Tanzania are presented first through aggregate, national level data and followed by available statistics for the institutional level. The sources used are the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Afrobarometer, the East African Bribery Index (EABI), and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). We recognize weaknesses in all these sources,<sup>7</sup> but in the absence of better, more accurate measures, we rely on them to provide some context to the challenging environment in which STACA has been operating.

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<sup>4</sup> Bryman, A. 2004. *Social Research Methods*. 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 275.

<sup>5</sup> Mikkelsen, B. 2005. *Methods for Development Work and Research: A New Guide for Practitioners* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), 96.

<sup>6</sup> Yin, R. 2003. *Case study research: Designs and methods*. 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage), 13.

<sup>7</sup> Treisman, D. 2007. “What Have We Learned About Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 211-244; Donchev, D. & G. Ujhelyi. 2014. “What Do

According to Transparency International's CPI, Tanzania is perceived as struggling with corruption. The CPI is constructed by the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. A composite index ranging from 0 (completely corrupt) to 100 (no corruption) is calculated for each country. Tanzania has, as of 2015, a score of 30, and its ranked in the 117 place among all countries evaluated.<sup>8</sup> According to the Afrobarometer in 2014, 64% of Tanzanians perceive corruption to be growing, while only 13% see it as decreasing.<sup>9</sup>

The WGI measure a country's control of corruption from 0 (no control) to 100 (complete control) by aggregating a number of perception based indicators of both political/grand and bureaucratic/petty corruption from 1996 to 2014. In 2014, Tanzania was rated on the 22.6 percentile on the control of corruption indicators, which is not only lower than the majority of the countries surveyed, but also lower than Tanzania's own rankings on the other WGI indicators.<sup>10</sup>

The GCB interviews citizens and experts to get an overall sense of: the perception of corruption, who people pay bribes to, and whether anti-corruption efforts are seen as effective. The GCB found that 46% of Tanzanians say that corruption increased a lot in 2013, while only 3% state that it decreased a lot. This is an improvement from 2011, where 64% said corruption had increased a lot. Households were also asked whether they had paid a bribe to any given institution for a service. In 2011 a total of 49% stated they had done so, and in 2013 56% affirmed to have done so. The police, the judiciary, the health sector, and public officials and civil servants are perceived to be the most corrupt in Tanzania.<sup>11</sup>

The Afrobarometer corroborates the findings of the GCB (Figure 1), showing that a majority of the Tanzanian public perceived an increase in the level of corruption in the country between 2012 and 2014. Three of the six STACA institutions (the Police, the Judiciary (judges and magistrates) and the PCCB) were included in the Afrobarometer assessments with results showing substantial public concern about corruption among officials of the institutions.<sup>12</sup> Perceptions can be changed, however, and for the institutions the most effective way to reduce the proportion of Tanzanians who think the agencies officials are corrupt is through continued progress in combating corruption and improving satisfaction of the public seeking their services.

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Corruption Indices Measure?" *Economics & Politics* 26(2): 309-323; Razafindrakoto, M. & F. Rouband. 2010. "Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa." *World Development* 38(8): 1057-1069; Olken, B. 2009. "Corruption Perceptions v. Corruption Reality." *Journal of Public Economics* 93: 950-964; Abramo, C. W. 2008. "How Much Do Perceptions of Corruption Really Tell Us?" *Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal*, 2 (3): 1-56.

<sup>8</sup> Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/>.


<sup>9</sup> Afrobarometer 2015a. Tanzania, <http://afrobarometer.org/data/tanzania-round-6-data-2015>.

<sup>10</sup> The other indicators are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law (World Governance Indicators Project, 2015, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>).

<sup>11</sup> Global Corruption Barometer 2013, <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013>.

<sup>12</sup> Afrobarometer 2015b. "After more than a decade of fighting corruption, how much progress? Findings from the Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey in Tanzania", [http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/media-briefing/tanzania/tan\\_r6\\_presentation1\\_corruption.pdf](http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/media-briefing/tanzania/tan_r6_presentation1_corruption.pdf)


Figure 1. GCB's perceptions of corruption by institution



Source: Global Corruption Barometer, 2015. P&C: Public officials and civil servants

Data from the EABI shows that the prevalence of corruption in the judiciary follows a consistently decreasing trend starting in 2010. As for the police, corruption prevalence has remained higher in the years subsequent to 2012. This is somewhat in contrast to what the Afrobarometer and GCB show.


Figure 2. EABI's bribery by institution



Source: East African Bribery Index.

Trust in institutions is closely related to perceptions of corruption. In 1999/2000, about 35% of respondents stated that they had little to no trust in the police. This has climbed and stabilized at around 40% as of 2014. Little to no trust in the courts was at 25% in 1999, peaked at 42% in 2003, and has stabilized at around 25% again in 2014. Trust in the PCCB is also low, with 35% stating that they have little to no trust in the institution.

Figure 3. Afrobarometer's trust in institutions



Source: Afrobarometer, 2015.

Overall, the corruption indices show that Tanzania is still struggling with corruption, and in spite of resources spent, little progress seems to have been achieved during the last five years. Nearly all sources of information (except the EABI) suggest that corruption in institutions is becoming more widespread. Trust in the institutions that are crucial to combat and control corruption is low. These surveys provide important contextual information for the STACA programme and underline the importance of reducing corruption in Tanzania and of regaining public trust in its law enforcement and judiciary. They should not, however, be understood as performance measures for the STACA programme. The original plan for STACA did include performance indicators on public trust but there was never a setup established to collect reliable data on these indicators, and the indices presented above are not targeted enough to be used as evidence for the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of STACA.

## PART 1: OVERALL EVALUATION REPORT

### 1. STACA's Theory of Change. Design, implementation, and outcomes

STACA is a complex programme that tries to solve the even more complex problems of institutional collaboration and trust between agencies tasked with combating corruption in a challenging environment. Such a programme will always benefit from a clear roadmap to guide implementation. The purpose of this section is to analyse STACA's theory of change: its roadmap for getting from A to B. It tests the logic of the programme design, evaluates whether the design was followed in practice, and seeks to explain which causal links were more (and less) effective.

The STACA programme's theory of change rests on one hypothesis and two assumptions, all formally stated in the Business Case (BC). The hypothesis is that if oversight institutions tasked with detecting and sanctioning corruption improve their technical capacity and work more effectively together, anti-corruption laws in Tanzania are likely to be more effectively enforced. The first assumption is that capacity building activities chosen by institutions are effective in improving capacity – for example that training and study visits lead to improvements in knowledge and skills; that equipment procured will be used by staff; that new IT systems function well enough to add to institutional performance, and so on. The second assumption is that once capacity is in place, there is sufficient will to allow it to be used. That is, if the programme is successful in improving technical capacity, political factors are such that this newly-acquired expertise can be used to strengthen government action against corruption.

Generally, it would be preferable to formulate preconditions, rather than general assumptions, for the theory of change to work.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, both assumptions are reasonable. Capacity building and political will are needed to make most reforms work. There are, however, other important preconditions for STACA's effective contribution to reduced corruption. They centre on the issue of collaboration.

In hindsight, the following preconditions were essential for greater collaboration between law enforcement agencies, and thereby for the effectiveness of the programme: (a) trust between agencies (from top to bottom of organisation); (b) incentives to cooperate within and across agencies; and (c) changes in practices, procedures, and laws. Some training activities aimed at increasing trust, as well as interviews, revealed examples of improved interaction between staff members across agencies. The programme was a welcome forum for coordination, and did in itself provide a minimal level of incentives to increase cooperation, but other initiatives could have been launched to increase these incentives. There were few changes in practices, procedures and laws as a result of the STACA trainings, however. Process re-engineering should have been an explicit activity, supported by efforts to obtain high-level buy-in and outside technical expertise and facilitation.

Figure 4 illustrates the theory of change of STACA's Component A. This kind of chart is useful to explain how the individual activities are meant to contribute to the overall goals of the programme, and how the system depends on many different actors to work smoothly. It presents a complex illustration of


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<sup>13</sup> See Connell, J. P., A. C. Kubisch, L. B. Schorr, and C. H. Weiss, eds. 1995. *New approaches to evaluating community initiatives: Concepts, methods, and contexts* (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute); Funnell, S., and P. Rogers. 2011. *Purposeful program theory: Effective use of theories of change and logic models* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), and Ober, H. 2012. *Peacebuilding with impact: Defining theories of change*. (London: CARE International UK). For a specific application to the area of anti-corruption, see Johnsen, J. 2012. "Theories of change in anti-corruption work: A tool for programme design and evaluation," U4 Issue paper (Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Centre).



the workings of the programme because it goes to the granular level of individual activities. The chart will therefore be used mainly in part 2 of this report.

Figure 4. STACA's theory of change



The evaluation team developed a streamlined version of this flow chart (Figure 5), focussing on the key steps in the law enforcement chain, from lead to sanction. When available for each key stage, data allows the analyst to identify the areas that perform well, and the areas where bottlenecks may appear. This simple chart shows that STACA's design captured the links between the generation of leads and the initiation of a court case. As recognised in the business case for STACA, each step in the process must function smoothly to achieve the programme outcome of "more active enforcement of




anticorruption laws and systems.” A failure at any point will frustrate its fulfilment. STACA’s own theory of change posits that this programme outcome requires not only strengthening each institution in the chain of enforcement from investigation to prosecution to conviction, but also ensuring that all the institutions in the chain “work more effectively together.”

In our view, STACA’s design would have benefitted from a greater focus on whistle-blowers as generators of leads. But the biggest problem in the theory of change is that the Judiciary was not strengthened with a view to improve case processing. Equipment, such as filing cabinets, was provided to primary courts with the purpose of reducing corruption in the courts themselves. However, primary courts in Tanzania do not handle corruption cases, making the equipment support to the judiciary disconnected from the anti-corruption law enforcement chain. STACA does not have to work on the whole law enforcement chain. There is still much value in strengthening the work of the NAO, FIU, PCCB and DPP, and the programme’s engagement with the judiciary could have been targeted to an entry point relevant for anti-corruption law enforcement. But the theory of change needs to clearly show how impact is expected to happen without the Judiciary in the programme’s sphere of influence.

When implementation began, the logic behind the original programme design was absent from several activities that were subsequently implemented. A review of project documentation and a series of interviews indicate that work plans were drawn up for activities without links to the goal of strengthening case processing. Capacity building became an end in itself. Partners were inadequately included in the inception phase of the programme and did not sufficiently internalise the programme’s logic. A fundamental tension arose within the programme between a focus on improving the processing of corruption cases on the one hand, and a more traditional approach to training and capacity building on the other.

Figure 5. The law enforcement chain for STACA



Improving case flow would require:

- Targeted interventions
- Reforms and drive at the highest institutional level
- Process reengineering, and some training

Building capacity in the sector would entail:

- Many diverse interventions
- A focus on training and equipment
- Substantial inputs and time to show effects

DFID designed the programme to improve the case flow, but the government partners and the Project Coordination Office (PCO) later steered it towards a traditional capacity building programme with a heavy focus on training. The individual training activities were often relatively well carried out and relevant, but in isolation they did not lead to any significant outcomes in curbing corruption. The case study summaries below and the full reports in part 2 analyse the theory of change for each activity in detail.

A theory of change is a causal logic model, but one that allows for analysing complex processes. Linear progression is not possible in many complex programmes. It often takes time to create meaningful, measurable change, and some setbacks should be expected. The World Development Report 2011 shows that the twenty fastest-moving countries needed an average of 27 years to bring corruption under reasonable control.<sup>14</sup> It would be unrealistic to expect the activities under the STACA programme that have only been running for 2-3 years to already change collaborative practices and trust between partner agencies. Any future or similar programmes should have longer design and implementation periods.

The STACA programme almost succeeded in facilitating a MoU between four agencies on improving case processing. Had the document been signed and the standards enacted, it would have been a significant milestone for the STACA programme. However, this milestone is still within reach, though it depends on the openness of the institutions to adopt alternative collaborative practices. Still, the overall verdict is that the many individual training activities did not sufficiently end up as more than the sum of their parts. Some had clear rationale to improve the law enforcement chain, others did not. Key bottlenecks remain for effective investigation, prosecution and sanctioning, and these will require measures other than training to remove them.

In summary, the STACA programme suffered from two issues related to its theory of change. First, a clear tension between the original vision of a programme focussed on overcoming bottlenecks in the law enforcement chain supported by DFID, and the vision that later emerged predominantly amongst government actors which viewed STACA more as a conventional programme to build capacity in a range of organisations in the law enforcement sector. Work plans were drawn up and a large number of training activities conducted, but at times with no direct link to the aim of improving collaboration between law enforcement institutions. Second, the programme underestimated how difficult, complex and time-consuming it is to change collaborative practices between law enforcement

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<sup>14</sup> World Bank. 2011. *World Development Report 2011. Conflict, security, and development* (Washington, DC: World Bank), 108.

institutions. An improved theory of change would recognise that success in enforcing anti-corruption laws is not just influenced by organisational capacity and high-level political will. Important preconditions for greater collaboration would need to be considered as well, such as: (a) trust between agencies (from top to bottom of organisation); (b) incentives to cooperate within and across agencies; and (c) changes in practices, procedures, and laws.

## 2. Main achievements and challenges of the programme

This section presents our overall assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact of STACA at the programme level. It draws lessons across the six cases but leaves the detailed discussion of the cases for the specific sections below and for part 2 of this report. The main achievements and challenges of the programme are judged mainly on the basis of: its level of goal attainment of the targets established in the logframe, a benchmarking of results to relevant comparators, and an analysis of the extensive consultations conducted with staff members of STACA partner agencies across Tanzania.

The ToRs provided the specific evaluation questions to be addressed. These were later refined in the inception period. The definitions of the five evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact) therefore differ slightly from the original formulations by the OECD.

### 2.1 Relevance

The aim of this subsection is to assess whether the activities carried out through STACA were consistent with the needs of the relevant institutions as well as with broader efforts to reduce corruption in Tanzania. Specifically, two evaluation questions are analysed:

- How appropriate were the activities chosen by implementing partners for increasing collaboration between institutions and ultimately reducing corruption?
- Were STACA's objectives aligned with those of the Government and individual institutions?

The main performance indicators are the degree of alignment between the objectives of STACA partners, DFID and the centre of government, and the perceptions of relevance expressed by STACA partner agency staff members.

Overall, this evaluation finds the STACA programme to have been relevant in its design. The goals of the programme were shared by both the broad national policy framework for anti-corruption and good governance, and by formal individual institutional strategies. The programme was unique in Tanzania and in no danger of duplicating existing initiatives. However, we find that some individual activities were weakly linked to the program goals so that over the course of its lifetime the programme has been on a downwards trajectory in terms of its relevance.


The interviews and focus group discussions showed that people generally appreciated the training activities, and considered them relevant for curbing corruption. However, they had many suggestions about how the relevance of these diverse activities could be improved, and rarely made the explicit link between the training activity and an increase in collaboration and trust between law enforcement agencies.

The electronic survey focussed on two elements of relevance. One question related to the relevance of different STACA activities to curb corruption in Tanzania. The other asked about the relevance of these activities for fostering trust and collaboration between institutions. This section presents the aggregated results across cases. Annex 2 provides the exact wordings of questions and the results

disaggregated by institution. The police and judiciary are omitted from this comparative analysis at the programme level, because of low response rates and because the different logic of the interventions would make the comparison unfair.

Survey respondents from the NAO, PCCB, DPP and FIU generally stated that STACA activities were relevant to curb corruption. It is noteworthy that the respondents from the NAO and FIU perceive the activities to be less relevant than those from the PCCB and DPP. The NAO and FIU activities consisted mainly of workshops, whereas the PCCB and DPP activities had more focus on interaction between agencies. Figure 6 summarises the aggregated data from questions 7, 15, 24, 33, 40 and 53 in the survey.


Figure 6. Relevance for curbing corruption



1 = not relevant at all, 5 = highly relevant.

Respondents also found the activities to be relevant for improving trust and collaboration between law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. As Figure 7 shows, the activities from the DPP and PCCB that were designed to promote trust and collaboration were also perceived as more relevant. This is hardly a surprise. But it is surprising that the NAO and FIU workshops were not designed with a greater focus on promoting trust and collaboration. The graph summarises questions 8, 16, 25, 34, 41 and 47.

Figure 7. Relevance for trust and collaboration



In short, the STACA programme is relevant to curb corruption in Tanzania. Unfortunately, the activities chosen by implementing partners were not always optimally linked with the goal of increasing collaboration and trust between institutions, even if they were relevant for curbing corruption in a broad sense. This lowered the operational relevance of the programme over time and – as explained below – also its effectiveness.

## 2.2 Effectiveness

The question of STACA’s effectiveness in improving collaboration and trust between law enforcement agencies in Tanzania is central to the purpose and objectives of this evaluation. This section analyses the extent to which planned outputs were achieved, and whether they contributed to the achievement of programme outcomes. The specific evaluation questions are:

- To what extent have the activities in the six case study areas contributed to or are likely to contribute to increased institutional performance?
- Did the programme strengthen collaboration between law enforcement institutions?
- What factors explain how, why and in what context the activities in the case studies have been effective or ineffective in achieving planned results?
- What is the evidence to confirm or refute the programme’s hypothesis that if oversight institutions tasked with detecting and sanctioning corruption improve their technical capacity and work more effectively together, anti-corruption laws in Tanzania are likely to be more effectively enforced?
- Were the programme’s two underlying assumptions with regards to the theory of change valid?

The cases on police sting operations and on provision of equipment to primary courts did not have strengthened collaboration as a goal. Here the effectiveness question is whether the objectives for increased institutional performance and reduction in corruption were reached. Indicators and data collection methods for the individual cases are included in the table below. The following indicators are cross-cutting for measuring effectiveness of all cases (except police and primary courts):

- Conviction rates in corruption cases.
- Changes in public expectations of corruption and public trust in STACA partner institutions.

- Number of corruption and fraud cases identified by NAO or FIU and passed to PCCB or the police for investigation, presented by PCCB to DPP, taken to court, and that obtained convictions.

The majority of these indicators are measured using STACA partners’ own administrative data. The available statistics on public expectations on corruption and public trust from sources such as the Afrobarometer were analysed in section 1 and showed no discernible positive or negative trends. However, given that the data is not sufficiently targeted to measure STACA activities, it is not suitable for attribution.

Effective interventions have a clear logic and stated goal. Generally, survey respondents rated STACA activities positively, but the NAO had a higher degree of respondents who did not think it was completely clear what the activities were meant to achieve (Figure 8). When asked to assess whether the activities led to an improvement in institutional performance, the survey respondents were less positive than for the relevance questions above (Figure 9). PCCB staff were most positive about the contribution of STACA activities to the performance of their institution, whereas NAO staff were least positive.

Figure 8. Clarity on purpose of activities




Figure 9. Institutional performance by institution




Table 1. National convictions data

Year	Number of convictions	Percentage
2011	52	46%
2012	47	40%
2013	89	59%
2014	135	49%

Source: PCCB website.

STACA has been effective in achieving some of its key pre-defined performance targets. As shown in Table 1, the total number of convictions has increased over the lifetime of programme, and the conviction rate has also risen--although as explained below, a focus on this indicator alone can actually undermine system performance. The number of Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) has also risen from 20 in 2011 to 144 in 2014 and Tanzania has been removed from the Financial Actions Task Force’s (FATF) grey list by amending the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) law.

However, for a complex programme such as STACA, one cannot rely on one or two indicators for a fair assessment of effectiveness. The theory of change needs to clearly spell out that the goal for a society is not to increase the convictions rate, but to reduce impunity and increase the deterrent effect of law enforcement. Similarly, having many STRs is useful but not an end in itself. One would therefore need to triangulate with other indicators, and whenever possible make useful comparisons. In the absence of alternative indicators, this kind of triangulation could not be made.

STACA has apparently helped reduce the median time taken from the PCCB’s first application for consent to prosecute a case until the consent has been granted by the DPP. While in the first years of the STACA program the data provided to the evaluation team showed that it remained stubbornly at 90 days, 30 days more than the statute allows, the PCCB and DPP report that as of July 1, 2015, the median time has been reduced to 45 days. What percentage, if any, exceeds the 60 day limit was not reported. Moreover, the percentage of cases where consent has been granted remains low, even if some small improvements can be seen, as shown in Table 2.<sup>15</sup>

*Table 2. Percentage of cases where consent has been granted*

Year	Consent to prosecute	Without consent	Percent granted consent
<b>2012</b>	87/135	67/95	56%/59%
<b>2013</b>	253/267	166/171	60%/61%
<b>2014</b>	274/205	151/112	64%/65%

Sources: DPP data. 2014 -2015 STACA Progress Report. PCCB web site.

Table 3 shows that there has been a healthy improvement in how NAO leads translate into corruption cases filed in court but that there is still much more to do. The same applies for the FIU leads. The number of PCCB cases based on leads from the FIU has only risen from 19 in 2011 to 23 in 2014. There is no clear discernible trend. The increase in STRs do not seem to have translated into more and better quality corruption cases, judged by the small change in PCCB cases that are based on FIU inputs. Although conviction numbers and rates have improved, there are no clear indications that this has been the result of improved collaboration between law enforcement institutions. Finally, by only counting the number of convictions one can easily miss the larger picture. Some cases matter more than others, and these typically are more complex to investigate and prosecute. STACA’s performance monitoring framework should not lead to a focus on petty corruption cases to show quantitative progress at the expense of more significant corruption cases.

*Table 3. PCCB cases originating from NAO reports*

Year	Sent to DPP	Returned w/consent	Filed in court
<b>2012</b>	15	8 (53%)	3
<b>2013</b>	26	15 (58%)	13
<b>2014</b>	20	17 (85%)	21
<b>2014</b>	31	26 (84%)	18

Source: PCCB administrative data supplemented by PCCB data provided March 10, 2016.

<sup>15</sup> As explained below, PCCB and DPP report different figures for the number of cases in which consent was granted or denied. The first figure in each cell is the number reported by DPP, the second the one by PCCB.

Overall, there are mixed signs for STACA's effectiveness, and the programme needs to improve its evaluability to answer these questions with certainty. It is also premature to assess many parameters around improvements in case processing, trust and collaborative practices. Judged against the logframe indicators, there are clear positive trends, but once indicators closer to the law enforcement chain are scrutinised, the performance seems less convincing. The programme almost succeeded in facilitating a MoU between four agencies on improving case processing. If the document had been signed and the standards enacted it would have been a significant milestone for the STACA programme. However, this milestone is still within reach.

### 2.3 Efficiency

This section analyses how economically resources and inputs have been converted into results by the STACA programme. Detailed assessments for each case are provided in part 2. The focus here is on programme level efficiency. The evaluation question for efficiency is as follows:

- Did STACA activities deliver good value for money looking at the costs compared to the results achieved?

This criterion is difficult to judge without clear results and useful comparisons. It is possible to assess the cost-effectiveness of governance and anti-corruption interventions, but it requires the programme to have been designed with this purpose in mind.<sup>16</sup> As explained above, the goals set by the programme were not sufficiently clear, and the level of goal attainment is a mixed picture. Moreover, there were no pre-defined comparisons established for measuring this evaluation question. It proved difficult for the evaluation team to find suitable comparisons for the very specific activities in the short time span of the evaluation.


The survey asked the organisers of STACA activities to assess the efficiency of the programme delivery. Such a self-assessment can be expected to have a high degree of positive bias, and consistently 63% of respondents stated that the management and delivery of STACA activities has been efficient compared to their costs. But there are also 23% of organisers who stated that the management and delivery was only "somewhat" efficient, and 7% answered "no" to the question. It should be noted that the sample for organisers is only 30 responses.

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<sup>16</sup> See Johnsen, J. 2014. "Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis of governance and anti-corruption activities," U4 Issue paper 10 (Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Centre).



Figure 10. Organisers' view of programme efficiency



As mentioned, the cost-efficiency of the individual cases is discussed below, but some results are important enough to have impact at the programme level. The poor efficiency of the activities concerning the provision of equipment to primary courts and the FIU awareness workshops are two powerful examples. These examples are manifestations of a larger systemic problem with the management structure of the programme, which resulted in complicated planning, poor supervision of programme delivery, a lack of results-orientation, and thereby in poor efficiency.

The daily management of the STACA programme was done by the PCO, which has three full-time staff members (although the office was handicapped for several months due to the untimely death of its head and the challenge of finding a replacement). The budget for the PCO constituted 10% of the total funds of Component A. Yet, this setup did not deliver a good supervision of activities. The PCO was hampered by the lack of clear targets, indicators and M&E capacity from the outset, and continued to struggle with monitoring throughout the programme. It is hard to manage a complex programme effectively without basic records and data of the activities performed, and the PCO did not possess this information. The programme spent over a fifth of its funds on per diems in 2014/15, and procurement of equipment such as computers and motorcycles also constituted a large part of the budget. A more resourceful management unit would potentially have reduced these expenditures and spent them on activities that were more closely related to the overall goals of STACA.

**2.3 Sustainability**

Sustainability is understood as the probability that the benefits from the programme will last after programme completion. It is in many ways premature to judge the sustainability of STACA but this section will provide our best judgement on the matter and the views of the beneficiaries of the programme. The evaluation question is:


- To what extent will benefits identified under effectiveness continue after programme funding ceases in 2016? Which benefits, if any, are most likely to be sustained?

This evaluation question has been assessed on the basis of interviews, focus group discussions and the electronic survey. We also consider a good indicator to be whether STACA partners have planned to

continue the programme activities independently when the current programme funding runs out in 2016.

The electronic survey asked the organisers for their views on sustainability. The views are not as positive as one might expect. Only 23% believe that the positive results from STACA will remain if funding from DFID stops. More than half of the 30 respondents state that some gains may be lost, but only to a limited extent, while 17% think that the positive results will disappear. The expected positive bias that usually comes when asking self-assessment questions may be neutralised in this instance by a desire to signal the urgency of continued funding. In any case, the best way to improve the sustainability of the STACA programme is to focus on tangible outcomes – changes in practices, procedures and laws –, rather than on one-off training activities and purchase of equipment.

Figure 11. Organisers' views on sustainability



## 2.3 Impact

The impact criterion is defined loosely in the ToRs for this evaluation. Impacts are any effects that the programme has produced, be they positive or negative, primary or secondary, direct or indirect, intended or unintended. The impact evaluation questions are:


- Have there been any negative or positive effects of programme activities? If so, what is the learning around how these effects occurred, why they occurred and in what contexts?

There is a potentially endless amount of programme effects that the evaluation team could have focussed on beyond the ones analysed under the effectiveness criterion, so the interviews and focus group discussions asked open-ended questions about both positive and negative consequences of STACA activities. The most worrying finding was around the joint inspections by the PCCB and the DPP; some interviewees suggested that these inspections actually led to mistrust between the two institutions. If this is true, it is a serious unintended negative effect of the programme that goes directly against its stated goal. However, other interviewees found that the joint inspections were useful and had improved collaboration. Results from the electronic survey also provide some counterweight to the argument that the joint inspections led to mistrust. Survey respondents from both the PCCB and the DPP judged the joint missions highly effective, both for fostering greater collaboration and trust between the two agencies and for improving the quality of cases. Asked how relevant the joint

missions had been for improving collaboration between the two, 74% of the 73 PCCB staff responding to the question and 72% of the 14 DPP respondents said they were “relevant” or “highly relevant.” About the value of the joint missions for curbing corruption in Tanzania, 55% of PCCB staff and 57% of DPP staff agreed they were “relevant” or “highly relevant.” There was similar agreement about the question asking whether respondents thought the joint missions had led to higher quality cases: 60% of those from the PCCB and 63% from DPP agreed or strongly agreed that they had led to better quality cases.

There were no other significant effects of the programme found by this evaluation other than the ones already reported under the effectiveness criterion. The electronic survey asked the organisers a different version of the impact question, focussing on whether they believe the programme could have a positive impact in the future given its design. The responses are highly positive: 60% believe that STACA has already contributed to a reduction in corruption in Tanzania, and 37% think that it has the potential to make a contribution in the near future. Only one respondent believe that STACA’s contribution will be marginal.

Figure 12. Organisers' views on impact



### 3. Summaries of case studies

Summaries of all the case studies are provided in this section. They are presented in the following order:

1. Training of NAO auditors to improve their ability to detect corruption.
2. PCCB review of NAO audit “red flags.”
3. Joint DPP-PCCB inspections of corruption cases.
4. FIU’s awareness raising workshops.
5. Police sting operations.
6. Provision of equipment to primary courts.

The full case study reports are provided in part 2.

### 3.1 Training of NAO auditors in detecting fraud and corruption

STACA has been supporting a series of training of NAO auditors for detecting fraud and corruption, providing testimony at court and other issues (see Table 4 below). Almost 500 auditors (out of a total of more than 600) have already been trained, and the intention is that all NAO auditors will have received basic fraud and corruption training by the end of the programme. The theory of change anticipated that these trainings would lead to an increased number of files, of improved quality, passed from NAO to PCCB over time. The 'increased number' theory is based on the premise that there have been many corrupt transactions which went undetected by NAO or were not investigated by PCCB due to capacity gaps. So if NAO staff improved their ability to detect fraud and corruption, they would find more potential instances of corruption.

However, indications of fraud are never reported directly by auditors to the PCCB. According to section 27 of the Audit Act, if there is suspicion of fraud resulting from any kind of audit, the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) is to be notified. The CAG will then decide whether the matter needs to be brought to the law enforcement agencies, and under what arrangements (whether immediate or through the public release of audit reports). In other words, there is currently no direct 'push' of red flags to the PCCB unless it is done by the CAG. The PCCB will typically review the publicly released audits and may 'pull' further information from the NAO offices that have undertaken the respective audits. It may also contact NAO offices directly, when it needs auditing support in specific cases, irrespective of whether leads came from a NAO audit report. In practice, all leads from NAO have been identified by PCCB from NAO reporting, but not based on immediate alert by NAO.

Five focus group discussions with staff in the regional NAO offices and several interviews with heads of the regional NAO offices presented a mixed picture of the effectiveness of the trainings. While some said the trainings were useful and helped to change their work practices, for others the extent of usage of the skills was low to none. Not all were able to distinguish between STACA supported training and training funded by other sources. Recollections of what had been learned were also cursory. A lack of consultation on training needs and the timing of trainings in the midst of other activities was a frequent complaint.

With one exception in November 2014, trainings of NAO staff did not include participants from other institutions under the STACA programme. As the practical experience of the facilitators from the police, DPP and PCCB was highly appreciated by trainees, an increase number of joint trainings with other agencies is likely to be well-received and could support better cooperation. They may also be a good opportunity for the agencies - particularly the PCCB and NAO - to discuss the tensions related to the sharing of documents required for audits when these are in PCCB's hands due to red flags in audited institutions.

More than 74% of NAO respondents to the survey said the trainings helped provide more leads of higher quality to the PCCB and other institutions. This is confirmed by about 75% of the PCCB respondents. While NAO respondents also report that collaboration among the agencies has improved (59%), these assessments from the survey are difficult to verify otherwise. The trainings have not led to changes in reporting practices between the agencies, and while the number of leads from NAO has increased during the last two years, the number of convictions from these leads remains low (see case study on red flags below).

Continued support for training should go hand in hand with more effective use of training needs assessments, use of evaluation forms filled after trainings to guide future activities, and structural

changes in reporting practices. Consultation at the management level and a policy framework for the collaboration between NAO and PCCB are required to ensure that the reporting and feedback loop between these two important oversight institutions runs more smoothly. Even changes to the Audit Act may be required if this is the main mechanism to improve effectiveness in the utilisation of audit findings. Regarding the organisation and execution of trainings the following recommendations were made by auditors themselves:

- The continuation and expansion of trainings should be based on an assessment of needs that includes consultation with resident auditors in charge of regional staff.
- Trainings that take many people from the office at the same time should be organised at times when they are likely to cause the least disruption to business (i.e., end of March to end of June).
- Trainings that build upon each other should be organised sequentially, to enable everyone to attend. Some trainings have been organised in parallel. The NAO should also have a record of trainings attended by staff to ensure that all staff members have an opportunity to acquire the skills they need the most, and to avoid repetitive allocation of similar trainings to the same staff members.
- NAO headquarters should foster a culture of knowledge sharing throughout its offices.

### 3.2 PCCB review of NAO red flags

NAO annual audits of local government authorities regularly reveal a range of problematic situations: ghost workers on the payroll, improper use of sole source procurements, cost overruns, and outright fraud and embezzlement. Findings from its fiscal year 2011-2012 audit led NAO to conduct 14 special audits; fiscal years 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 annual audits resulted in the opening of six special audits each year. STACA funded travel by PCCB headquarters staff to the regions so that they could devote special, additional efforts to the review of the “red flags” (indicators of possible fraud or corruption) which NAO auditors discovered during their annual audits.

The theory of change posits that if PCCB makes use of NAO findings, the result will be an “increased number and increased quality of files passed from NAO to PCCB,” directly leading to an “increased number (and increased quality) of cases presented by PCCB to DPP.” Presenting more and better cases will then both reduce the median time for consent to prosecution to be granted and the number of cases that are denied consent. And this result will, in turn, increase the number and quality of cases in court, thus producing more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws.

The data provide a mixed picture of the impact of the red flags visits. The number of files NAO has forwarded to law enforcement has steadily increased, from eight in 2012-2013 to 13 in fiscal 2014-2015. Likewise, the number of investigations PCCB has initiated using information supplied by NAO rose from 56 in fiscal 2011-2012 to 185 in fiscal 2013-2014. The number of cases PCCB has sent DPP using NAO information has steadily risen as well; the percentage of cases where consent has been granted rose from 62 percent in 2012 to 73 percent in 2014.

On the other hand, for the first ten months of 2015, the percentage of NAO leads that produced cases to which DPP granted consent has fallen to 40%, the lowest percentage recorded during the period STACA has been in effect. Furthermore, although the number of cases PCCB has brought to court on the basis of NAO data has increased sharply, the cases are not faring well in the courts. Only one of 37

cases of local corruption based on NAO reports has been adjudicated. While it did result in a conviction, the other 36 cases (of which 23 are against local government authorities themselves) remain pending with some filed as long ago as 2012.

Convictions depend not only on the quality of cases brought but on the ability of the courts to promptly and correctly adjudicate them as well. The reasons for the slow pace at which the courts are resolving PCCB cases arising from NAO reports should be determined and steps should be taken to hasten their disposition.

Surveys and interviews revealed many at PCCB and NAO were confused about the rules governing inter-agency collaboration. For example, NAO auditors have been unable to obtain local government authorities' documents in PCCB custody. Amendments to the current MoU governing NAO-PCCB may be a useful start. However, more open dialogue between the agencies will be required first. Moreover, should the MOU be signed, it would be important for the agencies to ensure it is disseminated to all relevant staff members in the agencies.

### 3.3 Joint inspections of corruption cases by PCCB and DPP

STACA funded joint missions by PCCB and DPP headquarters staff to the regions in order to i) collect data on the number of convictions, acquittals, and pending corruption cases in the magistrate and district courts, ii) review PCCB prosecutors' compliance with DPP circulars for prosecuting cases, and iii) discuss with district PCCB staff, DPP prosecutors, and magistrates and judges the challenges involved in prosecuting corruption cases.

The effective enforcement of Tanzania's anticorruption laws puts a premium on close collaboration between the PCCB and the DPP. Before the PCCB can file charges in a case where a public official is involved, it must secure the "written consent" of the DPP. The DPP in turn must grant or reject a consent request within 60 days.

STACA recognizes the importance of improving collaboration between PCCB and DPP, and the purpose of the joint missions was to foster it. The joint identification of districts where the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases was lagging, and the follow up joint discussions between PCCB and DPP headquarters staff on the one hand, and regional staff and magistrates and judges on the other, about the problems identified, were meant to improve relations between staff in different agencies and to further a unity of purpose transcending organizational boundaries.

But shortly after the missions began, these practices lost their "jointness." PCCB headquarters staff declined to participate in further ones; though they did direct senior PCCB staff in each region to provide the necessary cooperation. The PCCB regional staff the evaluation team interviewed said their participation in these joint missions was limited to meeting with the visiting DPP officials.

Evidence of the effect of the missions on improving the enforcement of the anticorruption laws is mixed. Survey respondents from both DPP and PCCB said they did help, but the few PCCB regional staff whom the evaluation team interviewed said the missions had helped only "somewhat" in establishing a link between the staff members of the agencies at the regional level. Data on changes in convictions and acquittals and median time for the DPP to grant consent over time from regions visited compared to those not visited would help in assessing effectiveness, but these data are not available.

In any event, data on convictions and changes in their rate data in isolation can be misleading indicators of program effectiveness. Conviction rates can be the result of changes that produce less effective enforcement. One way is to open fewer investigations but devote more resources to those that are opened. A second way is to shy away from pursuing complex, difficult cases in favour of



smaller, less complex matters that are easy to prove. Both STACA Annual Reports and civil society groups suggest this may have occurred in Tanzania.

Going forward, the joint missions should collect more and better data and share it widely. The STACA objective of more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws requires the collection of data across the entire criminal justice system, a point the U.K. National Audit Office emphasized in its report on improving the performance of the British criminal justice system. The same holds true in Tanzania. The data should include a broader set of indicators than the set currently gathered under STACA to ensure an accurate picture of the effect of the program.

### 3.4 FIU's awareness raising workshops

STACA supported nine workshops to explain Tanzania's anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws to private and public sector personnel. The goal was to increase the number of STRs the private sector filed and help law enforcement to understand how to employ STRs in corruption investigations and prosecutions.

The theory of change behind the workshops was that if banks and other entities which must report suspicious transactions understand their obligations, the number of STRs the FIU receives would increase. At the same time, FIU staff would become more skilled at spotting those STRs that suggest criminal activity. The combined effect of more STRs and a better trained FIU staff would be an "increased number and increased quality of cases passed from the FIU to the PCCB." This in turn would produce more and better quality cases for the PCCB to present to the DPP, leading finally to an increase in the number of corruption convictions.

The number of STRs banks and other firms in the financial sector filed increased markedly, from 17 in fiscal year 2011-2012 to 133 in fiscal year 2012-2015, but there were virtually no changes in STRs received from other sources. Other major targets of the workshops –casino operators, money value transfer agents, accounting firms and other designated nonfinancial businesses and professions– together submitted only one STR over the entire period.

Nonetheless, interviewees and focus group participants both reported that the workshops had been valuable. One prosecutor said she had learned how to draft a charge of money laundering at the workshop, had already won a conviction in one case, and currently had two prosecutions before the courts. The workshops helped build relations among FIU staff, employees of reporting entities, and law enforcement personnel, which contributed to greater awareness and understanding of the antimoney laundering laws. This networking helped FIU staff implement reforms that resulted in getting Tanzania removed from the Financial Action Task Force's list of countries with "strategic AML/CFT deficiencies," a critical step for remaining on this list could have harmed Tanzania's economy.

Going forward, STACA should reconsider how support for anti-money laundering activities affects corruption prosecutions. The theory of change provides that the FIU will pass "cases" to the PCCB, but the STRs the PCCB receives are not "cases." Rather, they are at most intelligence that may contribute to an ongoing investigation or trigger an investigation. The link between STRs and the prosecution of more corruption cases is therefore not as direct as the theory of change would suggest. Re-examination of the link might lead either to dropping the STR portions from the remainder of STACA or to a decision to provide additional assistance to the FIU and the PCCB so that the intelligence on corrupt individuals contained in the STRs is utilized.

The evaluation has been hampered by the absence of pre- and post-testing of workshop attendees to determine both their satisfaction with the material presented and what they learned from it. Pre- and

post-tests are the first two levels in the standard four-level training evaluation model developed by Kirkpatrick and employed by the World Bank in evaluating its training programs.<sup>17</sup> Both types of tests should be a part of future training programs. It would also be useful to include means for evaluating any behavioural changes and their impact, levels three and four in the Kirkpatrick model.

### 3.5 Police sting operations

The Tanzania Police Force has initiated several activities with STACA support to reduce corruption among traffic police, members of the Criminal Investigation Department, and officers manning charging rooms and front desks at police stations. Three are “sting operations:” surprise inspection visits to local stations, the secret filming of traffic police stopping motorists, and the sending of undercover officers pretending to be crime victims into police stations. The purpose of each was to provide direct evidence of officers either asking for or accepting a bribe.

The aim of the sting operations and the other activities directed at the police is to increase citizen confidence in the police. STACA’s revised theory of change posits that if citizens i) receive strong signals that corruption will not be tolerated in the police service and ii) personally experience that the corruption is being reduced, then the public’s trust in the police will increase and their expectations of corruption be lessened.

The number of officers arrested by fiscal year as a result of sting operations more than doubled in the first year of STACA, from 35 in 2011–2012 (the baseline year) to 73 during 2012–2013. It dropped to 32 for 2013–2014 and reached 20 during the first ten months of 2015. For the fiscal years 2011–2012 through 2013–2014, a total of 140 officers were arrested of which 65 were discharged from service and 17 charged with a crime. For the 20 arrested in June through August 2015, the September 2015 STACA Progress Report states nine were demoted, six dismissed, and five charged. In 2015, CID staff in 21 regions were the subject of surprise inspections resulting in the transfer of 93 officers.

The number of complaints citizens have lodged against police and the number specifically relating to corruption have declined since STACA began, from 340 complaints in 2011 to 178 in 2014. Several senior traffic officers in the regions told the evaluation team in interviews that they thought the sting operations had had some effect in deterring officers from asking for bribes, although they cautioned the effect may not last. They also noted that the effect depended upon the officer’s circumstances. Those hard pressed for money might be less deterred than those who are not.

In both its 2012 and 2015 surveys, Afrobarometer asked citizens their views on the trustworthiness and honesty of the police. There has been little change in their views between the two polls. In the 2012 survey, 16% said they could not trust the police “at all” and 23% said they could only trust the police “a little,” whereas in 2015, 13% said they can’t trust the police “at all” and 25% said they can only trust them “a little.” Although these results are too close in time and too crude to be a good measure of the program’s effect, they do show much work needs to be done in order to improve police/public relations, and underline why programs like STACA are critical.

The benefits of the sting operations are not likely to last, however. Indeed, in Tabora, where roadside stings were conducted in June, the Regional Police Commander recently told *The Citizen* that demands for bribes had become the order of the day among Tabora traffic police and that citizen complaints were on the increase. As several interviewees noted, and the literature on police corruption confirms, sting operations need to be regularly conducted to be effective.

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<sup>17</sup> D. Kirkpatrick & J. Kirkpatrick. 2006. *Evaluating Training Programs: The Four Levels*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Berrett-Koehler).



### 3.6 Provision of equipment to primary courts

It takes less time to find and retrieve cases that are filed on shelves rather than on piles. It also helps to preserve files from exposure to dirt, moisture on floors and other external causes of file corruption and erosion, to have them shelved rather than piled up on the floor or in hallways. All interviewed court personnel in courts that received storage equipment said that the time to find a case file has decreased with better storage.

According to court staff, where electricity is available and computers and printers and/or photocopiers have been allocated, this has considerably sped up the issuance of copies of judgments, which is particularly relevant for parties who want to appeal decisions. It was not possible, however, to validate this perception through interviews with ordinary court users. At the same time, prosecutors and legal aid agencies staff interviewed by the evaluation team felt that there had not been much change. Primary courts with no computers need to submit their handwritten judgments for typing to the district court, often competing with the documents that need typing from other primary courts and the district courts itself. Providing primary courts with computers and printing equipment, also means reducing the number of judgments to be typed up at district courts, hence speeding up processes at district court level as well.

There has been no baseline study measuring trust and corruption (experienced or perceived) at the courts that received support, or that did not, before the project began. The court users that the evaluation team interviewed on the premises of the primary courts were mostly dissatisfied with the length of time their cases take at court, with the unresponsiveness of court clerks, and with the failure to appear of magistrates or other parties to their cases. Afrobarometer perception surveys likewise do not show any marked change in corruption perceptions or trust in the courts of law generally between 2012-2014.

Court users and court personnel suggested several remedies- other than equipment - to reduce delays in court proceedings and in the issuance of judgment copies, as well as in bribery levels: (a) reading judgments only when already printed, (b) Improving the remuneration of court personnel, (c) strengthening the oversight of court personnel, and (d) increasing awareness of the actual fees and of proper procedures among court users as well as among court clerks.

Future support to the judiciary should:

- Be based on a needs-assessment for equipment at the individual courts, regardless of the funding source.
- Consider more direct ways to address corruption within the judiciary, such as support to the fledgling Directorate for Judicial Services, Inspections and Ethics and its activities (for example, assistance to complaint management).
- Be steered towards the higher level courts that actually hear corruption cases, if the aim is to increase conviction rates in corruption cases.
- Include CSOs and legal aid organizations in programme planning, monitoring and evaluation.

## 4. Conclusions and recommendations

This evaluation assays six cases of the broader STACA programme. These cases represent the most important activities, but the evaluation does not represent an assessment of the programme as a whole. The main purpose of this evaluation is learning. The programme was based on the right idea in

its original design: a programme that supported Tanzania's law enforcement institutions in better identifying, preparing and delivering corruption cases was both timely and needed. Better skills were needed, but improved collaborative practices –as well as institutional and legislative frameworks for coordination-- were seen as equally important. Unfortunately, the components of the programme that were evaluated lost focus over time and drifted towards a more traditional capacity building programme, which subsequently was stretched out as it worked with six different institutions. The theory of change did not sufficiently recognise that success in enforcing anti-corruption laws is not just influenced by organisational capacity and high-level political will. Important preconditions for greater collaboration are: (a) trust between agencies (from top to bottom of organisation); (b) incentives to cooperate within and across agencies; and (c) changes in practices, procedures, and laws. These preconditions were in particular forgotten when the programme moved from the design stage to implementation mode. The programme underestimated how complex and time-consuming it is to change collaborative practices between law enforcement institutions. Also, implementation was hampered by a management set-up that was not geared to such a complex programme.

STACA is still a relevant programme, judging from the six cases, despite the fact that some activities were not directly related to the programme objectives. The programme has also been effective in reaching a number of key self-defined performance indicators, such as an increase in conviction rates. However, the programme has not been effective in reaching its main outcome: better processing of criminal cases between the different law enforcement institutions in Tanzania. A general lack of results-orientation and the management structure for the programme as a whole lowered its efficiency, yet it is not an inefficient programme. It is premature to fully assess the sustainability and impact of the programme as a whole, and that is not the purpose of this evaluation. It is also premature to assess the sustainability and impact of the individual activities analysed as part of this evaluation given that most activities have only been in implementation mode for 2-3 years, and the indications vary across cases.

The STACA activities that worked best were the ones that were closest to the original vision and that had some joint elements included to foster collaboration and trust between law enforcement institutions. The joint activities between the PCCB, DPP and NAO did better in our view as well as in the views of the beneficiaries. The traditional training workshops conducted by the FIU and the NAO were both less relevant and less effective. The provision of equipment to primary courts was based on an incomplete theory of change altogether, so it is hard to see how any significant positive results should have come from this activity.

There was a clear tension between the original idea of overcoming bottlenecks in the law enforcement chain supported by DFID, and the vision that later emerged predominantly amongst government actors, which viewed STACA more as a conventional programme to build capacity in a range of organisations in the law enforcement sector. This unresolved tension led to a hybrid version of the programme, in which the many individual training activities did not sufficiently end up as more than the sum of their parts and key bottlenecks still remain for the effective investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of corruption cases in Tanzania.

Based on the evidence reviewed for the six cases, primarily based on interviews, survey data and document analysis, STACA has not yet led to a more active enforcement of anti-corruption laws and systems in Tanzania. However, reliable and relevant data is scarce. Therefore, our recommendations centre heavily on improving the evaluability of any follow-on programme. More consistent and higher quality data would also help the programme's management. The evaluation team recommend that DFID and the Government of Tanzania:

- Embed a central, independent data unit into the programme design that can collect, collate and make accessible data from the different agencies in a consistent, systematic manner.
- Include a M&E team in the management structure that has the skills and resources to strengthen the programme's evaluability and to help build M&E capacity in the individual agencies.
- Define success clearly from the outset of the programme, together with the key programme partners. Then, working with an experienced evaluator, construct indicators and establish baselines. Track trends continuously and systematically, and oversee that basic record-keeping is done by all involved programme partners for future evaluations and general management oversight.
- Support production of reliable external statistics from Tanzanian research institutions, for example on public trust in government agencies/perceptions of institutional integrity.
- Avoid rushing the design phase. Spend adequate time on problem diagnostics, and on consultations with partners about the theory of change and the preconditions for mutual success.
- Have a longer implementation phase. Keep the pressure for results constant but acknowledge that problem-driven, iterative and adaptive approaches to complex issues will take some time.
- Focus on case-flow and removing the key bottlenecks in the law enforcement value chain. Training is often a precondition, and will still be needed, but it should always be targeted to the main outcomes. Spin off or eliminate projects that do not relate to the main outcomes.
- Bring in more technical experts, international and national, to help design and lead the implementation of activities.
- Redesign the programme logic so that it acknowledges that public accountability most often is best strengthened by involving both the state and civil society, for example by focussing on the role of whistle-blowers. Components A and B of the programme should not be designed and implemented in parallel, but should be designed to work together and reinforce each other in advancing the same goals.

If these recommendations are followed, we believe STACA will have a greater potential to bring about meaningful and sustainable change in the fight against corruption in Tanzania. For that to happen, the theory of change needs revision, and more management and expert support needs to be supplied so as to ensure that the theory of change is implemented according to plan. First of foremost, however, the programme should supply better data.

## PART 2: INDIVIDUAL CASE REPORTS

### 1. Training of NAO auditors in detecting fraud and corruption

#### 1.1 Background

The National Audit Office (NAO) of Tanzania is the Supreme Audit Institution of the United Republic of Tanzania headed by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). Its mandate is enshrined in Article 143 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. The Public Audit Act, No 11 of 2008, mandates the NAO to conduct four kinds of audits: regular audits (section 26), forensic audits (section 27),<sup>18</sup> performance audits (section 28), and any other type of audit the CAG may deem fit, including by request of any person, institution, public authorities, ministries, departments, agencies, and local government authorities (section 29). Section 27 of the law also stipulates that, “[w]here, in the course of forensic audit or any other type of audit, the officer of the National Audit Office suspects frauds, they shall immediately notify the matter to the CAG who shall determine if and how the audit shall proceed as the matter may have to be reported to law enforcement organs”.

#### 1.2 Theory of change

STACA has been supporting a series of training programs for NAO auditors to improve their ability to detect fraud and corruption, to help them to testify more effectively in court, and to provide other assistance (see list in Table 4 below). Almost 500 (out of a total of more than 600) auditors have already been trained and the intention is that all NAO auditors will have received basic fraud and corruption training by the end of the programme. The purpose of these trainings according to the theory of change is for auditors to become more adept at spotting potential fraud and corruption issues as they go through audits (including regular financial audits, performance audits, forensic audits, etc.). They would then report instances of potential fraud and corruption through appropriate channels, including PCCB (for corruption) and the police (for fraud/ other criminality).

The theory of change anticipated that this training would lead to an increased number and increased quality of files passed from NAO to PCCB over time. The ‘increased number’ theory is based on the premise that there have been many corrupt transactions which have not been detected by NAO or followed up (investigated and/or prosecuted) by PCCB, so if NAO staff improve their ability to detect fraud and corruption they should pick up more instances. However, the ‘increased quality’ part could actually lead to a reduction in the number of cases reported, if NAO officers’ better understanding of corruption and fraud ‘red flags’ led them to report fewer false positives (i.e. reports of corruption from NAO which turn out not to involve corruption). The evaluation assumed that if this was happening, it should be possible to track the number of false positives before the training and see it reducing afterwards.

However, regular financial audits are not generally intended to detect corruption, but cases in which there are suspicions of fraud and/or corruption are to be reported to the CAG. Indications of fraud are therefore never reported directly by auditors to the PCCB, but only through the CAG, which has discretion (according to Section 27 of the Public Audit Act, 2008) to decide how best to deal with and/or channel suspicions of fraud to other law enforcement agencies for further follow up, when that

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<sup>18</sup> Forensic audit according to the 2008 Audit Act refers to an audit aiming at prevention and detection of irregularities (such as fraud, embezzlement and corruption), and to the application of auditing skills to situations that have legal consequences.

is deemed necessary. In other words, there is no direct 'push' of red flags to the PCCB, unless it is done by the CAG.

The Public Audit Act only requires the NAO to submit the audit reports to the president and to parliament. The general practice currently is that any party interested in using the audit reports can get access after these have been tabled in parliament (when they become public). By law, audit reports must be published within 9 months from the end of the financial year, and for the most part of the last decade the NAO has been able to produce the report on time.

The PCCB typically reviews publicly available audit reports, and may 'pull' further information from the regional NAO offices in the course of investigating leads or red flags. It may also contact NAO offices directly, when in need of auditing support in a specific case, independently of whether leads came from a NAO audit report.

### 1.3 Sources

This case study relies heavily on i) semi-structured interviews with NAO staff at management level both in the Dar es Salaam office and in regional offices (Arusha, Moshi, Kilimanjaro, Pwani, Morogoro, Singida and Dodoma), and ii) group interviews with more than 50 auditors who participated in trainings recently, although not necessarily only in training supported through the STACA programme. Auditors were asked for examples of how they used training, about the value added of the trainings and about what could have been done better/what else might be needed. Questions also tested the theory of change, and asked whether relations with law enforcement agencies had changed.

The review of administrative data remained very limited as the necessary information was mostly not available. Descriptive statistics on fraud and corruption cases were not available from NAO at the national or regional level, as reports are not disaggregated at the level of these categories. Statistics on corruption related offences could only be obtained from PCCB (see the case study on PCCB review of NAO red flags below). An expert assessment of copies of special audit reports which was suggested in the inception report of this evaluation was not conducted in consultation with NAO management, due to time and resource constraints. The assessment of training curricula remained limited to the qualitative reporting of the participants, as the training material the evaluation team was provided was incomplete (only some power point presentations were made available). NAO did not administer any pre- or post-tests to attendees that could be analysed.

### 1.4 Results

#### Effectiveness

Under STACA 480 auditors had been trained in the detection of fraud and corruption during audits by the end of the budget year 2014/15. More specific trainings were conducted as well, such as training on providing expert testimony at courts, how to prepare and safeguard evidence, and on auditing of extractive industries (see Table 4). Some staff have participated in several trainings, but there is as well staff who had not attended any of the trainings by the end of FY 2014/15. In the focus group discussion with NAO staff in the regions, participants highlighted the fact that some staff members had attended numerous trainings while others staff members had not participated in any trainings at all, and that this had led to complaints. Some staff also indicated dissatisfaction with the content of some of the trainings: for example, being too basic and/or too theoretical compared to what they would have preferred; whereas regional offices' resident auditors felt left out in deciding what kinds of training would be relevant and who should participate in them from their offices. This suggests a failure in making effective use of training needs assessments (which the NAO seems to be undertaking yearly, nonetheless), and poor consultation with the regional NAO offices, an issue discussed in the section on Efficiency and Relevance below.

With one exception,<sup>19</sup> the trainings designed by the NAO targeted their own staff, and did not include participants from other institutions. Facilitators and trainers, however, have included collaborators from the police—Directorate of Criminal Investigations, State Attorney offices and the PCCB. The NAO is planning to train other law enforcement agencies on the use of NAO reports in the future.

Table 4. List of trainings under STACA and number of trainees (planned/actual)

Kind of training	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15
• Experts testimony (Audit Report) in the Court of Law			100/130
• Joint training with DPP, PCCB, DCI and Judiciary on different types of Audit Reports		20 from each institution/ not carried out	20 from each institution/ not carried out
• Detection of fraud and corruption during the audit process	?/300	80/50	140/130
• Fraud and corruption in extractive industries, level 1		95/92	
• Fraud and corruption in extractive industries, level 2	-	-	40/40
• Cascade training on Money Laundering and Asset Recovery		?/15	
• Cyber forensics and investigative audit skills		?/45	
• Training on TRA software	60/56		
• Training on ENCASE system			7/not carried out

Focus group discussions with staff in the regional NAO offices and several interviews with heads of the regional NAO offices draw a mixed picture of the effectiveness of the trainings. Although they say the trainings were useful, many participants in the focus group discussions had problems to recollect which trainings they attended and when. Not all were able to distinguish between STACA supported training and training funded by other sources. Recollections of what had been learned were also cursory. A lack of consultation of training needs and the timing of trainings in the midst of other activities was a frequent issue of discontent (see section on Efficiency and Relevance below).

As regards the quality of the training and the qualification of the trainers/ facilitators, trainees appreciated the presence of PCCB and Criminal Investigation Department trainers with practical experience. The more theoretical approach of the consultant trainers to extractives industries was considered to provide only a limited picture of the business flow in this sector, and more hands-on experience on the side of the facilitators would have been preferred by participants. None of the respondents had of yet had the opportunity of putting the extractive sector audit skills to use, but it is expected that with development of Tanzania’s extractives industry, these skills be required in the future.

Most auditors interviewed during the evaluation reported to have a better overview of the fraud issues and other issues they were trained on, and in some cases also declared more confidence in using the insights in the audit process. However, very few auditors could give concrete examples of how they have put the new knowledge into practice. In some cases, for example, auditors reported to work more

<sup>19</sup> According to Nao, a joint training was conducted in Bagamoyo in November 2014. It is not clear which of the trainings listed in Table 4 this was.

diligently and consistently with the fraud checklist that accompanies their auditing exercises. They are more confident after the training, and apply the checklist more consistently. The extent to which they report however remains about the same by their own estimate. When they identify suspicious transactions, these are reported to the supervisors and may appear in the audit reports as well. None of the NAO offices visited in the regions appears to have changed reporting practices and interaction with the PCCB as a result of the training or otherwise. Reference is made to the Audit Act, and the decision on whether to report a particular incidence is left to the management. In practice, all leads from NAO have been identified by PCCB from NAO reporting, but not based on an immediate alert by NAO (see also the case study on the red flag system below).

NAO auditors have provided testimony at court. The resident chief auditor of Morogoro, for example, appeared as an expert witness in a case opened by PCCB in Monduli District in Arusha early in 2015. This case was built on red flags identified during the 2010 audit of Monduli, when the auditor was working in Arusha. The case is still under trial.

None of those who have given testimony have received feedback on the usefulness of the testimony or reporting by NAO, or any other information on the final resolution of the cases. The PCCB is not obligated to give feedback to the NAO, and the NAO often does not see a need to push for feedback from the PCCB. NAO auditors also reported that they find out whether there is any change in practice in their client institutions when they conduct subsequent audits.

While the existing interaction between NAO and PCCB has been mostly characterized as good, sometimes there is confusion regarding access to documentation for audit. This happens mainly in cases where the PCCB has held these from the auditees for the purpose of investigation and as a mechanism for safeguarding evidence. In several regions, for example, auditors have been restricted in some of the audits when particular documents (such as cash books, receipt books, etc.) were needed for the audit process, but due to red flags from previous years those particular documents were in the possession of the PCCB and were not readily made available to NAO auditors. There does not seem to be clarity on both sides about what should happen procedurally for the NAO to have the documents when needed. While some of the NAO staff hold that the PCCB should make certified copies and leave original statements with the auditees, the PCCB says that it is the obligation of the auditees to present the documents for audit to NAO. According to this view, it should not be the NAO that has to contact the PCCB directly. Instead, the NAO should task the auditees to ask back the information held by PCCB and agree with PCCB on dates to return the documentations for investigation. The PCCB says they sometimes are compelled to keep the documents to safeguard them from being destroyed.

### **Efficiency and relevance**

About 38% (Tsh 203,840,000) of the budget suggested under the work plan for 2014/15 is allocated to per diems, and most of those expenses are for trainings, for which transport and hotel conference packages are already budgeted separately. Each training participant received Tsh 80,000 (£26) per training day. This does not only appear inefficient, but may also distort incentives for the assignment of training spots and motivations for participation.

The decision about who attends which training and/or when is highly centralized in NAO. According to training participants, staff members are normally informed by headquarters to attend a particular training at a particular time. Often the information is relayed through the resident chief auditor, but there are also times when the information (because it is time sensitive) is sent directly to the staff member that has been selected to attend the training. Although participants usually provide feedback on evaluation forms after the trainings, considering that the assignment practices have not changed, they wondered whether anyone takes notice of their comments.

In addition, respondents showed concern about trainings sometimes being organised at times that are disruptive to their work, and because the decisions are communicated top-down without consultation with the resident auditors in charge. Some trainees noted that this can cause unproductive and unnecessary tensions at the office. In a large institution with as many employees as NAO, it would be impossible to consider every trainees scheduling preference, but consultations with resident auditors would not only ensure the trainings benefit the people who need them most, but can also reduce the extent of disruption they cause to their work.

Consultation with the resident auditors about trainings would also help ensure trainings are based on the staff's most important skills needs. For example, participants in the focus group discussions pointed out that at the moment the following areas of training are more urgently needed:

- Public Procurement Act.
- Audits in an IT environment, and ensuring that the NAO staff can keep pace with information technologies' (IT) updates in the institutions they audit.
- Audit Command Language (ACL) for as much staff as possible, and making the interface accessible to them.

Most of the trainings were considered too packed with information and participants would have appreciated to have more time to absorb the materials presented. They recommended that future trainings should ensure there is time for reflection and discussions, linking the information with practical problems they face in their everyday work. As the practical experience from the facilitators from the police, DPP and PCCB was highly appreciated by trainees, joint trainings with other agencies are likely to be well received, conducive to establishing better cooperation, and may even help resolve issues relating to authority over documents.

### **Sustainability**

Some regional NAO offices report holding debriefing meetings at which returning trainees reported on their newly gained insights and shared training materials with their colleagues (at all trainings materials in hard and/or electronic copy were shared with participants). There are however no formalised processes for this kind of sharing. In other offices there is no such practice and interviewees expressed the recommendation of making mandatory the practice of reporting back to the office and the sharing of knowledge after each training. In some regions (e.g. Manyara), resident chief auditors have tried to facilitate knowledge sharing by reshuffling teams to ensure people who have attended particular trainings can share their skills more effectively with those who haven't in the course of team work.

### **Impact**

More than 74% of the NAO respondents to the survey claim that they provide more leads of higher quality to the PCCB and other institutions than before the training. This is confirmed by about 75% of the PCCB respondents. While NAO respondents also report that collaboration among the agencies has improved (59%), these assessments from the survey are difficult to verify independently. The training has not led to changes in reporting practices, and while the number of leads from NAO has increased during the last two years, the number of convictions from these leads remains low (see case study on red flags).

Discussions about a MoU intended to improve collaboration and information sharing among the Police, NAO, PCCB and DPP ended in draft format. Nonetheless, the CAG and the head of Legal Services at NAO maintains that having to work together on STACA has in itself made it possible for the organisations to come closer than it was practice in the past: "before STACA nothing was going on [in terms of coordination], now you can have a conversation".



NAO, for example, only became a member of the Criminal Justice Forum following the start of the STACA programme. A MoU, especially between NAO and PCCB, would help guide and pave the way for better procedures for collaboration, including clarification as to the procedures to access evidence.

## 1.5 Recommendations

Continued support for training should go hand in hand with changes in how the trainings are allocated, scheduled, and relevant topics arrived at, as well as with structural changes in reporting practices between agencies. Consultation at the management level and a policy framework for the collaboration between NAO and PCCB is required to ensure that the reporting and feedback loop between these two important oversight institutions runs more smoothly. Even changes to the Audit Act may be required if this is the main impediment for a more effective collaboration with PCCB.

Regarding the organisation and execution of trainings the following recommendations were made by auditors themselves:

- The continuation and expansion of trainings should be based on an assessment of needs that includes consultation with resident auditors in charge of regional staff.
- Trainings that take many people from the office at the same time should be organised at times when they are likely to cause the least disruption to their business (i.e. between the end of March and the end of June).
- Trainings that build upon each other should be organised sequentially, to enable all to attend. Some trainings have been organised in parallel. The NAO should also have a record of trainings attended by staff to ensure that all staff members have an opportunity to acquire the skills they need and to avoid repetitive allocation of similar trainings to the same staff members.
- NAO headquarters should foster a culture of knowledge sharing throughout its offices.

## 2. PCCB Review of NAO Red Flags

### 2.1 Background

STACA funded travel by PCCB headquarters staff to the regions so that they could devote special, additional efforts to the review of “red flags,” indicators of possible fraud or corruption that auditors from the NAO discovered during audits of Local Government Authorities. For fiscal year 2011-2012, a little over £68,000 was budgeted; for 2012-2013, the budgeted amount was just under £27,000, and for 2013-2014, the budget was approximately £41,000.

Local Government Authorities are responsible for providing citizens essential public services, including everything from primary schooling to basic health care to agricultural extension services and local road maintenance. The authorities are financed through a combination of central government grants, donor funds, and locally generated revenues. All of the currently 163 local government authorities are audited annually by the NAO, and if in the course of an audit evidence suggesting fraud or corruption is discovered, a special audit may be ordered. If the special audit does not lay the suspicions to rest, the PCCB may open an investigation. Primary responsibility for following up on special audits lies with PCCB investigators posted to district offices, but often they do not have the time or expertise to do so.

Although decentralization began in the mid 1980s, only in the late 1990s were local government authorities given significant authority over expenditures and taxation, and many are still building the capacity required to run efficient, fraud-proof procurement, personnel, and revenue systems.<sup>20</sup> As a result, NAO annual audits regularly reveal a range of problematic situations: ghost workers on the payroll, improper use of sole source procurements, cost overruns and outright fraud and embezzlement. Findings from the fiscal year 2011-2012 audit led NAO to conduct 14 special audits; fiscal 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 annual audits resulted in the opening of six special audits each year.<sup>21</sup>

NAO’s annual audits are laid before parliament and are then made public, and its special audits often draw a great deal of media attention. Because of all this publicity, it is hardly surprising that Tanzanian citizens report little faith in the integrity of local governments. In a 2012 survey, half of the respondents said they believed that their local government council misused financial resources in contrast with only one in five who thought the council put the money to good use.<sup>22</sup>

STACA supported a number of activities to improve the chances of discovering fraud and corruption in local government authorities during NAO audits, and that the PCCB would be able to act on the discoveries. NAO auditors were trained on how to spot signs of fraud and corruption and on how to serve as expert witnesses in a trial. PCCB staff members were trained on how to read financial audits and on how they can be used to build a case of fraud or corruption. The red flag review missions sent additional, trained manpower to regions where the NAO had identified possible fraud or corruption in order to ensure timely, expert follow up.

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<sup>20</sup> For an overview of the decentralization process and local government authorities powers and responsibilities, see Venugopal, A, & S. Yilmaz. 2010. “Decentralization in Tanzania: An Assessment of Local Government Discretion and Accountability.” *Public Administration and Development* 30: 215–231.

<sup>21</sup> NAO, Annual General Reports of the Controller and Auditor General On the Financial Statements of Local Government Authorities for financial years 2012, 2013 and 2014. available at <http://www.nao.go.tz/?cat=34>.

<sup>22</sup> Tanzania Development Research Group (TADREG). 2013. Tanzania Governance Review 2012: Transparency with Impunity? (Dar es Salaam: NGO Policy Forum), 31.

## 2.2 Theory of change

The theory of change posits that if PCCB makes use of NAO findings, the result will be an “increased number and increased quality of files passed from NAO to PCCB” which will directly lead to an “increased number (and increased quality) of cases presented by PCCB to DPP.” Presenting more and better cases will then reduce both the median time for consent to prosecution to be granted and the number of requests that are denied consent. And this result will, in turn, increase the number and quality of cases in court, thus producing more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws.

## 2.3 Sources

Data on the NAO reports furnished to law enforcement agencies is from the current version of the PCO’s Results Framework Matrix. The data on the investigations PCCB opened based on those reports, and on whether DPP gave its consent to those PCCB thought warranted prosecution, is taken from the PCCB’s website and from data appearing on the PCO’s Logical Framework Matrix. A focus group discussion with PCCB staff was conducted to discuss the impact of the red flags initiative, where it succeeded and how it might be improved.

Information about Tanzania’s decentralization policy and the anticorruption challenges it raises was taken from the Venugopal and Yilmaz article, “Decentralization in Tanzania: An Assessment of Local Government Discretion and Accountability,” in the 2010 volume of the journal *Public Administration and Development*. Additional information on corruption issues and the results of audits of LGUs is contained in the annual audits of the financial statements of local government authorities for the fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014. The Policy Forum’s *Tanzania Governance Review 2012: Transparency with Impunity?* also informed the discussion

## 2.4 Results

*Table 5. Investigations opened by PCCB using NAO information*

	Special Reports to PCCB/ Police	PCCB Investigations Using NAO Data
<b>2011-2012</b>	--	56
<b>2012-2013</b>	8	74
<b>2013-2014</b>	11	185
<b>2014-2015</b>	13	--

**Sources: NAO, Results Framework Matrix; PCCB, Logical Framework Matrix.**

Table 5 shows the figures NAO has furnished the PCO on the number of special audits it passed to either the PCCB or the Tanzanian Police Force for fiscal years 2012-2013 through 2014-2015, along with the number of investigations PCCB reported opening on the basis of NAO reports. As the data show, the number of files NAO has forwarded has steadily increased, from eight in 2012-2013 to 13 in fiscal 2014-2015. Likewise, the number of investigations PCCB has initiated using information supplied by NAO rose from 56 in fiscal 2011-2012 to 185 in fiscal 2013-2014. This translates into an increase of 230 percent over the three years.

*Table 6. PCCB cases originating from NAO reports*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Sent to DPP</b>	<b>Returned w/consent</b>	<b>Filed in court</b>
<b>2012</b>	15	8 (53%)	3
<b>2013</b>	26	15 (58%)	13
<b>2014</b>	20	17 (85%)	21
<b>2015</b>	31	26 (84%)	18

Source: PCCB supplemented by additional data from CCB provided March 10, 2016..

The disposition of cases PCCB recommended for prosecution on the basis of NAO reports is presented in Table 6. In 2012, for example, PCCB sent 13 cases developed from NAO data to the DPP for prosecution. In 2012, DPP returned eight cases with consent to prosecute, and in that same year PCCB initiated three prosecutions that arose from NAO special reports. Over the four-year period, the number of cases PCCB has sent DPP using NAO information has steadily risen, from 13 in 2012 to 20 in 2014. On the other hand, the number of cases DPP approved for prosecution has remained relatively constant, eight in 2012, rising to 12 in 2013, falling to 11 in 2014 and to 8 in 2015. The theory of change assumed that greater reliance on NAO data to develop cases would increase the percentage of cases where consent was granted, and the data in table 6 offer some support for that assumption. The percentage rose from 62 percent in 2012 to 73 percent in 2014 (complete data for 2015 were not yet available to confirm this trend).

One reason for the large difference between the number of cases opened on the basis of NAO data and the number of cases sent DPP for consent to prosecution may be that many investigations resulted in sanctions short of a criminal case. These sanctions could range from a warning letter placed in an employee’s file to suspension without pay to demotion. And of course not all investigations reveal prosecutable wrongdoing. Efforts to draw out explanations for the differences from the interviewees were unsuccessful.

The data in Table 6 do, however, show that the number of cases PCCB has brought to court on the basis of NAO data has increased sharply over the period, from three in 2012 to 13 the next year to a high of 21 in 2014, with a slight drop to 14 for the ten months of 2015 reported. These cases do not seem to be faring well in court, however. Information contained on PCCB computer runs headed “Prosecution Files Classification” shows that only one out of 37 cases of local corruption based on NAO reports has been adjudicated. While it did result in a conviction, the other 36 cases (23 against local government authorities and 13 against education, health, and other service providers) remain pending. Some were filed as long ago as 2012.

### **Effectiveness**

The data displayed in Table 7 shows how the number of investigations PCCB opened on the basis of NAO information compares with the targets set. For 2013/2014, PCCB easily met the targeted number: the target was 70, and PCCB exceeded it by more than 150 percent.

*Table 7. PCCB investigations arising from NAO leads*

	<b>Baseline 2011/12</b>	<b>Milestone 1 2012/13</b>	<b>Milestone 2 2013/2014</b>	<b>Target 2014/15</b>
<b>Planned</b>	56	-	70	90
<b>Actual</b>		74	185	-

Source: Logical Framework Matrix

The data available to the evaluation team on convictions for cases arising from NAO audits would suggest there has been little or no effect on convictions. Still, convictions depend not only on the quality of cases brought, but on the ability of the courts to promptly and correctly adjudicate them, which involves matters outside the control of PCCB.

### **Relevance**

Three out of four PCCB staff said they were now getting higher quality leads from the NAO.

### **Efficiency**

The modest amounts spent sending PCCB headquarters staff to the regions to review NAO findings appear to have more than paid off both in terms of an increase in resulting investigations and of cases sent to DPP for consent to prosecution. Although judging by the sharp drop in the percentage of cases where consent was granted in 2015, case quality may have declined. The period, however, is too short to reach any conclusion.

### **Sustainability**

Senior PCCB staff said the benefits of the red flag review were palpable and that PCCB would continue to fund the program from its own budget if alternative funding was not available.

### **Impact**

According to senior PCCB officials, an unforeseen value of the reviews was the introduction of outsiders into regions where close working and personal relations among staff of different government agencies may have discouraged the pursuit of investigations.

## **2.5 Recommendations**

*Continue to foster close working relations between PCCB and NAO staff.* While senior PCCB and NAO staff applauded this activity, during discussions with the evaluation team some identified the need for even more efforts to enhance cooperation. An example several of them pointed at was whether, when conducting an audit, NAO can directly access the documents of the agency being audited in PCCB custody; or must NAO ask the agency to ask the PCCB to provide it with copies? Such issues remain unresolved. One way to advance in this area would be the development of a jointly authored MoU that covers these matters.

*Identify reasons why the courts are not expeditiously processing cases arising from LGA audits.* A major issue that emerged from a review of the data is the long delays in adjudicating criminal cases developed from PCCB review of NAO audits of LGAs. The end goal of supporting these reviews is to produce more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws, but if the cases are bogged down in the courts, the purpose of the activity is defeated.

### 3. Joint Inspections of corruption cases by PCCB and DPP

#### 3.1 Background

STACA paid for PCCB and DPP headquarters personnel to monitor the progress of corruption cases by conducting joint missions to various districts. The joint missions were tasked with collecting data on the number of convictions and acquittals in corruption cases since July 1, 2007, as well as gathering information on the number of cases pending in the magistrate and district courts. Mission teams were also directed to review PCCB prosecutors' compliance with DPP circulars for prosecuting cases, and to discuss with district PCCB staff, DPP prosecutors, and with magistrates and judges, the challenges involved in prosecuting corruption cases. All teams were led by a senior member of the DPP.

The leader of each team and the districts that were visited each year are reported in Table 8. As it shows, three districts were visited in 2013, 11 districts in 2014, and six districts in 2015 for a total of 20 district visits since the start of STACA.

YEAR	REGIONAL - DISTRICT	TEAM LEADER
<b>2013</b>	Arusha	F. Manyanda ANYANDA
	Kilimanjaro	Keneth Sekwao & Flora Massawe
	Tanga	F. Manyanda
<b>2014 1<sup>st</sup> round visit</b>	Morogoro, Njombe, Ruvuma	Ayoub Mwenda
	Iringa, Rukwa	Neema Ringo
	Mtwara, Lindi, Coast	Biswalo Mganga
	Mwanza, Shinyanga, Geita, Mara, Kagera	Lyimo
<b>2014 2<sup>nd</sup> round visit</b>	Manyara	Anselm Mwamboma
	Singida	
	Tabora	
	Kigoma	
	Dodoma	
	Shinyanga	
<b>2015 1<sup>st</sup> round visit</b>	Lindi	F. Manyanda
	Coast	
	Rukwa	
	Mtwara	
	Mwanza	Vitalis Timoth
	Shinyanga	
	Geita	
	Kagera	
<b>2015 2<sup>nd</sup> round visit</b>	Morogoro	Mary Lyimo
	Njombe	
	Ruvuma	

The Director of Public Prosecutions under the National Prosecutions Act, 2008, is mandated to coordinate investigations; the PCCB investigates a case while the DPP grants powers to PCCB prosecutors to prosecute the cases due to inadequate number of prosecuting attorneys in the DPP's office. The DPP and the PCCB cooperate within the confines of their statutory duties. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No. 11 of 2007 provides the framework. Section 57 provides that, except for cases of private sector fraud or corruption:

“prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted with written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions [and that the] Director of Public Prosecutions shall, within sixty days, give or withhold consent for prosecution.”

The requirement that the PCCB obtain written consent to prosecute public corruption cases means the PCCB and the DPP must work together closely to ensure the smooth, effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws. The DPP must make it clear to the PCCB the quantum and quality of evidence it must assemble in a public corruption investigation before seeking DPP's consent to prosecute. When the PCCB submits a file to the DPP that it believes meets these criteria, the DPP has to act promptly on the request for consent; by law it has 60 days to grant or withhold consent. Where the DPP determines a file does not meet the criteria, it should return the file with an explanation of what additional evidence is needed before it will grant consent.

In all criminal justice systems, it is essential that prosecutors and investigators enjoy, in the words of Britain's Attorney General, “a close, professional, and robust relationship.”<sup>23</sup> In Tanzania, the consent granting process prescribed by statute makes the achievement of that goal particularly hard to realize; a PCCB investigator can interpret a refusal to grant consent in his or her case as a reflection on the investigator's competence or professionalism. Delay in the DPP's consent can generate tensions too. The public may interpret the delay as either a lack of commitment to fighting corruption or as an indication that the decision-making process has itself been corrupted. The temptation is then for the PCCB and the DPP to engage in a public spat over which agency is to blame for the delay.<sup>24</sup>

### 3.2 Theory of change

The business case for STACA recognizes the importance of PCCB and DPP working closely together for the nation's anticorruption laws to be effectively enforced, and indeed closer collaboration between the two is a central element in the program's theory of change. It posits two conditions that must be met if the program objective of more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws is to be realized. One is the strengthening enforcement agencies and the second is ensuring that they “work more effectively together.”

The purpose of the joint missions is to improve collaboration between PCCB and DPP. Figure 13, an excerpt from the diagram depicting the theory of change, shows how this improved collaboration is expected to contribute to more effective enforcement of the anticorruption laws. “Improved

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
<sup>23</sup> Attorney General's Memorandum of Evidence to the Justice Committee in its Inquiry into the Work of the Crown Prosecution Service, quoted in House of Commons, Justice Committee. 2009. *The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System* (Ninth Report of Session 2008–09), 15.

<sup>24</sup> One manifestation of the tension is the ongoing public debate about whether to abolish the consent requirement. See, for example, “Why Hosea is right and his critics wrong!” *The Guardian IPP* (Tanzania), June 22, 2013, <http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=56216>.



cooperation between law enforcement agencies, especially DPP and PCCB” will lead directly to “reduced median time taken” for obtaining consent to prosecute and to a “decreased number of cases returned for further investigation.” As the figure indicates, the theory of change anticipates that this result in turn will increase the rate and number of convictions for corruption. Although the mechanism is not shown, presumably the assumption is that the increase will occur through weeding weak cases out before trial.

Figure 13. Joint mission role in TOC



The same figure shows a second way in which the joint missions are expected to contribute to the program objective. The missions were to gather data on the number of convictions and acquittals and on PCCB prosecutors’ compliance with DPP directives for prosecuting cases. From this information, PCCB and DPP were expected to be better able to monitor prosecutions in the regions. And as shown in the bottom left of Figure 13, the theory posits that “effective monitoring systems established to track quality of PCCB/DPP prosecutions” will lead directly to an “increased conviction rate in corruption cases and increased overall number of convictions.”

### 3.3 Sources

Data on conviction rates, the number of cases where DPP granted or withheld consent, the number of files reviewed and the mean number of days for consent to be granted were taken from three sources: i) the PCCB website, ii) data furnished to the PCO by the DPP, and iii) the PCO’s latest versions of the Logical Framework Matrix and the Results Framework Matrix. Figures were crosschecked for consistency. DPP and PCCB reported different figures for cases PCCB presented to DPP for consent, so both figures are presented. The source for the number of joint missions, their leaders and the area visited was the recollections of DPP Assistant Director Fredrick Manyanda. Information on the relationship between the prosecution and investigators was taken from The House of Commons Justice Committee. 2009. *The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System*; David Harris. 2011. “The Interaction and Relationship Between Prosecutors, and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform Efforts.” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper 19 (University of Pittsburgh); The [U.K.] National Audit Office. Lord Chancellor’s Department, Crown



Prosecution Service, Home Office. 1999. *Criminal Justice: Working Together* (London: The Stationery Office), and the 1993 *Report of The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice* (Runciman Commission).<sup>25</sup> It was supplemented by interviews with PCCB Director Edward Hoseah, press reports, secondary literature on anticorruption agencies published by U4, and studies by The Tanzania Policy Forum.

Interviews were conducted with PCCB regional staff in Arusha, Babati, and Morogoro, as well as with headquarters staff. DPP Assistant Director Manyanda and the current Director of Public Prosecutions, Biswalo Mganga, were interviewed in Dar, and regional DPP staff was interviewed in their offices in Arusha, Babati, Moshi, Pwani, Morogoro, Dodoma, and Singida. Survey data supplemented these interviews. The analysis drew on the academic and practitioner literature on conviction rates. The principal sources were the article by Rasmusen, Raghav, and Mark Ramseyer, "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice," in the 2009 issue of the *American Law and Economic Review* and David J. Roberts, "Integration in the Context of Justice Information Systems: A Common Understanding," Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2004.

### 3.4 Results

*Table 9. National conviction data*

	Number of convictions	Percentage
<b>2011</b>	52	46%
<b>2012</b>	47	40%
<b>2013</b>	89	59%
<b>2014</b>	135	49%

Source: PCCB Website.

The evaluation team found data on the number and rate of convictions for only two of the districts the joint missions visited, Arusha and Kilimanjaro. From 2007 through the first joint mission to Arusha in 2013, the DPP had consented to prosecution in 48 cases. Twelve of these 48 have gone to trial producing eight convictions and four acquittals for a 75% conviction rate (8 of 12). In Kilimanjaro consent has been given in 57 cases of which 28 have been tried. Of these 28, 12 resulted in convictions and eight in acquittals for a 60% (12 of 20) conviction rate. That the Arusha conviction rate was higher than the national rate (shown in table 9) might be taken as an indication that the joint mission there made a difference, but without more data this remains conjecture.

*Table 10. Percentage of files where consent was granted*

	Consent to prosecute	Without consent	Percent granted consent
	DPP/PCCB data		
<b>2012</b>	87/135	67/95	56%/59%
<b>2013</b>	253/267	166/171	60%/61%
<b>2014</b>	274/205	151/112	64%/65%

Source: DPP data, 2014 -2015 STACA Progress Report; PCCB website.

Both the DPP and the PCCB report the number of files to which DPP has granted consent and the number where it has refused consent by year. While STACA annual reports note that the data from the two agencies has yet to be harmonized, the differences are not that great. Table 10 reports the figures each agency has supplied. DPP data appears first, followed by the PCCB figure. Thus, for 2012 DPP

<sup>25</sup> Available at [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/271971/2263.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/2263.pdf).

reports that the PCCB submitted 87 files for consent whereas PCCB reports that it submitted 135 files; DPP data show that in 67 consent was not granted while PCCB data show in 95 consent was not granted. The “percent granted consent” in column three shows first the percentage based on DPP figures and second that calculated from DPP data. So for 2012 DPP data shows consent was granted in 56 percent of the cases and whereas PCCB data shows 59 percent. As column three indicates, despite differences in the two agencies’ figures, data from the two produce similar consent percentages. Both show that DPP gave its consent to roughly 60% of the files PCCB submitted each year.

Like with the conviction data, however, these data are not broken down by district, and hence it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the effect of the joint missions on the consent rate. However, that the national rate was constant across the period might suggest the missions had little if any effect on consent rates--but again this is conjecture that would require further analysis to confirm or reject.

The survey data and interviews do provide information about the impact of the joint missions in the district, but the picture they provide is decidedly mixed. Whereas the 73 PCCB staff and 14 DPP staff replying to the relevant survey questions said the joint missions had been quite effective in improving the enforcement of the anticorruption laws, those asked in one-on-one interviews were far less sanguine.

Survey respondents from both the PCCB and the DPP judged the joint missions highly effective both for fostering greater collaboration and trust between the two agencies and for improving the quality of cases. Asked how relevant the joint missions had been for improving collaboration between the two, 74% of the 73 PCCB respondents and 72% of the 14 DPP ones said they were “relevant” or “highly relevant.” About the value of the joint missions for curbing corruption in Tanzania, 55% of PCCB staff and 57% of DPP staff agreed they were “relevant” or “highly relevant.” There was similar agreement with the question asking whether respondents thought the joint missions had led to higher quality cases. Sixty percent of those from the PCCB and 63% from DPP agreed or strongly agreed that they had.

By contrast, the interviewees said the missions had little effect, although only a small number of those interviewed spoke in detail about them. The most significant information revealed in the interviews was that a short time after they began, the missions lost much of their “jointness.” PCCB designated senior PCCB staff in each district to participate in place of Dar es Salaam based personnel. The few PCCB district staff who did participate in the joint missions said their participation was limited to meeting with the visiting DPP officials, but interviews were conducted in only a handful of districts, so the evaluation team cannot tell how often this was the case.

Several DPP and some PCCB district staff did say the DPP visits had helped open lines of communication or strengthen existing lines, but others said their only real purpose was to ensure PCCB staff filed the monthly case status reports DPP requires. None of the PCCB staff interviewed said DPP had followed up on any of the issues they had raised during their meetings.

DPP issued a one-page guidance note on the visits listing the individuals the mission should meet and what issues they should raise. It also developed a several page questionnaire with more detail on the information to be gathered. If the guidance note and questionnaire were followed, the results would provide valuable insights into the areas where performance was lagging and into the systemic changes that would make a difference. Based on the recollections of some interviewees, however, it seems not all missions followed the DPP guidance.

Several interviewees recalled a particularly successful joint mission that took place early in the program. Magistrates, judges, PCCB staff, and DPP prosecutors there identified six challenges to improving the number and rate of convictions:

- There were not enough state attorneys authorized to prosecute cases.
- Many prosecutors had not been adequately trained on anti-corruption laws.
- Attorneys in the districts did not have access to current developments in the law, summaries of important cases, directives issued by DPP and recent amendments made by parliament.
- Even minor errors in the drafting of charges required a whole new consent process be instituted with the file being re-sent to DPP headquarters.
- Cases were delayed because witnesses, often public servants with knowledge of the crime, had moved to another area and there was confusion about who was responsible for funding their travel back to the district where the trial was to be held.
- Only DPP can represent the state on appeals to the High Court, and the PCCB trial attorneys rarely learned how the High Court decided their case and thus did not know if they had erred at trial and, if they had, what their mistake was.

## Effectiveness

There are four STACA program indicators the joint missions were expected to affect: 1) the percentage of verdicts resulting in a conviction, 2) the number of cases where DPP refused consent to prosecute, 3) the number of files the joint missions reviewed, and 4) a reduction in the median time for granting consent. STACA documents report both a target and an actual result for the first three; for the fourth, “median days to grant consent,” only the actual results appear in the documents. Data on the four indicators have been assembled from the various STACA documents. The information appears in Table 11.

<i>Table 11. Indicators affected by joint missions</i>				
	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
<b>1) Conviction percentage</b>				
Planned	46%	48%	50%	52%
Actual	--	59%	50%	50%
<b>2) Cases returned w/out consent</b>				
Planned	29	96	91	20
Actual	--	166/171*	151/112	--
<b>3) Case files reviewed</b>				
Planned	0	--	50	100/231
Actual	--	--	456	--/700
<b>4) Median days to grant consent</b>				
Planned	--	--	--	--
Actual	90	90	90	90/14

Where two figures appear, the first one is from DPP, and the second one from PCCB.

Source: Logical Framework Matrix; Results Framework Matrix; 2014 -2015 STACA Progress Report.

For the three indicators where both planned and actual results are shown: one met its target; one exceeded it; and one fell considerably short. The actual conviction rate in corruption cases, the first indicator reported in Table 11, was very close to the targeted rate in 2013 and 2015 and surpassed it in 2014. By contrast, the second indicator listed in table 11, “actual number of case files returned without consent,” fell short of its target by a significant number. This is true whether return data is taken from DPP or PCCB data. The target for number of case files the joint missions aimed to inspect was exceeded.

For “median time to grant consent,” only the actual figure appears in a STACA document (the Results Framework Matrix), and it remained constant at 90 days from the baseline year of 2011 through 2014 (this exceeds the maximum set by law by 30 days). The two figures, 90 and 14, shown for 2015 are from the PCCB and the DPP respectively.

Going forward, STACA should recognize that changes in conviction rates for corruption cases are not an appropriate way to gauge the effect of the joint missions, or indeed of any element of the program. As Rasmussen and colleagues have shown,<sup>26</sup> increases in conviction rates can be misleading. The assumption behind measuring the conviction rate is that the higher the rate, the more effectively the law is being enforced. But this is not necessarily the case. Fewer investigations may be opened with more resources devoted to those that are opened, or complex, difficult cases may not be pursued in favour of smaller, less complex matters that are easier to prove. Neither alternative results in more effective enforcement but both will produce higher conviction rates.

Some observers suggest that the focus on conviction rates in Tanzania has skewed enforcement of the anticorruption laws. The STACA Annual Review for January-March 2015 reports that the “overall conviction rate of 50% is mostly achieved in petty corruption cases; [the] conviction rate in grand corruption cases is much lower.” (The Policy Forum ascribes the reluctance to investigate grand corruption to the difficulties enforcement staff experience in obtaining consent in complex, grand corruption cases.<sup>27</sup>)

### **Relevance**

The joint missions were consistent with both the needs of DPP and PCCB and with the broader effort to reduce corruption in Tanzania. To operate effectively, both institutions need the kind of performance data the missions were designed to collect. The missions aimed to foster a close working relationship between PCCB and DPP as well; and as explained above, a close relationship is critical to the effective enforcement of the nation’s anticorruption laws.

### **Efficiency**

The absolute costs of the joint missions were minimal. The expenses budgeted for 2014-2015 were £610 per district for transportation, lodging, and other expenses. These costs appear reasonable and not out of line with expected costs. The only alternative to face-to-face meetings would be video or audio conferences. In some districts neither would be feasible given connectivity problems, and in any event neither is as effective as in-person meetings.

### **Sustainability**

Survey respondents from both PCCB and DPP overwhelmingly reported that the joint missions had improved working relations between PCCB and DPP and case quality. To the extent that these changes were the result of the advice and training provided during the missions and the strengthening of inter-personal relations, one would expect the changes to endure.

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<sup>26</sup> Rasmusen, E., M. Raghav, and M. Ramseyer. 2009. “Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice.” *The American Law and Economic Review* 11(1): 47 – 78.

<sup>27</sup> See Tanzania’s Policy Forum’s 2010-2011, 2012 and 2013 governance reports available on its website, <http://www.policyforum-tz.org/pf-governance-studies>.

## Impact

Some interviewees suggested that the failure of the PCCB headquarters staff to participate in the joint missions may have exacerbated tensions between the PCCB and the DPP. However, regional PCCB and DPP staff said the missions either produced some increase in collaboration or had no effect. As several interviewees said, relations at the district level between the PCCB and the DPP are a function of the personal chemistry between senior district staff and are relatively immune to frictions between headquarters personnel.

### 3.5 Recommendations

*In the future the joint missions should collect more and better data and share it widely.* As noted at several points in the discussion above, it appears that the district level data the DPP protocol called for was not collected, or if it was, it has not been widely circulated. To enforce the anticorruption laws effectively, both DPP and PCCB need performance data: how many investigations are underway, how many matured into cases sent to DPP for consent, what percentage were granted consent, the reasons why consent was refused, the time required for consent decisions to be made, the percentage of convictions and acquittals, the length of time to resolve a case once charges are filed, the quality of the prosecutions, and further, was the prosecutor competent, knowledgeable, professional?

In its 1999 report, *Criminal Justice: Working Together*,<sup>28</sup> the U.K. National Audit Office emphasized how important such data is for improving the performance of the British criminal justice system. The same holds true in Tanzania. As discussed throughout this case study, missing or incomplete data prevented the evaluation team from determining how well the anticorruption laws were being enforced and the effect the joint missions had. This is not to underestimate the challenges of the undertaking; the continuing efforts to gather and harmonize data across the British criminal justice system shows it requires a constant focus by senior leaders along with adequate resources. But its value for improving the effectiveness of enforcing the anticorruption laws is clear. Its collection would also permit authorities to address, or rebut, citizens' belief that cases of grant corruption are being ignored or consent unduly delayed. Moreover, as a recent analysis of the state of integrated criminal justice system information in the United States observed, the process of identifying and gathering data across the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication phases often exposes areas where efforts are needlessly duplicated and business processes are redundant or circuitous.<sup>29</sup>

*Develop a broader set of indicators to ensure an accurate picture of the effect of the joint missions.* Use of an increase in the conviction rate and the number of convictions alone to gauge the effectiveness of the joint missions, and indeed other elements of STACA, can create distortions. These numbers can be manipulated to show increases when in fact enforcement effort is lagging; a charge civil society has levelled in Tanzania. These data should be supplemented by collecting information on the cases investigated and prosecuted by, whether they are section 15 cases, small public corruption cases or grand public corruption cases. It is also critical, as Rasmussen and colleagues show, to pair such data with the budgets devoted to investigation and prosecution to ensure effort matches resources.

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<sup>28</sup> Lord Chancellor's Department, Crown Prosecution Service, Home Office. 1999. *Criminal Justice: Working Together* (London: The Stationery Office), <https://www.nao.org.uk/report/lord-chancellors-department-crown-prosecution-service-home-office-criminal-justice-working-together/>.

<sup>29</sup> Roberts, D. J. 2004. *Integration in the Context of Justice Information Systems: A Common Understanding*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance).

## 4. FIU awareness raising workshops

### 4.1 Background

STACA supported nine workshops to explain Tanzania’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws to private and public sector personnel. The dates of the workshops, the number of participants, and the sector or institutions they represented are listed in Table 12. As it indicates, 465 individuals have attended workshops since STACA began. Of the nine workshops, three were for police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement agency staff, and six for employees of the private sector.

The private sector firms represented were of two kinds. The first were banks, foreign exchange dealers, insurance companies and other businesses that operate in financial sector where the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing are plain. The second group consisted of what, in money laundering parlance, is termed “designated nonfinancial businesses and professions” (DNFBPs). These are real estate companies, casinos, and other types of business where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is often substantial.

*Table 12. STACA-supported anti-money laundering/terrorist financing awareness workshops*

Year	Attendees	Institutions/sector represented
<b>2012</b>	46	Reporting entities from variety of firms.
<b>2013</b>	48	Forex dealers, insurance companies, securities dealers, NGOs.
	40	DNFBPs.
<b>2014</b>	49	Staff from 26 regulatory and licensing authorities.
	44	Sixteen real estate firms.
	47	Zanzibar law enforcement personnel.
<b>2015</b>	31	Real estate developers and agents.
	44	Money or value transfer services, NGOs.
	106	Law enforcement personnel, staff from other government agencies.*
<b>Total</b>	465	

Source: FIU records and STACA reports. \*Data from records that the evaluation team has shows this is from one activity while FIU reports it included multiple activities.

Like most developing nations, Tanzania only recently outlawed money laundering and the financing of terrorist activity. A law was enacted in 2006 and the FIU became operational in 2007. The FIU’s principal responsibility is to receive STRs from those required to report by law, analyse them, and where appropriate send intelligence reports to law enforcement. The FIU also provides feedback and issues guidelines to reporting persons and maintains statistics on matters related to money laundering and terrorist financing to ensure effective and efficient systems for combating these forms of criminality in the country.

Tanzania’s AML/CFT regime underwent Mutual Evaluation in 2009 and a number of weaknesses were identified.<sup>30</sup> The FIU had limited authority over securities dealers, money transfer agencies, and other non-bank financial institutions, and no authority over transactions occurring in Zanzibar. As a result of the review, in order to “persuade” Tanzania to comply with international AML/CFT standards, in February 2011 the FATF placed it on what is informally known as the “grey list,” countries it deems to have “strategic AML/CFT deficiencies”. Because being grey listed can have serious economic

<sup>30</sup> ESAAMLG Secretariat, Mutual Evaluation Report for the United Republic of Tanzania, December 2009, [http://www.esaamlg.org/reports/view\\_me.php?id=197](http://www.esaamlg.org/reports/view_me.php?id=197).

consequences, with some foreign firms reluctant to trade with companies headquartered in listed countries and others requiring additional, costly documentation before trading, the Tanzanian government undertook a major effort to meet FATF’s critiques. It succeeded, and in June of 2014 FATF declared that Tanzania was “no longer subject to FATF’s on-going global AML/CFT compliance process.”

**4.2 Theory of change**

The theory of change motivating STACA’s support for the workshops is that if banks and other entities which must report suspicious transactions understand their obligations, the number of STRs the FIU receives will increase. The theory of change posits that FIU staff will also become more skilled at spotting those STRs suggesting criminal activity, and the combined effect of more STRs and a better trained FIU staff will be an “increased number and increased quality of cases passed from the FIU to the PCCB.” This in turn will produce more and better quality cases for the PCCB to present to the DPP, leading finally to an increase in the number of corruption convictions.

**4.3 Sources**

Data on workshop attendees and their affiliation were taken from records kept by the FIU supplemented by the annual reports of STACA prepared by the PCO. Information on money laundering prosecutions was taken from police statistics provided by the PCO; it was supplemented by data from DFID. DPP prosecutors in Babati, Moshi, Pwani, and Singida were interviewed about the FIU workshops; survey respondents were asked about them as well.

Senior FIU staff members were interviewed about the FIU and the workshops and focus group with FIU staff conducted. The information furnished by FIU personnel was supplemented with reports prepared by the East African Antimoney Laundering Secretariat and by the Financial Action Task Force. Secondary sources on AML/CTF that were used in reaching conclusions were P. Reuter and E. M. Truman. 2004. *Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering* (Washington, DC: The Peterson Institute) and J.C. Sharman. 2008. “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developing States.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (3), and J. C. Sharma. 2011. *The Money Laundry: Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

**4.4 Results**

Data on the change in the number of STRs submitted to the FIU by sector since the start of STACA appear in Table 13. While the number of STRs filed by banks and other firms in the financial sector increased markedly (from 17 in fiscal year 2011-2012 to 133 in fiscal year 2014- 2015), there were virtually no changes in STRs received from other sources. Senior FIU staff who participated in a focus group organized by the evaluation team cautioned that awareness of its legal obligation is only one reason why a firm might choose to report a suspicious transaction. Many other factors are involved too, not the least of which is that reporting can alienate current and future customers.

Given this caveat, it is hard to assess with the data at hand the impact of the workshops on the non-financial sector groups. A major target group of the workshops – casino operators, money value transfer agents, accounting firms and other designated nonfinancial businesses and professions – together submitted only one STR over the entire period. Still, the workshops may have prodded reporting persons to alert the FIU about suspicious transactions. Submissions by regulators rose from zero in the first year to a total of five over the STACA period, and law enforcement agencies also began submitting more STRs.

*Table 13. STRs submitted by sector*

Sector	Fiscal year			
	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15

<b>Financial Institutions</b>	17	49	76	133
<b>Regulators</b>	0	4	1	0
<b>DNFBPs</b>	0	1	0	0
<b>Insurance Companies</b>	0	1	1	0
<b>Other FIUs</b>	0	0	0	5
<b>Law enforcement agencies</b>	2	1	3	4
<b>Whistleblowers</b>	1	1	3	2
<b>Totals</b>	20	57	84	144

## Effectiveness

STACA did not set any target for increases in the number of STRs submitted to the FIU as a result of the workshops alone, something that would have been very hard to do given that STR submission is influenced by multiple factors. The available data does not show whether the increase in the number of STRs helped increase the number of corruption convictions. To determine if the STRs had been helpful, information on the number of STRs sent to the PCCB and the use other staff made of them would be required.

## Relevance

Interviewees and focus group participants both said the workshops had been valuable. DPP prosecutors in Babati, Moshi, Pwani, and Singida told evaluation team members that they had found the awareness workshops on AML/CFT they had attended “useful” or “very useful.” The AML/CFT laws represent a recent addition to the list of criminal offenses in Tanzania, and several prosecutors said that before the workshops they had known little if anything about the crimes of money laundering and terrorism financing. One prosecutor said she learned how to draft a charge of money laundering at the workshop, had already won a conviction in one case, and had two prosecutions before the courts at the time of the interview.

FIU focus group participants all said the workshops had helped them do their job. One said that he was “really glad” the FIU had been a part of STACA. Why? “Because the FIU’s mandate is awareness raising and drafting law with other stakeholders.” The discussions in the workshops and the contacts made through the workshops were helpful for both. “The networking it fostered has been a big help, said another participant.” Law enforcement personnel now call about AML/CTF laws while before the workshops they did not. As the focus group members explained, networking is important because there have been changes in FATF rules necessitating constant communication with entities subject to the AML/CTF rules. “Onsite supervision shows better compliance,” several volunteered. That is, when FIU staff visit entities required to comply with AML laws, the staff can see employees of the entities are following the FIU’s reporting rules. Financial institution employees also now call FIU staff with questions about how to comply with the FIU’s reporting guidelines.

One important step in getting Tanzania removed from the grey list was amending the AML/CFT law. The workshops the FIU held with stakeholders generated inputs for the amendments and eased their passage. Focus group participants also believe the workshops fostered greater trust among law enforcement personnel. They facilitated more exchange of information and more requests for information from the FIU. Although the workshops have strengthened cooperation among law enforcement personnel and between the private sector and the FIU, there has been little change in the number of money laundering investigations, prosecutions, and convictions since STACA began. Data from the Tanzanian Police Force on investigations, prosecutions, and convictions appears in table 14. While the number of investigations increased from 23 in calendar year 2011 to 45 in 2014, prosecutions and convictions remain few; although given the length of time required to develop a case of money laundering or terrorist finding, these numbers can be expected to increase over time.



*Table 14. Money laundering cases investigated and prosecuted and convictions obtained*

	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Investigated</b>	23	30	24	45
<b>Prosecuted</b>	2	4	0	1
<b>Convictions</b>	1	1	2	0

Source: Police statistics reported to PCO; supplemented for '12 & '13 by DFID

The challenges Tanzania faces in enforcing AML/CTF laws are not unique. It takes years to develop the infrastructure required to persuade companies to submit STRs. In the first years after it required companies to submit STRs, the government of Botswana never received more than 100 in a given year. Nor are the challenges limited to developing states. A recent analysis by Transparency International-UK finds that the UK government has been unable to get companies in a number of nonfinancial business sectors to report STRs.<sup>31</sup>

More significant than whether the number of STRs has increased at an appreciable rate is the impact more STRs would have on the number of corruption prosecutions. Suspicious transactions reports are triggered when a bank or other reporting entity observes unusual activity in a customer's account. Examples are the wire transfer of a large sum to a bank in secrecy jurisdiction or a would-be customer seeking to open an account who is unable to provide a convincing explanation for the source of the funds. In either case, if an STR is submitted, it will not say whether the funds in question are the proceeds of a corruption crime or tax evasion or trade mispricing. Indeed the funds may be the product of entirely legitimate transactions--that is why the reports are labelled "suspicious."

*Table 15. FIU workshops budgets: 2014-2015 (in £s)*

Attendees	Days	Total	Per person per day
45	3	16,120	119
60	2	13,020	59
50	5	16,904	68
55	5	17,089	62

At best if one of the individuals identified in an STR is a public official, or a relative or known associate of a public official, it will be useful for the PCCB to be informed, either to help with an ongoing investigation of the official or, when added to other intelligence the PCCB has gathered on the individual, to prompt the opening of an investigation. Contrary to what the theory of change suggests, the route from an STR to the opening of a corruption investigation is by no means a direct one.

### Efficiency

Table 15 shows the budget for four workshops as reported in the FIU's work plans for 2014 and 2015. The costs include not only per diem and travel expenses for participants but the costs of renting conference space, printing materials, and so forth. The expense per participant/per day ranges from

<sup>31</sup> Transparency International –UK, Don't Look, Won't Find: Weaknesses in the Supervision of the UK's Anti-Money Laundering Rules, London, 2015, available at: <http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/dont-look-wont-find-weaknesses-in-the-supervision-of-the-uks-anti-money-laundering-rules/>

119£s to 62£s. The cost of the first one is particularly high because 20 officials from Zanzibar attended. The other three had few if any attendees that had to be flown in.

While the expenses to hold the workshops are modest, judged solely by the small increase in STRs submitted since they were begun, the costs are significant. On the other hand, as explained above, the benefits of the workshops have gone beyond simply increasing the number of STR submissions. The workshops provided critical training to prosecutors, helped build relationships between reporting entities and the FIU, and proved useful in the successful effort to have Tanzania removed from FATF's grey list.

### **Sustainability**

Some of the benefits of the workshops are likely to continue. Prosecutors trained in the elements of the crime of money laundering will be able to continue to employ that knowledge to bring new cases against money launderers. According to the DPP's office, as of December 2015 more than 30 money laundering cases have been filed in courts of law in Tanzania, since 2011. Most of the cases did not necessarily emanate from reported STRs, but rather from what enforcement personnel learned about money laundering offenses from the workshops and other source. The relationships FIU staff established with employees of reporting entities are also likely to continue.

### **Impact**

The workshops contributed to four positive outcomes. The most important was the help they provided in getting Tanzania off FATF's grey list. As explained above, removal required Tanzania to amend its AML/CTF regime, and the workshops helped generate ideas for amendments to the law and support for their passage. Second, prosecutors attending the workshops learned about the criminal law provisions of the AML/CTF law and have put that knowledge to use prosecuting violators. Third, private sector employees of banks and other reporting entities now call the FIU for advice and guidance on compliance, and fourth, some financial firms have increased their compliance with the AML/CTF law.

## **4.5 Recommendations**

*Reconsider the Theory of Change as it relates to the effect an increase in STRs will have on corruption prosecutions.* The ToC states that the FIU will pass "cases" to the PCCB, but the STRs the PCCB receives are not "cases." Rather, they are at most intelligence that may help with an ongoing investigation or trigger an investigation. They are thus one of the building blocks of a corruption case. The link between STRs and the prosecution of more corruption cases is therefore not as direct as the ToC would suggest. Re-examination of the link is called for. It might lead either to dropping the STR portions from the remainder of STACA or to a decision to provide additional assistance to the FIU and the PCCB so that the intelligence on corrupt individuals contained in the STRs is utilized.

*Build evaluation techniques into training programmes.* The evaluation has been hampered by the absence of pre- and post-testing of workshop attendees to determine both their satisfaction with the material and what they learned from it. Pre- and post-test are the first two levels in the standard four-level training evaluation model developed by Kirkpatrick,<sup>32</sup> and both should be built into future training programs. It would also be useful to include means for evaluating any behavioural changes and their impact, levels three and four of the Kirkpatrick model.

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<sup>32</sup> D. Kirkpatrick & J. Kirkpatrick. 2006. *Evaluating Training Programs*.

## 5. Police sting operations

### 5.1 Background

The Tanzania Police Force undertook several activities with STACA support to reduce corruption among traffic police, members of the Criminal Investigation Department, and officers manning charging rooms and front desks at police stations. Three of the activities are “sting operations”: surprise inspection visits to local stations, the secret filming of traffic police stopping motorists, and the sending of undercover officers pretending to be crime victims into police stations. The purpose of each was to provide direct evidence of officers either asking for or accepting a bribe.

Opinion polls show Tanzanians have little faith in the honesty of the police force. The 2008 Afrobarometer survey reported that 36% thought “most or all police were corrupt” and in the 2012 survey, taken just before STACA was launched, the percentage saying most or all officers are corrupt jumped 20 points to 56%. In the 2012 View of the People survey citizens were asked specifically about traffic officers, and 76% said they “were affected by corruption a lot.”<sup>33</sup> The 2010 DfID scoping exercise produced similar results. Informants reported corruption was widespread in the Traffic Division and that that division, the Criminal Investigative Department, and front desks operations were the three units within the force with highest rates of corrupt practices.

Even before STACA began, police leaders were taking measures to address corruption in the ranks. With the traffic police, they had already initiated sting operations targeting roadside bribery, and STACA funding allowed them to expand the operations. A roadside sting involves establishing a covert observation post in a place where motorists are frequently stopped for traffic violations. Undercover officers manning these posts then film police making stops. If they observe money changing hands or other activity suggesting a bribe has been paid, the officer making the stop will be arrested. The undercover officers will often try to locate the motorist to see if he or she will cooperate in pursuing a case against the officer to buttress the evidence captured on the film.

Roadside stings were not the only method the police department used STACA funding to reduce corruption among traffic police. A number of training sessions on proper procedures and ethics were held and brochures printed and distributed to motorists and truckers listing numbers to call if they were asked for a bribe.

STACA also funded the purchase of three advanced speed “guns,” cameras that record a passing automobile’s speed and image in memory. The speed guns the traffic police had been using were open to abuse as they showed only a car’s speed. An officer might take a reading of a speeding car and then stop other drivers, claim the reading was of their car, and demand a bribe. By capturing an image of the car speeding, the new cameras put an end to that kind of abuse. They also eliminated roadside arguments between officers and the motorists they stop; the motorist could no longer claim the policeman made a mistake or is trying to shake her down. A third advantage to the new cameras was that it was easy to see if officers were taking bribes to let speeders off. If at the end of an officer’s shift the camera has 20 pictures in memory, the officer should have written 20 speeding tickets. If there are fewer tickets written than speeding cars pictured in the camera’s memory, the officer has to account for the difference.

Police leaders quickly recognized the advantages of the new cameras and within months of their purchase ordered 250 more using the department’s own funds. Senior police officials say these purchases very likely would not have occurred but for the demonstration effect of the three bought with STACA funding.

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<sup>33</sup> Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA). 2013. “The View of the People 2012” (Dar es Salaam).

To address corruption among officers in the CID or involved in taking citizen reports of crime or other front desk operations, police leaders initially stressed training and procedural reforms. In May 2012, for example, 211 officers responsible for front desk operations in Dar es Salaam were trained on ways to improve front desk officers' performance, and in 2013 CID commanding officers were taught techniques for discovering police misconduct. In 2014 sting operations aimed at CID and front desk personnel were initiated.

### 5.2 Theory of change

The aim of the sting operations and the other activities directed at the police is to increase citizen confidence in the police. STACA's revised theory of change posits that if citizens i) receive strong signals that corruption will not be tolerated in the police service and ii) personally experience that the corruption is being reduced, then the public's trust in the police will increase and their expectations of corruption be lessened.

### 5.3 Sources

Data on public perceptions of police corruption are from the 2008 and 2012 Afrobarometer surveys and the 2012 View of the People survey administered by REPOA. The PCO's current version of the Logical Framework is the source of the data on sting arrests through 2014. For 2015 the data is from the STACA September 2015 Progress Report. Figures on the number of complaints citizens filed against the police is from the third Annual Review of STACA and the STACA Progress Report 2012 – 2013. Road accident data is from the Tanzanian Police Force and the World Health Organization's *Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015*.

A focus group discussion with professional drivers was conducted. Regional police officers from Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, Manyana, Mbeya, Morogoro, Moshi, Njombe, Pwani, and Singida were interviewed. Interviews were also conducted with Assistant Police Commissioner Johansen Kahatano, head of the TPF traffic division; Mathew J. Msuyale, Assistant Superintendent of Police, and Inspector Deus Sokoni in Dar.

2011 – 2012	35
2012 – 2013	73
2013 – 2014	32
2015 (June – Sept.)	20*
Source: Logical Framework Matrix; *Sept. '15 Progress Report.	

The discussion on police corruption draws on Daniel Nagin's "Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century" from a 2013 issue of the journal *Crime and Justice* and Lawrence Sherman, *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption* (University of California Press, 1978). Kempe Ronald Hope's *Police Corruption and Police Reforms in Developing Societies* (CRC Press, 2015), and Tim Prenzler's *Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity* (CRC Press, 2009) also informed the discussion.

### 5.4 Results

The numbers of officers arrested as a result of sting operations, by fiscal year, appears in Table 16. While the number more than doubled in the first year of STACA, from 35 in 2011-2012, the baseline year, to 73 during 2012-2013, it dipped to 32 for 2013-2014. The September 2015 STACA Progress Report records 20 arrests in sting operations conducted from June through August 2015. The report

does not specify whether those were the only arrests for all of fiscal year 2014-2015 or just those for the three-month period.

Depending on the strength of the evidence, the arrested officer will be prosecuted criminally, dismissed from the force, reprimanded, or simply transferred out of the traffic division. For the fiscal years 2011-2012 through 2013-2014, the Logical Framework Matrix shows that a total of 140 officers were arrested, and the third Annual Report on STACA says that from these, 65 were dismissed and 17 charged. For the 20 officers arrested between June and August 2015, the September 2015 STACA Progress Report states nine were demoted, six dismissed, and five charged. That report also states that CID staffs in 21 regions were subject of surprise inspections resulting in the transfer of 93 officers.

*Table 17. Citizen police complaints*

<b>Citizen police complaints</b>	
<b>2011</b>	340
<b>2012</b>	314
<b>2013</b>	260 (37 corruption related)
<b>2014</b>	178 (20 corruption related)

Source: STACA Annual Review III; STACA Progress Report 2012-2013.

The number of complaints citizens have lodged against the police, and the number specifically linked to corruption, has declined since STACA began. As Table 17 reports, complaints fell from 340 in 2011 to 178 in 2014. The table also shows that, for the two years where corruption complaint data is disaggregated, there has also been a decline, from 37 in 2013 to 20 in 2014.

Several senior traffic officers in the regions told the evaluation team in interviews that they thought the sting operations had had some effect in deterring officers from asking for bribes, although they cautioned the effect may not last. They also noted that the effect depended upon the officer’s circumstances. Those hard pressed for money might be less deterred than those who are not.

Only four officers responded to the survey asking for an opinion on whether the sting operations reduced the level of roadside bribery. Two said it had reduced it “a great deal” and two said it had reduced it “somewhat.”

The evaluation team convened a group of professional drivers to hear their views on the traffic police stings and the introduction of the new speed cameras. They did not understand how the sting operations worked and several thought the surreptitious filming of a police officer stopping a motorist was improper or illegal. They also noted that when stopped for speeding, if they asked to see the camera that recorded their speed, it often took quite some time for the officer with the camera to respond when summoned. Some suggested that this was a sign the police were trying to discourage them from asking to see the evidence of their speeding. Others said many cameras were no longer functioning as they were supposed to.

The drivers pointed to other issues that made enforcing the traffic laws problematic: a lack of coordination between the police and SUMATRA, the agency that regulates bus transportation; poorly signed roads giving rise to arguments between police officers and motorists on what is the lawful speed on a particular stretch of highway, and badly built or maintained roads. All these exacerbated the natural tensions between professional drivers and the traffic police.

Tables 18 and 19 show Tanzanians’ responses to questions Afrobarometer posed in 2012 and again in 2015 about the trustworthiness and honesty of the police. As the tables show, there has been little change in citizens’ views about either. In the 2012 survey 16% of those polled said they could not trust the police “at all” and 23% said they could only trust the police “a little.” These figures remained virtually unchanged in the 2015 poll with 13% saying they can’t trust the police “at all” and 25% saying they can only trust them “a little.”

There was a slight change between the two polls in citizens’ perceptions of corruption in the police. Whereas the percentage saying “most” or “all” police are corrupt were corrupt was 56 in 2012, it fell ten points, to 46 percent, in 2015. On the other hand, the percentage saying no police were corrupt remained virtually unchanged – at five percent in 2012 and six percent in 2015.

<i>Table 18. Trust in police</i>		
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The police?		
	2012	2015
Not at all	16%	13%
A little	23%	25%
Somewhat	36%	38%
A lot	24%	22%
Source: Afrobarometer		

<i>Table 19. Perception of corruption in police</i>		
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The police?		
	2012	2015
None	5%	6%
Some	36%	40%
Most	39%	41%
All	17%	5%
Source: Afrobarometer		

Public attitudes towards the police and other law enforcement agencies tend to change slowly; the few years that have elapsed between the 2012 and 2015 surveys are not enough to register any change attributable to STACA or other reforms. But the data do provide a baseline against which to conduct future surveys.

Senior police officials suggested the combined effectiveness of the traffic stings and the new speed cameras could be gauged by a reduction in road accidents. All else equal, less roadside bribery as a result of the stings and the cameras would mean stricter enforcement of the speed limit and other traffic laws, and stricter enforcement would translate into fewer accidents. Official statistics do show that automobile fatalities in Tanzania fell by six percent between 2013 and 2014 and that the number of road accidents declined by almost a third. However, given the limited data available, it is not possible to isolate the effect of the stricter enforcement on the accident rate--and in any event the World Health Organization cautions that in many developing countries road accident data may be incomplete.<sup>34</sup>

**Effectiveness**

The target for citizen confidence in the police appearing in the Logical Framework Matrix is 65 percent of the public saying they trust the police “somewhat” or “a lot.” As table 18 shows, the target was missed by five points, with only 60 percent of respondents to the 2015 Afrobarometer survey saying they trusted the police somewhat or a lot.

<sup>34</sup> World Health Organization. 2015. *Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015* (Geneva), [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/road\\_safety\\_status/2015/en/](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2015/en/)

## Relevance

The sting operations were consistent with the needs of the police force to reduce corruption in order to build citizen confidence.

## Efficiency

A question was raised whether the sting operations are a cost effective way to curb corruption in the traffic police. It takes 18 months to recruit and train police officers and several years on the job for them to be seasoned. But if they are caught in a sting operation, they are lost to the force permanently. It was suggested that some alternative to discharge when the evidence was strong should be considered, given the cost of replacing a terminated officer. One thought was a whistleblower program with immediate feedback to the officer soliciting the bribe. Drivers who are solicited would quickly report the incident, and the officer involved would be immediately reprimanded. Were apprehension certain and the reprimand imposed quickly, this would be a more effective deterrent than termination, a more severe punishment but one likely meted out with less certainty and at an uncertain future date.<sup>35</sup>

## Sustainability

It is unlikely the benefits will last. As several interviewees suggested, the stings must be conducted at regular intervals to maintain their deterrent effect. A December 3 story in Tanzanian online newspaper *The Citizen* confirms their observation. Tabora Regional Police Commander Hamis Suleiman is quoted saying demands for bribes had become the order of the day among Tabora traffic police and that citizen complaints were on the increase.<sup>36\*</sup> Roadside stings were conducted, or least the March 2015 STACA Progress Report said they would be conducted, in June 2015.

## Impact

Measuring the effect of a deterrent is a particular challenge, for it requires determining how much crime *did not occur* as a result of the intervention. The surveys and interviews suggest there was some deterrent effect but the magnitude is open to question. As one interviewee suggested, the cost of the stings in terms of recruiting and training replacements for those discharged may be a significant overlooked effect.

## 5.5 Recommendations

*Conduct more frequent sting operations.* As several interviewees noted, and the literature confirms,<sup>37</sup> to be effective sting operations need to be regularly conducted.

*Expand outreach about sting operations and anticorruption efforts to road users generally.* As the focus group discussion with the professional drivers' group revealed, there is much misunderstanding about the traffic police sting operations. The group also remains to be persuaded that senior police officers are committed to cracking down on corruption among traffic officers.

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<sup>35</sup> Nagin, D.S. 2013. "Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century," *Crime and Justice*, 42(1): 199-263.

<sup>36</sup> Kakwesi, R. 2015. "Traffic cops warned to shun bribes," *The Citizen* (Tanzania), December 3.

<sup>37</sup> Sherman, L. 1978. *Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption* (Berkeley: University of California Press).



## 6. Provision of equipment to primary courts

### 6.1 Background

The Tanzanian judiciary consists of four tiers: the Court of Appeal, the High Court, Magistrates Courts (Resident Magistrates Courts and District Courts) and Primary Courts. Currently, there are 28 Resident Magistrates' Courts and 110 District Courts. The Resident Magistrates' Courts and the District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. The District Courts, unlike the Resident Magistrates' Courts, should operate in every district. They receive appeals from the Primary Courts. The Resident Magistrates' Courts are located in major towns, municipalities and cities, which serve as regional headquarters. There are 1,105 Primary Court stations, of which 960 are operational. The Primary Court is the lowest court in the hierarchy. It has jurisdiction over criminal, civil and matrimonial law, probate and administration of estates, and appeals from ward tribunals.

Perception of corruption in Tanzanian courts is high and the level of public trust in judges and magistrates low. Afrobarometer survey results in 2012, when the STACA programme started, showed that 83% of the Tanzanian public perceived that some (51%), most (25%) or all (7%) of judges and magistrates were involved in corruption. On the other hand, 74% of the public expressed some (41%) or a lot (33%) of trust in the courts of law, whereas 25% said they did not trust the courts at all (6%) or only did so a little (19%). The objective of STACA in providing equipment has been to improve court performance, reduce the perception of corruption and restore public trust in the judiciary.



### 6.2 Theory of change

The judiciary states that the main reason for the perception of corruption in courts is the lack of equipment. The problems as stated by senior officials in the judiciary are:

- The filing system is weak, with case files being stored badly, leading to delays in retrieving cases.
- Judgments take time to be written up as they are written by hand and then typed up.
- Citizens perceive that officials are waiting for bribes when processes take time to complete.

The implicit theory of change that the judiciary put forward when discussing programmatic support with DFID is that provision of equipment would lead to improvements in court performance, which in turn would improve public trust in the judiciary and lessen the perception that bribes are needed to get business done. DFID has supported the judiciary to supply primary courts with various equipment (computers, photocopiers, printers, steel racks, double door cabinets, motorcycles).



While there is an obvious and urgent need for improved facilities and equipment at most Tanzanian sub-ordinate courts, there are multiple factors for delays and bribery. The notion that delays cause willingness to bribe to speed processes up is widely acknowledged. Bribes may, however, also be offered or asked for in return for the loss of evidence, a more lenient verdict, a verdict in favour of a particular party, etc. Furthermore, there are multiple reasons for delays, many of which also related to resource scarcity, while not necessarily only to the lack of equipment. The court personnel, magistrates and administrators interviewed as part of this evaluation have reported on other factors for delays. Most commonly named were the lack of cooperation from witnesses (that is, witnesses not appearing at court hearings due to travel costs, intimidation, or lack of interest/ personal benefit from giving testimony), and assessors not being available (see also other explanatory variables under Relevance, below).

### 6.3 Sources

Interviews were conducted with primary and district court magistrates and clerks of 25 primary courts in 10 regions (Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Pwani, Mbeya, Iringa, Njombe, Dodoma, and Singida) to test the theory of change on court performance and perceptions of corruption within the courts. Reaching out to court users in a systematic manner--i.e. through court committees--proved to be difficult in the absence of court user committees at primary courts. At the same time, as the evaluation of the STACA Programme, REPOA conducted a court user satisfaction baseline survey for the judiciary of Tanzania in 13 regions of the mainland, that will be available in early 2016. The evaluation team talked to a handful of randomly selected people present on the courts premises, defendants, witnesses and relatives, but these interviews did not yield much information to assess change in courts. Representatives of the bar association in Arusha and Dar es Salaam and legal aid workers were in a better position to make an assessment of 'before and after' the provision of new equipment, as they have had engagement with the courts during an extended period of time and across cases. The caveat here was that no legal representation is actually allowed at primary courts.

All information the team could retrieve on number of cases, time to conclude cases, time for appeals and time to locate and retrieve case files, was entirely based on what the interviewees were able to recollect, as no written records of this information seemed to exist. The Judiciary of Tanzania (JoT) STACA coordinator provided a comprehensive list of courts which have been supplied with equipment through STACA (see Tables 23A and B at the end of this case study).

### 6.4 Results

#### Effectiveness

Support under STACA has focused on the subordinate courts, in an attempt to address corruption within the courts. Corruption cases are heard by the Resident Magistrate courts upwards. As such, the support to judiciary has been disconnected from the overall programme outcomes focusing on anti-corruption enforcement, such as higher convictions rates in corruption cases.

It takes less time to find and retrieve cases that are filed on shelves rather than on piles. It also helps preserve files to a certain degree from exposure to dirt, moisture and other external causes of file corruption and erosion, compared for example to when they are piled up on hallway floors. All respondents in courts that received storage equipment said that the time to find a case file has decreased with better storage. In addition, courts were recently instructed by the high court to organize files by year.

Where electricity is available and computers and printers and photocopies have been allocated, this has considerably sped up the issuance of copies of judgments, which is particularly relevant for parties who want to file an appeal. This perception however was expressed by the magistrates, but not shared

regarding upper courts by prosecutors and legal aid staff the evaluation team spoke with. Primary courts with no computers need to submit their handwritten judgments for typing to the district court, often competing with the documents that need typing from other primary courts and from the district courts itself. Getting judgments typed under this arrangement can take more than two weeks, whereas courts that have computers can issue written copies of judgments within a week. Providing primary courts with computers and printing equipment also means reducing the number of judgments to be typed up at district courts, hence also speeding up processes at district court level.

Availability of ink for printers and photocopiers, paper and electricity (blackouts) remains a problem, but according to some interviewees, these complaints are sometimes used as a pretext for delays. Sometimes it is the magistrates who do not prepare judgments on time, and the non-availability of equipment is merely used as an excuse (see also other explanatory variables under Relevance below).

There has been no baseline study measuring trust and corruption (experienced or perceived) before the project started in the primary courts that received support (or that did not). The courts users that the evaluation team interviewed on the premises of the primary courts were mostly dissatisfied with the length of time their cases take in court, the unresponsiveness of court clerks and other parties to the case, as well as with the absences of the magistrates. Late delivery of copies of judgments is also a perennial complaint, especially about higher level courts where corruption cases are heard. However, neither court personnel nor court users, including legal aid professionals who help litigants in the background (as no legal representation is allowed in the subordinate courts), perceive improvements in the extent of corruption. Without a baseline for court users on level of trust, the evaluation could not establish either whether there has been a change in the respective facilities following the supply of equipment to the courts.

Afrobarometer perception surveys likewise do not show a marked change in corruption perception and trust in the courts of law between 2012-2014. For example, Table 20 shows that the proportion of those surveyed that perceive that judges and magistrates are involved in corruption was 82% in 2014 (35% saying most/or all of them are involved in corruption), compared to 83% in 2012 (32% saying most or all of them are involved). On the subject of trust, popular views show that the proportion expressing some or a lot of trust declined by 5 percentage points from 74% in 2012 to 69% in 2014.

*Table 20. Perception of corruption among Judges and Magistrates (percentage)*

	None of them	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't know
<b>2012</b>	12	51	25	7	6
<b>2014</b>	10	47	31	4	7

*Table 21. Trust in courts*

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't Know
<b>2012</b>	6	19	41	33	1
<b>2014</b>	8	21	43	26	2

Source: Afrobarometer (2012, 2014).

**Efficiency**

The judiciary did not plan new activities for FY 2014/15 under the STACA programme, and did not receive funds. An outstanding balance from FY 2013/14 was carried forward to 2015. The outstanding balance as of June (TSh 340,234,458) is committed for the procurement of solar power and the acquisition is in progress.

The decision on procurement and allocation of equipment was made entirely at the central level without consulting the lower courts. Procurement followed government procurement rules, but it was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess whether rules have been adhered to and whether more cost-efficient purchases could have been made at local level. Although grateful for what has been allocated to them, respondents at the primary courts felt that procurement through the primary courts would ensure for equipment to be purchased based on actual needs, be quicker, and save on transport costs. On the other hand, the bulk purchase of a high number of items through the central court administration allows for special discounts and a certain standardisation of specifications, and hence of maintenance throughout the courts.<sup>38</sup>

The first batch of equipment under STACA support was procured without appropriate directives of where it should go and was temporarily stored at high court buildings before distribution to the lower courts. This led to the high court(s) keeping the equipment and the need to purchase new equipment for the primary courts. This was later corrected by a new JoT STACA coordinator, who has also undertaken efforts to liaise directly with the receiving courts on the equipment needs. It should also be noted that typewriters were used at courts in the past, but they have become dysfunctional or considered too tedious to work with and are no longer in use in most courts--with the notable exception of Temeke primary court in Dar es Salaam.

### Relevance

There is still no systematic consultation of the lower courts on their equipment needs. The JoT STACA coordinator reported, however, to have been in contact by phone with at least some of the local court administrations about what kind of equipment they need.

According to the JoT STACA coordinator, there have been some transfers of equipment between courts, where the use and maintenance of computers and photocopiers could not be ensured--i.e. where there is nobody who can type on a computer, the computer will be posted at the district court and hand-written documents are submitted by the primary court to be typed up.

Courts with no electricity were not given computers and printer and/or photocopying machines, with the exception of the primary court in Himo (Kilimanjaro), which received a photocopying machine in February 2015 that was still in its original packaging in October 2015 waiting for the magistrate's repeated requests for electricity to be fulfilled (see photo).



The opposite was the case in Pwani, where the Msoga/Lugoba Primary court was provided with a full set of equipment, but although the computer was much needed, the shelf and cabinet have not been unpacked as the court premises are new and came with sufficient storage space.

Most magistrates and court administrators would prefer to be given funding and procure for themselves, the main reasons given being reduction in time to procure and reduction of transportation and logistics costs.

The low income of court clerks and magistrates was mentioned by most respondents within the courts as a reason for the susceptibility of court staff to bribes. In some cases, bottlenecks and delays may be

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<sup>38</sup> Having identified this challenge, JOT reportedly has since taken deliberate measures to ensure that all equipment are allocated to where they were supposed to go and work. JoT is still in need of both resources in terms of materials and human resources and efforts are ongoing to employ additional staff.

created deliberately to increase the willingness of litigants to pay for speeding up a process, be it for buying paper or ink or a straightforward payment to court personnel.

At a resident magistrate court (with four computers) that the team visited, all judgments must be typed up within a week and be released on Friday. The resident magistrate supervises this. He himself writes up the judgments within a day on his personal laptop, and finds that procedure less time-consuming than reviewing the typed up judgments from the typists, who frequently make mistakes. The corrections take time. He is aware of the typists taking bribes (between Tsh 5-10 thousand) from court users to prioritize the typing up of their judgments. Therefore, he sees the need for strict supervision of the order in which the judgments are typed up.

Concerning delays in court proceedings, the late or non-appearance of parties to a case, in particular witnesses and assessors, is considered a crucial factor. Assessors are elders from the community who are only paid a honorarium of TSh 5000 per case. Assumedly these elders are financially independent volunteers, in practice they may still need to make a living, for which the honorarium is not enough. Witnesses are only reimbursed for travel upon completion of the case and this through invoicing the high court, which can take time.

Furthermore, currently most cases are not heard day-to-day, but sessions can be adjourned by up to 14 days, which may result in repeated costly and time-intensive travel for litigants and witnesses.

As part of the *Big Results Now* drive of which the judiciary is one of the implementing agencies in the government, primary court magistrates were recently given a target of completing 250 cases per year, with at least 20 cases cleared per month to address the backlog of cases. This target alone is of course not the solution to delays. Court users and court personnel suggested several remedies, other than equipment and targets, to reduce delays in court proceedings and the issuance of judgment copies, as well as bribery:

- Judgments should only be read when already printed.
- Improve the remuneration of court personnel.
- Improve oversight of court personnel.
- Improve awareness of actual fees and proper procedures among court users and court clerks.

### **Sustainability**

The new *Strategic Plan for the Judiciary 2015/16-2019/20* has, according to the JoT STACA coordinator, been informed by STACA experiences. It recognises corruption as a problem in the Tanzania judiciary and contains three main pillars: (1) Good governance and accountability; (2) Access to Justice and Expeditiousness, and (3) Public Trust and Stakeholder Engagement.

The judiciary has paired the support by STACA with support in similar numbers under the government budget. The numbers presented in Table 22 were provided to the evaluation team by the JoT STACA coordinator.

Table 22. Equipment paired by government

Item	STACA	Government
Motorcycles	214	230
Heavy-duty photocopier	14	18
Bicycles for clerks and local level court to deliver summons	-	1000

Maintenance of the provided equipment does not seem to be a problem at most of the courts the valuation team visited. The stationery needed to run the printers and photocopiers is purchased by primary courts themselves. Most of those who have computers and printer/photocopiers have not reported technical problems. If they need technical assistance, they would get it from the zonal courts. Nonetheless, there are also instances, such as in Singida, where no photocopying had taken place in the two weeks before the interview, because they ran out of toner and the replacement cartridges have not been easy to get in the Singida township. Also they are unable to print/photocopy necessary documents most of the time due to persistent power outages.

### Impact

The impact of the equipment procured under STACA cannot be separated from the impact of the same kind of equipment procured and distributed under the government budget at the same time. Primary courts were handed over equipment by the district courts and in most cases the equipment received the general “government of Tanzania” label. Hence, if anything, an assessment can only be made about the impact of the provision of this basic equipment overall.



Anti-corruption poster at Magomeni Primary Court

The Directorate for Judicial Services, Inspections and Ethics (DJSI&E) was established around the same time that STACA started in the judiciary. Its head has been a facilitator at STACA supported trainings. The directorate is under the Chief Court registrar and has a director and three deputies: 1) case management, 2) complaint management, and 3) inspection and ethics. No further staff has been assigned, yet. They use the existing judicial structures for implementation. A complaint management manual is currently being developed and is expected to be ready by January 2016. There has been consultation at various levels within the judiciary, but no consultation of external stakeholders (legal aid, NGOs, court users).

There has always been a complaint system in the judiciary, but until the directorate was established, complaints were processed at the court they were received or at the next superior court. People do not use the existing complaint boxes and there has never been a comprehensive system or overview of complaints.

In December 2014, JoT STACA coordination office started distributing posters encouraging court user to contact a certain email address, texting or calling a dedicated complaint number at the high court in Dar es Salaam to find out what kind of complaints people have (see picture from Magomeni primary court above). The most frequently seen poster reads:

United Republic of Tanzania  
Judiciary of Tanzania  
SLP 9004 Dar es Salaam  
Email. [Info@judiciary.go.tz](mailto:Info@judiciary.go.tz)

GETTING COURT SERVICES IS YOUR RIGHT  
DON'T PAY A BRIBE

If you have noticed any action or motive that shows sign or act of corruption in order to get service, please report to the Magistrate, Judge in charge or court administrator. Send SMS to 0752500400 or send an email to the above address.

Issued by the Court Administrator of Judiciary of Tanzania.

The director of DJSI&E himself manages the mobile phone to which the complaints are sent. Systematic analysis of the complaints is not possible yet, as so far the number is not linked to a computer and is only managed through a mobile phone. The DJSI&E started the number without having an IT-based complaint management system in place. The director has asked IT support at the judiciary to develop a custom-made programme to manage the complaints.

At the time of the evaluation, the email address had hardly ever been used (1 message a week). Initially there were a lot of complaints, but now the numbers have declined. They get seven to ten complaints a day by text message, and so far have managed to resolve all of them. They give deadlines on resolution of complaints and this may affect officials' promotion or demotion through the judicial service commission. Common complaints include delays in judgment delivery, delay in getting copies, and corruption allegations (a lot of which are based on perceptions rather than actual bribery taking place). The directorate is about to publish information on course fees in accessible language.

## 6.5 Recommendations

There is no arguing about the urgent need for better facilities and equipment at most of Tanzanian sub-ordinate courts. Nevertheless, there are three arguments against continuing funding for the mere procurement of equipment for sub-ordinate courts under DFID programming.

*First, support should be based on a needs-assessment for equipment at the individual courts, regardless of the funding source. There may be economies of scale in a centralized procurement process, but allocation of equipment should still be needs based. Any continuation of DFID support to procurement should follow an actual needs assessment.*

*Second, there are more direct ways to address corruption within the judiciary, such as support to the fledgling DJSI&E and its activities (for example, assistance to complaint management and to the currently non-existing back-office processes).*

*Third, if the judiciary was to be truly integrated in the outcomes of increasing conviction rates in corruption cases, that is in the repressive rather than preventive approach of the overall STACA*

programme, then support must be steered towards the *higher level courts* that actually hear corruption cases

Any future support to the judiciary should go hand in hand with the *involvement of key internal and external stakeholders in the programme planning*, including CSOs and legal aid organizations. Sufficient resources should be allocated for monitoring and evaluation of the programme from the start of a new phase.

Table 23A. Distribution of equipment supplied by STACA by region and court (1<sup>st</sup> phase)

S/NO	REGION	ITEM	STATION				TOTAL
			HC	RM	DM	PC	
1.	ARUSHA	MOTORCYCLES					14
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	5	3 to RM Arusha and 1 to RM –Manyara	-	Arusha Urban -1 and Kiteto-1	11
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	-	-
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE-HEAVY DUTY	-	-	-	-	-
		STEEL RACKS	14	(4) -2 RM Manyara and 2 RM Arusha	(18)- 2 for each District Court	-	36
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS	7	2 to Arusha and 2 to Manyara	(7)- 1 to each District	-	18
		FILE COVERS	13,600				
		POSTERS	3PKTS				
2.	BUKOBA	MOTORCYCLES					37
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	3	1	8 - Biharamuro – 2, Karagwe – 2, Ngara-1, Bukoba-1, Chato - 1, Muleba -1		12
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	-	-
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE-HEAVY DUTY	-	-	-	-	-
		STEEL RACKS	-	10	Bukoba – 11- all to PC, Muleba -10, Biharamuro- 18, Ngara -18, Karagwe – 8 (2-Kayanga PC)	Bukoba Mjini -10, Karagabaine – 4, Muleba – 1, Kashasha -1, Nshamba - 1, Muhutwe -1, Kyaka -3, Kayanga-2	77
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS	-		Bukoba -6, Muleba - 3, Biharamuro-5,	Bukoba Mjini – 1, Karagabaine – 1, Kayanga -1	27



					Chato – 3, Ngara -5, Karagwe -5			
		FILE COVERS	13,600					
		POSTERS	3PKTS					
3.	DSM	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>STATION</b>					
			<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					5	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	-	-	3 to Ilala, 3 Kinondoni and 2 Temeke	-	8	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	1 to Kariakoo and 1 Sinza	2	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE- HEAVY DUTY						
		STEEL RACKS			8 to Ilala, 12 Kinondoni and 4 Temeke	-	24	
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS			4-Ilala, 5 Kinondoni, 8 Temeke			
		FILE COVERS				Sinza – 2000, Temeke 2,000, Kigamboni 2,000, Ukongu- 2,000, Kimara – 2,000, Kinondoni -2,000 Kariakoo- .2000Buguruni - 2,000 and Kawe2,000		
4	DODOMA	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>STATION</b>					
			<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					22	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS					6	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE					-	

		PRINTER- HEAVY DUTY					-	
		STEEL RACKS					42	
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS					16	
		FILE COVERS	13,600					
		POSTERS	3PKTS					
5.	IRINGA	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>STATION</b>					
			<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					16	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	-	-	-	3- Ludewa, Makambako na Kilolo	3	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE						
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE- HEAVY DUTY						
		STEEL RACKS- 33	25 –bado yapo HC	-	-	Kilolo – 4 Pawaga-1 Kidodi -1	33	
STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS	8	Iringa RMs – 1	Njombe -1	Wanging'ombe -1, Makete -1,Ludewa - 2, Mawengi -1, Kilolo -1, Mufindi Urban – 2, Igowole - 1	19			
		FILE COVERS	13,600					
		POSTERS	PKT 3					
6.	KIGOMA	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					8	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS		1	(3) - 2- Kibondo, 1 – Kasulu	2 –Ujiji and 1 Kasula Urban	6	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	-	-	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE- HEAVY DUTY	-	-	-	-	-	
		STEEL RACKS	-	7	(8_ - 2 to DC- Kigoma, 2 to DC-	(18) – 2 to Ujiji, 1 - Kalinzi, 1 - Ilagala, 1	33	

					Kibondo and 4 to DC Kasulu	-Uvinza, 2 - Nguruka, 2 - Kibondo urban, 1 - Kakonko, 1 – Kasanda,, 1 – Itaba, 1 – Kifura, 2 –Kasulu urban, 2 – Makere and 1 – Nyakitonto.		
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS		3	(5) – 1-Kigoma, 2- Kibondo and 2 Kasulu	(7) – 1- Ujiji, 1- Uvinza, 1 Kibondo urban, 1 – Kasanda, 1 – Itaba, 1 Kasulu and 1 Makere	15 but 12 are for STACA	
7.	MWANZA	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>STATION</b>					
			<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					43	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	7	RM Mwanza- 6	-	-	13	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	-	-	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE- HEAVY DUTY	-	-	-	-	-	
		STEEL RACKS	29	-	-	(21) 4-Ilemela, 10- Nyamagana and 7 Mkuyuni	60	
STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS	27	-	-	1- Nyamagana	28			
8.	MTWARA	<b>ITEM</b>	<b>STATION</b>					
			<b>HC</b>	<b>RM</b>	<b>DM</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
		MOTORCYCLES					17	
		COMPUTERS, PRINTERS AND UPS	3	-	-	-	3	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE	-	-	-	-	-	
		PHOTOCOPIER MACHINE- HEAVY DUTY	-	-	-	-	-	
		STEEL RACKS	2	-	2 -Masasi	3 -Mtwara urban, 2- Mikindani, 2- Lisekese, 2 – Mangaka, 2-	28, 1 extra	

						Newala, 1 – Tandahimba, 2- Nachingwea, 1- Mingoyo, 3- Lindi Urban, 3-Kilwa, 2- Nanyumbu and 1- Chikundi.	
		STEEL DOUBLE DOOR CABINETS	4	2 at RM Mtwara	(23)– 2 at Masasi and 1 at Mikindani	(3) 1-Mikindani, 1- Mtwara Mjini and 1 Mangaka	15 – seen 13

Table 23B. Distribution of equipment supplied by STACA by region and court (2<sup>nd</sup> phase, 2013/14)

S/NO	REGION (PRIMARY COURTS)	FULL SET COMPUTERS	PRINTERS	PHOTOCOPIER MACHINES DFID	PHOTOCOPIER MACHINES LOCAL COMPONENT
1	<b>MBEYA</b> Mbeya Urban Mwanjelwa Mbarali Rungwe Mbozi Ileje Kyela	7	7	7	2
2	<b>MOSHI</b> Moshi Urban Himo Same Rombo Mwanga Hai	6	6	6	4
3	<b>PWANI</b> Bagamoyo Kisarawe Mkuranga Utete Msoga	5	5	5	2
4	<b>MOROGORO</b> Morogoro Mjini Mvomero	5	5	5	2

	Kilosa Mahenge Kilombero				
5	<b>SINGIDA</b> Singida Kiomboi	2	2	2	2
6	<b>LINDI</b> Lindi Nachingwea Liwale Ruangwa Kilwa Masoko	5	5	5	2
7	<b>MUSOMA</b> Musoma Serengeti Tarime	4	4	4	1
8	<b>SHINYANGA</b> Shinyanga Maswa Meatu Kahama Bukombe	6	6	6	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>18</b>

## Annex 1: List of people consulted and interviewed

S/No	Name	Gender	Title	Institution
1.	Frank Killo	M	Program Coordinator	STACA Program Coordination Office (PCO)
2.	Oscar B. Hossea	M	Procurement expert	STACA Program Coordination Office (PCO)
3.	Gethseman Mkumbo	M	Finance Expert	STACA Program Coordination Office (PCO)
4.	Onesmo H. Makombe	M	Commissioner	Financial Intelligence Unit
5.	Jamila E. Lutanjuka	F	Principal Supplies Officer & STACA focal Person	Financial Intelligence Unit
6.	Gilbert Nyombi	M	Assistant Commissioner	Financial Intelligence Unit
7.	Seif Omar	M	Principal Accountant	Financial Intelligence Unit
8.	Kassim Robert	M	Chief legal officer	Financial Intelligence Unit
9.	Prof Mussa Assad	M	Controller and Auditor General	National Audit Office
10.	Pili S. Mazowea	F	Principal Administrative Officer	National Audit Office
11.	Henry Kitambwa	M	Head of Legal Services	National Audit Office
12.	Frank Sina	M	Legal Officer -- STACA Focal Person	National Audit Office
13.	Karim Seleman	M	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
14.	Tegemea Benson	M	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
15.	Beatrice Matunda	F	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
16.	Kirondera Nyawamzo	M	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
17.	Richson. Ringo	M	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
18.	Darius Cosmas	M	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
19.	Theresia Wasaga	F	Auditor – HQ	National Audit Office
20.	Safina Mbwambo	F	Executive Management Assistant	National Audit Office
21.	Honest P Muya	M	Resident Auditor in Charge – Manyara	National Audit Office
22.	Deogratias Shauri	M	Auditor – Manyara	National Audit Office
23.	Nyamizi Bituro	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
24.	Goodluck Minja	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
25.	Robby mwita	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
26.	Furaha M Kaboneka	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
27.	Jacqueline Macdaves	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
28.	Japhet E Shirima	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
29.	Innocent Kong’oa	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
30.	Said Mhando	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
31.	Dominica Mushi	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
32.	Henri Naimani	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office

33.	Daniel Amon	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
34.	Rose Munis	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
35.	Helena A Manga	F	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
36.	Roman L Kavishe	M	Auditor – Arusha	National Audit Office
37.	Joseph Shirima	M	Resident Auditor in Charge – Kilimanjaro	National Audit Office
38.	Oliver Faustine Lyimo	F	Auditor – Kilimanjaro	National Audit Office
39.	Kevin Sanga	M	Auditor – Kilimanjaro	National Audit Office
40.	Josiah Kuruchumila	F	Resident Auditor in Charge—Singida	National Audit Office
41.	Deogratius Andrew	M	Auditor	National Audit Office
42.	Francisca Mhongole	F	Auditor	National Audit Office
43.	Martin Madallo	M	Resident Auditor in Charge—Kongwa	National Audit Office
44.	Baraka Matafu	M	Auditor—Dodoma	National Audit Office
45.	Givons Kiwelu	M	Auditor—Dodoma	National Audit Office
46.	Sylvester Kibona	F	Resident Auditor in Charge- Morogoro	National Audit Office
47.	Habiba Issa	M	Auditor—Morogoro	National Audit Office
48.	Jackob Thomas	M	Auditor—Morogoro	National Audit Office
49.	Shaban Haule	M	Auditor—Morogoro	National Audit Office
50.	Ali Seif	M	Auditor—Morogoro	National Audit Office
51.	Arnacha A. Kahwili	M	Deputy Resident Auditor in Charge--Pwani	National Audit Office
52.	Irene Kenneth–	M	Auditor—Pwani	National Audit Office
53.	Florence Martin	F	Auditor—Pwani	National Audit Office
54.	Christopher C. Musendo	M	Auditor—Pwani	National Audit Office
55.	Willy Undule	M	Resident Auditor in-charge - Iringa	National Audit Office
56.	Ayub Mwenda	M	Assistant Director	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
57.	Frederick K. Manyanda	M	Assistant Director	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
58.	Biswalo E. K. Mganga	M	Director of Public Prosecution	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
59.	Imaculata Banzi	F	State Attorney in Charge—Manyara Region	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
60.	Khalil Nuda	M	State Attorney and Focal Person for PCCB cases—Arusha Re	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division

61.	Elizabeth Swai	F	State Attorney—Arusha	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
62.	Neema Mwanda	F	State Attorney in charge-Kilimanjaro	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
63.	Ignas Mwinuka	M	State Attorney—Kilimanjaro	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
64.	Cecilia Shelly	F	State Attorney in Charge—Pwani	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
65.	Elisaria Zacharia	M	State Attorney in Charge—Singida	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
66.	Angaza Mwaipopo	M	State Attorney in Charge—Dodoma	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
67.	Rose Shio	M	Deputy State Attorney—Dodoma	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
68.	Sunday Hyera	M	State Attorney in Charge—Morogoro	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
69.	Apimaki P. Mabrouk	M	State Attorney in-charge – Njombe	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
70.	Ismail Manjoti	M	Principal State Attorney in-charge - Iringa	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
71.	Lillian Ngilangwa	F	Senior State Attorney (Prosecuting Attorney in-charge – PAI)	Attorney General’s Chambers – Public Prosecution Division
72.	Wanyenda P. Kutta	F	JoT STACA coordinator	Judiciary of Tanzania
73.	Alvin Mugeta	M	Registrar of High Court	Judiciary of Tanzania
74.	Hellena Sanga	F	Acting Resident Magistrate—Temeke Primary Court – Dar es Salaam	Judiciary of Tanzania
75.	Digna Mwamdosya	F	Magistrate Sinza Primary Court—Dar es Salaam	Judiciary of Tanzania
76.	Luzango Khamsini	F	Acting Resident Magistrate-Temeke District Court – Dar es Salaam	Judiciary of Tanzania
77.	Augustine K. Rwizile	M	Resident Magistrate—District Court, Arusha	Judiciary of Tanzania
78.	David Zahabu	M	Resident Magistrate—Marombosho Primary Court, Arusha	Judiciary of Tanzania
79.	Edward Jacob Mmbaga	M	Resident Magistrate—Moshi Urban Primary Court, Kilimanjaro	Judiciary of Tanzania
80.	Shabai William Mkude	M	Resident Magistrate—Himo Primary Court, Kilimanjaro	Judiciary of Tanzania
81.	Consolata P. Singano	F	Resident Magistrate in charge—Kiomboi District Court, Singida	Judiciary of Tanzania
82.	Bakari Iddi Bakari	M	Court Administrator—Kiomboi District Court	Judiciary of Tanzania



83.	Elilumba Reuben Kyusilu	F	Court Clerk — Kiomboi Primary Court	Judiciary of Tanzania
84.	Njau Ferdinand	M	Magistrate in Charge—Utemini Primary Court, Singida	Judiciary of Tanzania
85.	Suniva Mwanjombe	F	Magistrate in Charge—District Court, Dodoma	Judiciary of Tanzania
86.	Jamila Mkababa	F	Magistrate in Charge—Primary Court, Dodoma	Judiciary of Tanzania
87.	Janeth Lyimo	F	Court Administrator—Kilombero District Court, Morogoro	Judiciary of Tanzania
88.	Shida Nganga	M	Resident Magistrate—Nunge Primary Court, Morogoro	Judiciary of Tanzania
89.	Joyce J. Mkhoi	F	Resident Magistrate—District Court, Morogoro Urban	Judiciary of Tanzania
90.	Imelda Raphael Ndaga	F	Magistrate in Charge—Msoga/Lugoba Primary Court, Pwani	Judiciary of Tanzania
91.	Myombo Y. Charles	M	Magistrate in Charge—Mkuranga District Court, Pwani	Judiciary of Tanzania
92.	Onesmo Zunda	M	Resident Magistrate in-charge - Urban Primary Court, Mbeya	Judiciary of Tanzania
93.	Cyprian J. Mwananzumi	M	Resident Magistrate in-charge – Urban Primary Court, Njombe	Judiciary of Tanzania
94.	Godfrey Isaya	M	District Resident Magistrate in-charge - Iringa	Judiciary of Tanzania
95.	Shilinde Ngalula	M	Legal Officer in Charge—Arusha Sub Office	Legal and Human Rights Centre
96.	Kaleb Gamaya	M	Secretary/CEO	Tanganyika Law Society
97.	Magdalena Mlolere	F	Programme Officer-Legal Aid	Tanganyika Law Society
98.	Mercy Kessy	F	Legal Aid Officer	Tanganyika Law Society
99.	Dr. Edward G. Hoseah	M	Director General	PCCB
100.	Kulthum A. Mansoor	F	Director of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation	PCCB
101.	Sabina Seja	F	Director of Research and Statistics	PCCB
102.	Alex Mfungo	M	Director of Investigation	PCCB
103.	Neema Mwakalelye	F	H/Section IT HQ	PCCB
104.	John Kabale	M	H/Section Community Education HQ	BCCB
105.	Kasim Ephrem	M	Deputy Director of Investigation	PCCB
106.	Donasian Kessy	M	H/section-Supervisor	PCCB
107.	Leonard Mtalai	M	H/section-Supervisor HQ	PCCB
108.	Malimi Mifuko	M	H/Section Complaints HQ	PCCB
109.	Odessa Horombe	F	Prosecutor HQ	PCCB
110.	Simon Maembe	M	Investigator HQ	PCCB
111.	Eugenius Hazinamwisho	M	Investigator HQ	PCCB
112.	Julieth Matechi	F	Investigator HQ	PCCB
113.	Judith Mashasi	F	Investigator HQ	PCCB

114.	Colman Lubis	M	Investigator HQ	PCCB
115.	Kresensia Swai	F	Investigator HQ	PCCB
116.	Janeth Ishengoma	F	Prosecutor HQ	PCCB
117.	Leonard Swai	M	Prosecutor HQ	PCCB
118.	Moza Kasubi	F	Prosecutor HQ	PCCB
119.	Leticia Chinguwile	F	Investigator-Temeke, Dar es Salaam	PCCB
120.	Mbumi Kisiku	F	Prosecutor-Temeke, Dar es Salaam	PCCB
121.	Sophia Gura	F	Prosecutor- Ilala, Dar es Salaam	PCCB
122.	Daimon Mwakababu	M	Investigator-Ilala, Dar es Salaam	PCCB
123.	Joventus Baitu	M	Regional Bureau Chief (RBC) Supervisor –Arusha	PCCB
124.	Adam Kilongozi		Prosecutor—Manyara	PCCB
125.	Mogassa Mogassa	M	RBC Supervisor –Manyara	PCCB
126.	Didie Msumi	F	Prosecutor –Manyara	PCCB
127.	Emma Kuhanga	F	RBC Supervisor – Dodoma	PCCB
128.	Joshua Msuya	M	RBC Supervisor Singida	PCCB
129.	Jafari Uledi	M	Prosecutor—Singida	PCCB
130.	Boniface Kamwesigire	M	Prosecutor—Singida	PCCB
131.	Emma Kuhanga	F	RBC Supervisor – Dodoma	PCCB
132.	Emmanuel Kiyabo	M	RBS Supervisor—Morogoro	PCCB
133.	Alex Kuhanda	M	RBC Supervisor—Kilimanjaro	PCCB
134.	Simon Ngoma	M	Investigator—Kilimanjaro	PCCB
135.	Beater Peter	F	Deputy Regional Bureau Chief - Mbeya	PCCB
136.	Nimrod Mfwele	M	Prosecutor - Mbeya	PCCB
137.	Charles Nakembetwa	M	Regional Bureau Chief – Njombe	PCCB
138.	Stephen Mafipa	M	Deputy Regional Bureau Chief - Iringa	PCCB
139.	Johansen Kahatano	M	SACP, Traffic Police HQ, Dar es Salaam	Tanzania Police Force
140.	John H. Laswai	M	ACP—Ethics Department, Police HQ	Tanzania Police Force
141.	Madalo Nzumbi	M	SSP—Ethics Department, Police HQ	Tanzania Police Force
142.	Deus Sokoni	M	Legal Officer- Traffic Police HQ, Dar es Salaam	Tanzania Police Force
143.	Mathew J. Msuyale	M	ACP –IT Officer, Traffic HQ, Dar es Salaam	Tanzania Police Force
144.	Ernest E. Shalua	M	SSP –Ethics Department	Tanzania Police Force
145.	Mary C. Kipesha	F	Head of Traffic Police-Manyara	Tanzania Police Force
146.	Marisson Mwakyoma	M	Head of Traffic Police – Arusha	Tanzania Police Force
147.	Hendry William	M	ASP-Deputy Head of Traffic Police-Kilimanjaro	Tanzania Police Force
148.	Joseph C. Bukombe	M	ASP-Head of Traffic Police - Singida	Tanzania Police Force

149.	Nuru K Selemani	M	SSP-Head of Traffic Dodoma	Tanzania Police Force
150.	David Misime	M	SACP - Regional Police Commander-Dodoma	Tanzania Police Force
151.	Boniface H. Mbao	M	SP-Head of Traffic Police-Morogoro	Tanzania Police Force
152.	Issango Abdi Hamis	M	SSP-Head of Traffic Police – Pwani	Tanzania Police Force
153.	Francis D Medard	M	ASP-Police Officer –Pwani	Tanzania Police Force
154.	Butusyo A. Mwambelo	F	SSP Head of Traffic – Mbeya	Tanzania Police Force
155.	Kevin E. Ndimbo	M	ASP Head of Traffic - Njombe	Tanzania Police Force
156.	Leopard Fungu	M	ASP Head of Traffic – Iringa	Tanzania Police Force
157.	Justin Williams	M	Governance Advisor	Department for International Development (DfID)
158.	Esther Forgan	F	Evaluation Advisor	Department for International Development (DfID)
159.	Elimboto Njoka	M	Executive Secretary	TABOA – Tanzania Bus Owners Association
160.	Boniface Prosper	M	Vice Chairman	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
161.	Yusufu Yunge	M	Secretary	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
162.	Jabu Darwesh	M	Council elder (Mzee wa Baraza)	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
163.	Daniel Shawa	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
164.	Hamisi Amiri	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
165.	Cyprian Mziba	M	Member – from Geita Region	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
166.	Ismail Marambo	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
167.	Khalfani Kusaga	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
168.	Elinkira K. Ndosi	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
169.	Mboka Mwakitwiri	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
170.	Simon Joseph	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
171.	Hassani H. Msichoke	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
172.	Leonard Kaliwa	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
173.	Khamis Mwansyunguti	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
174.	Freddy Alexander	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
175.	Tumaini E. Mwazembe	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
176.	Rajabu J. Riky	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association
177.	Yahaya H. Haji	M	Member	UWAMATA – Tanzania Bus Drivers Association



## Annex 2: Full set of graphs from the electronic survey