



# Human Security Bulletin

The Canadian Consortium on Human Security



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Centre of International Relations  
University of British Columbia  
Liu Institute for Global Issues  
6476 N.W. Marine Drive  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6T 1Z2, Canada

Phone: +1 604 827-5679  
Email: [cchs.hq@ubc.ca](mailto:cchs.hq@ubc.ca)

Websites:

[www.humansecurity.info](http://www.humansecurity.info)  
[www.humansecuritybulletin.info](http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info)  
[www.humansecurity-cities.org](http://www.humansecurity-cities.org)



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## **The Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan: A Human Security Dilemma for Canada**

Dear Reader,

CCHS is launching a new version of the [Human Security Bulletin](#). The current edition looks at the militarization of the delivery of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and the human security challenges this poses for Canada.

Today in Afghanistan, Canada finds itself in a dilemma. The Canadian government defines its mission as a “whole of government” approach through the [combined 3D \(Defense, Diplomacy and Development\) paradigm](#). However, key NGOs are objecting to the delivery of assistance by the military to the point of refusing to work with them in the areas they occupy. But at the same time, NGOs and groups with humanitarian aid delivery mandates are dependent on both the foreign and local military for protection. Moreover, in keeping with the 3D approach, the military very much want to be seen to be providing assistance to engage the local population.

In this edition of the Bulletin, we take up this issue with editorials from leading scholars that expose various points of view. The debate is a complicated one as several of the leading international NGOs in Afghanistan now operate with multiple mandates. The result is that they face serious dilemmas as to the nature of their role with respect to the government, the foreign military and donors, as [Lara Olson points](#) out. [François Audet](#) of CARE Canada places Canadian policy in Afghanistan in a larger context while reminding us that the intervention is still in an experimental stage. Whereas field research by [Norine MacDonald](#) of the [Senlis Council](#) indicates that “the level of human suffering in the region has in fact increased as a direct consequence of the military campaigns conducted by Canadian soldiers”, [Arne Strand](#) cautions that NGOs have much to do in “informing Afghans of their intentions and programmes and to stick to the promises made”. Finally, Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims sets up an interesting comparison of the negative effects of the militarization of aid with traditional post-conflict initiatives.

We have also provided a brief [background to the human security implications of the involvement of the military in the delivery of aid](#). What is more, CCHS has compiled an [annotated list of the most recent and relevant reports, analysis, and data sets](#) on the issue of military involvement in the delivery of aid in Afghanistan.

This issue also includes a [new section citing a few key human security events and publications](#). Of particular note is the pilot launch of the Afghanistan section of the online web resource, [Peace Operations Monitor](#), a project of the [Peace Operations Working Group](#) of the [Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee \(CPCC\)](#). This project maps out the Canadian mission in Afghanistan where the new models of military-humanitarian relationships known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have created much debate and controversy.

CCHS is grateful to the contributors for providing their thoughts and research to this edition of the Human Security Bulletin. Special thanks go to Cameron Ortis of the Centre for International



Relations and Robert Hartfiel of the Human Security Centre for sharing their invaluable ideas with us.

We hope you enjoy this edition of the Bulletin and welcome your feedback.

Mrinalini Menon

[mrinalini.menon@ubc.ca](mailto:mrinalini.menon@ubc.ca)



## 1. Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>

Lara Olson\*

Five years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan cannot be called a post-conflict country and still faces immense relief and recovery needs. Among the multitude of international agencies, foreign military forces, and donors involved, NGOs are a key player in Afghan reconstruction. More than 800 NGOs, both international and indigenous, work on health, education, economic development, human rights, gender equality, peacebuilding, governance, and mine action, to name just a few programs. As the main implementers of aid at the community level, NGOs are indispensable to the overall international effort.

Such work in Afghanistan has become very dangerous. Over 90 aid workers have been murdered since 2003, making Afghanistan the most dangerous country for aid workers in the world. This insecurity for NGOs has a direct impact on the level, reach and quality of assistance. Some NGOs have ceased operations altogether, as in the case of Medicins Sans Frontiers in 2004 after five of its staff were killed. Other international NGOs have curtailed programs in certain regions, and keep international staff bunkered in Kabul, working in the provinces mostly through local NGO partners. However, local NGOs face equally high risks - most of the aid workers killed in recent years have been Afghan nationals.

**‘many of the largest international NGOs... face serious dilemmas as to what their role should be with respect to the government, the foreign military and donors’**

Beyond the tragic loss of life itself, the major cost of this insecurity is the disruption in urgently needed projects that affect millions of Afghans. As the May 2006 riots in Kabul illustrated, public anger at the lack of visible results from the reconstruction effort is mounting. If the most volatile areas of the country receive very little aid, the resulting discontent can fuel more resentment toward the foreign community and its partner, the Karzai government. This, in turn, helps recruit for the insurgency and fuels more insecurity in a vicious cycle.

NGOs differ on what they perceive to be the causes of insecurity. Most agree that NGOs are widely seen as ‘soft targets’ - they are visible in communities and reject using armed guards. But clearly there are other reasons. Some point to the overall context in which all outside assistance is seen as political support for the Karzai government. As one NGO advocate put it, “If the lives of regular Afghans improve, more ordinary people would support the government and that is what the insurgents do not want.”<sup>2</sup>

Many international NGOs also point to the troubling overall donor framework that has merged security, relief, reconstruction and development. This has occurred from the earliest days of the

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<sup>1</sup> This article is a synopsis of “Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2006, Vol. 9, Issue 1.

[http://www.jmss.org/2006/2006fall/articles/olson\\_ngo-afghanistan.pdf](http://www.jmss.org/2006/2006fall/articles/olson_ngo-afghanistan.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Moh Hashim Mayar, deputy director, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), interview with author, September 12, 2006.



U.S.-led coalition, which had military officers engaged in reconstruction work wearing civilian dress and driving unmarked vehicles. It occurs through the many ‘hearts and minds’ aid projects to win the goodwill of the population towards the foreign troops. It occurs institutionally through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, small bases of foreign troops outside Kabul tasked with both establishing security and undertaking reconstruction. Critics claim that such military-led assistance is more driven by political and security criteria (such as bolstering the credibility of the national government, gathering intelligence, force protection, or pacifying a region where insurgents are more active) than by humanitarian need.

Many NGOs believe that such approaches have compromised public perceptions of humanitarian assistance as politically neutral and have led the population to see NGOs as simply an arm of the foreign military presence. NGOs do not dispute the need for security assistance to Afghanistan for the transition period, before effective domestic security forces are established. But they advocate for a stricter separation of roles, where the military focuses on establishing security, and in turn allows aid agencies to focus on relief and reconstruction.

These concerns about the overall framework for Afghan reconstruction have led to much soul-searching among international NGOs committed to political neutrality and independence. Historically, humanitarian NGOs have been more insistent on separating military and humanitarian responses, so that if war resumes they can access needy civilians on all sides. At the same time, development-oriented NGOs have always been more open to working with governments, recognizing the necessarily political nature of much of their work. However, many of the largest international NGOs in Afghanistan are now multimandate agencies involved in both relief and development, and so face serious dilemmas as to what their role should be with respect to the government, the foreign military and donors.

Over the last few years, the major NGOs in Afghanistan have formed networks to coordinate approaches and undertake advocacy with donors and the military to respect ‘humanitarian’ space. This notion refers to the separation of political/military and humanitarian responses in order to preserve the right of needy civilians to receive assistance on the basis of need, and independent of political affiliation.

Through such advocacy, there have been some improvements in the communication between NGOs and the military, with some accommodation of NGO concerns. However the overall framework of Afghan reconstruction is a larger issue that goes beyond NGO-military dialogue in the field. It requires a wider engagement with donors and some evidence-based research on the benefits, pitfalls, and tradeoffs of the model of international assistance that dominates in Afghanistan.

*\* Lara Olson is an Associate at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary. Her work focuses on the effectiveness of NGO humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts in conflict areas. Over the last 10 years, she has worked with NGOs in the field and on international research projects examining the impact of conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Lara holds a Masters degree from the London School of Economics and has*



*particular expertise on conflicts in the Caucasus and former Soviet Union.*  
[lolson@ucalgary.ca](mailto:lolson@ucalgary.ca).

*Links to other publications:*

*Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners.* Mary B. Anderson and Lara Olson.  
*Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, Collaborative for Development Action, Cambridge, MA: 2003.*

## **2. Afghanistan : l'approche 3D et l'insécurité humaine**

*Francois Audet\**

Les événements du 11 septembre ont littéralement bouleversé les politiques étrangères de la majorité des pays occidentaux. Dans le cas du Canada, de nombreux analystes concluent que c'est l'occasion de prendre un rôle de leadership international. La meilleure illustration de ces réalités changeantes est peut-être la décision prise par le gouvernement fédéral, en avril 2004, d'entreprendre une révision approfondie de la politique internationale qui englobe les politiques commerciales, diplomatiques, de défense et de développement. En demandant cette révision, le gouvernement fédéral a déclaré que le moment était venu pour le Canada de retrouver sa place et son influence comme puissance moyenne, place qu'il occupait pendant la période qui a suivi la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

L'un des résultats de cette révision de la politique internationale a été l'établissement du concept d'intervention 3D pour : développement, défense et diplomatie. Le principal laboratoire de cette nouvelle approche est sans contredit l'Afghanistan qui est devenu, depuis 5 ans, le principal bénéficiaire de l'aide canadienne : de moins de 7 millions de dollars en 2000, l'aide canadienne en Afghanistan a atteint près de 90 millions de dollars en 2005. Cette stratégie du gouvernement du Canada a uni les fronts diplomatiques, du développement et de la défense par le biais du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECI), de l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), et du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), respectivement. Entre autres, à travers la coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM), les Forces canadiennes impliquées ont entrepris plusieurs interventions à caractère humanitaire financées par l'ACDI. Dit autrement, les champs de bataille d'aujourd'hui ne sont plus strictement réservés aux soldats et une coopération civilo-militaire améliorée y jouera un rôle essentiel.

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Cet amalgame d'intervention suscite une certaine polémique. Cette approche est particulièrement critiquée par les ONG qui considèrent que l'intrusion du militaire dans la zone humanitaire nuit à



l'impartialité de l'intervention et génère des tensions<sup>3</sup>. Les divergences d'intérêts entre les acteurs militaires et humanitaires sont sûrement à la base de cette confrontation. D'un côté, les militaires poursuivent l'objectif de sécuriser la région. Qu'elle soit justifiée ou non, l'usage de la force déstabilise nécessairement l'environnement socio-économique et augmente les risques des populations civiles non combattantes. Cela n'est pas nécessairement compatible avec l'intervention humanitaire qui vise à protéger les droits des civils et à répondre à leurs besoins humains fondamentaux. Conséquemment, l'aide semble davantage être utilisée pour modérer les tensions sociales et favoriser les relations à caractère diplomatique.

Le Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'OCDE reconnaît que, dans le cas de l'Afghanistan, les tentatives d'utiliser l'aide pour influencer la politique n'ont pas été efficaces. Le rapport du CAD précise entre autres que « une leçon clé à retenir est que ces fournisseurs d'aide devraient être plus modestes de l'influence qu'ils peuvent espérer exercer sur un conflit par l'aide<sup>4</sup> ». De fait, on observe plutôt l'effet espéré inverse, soit la pérennisation du sous-développement, l'augmentation de la pauvreté et l'aggravation de la violence.

En ce qui concerne l'expérience du Canada en Afghanistan, le Conseil canadien de la coopération internationale (CCCI) expose les risques suivants, soit que la combinaison des rôles des militaires et des civils, sous une seule et même structure de commandement, suscite plusieurs préoccupations<sup>5</sup> :

- (1) L'absence d'une distinction claire entre les activités militaires et les activités de développement met en péril les destinataires de l'assistance aussi bien que les travailleurs humanitaires. En effet, ceux-ci deviennent la cible d'attaques parce qu'une faction croit qu'ils sont de connivence avec le parti adverse. L'armée compromet la neutralité de ses propres services à la communauté en abandonnant ses activités pour prendre les armes.
- (2) Le personnel militaire change tous les six mois. Les soldats ne restent pas assez longtemps sur place pour devenir efficaces dans le domaine du développement local. Les Canadiens ne doivent pas recevoir des informations trompeuses quant à l'incidence qu'ont sur le développement les activités de relations publiques destinées à gagner l'appui des populations canadiennes et afghanes à l'égard de l'armée.
- (3) L'aide humanitaire est employée à des fins militaires pour amener la population à se rallier à un camp ou l'autre. Il arrive aussi que l'on négocie la distribution de l'aide en échange de renseignements. Ce genre d'arrangement peut être tacite ou explicite; dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la population est mise en danger.

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<sup>3</sup> Voir à titre d'exemple les textes de John Watson et Kevin McCort en ligne, respectivement : [http://www.care.ca/work/hot\\_issues/Afghanistan/SPEECH\\_Medusas\\_Head10-12-06.pdf](http://www.care.ca/work/hot_issues/Afghanistan/SPEECH_Medusas_Head10-12-06.pdf) & [http://www.care.ca/work/hot\\_issues/Afghanistan/McCort\\_f.shtm](http://www.care.ca/work/hot_issues/Afghanistan/McCort_f.shtm)

<sup>4</sup> CAD, OCDE. « The limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situation: case study Afghanistan », 2002, p. 6 (en ligne) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/46/24438978.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Conseil canadien de la coopération internationale, 2005. [http://www.ccic.ca/f/docs/002\\_peace\\_2005-04-10\\_afghanistan\\_briefing\\_note.pdf](http://www.ccic.ca/f/docs/002_peace_2005-04-10_afghanistan_briefing_note.pdf)





Dans tous les cas, il apparaît clair que l'intervention en Afghanistan est encore au stade d'expérimentation et que la stratégie 3D génère des résultats indésirables sur les intervenants humanitaires et les populations civiles. Une meilleure coordination entre les acteurs, des opérations sur le terrain concertées évitant le panachage d'actions militaro-humanitaires et le respect mutuel des intervenants sont certainement quelques pistes de solutions pour améliorer l'intervention. Enfin, si dans une situation de paix le développement semble interminable, il ne faut pas sous-estimer naïvement la durée d'une intervention aussi complexe que celle en Afghanistan. Ce n'est donc pas en fonction de programmes quinquennaux qu'il faut calculer l'intervention canadienne dans le contexte afghan, mais plutôt sur une transformation générationnelle. Reste à savoir si les administrations politiques sont prêtes à attendre.

*\*François Audet est Directeur Régional pour L'Amérique latine chez CARE Canada. Monsieur Audet est également chercheur associé et doctorant à la Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes de l'Université du Québec à Montréal.*

### **3. Losing Hearts and Minds: The Empty Shell of Human Security in Southern Afghanistan**

*Norine MacDonald\**

If we examine the current situation in southern Afghanistan through the lens of human security and evaluate the impact of the counter-insurgency campaigns on the local population, it is clear that the international community is not doing enough to discharge its duties to protect Afghan civilians. In particular, Kandahar Province, where Canada has taken responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team, has seen tens of thousands of Afghans displaced by fighting, bombings, and poppy crop eradication without any provision being made for food, shelter or medical aid. The Taliban are now in control of significant parts of the region, benefiting from the growing discontent of the local population with the international community who are perceived by the local population as failing to deliver on promises made.

Our field research in southern Afghanistan reveals that after five years of international presence in Afghanistan most of Kandahar's 800,000 people are still living in dire poverty and 70 percent do not have a secure source of food. There are a growing number of informal refugee camps in the region, created by crop eradication, bombing, and drought. Development and food aid in southern Afghanistan are so minimal and dysfunctional, as to be effectively nonexistent. Moreover, none of the refugee camps are being provided with food aid, and none have sufficient water, medical care, or shelter. Children and the elderly are starving.

**'the level of human suffering in the region has in fact increased as a direct consequence of the military campaigns conducted by our Canadian soldiers'**

Human security as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) refers both to safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, and to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. In southern Afghanistan, by applying both elements



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of this definition we can clearly state that the local population is not experiencing even the most minimal levels of human security.

First, constant bombing campaigns seriously disrupt the patterns of daily life. From June to December 2006, the US instigated a bombing campaign in southern Afghanistan, during which more than 2,600 air operations were carried out,<sup>6</sup> resulting in the destruction of entire villages and reportedly killing thousands of innocent civilians. With no functioning aid system in the region, no provisions were made for the displaced villagers and civilian casualties, and no compensation has been provided for the reconstruction of the many homes and villages destroyed. The international community bombed the homes and lives of the very people we had come to protect and prompted the mass displacement of civilians from affected areas to existing and newly created camps. Additionally, there was no debate at the international level on the initiation of the bombing campaigns or the effects this would have on the local population.

Second, lack of food has resulted in hunger and starvation in southern Afghanistan. In March 2006 the limited food aid going into the makeshift refugee camps in southern Afghanistan was stopped, apparently as a result of a policy decision aimed at forcing camp inhabitants to return to their homes. However, it was seen early on that not only did people not “return home” – the people in the camps have no “home” to return to – most of the camps actually grew in size. The decision to cut aid to the camps was followed by an aggressive US-led poppy eradication campaign that left the poorest farmers unable to feed their families, and forced many of them to leave their villages in search of work. The US is currently advocating for the chemical spraying of poppy crops with herbicide to be introduced this spring, which in addition to its negative environmental effects will further increase discontent among the local population, invigorate support for the insurgency, and fuel anger against the international community.

Lastly, there is a serious lack of medical care and medicines in the south of Afghanistan. Our initial visits to hospitals in both Lashkar Gah and Helmand revealed that the hospitals are without sufficient food, medicines, blood or medical equipment. In the five years since the international community arrived in southern Afghanistan there has been no aid of any substance to these hospitals.

Constant bombings, lack of food, shelter and medical care have seriously undermined Canada’s chances of winning the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition to the human security implications of this situation, it creates a serious obstacle for Canadian military personnel on the ground, who can only succeed in their stabilization and counter-insurgency mission if they manage to win the support of the locals. At the moment, however, the level of human suffering in the region has in fact increased as a direct consequence of the military campaigns conducted by our Canadian soldiers and their colleagues in addition to the political neglect of the civilian population.

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<sup>6</sup> For further discussion on this topic, see: Senlis Afghanistan, ‘Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Zroona Aw Zehnoona’, December 2006, [online] Available at: [www.senliscouncil.net](http://www.senliscouncil.net)



The political decisions to bomb Afghan villages, to withhold food and development aid, and to eradicate Afghans' livelihoods, have sparked a negative chain reaction whereby the local populations of Afghanistan are being driven straight into the arms of the resurgent Taliban. The de facto absence of the aid and development communities in the south creates a negative environment. It is within this negative climate that Canadian troops are forced to fight. As a result these failures of the development and aid communities contribute to the number of military casualties Canada is experiencing.

Canada must not leave the war, but while engaged in military campaigns in Afghanistan, it is important to assure the people of Kandahar of sufficient food, shelter and medical assistance. It is not a war that will be won by military means alone. Canada needs to provide a positive environment for the Canadian military to fight in and successfully carry out its peacebuilding and conflict-prevention duties in southern Afghanistan under the ISAF mandate.

This positive environment can only be created if the political will can be found to do things differently in southern Afghanistan and in Kandahar in particular. At the moment, however, the human security agenda in Kandahar province is being wholly neglected by the Canadian government. Canada must move quickly to assist the Afghan people with food, shelter, and medical assistance before the situation further deteriorates. The vicious circle of lack of attention to the human security agenda which in turn leads to an increase in support for the Taliban, and more Canadian and civilian deaths must be brought to an end.

*\*Norine MacDonald QC is the President and Lead Field Researcher of Senlis Afghanistan ([www.senliscouncil.net](http://www.senliscouncil.net)). Ms. MacDonald QC spends most of her time in Afghanistan conducting field research in southern Afghanistan and other areas of the country. Senlis Afghanistan is a research and policy group that has developed its own food aid programme for Kandahar province since August 2006.*

#### **4. Ways to regain Afghan trust**

*Arne Strand\**

When travelling with NGOs in Afghanistan in recent years I have often questioned why things have changed so dramatically. Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s. Why were people not coming out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past?

##### **Perceptions of the international community**

There may be a number of reasons, but much derives from perceptions held amongst ordinary Afghans of the various international players to which they are exposed. Certainly, they are disappointed by the international community in general as expectations of a better and more secure life have not yet materialised. Much of the attention has been focused on inadequate delivery of humanitarian assistance, but research has demonstrated that the cooptation of former warlords and a significantly deteriorated security environment are important contributing factors to the increasingly



negative attitude of the Afghans.<sup>7</sup> From a human security viewpoint the situation is especially grave for women. Large numbers of cases of self-immolation are being recorded at hospitals in Herat, while violence and rape are reported mainly to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The principal reason for the lack of reported cases as explained in an interview in Kandahar in 2005 is that: '...there is no use reporting to the police, they don't care; the AIHRC is at least willing to take note of our case'.<sup>8</sup> As recently documented in northern Afghanistan, many find the police to be a threat to their security rather than a force of protection. Likewise, people find many governmental officials to be deeply corrupt and involved in a range of illegal activities. They then wonder why this is allowed to happen when there are numerous foreign advisers training and working with the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Army and the ministries.

**'the separation that has been established between the military and humanitarian agendas in the north has reduced this tension considerably'**

### Blurring of lines

Another reason for Afghans to take a more cautious attitude towards humanitarian agencies is that the lines between humanitarian and military interventions have been blurred. In November 2002, the US military introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the notion of 'winning hearts and minds' as a military strategy through implementation of humanitarian projects in areas under their control. To support these plans and as a means of force protection US troops tried to associate themselves closely with any humanitarian and development activity under way. One such way was the use of white cars to capitalise on the humanitarian profile of NGOs and UN agencies.

This has turned NGOs into targets for military groups opposing the international military presence and portrayed projects such as new school buildings as symbols of foreign interference, not unlike how they were perceived during the Soviet invasion. While some NGOs capitalised on this new funding opportunity, the majority protested on grounds of principle. Out of fear for their security they advocated a clear separation between humanitarian and military interventions.<sup>9</sup> While the US continued its dual strategy in the south, other nations that were part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) opted for a clearer separation between their military and humanitarian engagements, following the example of British troops in Northern Afghanistan. However, due to the lack of a common ISAF policy, each PRT nation was left to develop its own approach subject to its military and humanitarian strategy and depending on the funds it had available.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Draws on collaborative research with the Afghan based Cooperation for Peace and Unity for the What Kind of Peace is Possible? project, presentation made at International Conference, Vilankulo, Mozambique, November 20-21, 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Interview for 'Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05 from Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A Joint Evaluation. Copenhagen, Danida

<sup>9</sup> See for example Barbara J. Stapleton (2003) *A British Agencies Afghanistan Group Briefing Paper on the Development of Joint Regional Teams*, Kabul, BAAG

<sup>10</sup> See Erik Krogh Lauritzen and Gunnar Olesen with Arne Strand (2006) *The Role Assignment of External Armed Forces in Societal Reconstruction*, available at <http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=278&Civilian---Military-Relations>



### Regaining trust

Research undertaken in different parts of Afghanistan over recent years has allowed a comparison of attitudes towards the international forces and NGOs. A doctor asked rhetorically: '...are the forces here to protect us or themselves?', representing a common scepticism in southern Afghanistan about the aggressive military intervention they have experienced. In the north, by contrast, interviews revealed that ordinary Afghans regarded the international troops as a guarantee against renewed warlordism and warfare, and a sign of continued international engagement. While most experienced NGOs operating in the south have avoided contact with military forces, the separation that has been established between the military and humanitarian agendas in the north has reduced this tension considerably.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, if humanitarian agencies are to regain the trust of the Afghans it remains of crucial importance that they continue to demonstrate their distance from the military forces. For their part, the military forces need to understand and respect this strategy and refrain from using humanitarian symbols and projects. However, there is more to be done. Other findings make it equally clear that the NGOs have a major job to do in informing Afghans of their intentions and their programmes, and to stick to the promises they make. All the signs indicate that they need to reflect critically on their own position. On the one hand, they need to decide whether they just wish to capitalise on available funds and limit themselves to project implementation. On the other, they may choose to side with the Afghan population and voice their concerns against aggressively performed military operations, oppressive and corrupt government officials, humanitarian agencies failing to live up to people's expectations and the violence that particularly affects women. The latter strategy might result in less funding but warmer welcomes in Afghan villages and townships.

*\* Arne Strand is a Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, and holds a PhD in Post-war Recovery Studies. Strand directed Norwegian NGOs in Pakistan/Afghanistan between 1988 and 1997, and has undertaken a range of reviews and research projects in Afghanistan since 1998.*

## 5. The Negative Face of the Militarization of Aid

*Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims\**

Traditional post-conflict peace initiatives require the active engagement of various actors: the military to promote security, aid agencies which engage in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and support social and economic development, and international actors such as NGOs, states, and the UN which provide the capacity to fledging institutions in a failed state to strengthen the infrastructures that are necessary for stability and sustainable peace.

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<sup>11</sup> See Agency Coordination Body of Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Brief to the Security Council, 13 November 2006, available at <http://www.acbar.org/downloads.php>



In recent years, this traditional approach is being replaced by the concept of ‘three block war’. This was a term coined by US General Charles Krulak. The transition took place initially in the US and has now been popularized by the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian military. According to the model, “on the first block we will deliver humanitarian aid or assist others in doing so. On the second, we will conduct stabilization or peace support operations. On the third, we will be engaged in a high intensity fight.”<sup>12</sup> The approach demands readiness to “conduct the operations simultaneously and very close to one another.”<sup>13</sup> The three block war model found expression in Afghanistan in 2003 when the United States established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Gardez, Kunduz and Bamyán followed soon after by the British in Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Canada in the South. The stated purpose of the PRTs was to act as vehicles for “advancing the central government’s presence throughout Afghanistan and to provide direct support to the reconstruction effort.”<sup>14</sup>

**‘a second important issue of concern relating to militarization of aid is the lack of engagement of local actors to contribute to sustainable peace and development’**

While most in military circles see this approach as innovative and pragmatic given the changing nature of conflict, the general consensus among non-military actors, including NGOs, aid organizations, and grass root groups in post conflict zones is that the model is problematic, detrimental to peace efforts and insufficiently problematized. This article outlines in brief the three main concerns with the militarization of aid in Afghanistan.

Firstly, it is inappropriate and indeed impossible to undertake peacebuilding while engaged in a violent military operation. The three block war approach prescribes this and finds expression in Afghanistan both in the form of the PRTs and more recently in the counterinsurgency efforts in the south framed as the battle to “win hearts and minds”. Moreover, the blurring of lines between military action and humanitarianism weakens the effectiveness of the work of aid agencies who have long operated in Afghanistan thereby undermining one of the basic principles of aid delivery, neutrality and impartiality. This compromises the safety and security of aid workers. We have seen a noticeable increase in attacks on foreign aid workers and their Afghan colleagues who are seen to be ‘collaborating’ with the ‘outsiders’ resulting in the departure of Medecin Sans Frontiers, Care, and other organizations. Unfortunately, it also compromises the safety of aid recipients. While aid agencies have spent decades working in the field and developing best practices models, militaries lack the experience and expertise to deliver aid thereby leading to confusion and chaos. It would be prudent to return to traditional peace operations approach which allows the military to focus on security, and leave aid organizations to do what they do best which is to deliver aid and alleviate suffering.

<sup>12</sup> Department of National Defence: [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5\\_4\\_1\\_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5_4_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&)

<sup>13</sup> Department of National Defence: [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5\\_4\\_1\\_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5_4_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&)

<sup>14</sup> Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peace Coordinating Committee, (2003), “*NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance.*”



A second important issue of concern relating to militarization of aid is the lack of engagement of local actors to contribute to sustainable peace and development. Traditionally, humanitarian organizations work with locals to develop and implement aid programs. Engaging local actors allows for capacity building so that the work can be continued by grassroots colleagues when the aid actors depart the post conflict zone. Care Canada operated on this model and was able to sustain some of its projects after it was forced to remove its Canadian employees due to security concerns.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, militarization of aid has significantly detrimental effects on the status of women. In Afghanistan, the military presence has resulted in the further exclusion of women from the public space and has had the effect of contributing to rigid interpretations of Islam and its accompanying restrictions on women's rights. Furthermore, when aid is delivered by soldiers, it is less likely to reach the most vulnerable – women and their children. This vulnerability has led aid organizations to encourage better participation of women in the delivery of aid to their communities and has ensured an improved distribution. It is impossible for the military to do the same, particularly in Afghanistan where cultural customs call for the separation of women from all non-related men. Although aid militarization benefits the military by creating the impression of the new ways it can contribute to 'peace,' it is problematic given the very goal of military campaigns is the use of force to resolve conflict. Unless these fundamental issues are taken into account the militarization of aid will hinder rather than serve cause of peace in Afghanistan.

\*Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims is Assistant Professor in the M.A. program in conflict studies at St. Paul's University in Ottawa. Cheshmak is a peace researcher, educator and activist and is completing her Ph.D. in International Relations at York University. Her doctoral research focuses on the impact of violence on women and the role of women in peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Cheshmak worked in Afghanistan for 7 weeks in the summer of 2003 providing human rights and peacebuilding advocacy training to Afghan women working for NGOs, government ministries and UN staff. She serves on the Afghan Women's Advocacy Committee of Canada. She can be reached at [cheshmak@ustpaul.ca](mailto:cheshmak@ustpaul.ca).



## **Background: Human Security and the Militarization of Aid Delivery**

*Mrinalini Menon\**

This article aims to provide a background to the militarization of the delivery of humanitarian aid. In doing so, it underlines the importance of taking a human security perspective to what is increasingly viewed as a national security matter. It concludes by identifying some key research questions which could help formulate thinking on the Canadian policy agenda in Afghanistan.

The trend toward the militarization of the delivery of aid began in 1991 with Operation Providing Comfort, where US troops became involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in Iraq. Since then, military personnel and equipment have been controversially involved in aid delivery in various reconstruction efforts in conflict zones like Somalia, Bosnia, and most recently in Afghanistan.

Based on the premise that complex emergencies require complex responses from the international community, it is important to ask whether the international community needs to rethink what might be considered outmoded concepts and means of delivering humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, following recent experiences in Afghanistan, can the international community return to an understanding of intervention and reconstruction where the scope and functions of the military are clearly delineated from that of impartial aid workers?

The increasing numbers of deaths of aid workers in Afghanistan in absolute terms has forced donors, large international aid agencies, smaller NGOs, and members of the military to engage in a debate about what might be the most effective and impartial route to ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid in a complex crisis. The NATO-mandated International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) emphasis on promoting civilian-military projects has motivated several NGOs and aid agencies to issue statements calling for the separation of military and humanitarian aspects of the intervention.

However, the US (and the UN) is seen to increasingly rely on armed military personnel for the delivery of aid which is intended to buttress its own counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist campaigns. There are some tensions between the priorities of the US-led coalition forces and ISAF as a result. Members of the international donor community argue that the militarization of aid delivery is hindering rather than helping aid workers fulfill their mandate in volatile areas of the country, thereby making aid workers "soft targets" and more prone to attack. There is also the additional problem of operational inefficiency if the military is deployed for purposes of aid delivery, since troops are not generally trained for humanitarian operations.

As it stands, humanitarian aid has become part of a "winning hearts and minds" campaign, just as the military is staging a similar, parallel effort to bring security and stability to the nascent Afghan state. Such efforts are perceived as taking away valuable and limited resources from an already strained military campaign. If humanitarian aid is seen as partisan, then aid workers themselves run the risk of being viewed as legitimate targets.





A “human security” lens has the potential to identify common objectives in the fields of both humanitarianism and development, and international security.<sup>15</sup> In this context, then, looking at the issue of militarization of humanitarian aid might be fruitful if done from a human security perspective. The [Afghanistan National Human Development Report](#) (2005) concluded that “the responsibility of the government and the international community in Afghanistan is to provide human security public goods for all Afghans, regardless of gender, ethnicity or geographic location.”<sup>16</sup> However, one of the fundamental paradoxes underlying this statement is that a stable and secure state is required to provide freedom from fear to its residents. In a situation where the viability and environmental security of such a state remains a distant prospect, how does the international community develop an action plan for the provision of security to individuals?

Promoting a human security agenda has been compromised by the cost of promoting a national security agenda. In fact, one of the central paradoxes when assessing the Afghanistan intervention was that a state-centric approach has been adopted right from the beginning. This raises the issue of whether it is possible to co-opt a human security-oriented approach to the long term viability and sustainability of the reconstructed Afghan state.

Some of the key questions facing the international community and Canadian policy-makers are: Is the blurring of the lines between the military and aid workers serving to undermine the neutrality and legitimacy of aid agencies as an impartial party to the conflict? A related issue is that of determining whether aid workers should have increased or decreased visibility. It is also important to consider how the case of Afghanistan speaks to the issue of whether a human security agenda can be promoted along with a state-security approach. A study of this would help members of the international community identify ways in which it can be instrumental in bringing peace dividends five years into the invasion of Afghanistan, while continuing to simultaneously stage a counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operation. Lessons of this nature can be useful in understanding how aid should be delivered in complex emergencies.

*\*Mrinalini Menon is the CCHS Communications Coordinator and is the Editor of this issue of the Human Security Bulletin. Her research interests lie in statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, East and Central Asian security cooperation and multitrack diplomacy. She has previously worked at the East-West Center Washington and is now with the Canadian Consortium on Human Security since April 2006. She can be contacted at [mrinalini.menon@ubc.ca](mailto:mrinalini.menon@ubc.ca)*

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<sup>15</sup> Barnett, Rubin. (2002), “Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security”, Social Science Research Council, New York

<sup>16</sup> Saba, Daud S., and Omar Zakhilwal (2004), *Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities*, Afghanistan National Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme



## Reports, Analysis, Data, and News

### 1. Reports

#### [Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey Afghanistan 2007](#)

Delesgues, Lorenzo, and Yama Torabi (2007)

Tiri, London

*Synopsis:* An analysis of Afghanistan's Reconstruction National Integrity System examines the "interactions between a selected group of Afghan institutions" that foster corruption.

#### [ACBAR Brief to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan](#)

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (2006)

*Synopsis:* Insecurity has severely inhibited the capability of aid agencies to function and must become the primary objective for the international community. However, military intervention alone will not suffice; security hinges on a greater emphasis by international donors on the construction of Afghani government institutions.

#### [Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan: Action Plan of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan](#)

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2006)

*Synopsis:* In accordance with a 2005 report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission entitled "A Call for Justice", this three year action plan outlines a strategy for the Government of Afghanistan to help remedy injustices and divisions resulting from conflicts during the post-Taliban period.

#### [Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations](#)

Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer, and Katherine Haver (2006)

Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group Report, London, UK

*Synopsis:* Results of a two-year examination on the provision of aid in insecure environments provide data on violence against aid workers and an analysis of its effect on aid agencies' organizational structure and aid delivery operations.

#### [Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan 11 to 16 November 2006](#)

United Nations Security Council (2006)

*Synopsis:* The United Nations Security Council's mission to Afghanistan reports on several key issues including the general security situation, the role of security forces, the need to build government "capacity" and institutions, and the challenge of coordinating development and humanitarian efforts. In addition to other recommendations, it advocates for civilian organizations to be solely responsible for the disbursement of aid.



[The Challenges of Stabilization and Reconstruction: How to Improve International Cooperation](#)

Frank, Melanie, (2006)

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung / NATO

*Synopsis:* Delegates from governments, NATO, and NGOs present differing perspectives on the relationship between NATO and NGOs in several countries including Afghanistan.

[Aid During Conflict: Interaction between military and civilian assistance providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002](#)

Oliker, Olga et al. 2004

Santa Monica: RAND

*Synopsis:* International assistance to Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom successfully thwarted a major humanitarian crisis; an analysis of this experience reveals many lessons in the provision of aid in similar situations and in general.

[Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities](#)

Saba, Daud S., and Omar Zakhilwal (2004)

Afghanistan National Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme

*Synopsis:* Persistence of insecurity in Afghanistan stems from the international community focusing on protecting the state from internal and external threats; international efforts need to be redirected towards ensuring the security and basic welfare of individuals and eliminating conflict-fuelling, “horizontal inequalities” across different groups of people.

## 2. Analysis

[NATO’s Afghan Struggle: Build, and Fight Taliban](#)

Gall, Carlotta (2007)

*New York Times*, January 13, 2007

*Synopsis:* The chief problem with NATO’s provision of humanitarian relief can be exemplified by their destruction of orchards, walls, and houses in order to secure a river crossing for the construction of a \$5 million bridge which, according to locals, primarily serves ISAF troop movements. The lack of coordination between NATO’s combat operations, its relief efforts, and the activities by NGOs undermines NATO’s counter-insurgency.

[Saving Afghanistan](#)

Rubin, Barnett R (2007)

Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2007



*Synopsis:* In order to salvage the international effort in Afghanistan, the United States must radically alter its strategy; this includes increasing the military and reconstruction expenditure and adjusting its approach to Pakistan whose frontier continues to shelter Taliban insurgents.

*Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict*

Jonathan Goodhand (2006)

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO

*Synopsis:* This book examines the impact of NGOs on conflict and peacebuilding as well as the determinants of an NGO's ability to operate within and affect conflict.

[Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep – A Case Study of the Military Coalitions in Southern Afghanistan](#)

Senlis Council (2006)

*Synopsis:* International forces under Operation Enduring Freedom have failed to establish security in Kandahar, and their eradication of poppy production has incited local animosity towards international forces and support for the Taliban; as a result, the Canadian military's role in Kandahar will be much more violent than its preceding role in Kabul, contrary to statements by the Canadian Government. Canada's mission must be more clearly defined and must recognize that development and security are mutually dependent.

[Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes](#)

International Crisis Group (2006)

Asia Report No. 123. Brussels: International Crisis Group

*Synopsis:* The ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan stems from the international community's desire for a "cheap" and quick military solution. Quelling the insurgency requires a change in strategy including the dedication of more resources and an emphasis on providing Afghans with a credible alternative to Taliban rule through the establishment of non-corrupt and legitimate governing institutions.

[Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan](#)

Olson, Lara (2006)

*Journal of Military and Security Studies*, Fall 2006, Vol. 9, Issue 1

*Synopsis:* Afghanistan will test the ability of military aid programmes to coexist with neutral NGOs. This paper explores, from an NGO perspective, the problems of their security, concerns about militarization of aid, and their "scapegoating" by the international community for humanitarian failures.

[Afghanistan and Threats to Human Security](#)

Barnett, Rubin. (2002)

Social Science Research Council, New York



*Synopsis:* Afghanistan has been a battleground between warring factions sponsored by competing foreign interests whose disregard for reconstruction and the development of proper institutions has rendered Afghanistan a failed state. The consequent human insecurity threatens the United States and other countries by propagating terrorism and narcotics.

[The US and the 'bilateralization' of humanitarian response](#)

Stoddard, Abby (2002)

Humanitarian Policy Group Background Paper, London: Overseas Development Institute

*Synopsis:* The US government increasingly contributes to humanitarian aid through bilateral agreements rather than existing multilateral organizations; additionally, US government funding generally flows through NGOs on a project-by-project basis instead of through recipient countries' governments.

[Afghanistan: humanitarian aid and military intervention don't mix](#)

Ford, Nathan (2001)

Medecins Sans Frontiers and *British Journal of General Practice*, November, 2001

*Synopsis:* NATO's provision of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan associates aid and aid workers with NATO which potentially qualifies them as legitimate military targets; NATO must entirely relinquish its role as aid provider to the civilian NGO community.

### **3. Data Sources**

[ABC News / BBC World Service Poll: Afghanistan: Where Things Stand](#)

ABC News / BBC World Service (2006)

*Synopsis:* A joint ABC News and BBC World Service poll gauges Afghans' expectations on improvement, the effectiveness of government, their local security, and their support for the Taliban.

[Afghanistan: IDP Settlements and Population Estimates](#)

ReliefWeb (2006)

*Synopsis:* This map displays the location and population of Internally Displaced People settlements in Afghanistan.

[Afghanistan Fact Sheet](#)

UNDP (2006)

*Human Development Report 2006*

*Synopsis:* Afghanistan's basic human development statistics from 2004 comprise this fact sheet.



[Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force \(ISAF\) - Provincial Reconstruction Teams \(PRTs\) \(as of 15Nov 2006\)](#)

ReliefWeb (2006)

*Synopsis:* This map displays the location of ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams as of November 15, 2006; links to information from different periods and similar maps are also available.

[Afghan Public Opinion Amidst Rising Violence](#)

Weber, Stephen et al. (2006)

WorldPublicOpinion.org Poll

*Synopsis:* An opinion poll of Afghans reveals their disappointment with the pace of reconstruction and their preference of economic aid over military assistance. Many perceive the central government as corrupt, distrust the Taliban and Pakistan but appreciate efforts by NGOs.

#### 4. News

[Too many Afghan civilians killed by NATO forces: official](#)

CBC News (2007)

cbc.ca, January 3, 2007

*Synopsis:* ISAF spokesperson Brig. Richard Nugee admits too many Afghan civilian casualties have been incurred and that “the single thing that we have done wrong and we are striving extremely hard to improve on [in 2007] is killing innocent civilians”.

[Human Security key to Afghan future, aid agencies advise Security Council](#)

Norwegian Refugee Council (2006)

Reuters: AlertNet,

*Synopsis:* The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief believes the international community’s approach to Afghanistan is flawed; new resources ought to be allocated solely to improving human security and not to the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) national security agenda.

[NGOs in Afghanistan fear backlash over NATO’s humanitarian role](#)

Briand, Sylvie (2006)

ReliefWeb, 06 Nov 2006

*Synopsis:* NGOs operating in Afghanistan advocate for ISAF forces to cease providing aid.

[Afghanistan Called ‘Key Priority’ for NATO](#)

Abramowitz, Michael (2006)



*Washington Post*, Thursday, Nov. 30, 2006, Page A14

*Synopsis:* NATO members label Afghanistan a “key priority” and decrease restrictions on the role of their forces there.

[Afghanistan: Humanitarian work is the task of aid workers, not soldiers, Security Council team told](#)  
IRINNews.org (2006)

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN News

*Synopsis:* Military provision of aid renders aid workers and soldiers indistinguishable to Afghans according to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief.

[Can the battle for hearts and minds be won?](#)

Hahn, Paul (2006)

CTV News, CTV.ca, 21 Sep 2006

*Synopsis:* The Canadian Military is conducting a “three block war” strategy combining military offences with peacekeeping and humanitarian work, but this strategy has been criticized as being ineffective at producing long-term reconstruction and as an impediment to the ability of civilian NGOs to operate neutrally.

\* *Synopses written by Kevin Macdonald (cchsra@interchange.ubc.ca)*



## Human Security Events and Publications

### 1. Research and Analysis – Senlis Council

The [Senlis Council](#) is an international policy think tank with offices in Kabul, London, Paris and Brussels. The Council's work encompasses foreign policy, security, development and counter-narcotics policies and aims to provide innovative analysis and proposals within these areas. The extensive program currently underway in Afghanistan focuses on global policy development in conjunction with field research to investigate the relationships between counter-narcotics, military, and development policies and their consequences on Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. Senlis Afghanistan has field offices in the Afghan cities of Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. Senlis regularly releases reports on Afghanistan available online [www.senliscouncil.org](http://www.senliscouncil.org) including these:

- [Hearts and Minds in Southern Afghanistan: Zroona aw Zehnoona](#) (Autumn 2006)
- [Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada's Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan](#) (October 2006)
- [Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban](#) (Spring / Summer 2006)

### 2. Web Resource – Peace Operations Monitor now online!

[Peace Operations Monitor](#) ([www.peacebuild.ca/powg/POM/](http://www.peacebuild.ca/powg/POM/)) is a web-based resource providing up-to-date factual information on complex peace operations. It provides an independent source of information about the mandates, multifaceted composition, structures, performance and challenges of military and civilian aspects of UN and other peace operations. It draws on publicly available data from UN, NATO, national government, media, academic, and NGO sources regarding military deployments and humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities to reveal a more comprehensive picture of selected international peace operations.

[Monitoring Peace Operations in Afghanistan](#) is now ready. This, the pilot stage of the project, maps out a contemporary and significant mission that Canada is engaged in - Afghanistan - where new models of military-humanitarian relationships known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have created much debate and controversy.

Peace Operations Monitor is a project of the [Peace Operations Working Group \(POWG\)](#), a working group of the [Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee \(CPCC\)](#). The POWG provides a platform for the engagement of Canadian individuals and civil society organizations related to complex peace operations. Funding for this first phase was provided by the World Federalist Movement – Canada and the University of Calgary [Centre for Military and Strategic Studies](#). Sudan and Haiti are the next areas of focus for the POM.

For further information Contact [Dave Peabody](#), Coordinator, Peace Operations Working Group.





### **3. Paper – “Assessing the Circumstances and Forms of Canada’s Involvement in Fragile States: Towards a Methodology of Relevance and Impact”**

[Country Indicators for Foreign Policy \(CIFP\)](#) at Carleton University has published a rigorous analysis of Canada’s current efforts to develop its analytical capacity with respect to failed and fragile states. Similar initiatives extend from the Human Security agenda advanced by successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the latter half of the 1990s to current initiatives including the Responsibilities Agenda, the new Global Peace and Security Fund, and the [Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force \(START\)](#).

CIFP’s Fragile States Analysis and Assessment project is successor to previous attempts by CIDA, along with various domestic and international partners, to create analytical and assessment tools to aid in policy and programming decision-making in unstable or otherwise conflict-prone areas. The paper includes a section on key findings from the Canadian experience. One of the main findings is that failed and fragile state policies are often not informed by regular situation analyses. Where such analyses are factored into programming, it is often a “one-off” exercise or an external analysis that does not reflect monitoring. Given the dynamic and complex nature of conflict, systematic monitoring and analysis in combination with structural risk assessments are prerequisites for appropriate and sustainable action. The paper is [online](#) at [www.humansecuritybulletin.info](http://www.humansecuritybulletin.info).

### **4. Policy Brief – [Human Security Centre](#) Policy Brief**

The [Human Security Brief 2006](#) updates the 2005 [Human Security Report](#)'s conflict trend data and analyzes the findings of two recently released datasets that track trends in war terminations and organized violence against civilians. The new data in this publication from the [Human Security Centre](#) indicate that the post-Cold War decline in armed conflicts and related fatalities has continued, with Sub-Saharan Africa seeing the greatest decrease in political violence. Other encouraging trends include continuing declines in the number of genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians, and a drop in refugee numbers and military coups. But some findings are far from positive. Four of the world's six regions have experienced increased numbers of conflicts since 2002, the last five years have seen a huge spike in the estimated death toll from terrorism, while negotiated settlements, which are responsible for an increasing proportion of conflict terminations, have worryingly high failure rates. Read the Human Security Brief [online](#).

### **5. Workshop – Coordinated Approaches to Security, Development and Peacemaking: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Liberia, at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary**

This workshop, hosted from March 30-31, 2007 at the Rozsa Centre, University of Calgary, addresses the following themes: Do current attempts to implement coordinated approaches, such as Canada’s 3-Ds policy, work in practice? Do they really improve the impacts of international assistance in conflict-affected countries?



The workshop will focus on the experience of recent international interventions in Afghanistan and Liberia, as case studies. The two-day workshop brings together representatives of the main actors in such peace operations: experienced personnel from aid agencies, government policymakers, the military, NGOs, together with analysts of peacebuilding and peace operations and representatives from the case study countries. The objective is to take stock of how efforts to more closely align outside assistance are working in practice, from the perspective of multiple actors in the field.

This event is co-organized by [Lara Olson](#), Associate (NGOs, Aid and Conflict) at [CMSS](#), and Dr. Hrach Gregorian, President, [Institute of World Affairs](#) in Washington, D.C.



## 1. CCHS Complementary Activities Winners

As part of its Complementary Activities program, the Consortium has sponsored a number of human security-related workshops and conferences across Canada. For the 2006-2007 competition, a total of 20 applications were received from a diverse network of institutions across Canada, including NGOs and student organizations, as well as events organized by young scholars. The applications underwent a review by a national committee in December 2006 and the following winners were chosen:

1. “Failing, Failed and Fragile States” Conference hosted by the International Relations Student Association at UBC: [www.fragilestates.ca](http://www.fragilestates.ca)
2. “Can the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds serve as a model for the Canadian extractive industry operation overseas?” workshop hosted by the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto
3. “Human Security and the Environment” roundtable organized by BC-based NGO, One Sky – Canadian Institute of Sustainable Living
4. “Failed and Fragile States: Strengthening Canada’s policies on failed states ” Conference at Royal Roads University
5. “Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: Assessing DDR Processes” Conference at the University of Alberta
6. “Before the Crisis Breaks: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Preventive Diplomacy in the 21st Century”, the Peace and Conflict Society at the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies’ second annual international conference at the University of Toronto.

Conference Reports will be available in March 2007 and can be accessed at <http://www.humansecurity.info/>. Further details on these events will be posted online as they become available.



## 2. CCHS Fellows Roundtable

One of the most effective and energizing aspects of the Consortium continues to be the funding of bright young Canadians. The [CCHS Fellows](#) and [Graduate Research Award](#) holders continue to impress, in their commitment both to the human security agenda and to the advancement of policy relevant research at Canadian institutions.

On February 2, 2007, the Consortium will hold a **CCHS Fellows Roundtable** in collaboration with the Munk Centre for International Studies ([hyperlink](#)) at the University of Toronto. This Roundtable will provide an opportunity for present CCHS Doctoral, Post-Doctoral and Non-Academic Fellows and Munk Centre Post-docs to build a tighter network and research community that will contribute to keeping human security front and centre on both scholarly and policy agendas.

This opportunity will allow researchers to:

- directly learn about each other's research in a way that contributes to their ongoing work,
- showcase their innovative research,
- push forward a comprehensive human security agenda,
- establish a virtual network of scholars.

This event will precede the University of Toronto Peace & Conflict Studies Conference "Before the Crisis Breaks: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Prevention Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" (<http://www.peaceandconflictsociety.ca>). This timing will allow CCHS Fellows to benefit from participation in this CCHS-funded conference, bringing together well-known international scholars and over 120 students.

CCHS Fellows, CCHS Executive Council Members, Department of Foreign Affairs policy-makers, and Munk Centre Post-Docs are invited to participate in the CCHS Fellows Roundtable. For more information on the Roundtable, email [humansecurityroundtable@hotmail.com](mailto:humansecurityroundtable@hotmail.com). For information on the CCHS Fellowship Programme, refer to the CCHS website at [www.humansecurity.info/cchsfellowships.htm](http://www.humansecurity.info/cchsfellowships.htm).



## CCHS Fellow Profile: Andrea Charron

Andrea Charron is a doctoral candidate in the War Studies program at the *Royal Military College of Canada*. With a BScH from Queen's University, MPA from Dalhousie University and an MA in International Relations from Webster in Leiden, The Netherlands, Andrea has an eclectic academic background. As a participant of the Canadian Federal Government's Management Trainee Programme, Andrea has worked as a policy advisor for Canada's Revenue Agency, Canada's Border Services Agency and the Privy Council Office.

Her doctoral dissertation will investigate United Nations' sanctions in four separate contexts: interstate conflicts, intrastate conflicts, pariah/rogue states and armed non-state actors. The two main research questions are: 1) How has the purpose of sanctions changed in the last sixty years? And, 2) what can this changing view of sanctions tell us about the wider issue of the international communities' approach to peace and security especially the notion of "human" security?

In 2006-2007 Andrea was awarded a **CCHS Doctoral Dissertation Award** to finance travel to the UN headquarters. Her fieldwork includes interviews with Presidents of sanction committees as well as with experts in the field of sanctions. Her findings to date suggest that the international community's reliance on "smart" or "targeted" sanctions as *the* international peace and security tool of choice poses a conundrum. On the one hand, employment of these smart sanctions indicates a commitment to human security on the part of the international community. On the other hand, the effects of imposing sanctions can threaten and harm human security. And yet, an analysis of this conundrum is absent because of the world's reliance on this new form of sanction as an alternative to measures involving armed force

Andrea is the winner of the David Scott-GD Canada Prize for her paper entitled: "The 3Ts of Canada's Sanctions" presented at the Conference of Defence Association Institute's Graduate Student Symposium in October 2006. She is also the recipient of a *Defence Research Development Scholarship*, a *Social Sciences and Humanities Doctoral Fellowship* and a *Graduate Research Award, International Security Research and Outreach Programme* of Foreign Affairs Canada.

## Publications and Presentations:

Jane Boulden, Andrea Charron, Ben Zyla, "Darfur", *Beyond NATO: The Transatlantic Security Relationship Approaching 2010*. Peter Schimt (ed). 2007.

"Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide" by Gerard Prunier, *Canadian Military Journal* for Winter 2006.

*The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* by Martha Finnemore, *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 7(3), (Autumn 2006).

[http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol7/no3/16-Book3\\_e.asp](http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol7/no3/16-Book3_e.asp)



“Enmification and Violent, Intrastate Conflict: A Study of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide”, *Southwestern Social Science Association Conference*, San Antonio Texas, (April 13 – 16, 2006).

“Canada, the United States, and the Northwest Passage: Sovereignty to the Side”, *Polar Geography*, 29(2) (October-December 2005): 171-187.

“The Iraqi Prisoner Scandals: Beware the Amity of Public Opinion”, Ted Woodcock (ed.). *Cornwallis X: Analysis of New and Emerging Conflicts* (Ottawa: Pearson Peacekeeping Press, 2005).

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Andrea can be reached at: [Andrea.Charron@rmc.ca](mailto:Andrea.Charron@rmc.ca)