CMIREPORT

"How can the Elections Help us Quell Hunger?"
Mid-Term Review of Norwegian Support to
UNDP's Trust Fund for Civic Education

Aslak Orre and Christian Larssen
with inputs from Manolo Sánchez

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Cover photo:
Promoter addressing a "tree-shadow meeting" in Aldeida Dondo, Huambo

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Contents

Acronyms

ADRA	Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente
AEA	Aliança Evangelica de Angola
CEAST	Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé
CICA	Conselho das Igrejas Cristãs de Angola
CIPE	Comissão Interministerial para o Processo Eleitoral
CNE	Comissão Nacional Eleitoral
COIEPA	Comité Inter-Eclesial para Paz em Angola
CPE	Comissões Provinciais Eleitorais
DEX	Direct Execution Modality
DW	Development Workshop
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
FAPED	Federação Angolana para Pessoas Portadores de Deficiências
INIDE	Instituto Nacional de Investigação e Desenvolvimento da Educação
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NDI	National Democratic Institute
PECE	Programa de Educação Cívica e Eleitoral
PSU	Project Support Unit (also: civic education team)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UTCAH	Unidade Técnica para a Coordenação da Ajuda Humanitária

Thanks

The review team would like to express its gratefulness to all the people in the UNDP (and partners) who contributed with so much to a very memorable journey through several provinces, as well as in Luanda. In particular, our thanks go to Friedrich Affolter and Henriques Freitas Cabula, as well as all the many kind activists and organisers of civic education who facilitated the review in Cabinda, Huambo, Kuanza Sul and Benguela. We also thank Estévão for taking us safely around Luanda.

The consultancy mission had a troublesome start and last-minute changes were made to the team and to the interpretation of the ToRs due to unfortunate events: two (!) passports which went astray, an airport strike in Norway and a railway breakdown – which made us suspect that some *feitiçaria* was involved to impede the mission. Manolo Sánchez of Scanteam was indeed prevented from coming to Angola by these events, but the remaining team could fortunately enjoy his contributions in terms of quality assurance in the write-up process. We are also grateful to Aled Williams for proof-reading the manuscripts.

The team would like to thank Norad (Eli Moen), and in particular Vibeke Skauerud as the responsible officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda for showing great flexibility, and for the outstandingly friendly reception at the Embassy when we eventually arrived in Luanda. Thanks also to Nanna Thue and Lise Stensrud for being great travel company in Kwanza Sul.

Thanks to the people in the provincial communities who accepted the presence of the odd foreigners during the civic education sessions.

Summoning a civic education session, Bucu Zau, Cabinda

Executive summary

- In late 2006 the GoA authorised the UNDP to carry out a civic education project. A trust fund to support civic education activities was set up with support from the embassies of Norway and Sweden as well as from USAid, as well as UNDP's own funds. By late 2007, 22 CSOs or umbrella organisations had been selected and supported with grants to carry out civic education activities throughout the country.

- The purpose of the mid-term review is to assess the results achieved and provide advice for the Norwegian embassy on the issues of civic education and democracy support in Angola. A team of two consultants carried out the review – in a mission which was simultaneously reviewing a civic and electoral education programme implemented by Development Workshop, taking place in the period between May 21 and June 3, 2008.

- The consultants produced this report after having meetings with the UNDP project support unit as well as with other key figures in the UNDP. In addition, travels to the provinces of Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo and Cabinda strongly informed the report. The visits in several provincial towns provided opportunities to observe in loci many sessions of civic education carried out by some of the 22 CSOs.

- The context in which civic education took place in 2008 could be characterised in terms of the generally low knowledge about civic rights and the political system. Three dynamics also influence civic education: The considerable *enthusiasm* for peace and democratisation, the *fear* of a backlash after the elections similar to the 1992 elections and the *authoritarianism* of political life.

- In hindsight, one can say that the UNDP Trust Fund for Civic Education appears to embody several agendas, partly reflected in the project documents: a) a desire to generally contribute to democratisation and the electoral process, b) a desire to set up an organisational vehicle to deliver "civic education" concretely to a number of citizens, and c) the goal of developing the capacity of selected civil society organisations. The prodoc's (Project Document) objective statement is geared towards a) but the immediacy of the programme meant that the practicalities of b) and in particular c) have taken front stage.

- The review generally commends the outstanding performance of the project support unit (PSU) – which in a short time has managed to set up and implement M&E routines for the many involved organisations, as well as provide a large amount of training and *in loci* follow-up. It has combined this with carrying out an impressive schedule of training sessions on substantive civic (such as the electoral law) and human rights issues, including the usage of Angolan produced learning materials (from CNE, ministries and some NGOs). The training and follow-up were without exception praised by the CSOs.

- The new experience has brought many challenges both for the implementing CSOs, most of whom seem to perform satisfactorily, as well for the UNDP, who have already drawn important lessons learned and taken corrective measures to further improve the programme's overall performance. The political environment, the highly variable organisational capacities of the various CSOs and training levels of their staff provided challenges for the UNDP PSU.

- Based on reporting from the CSOs and the review team's extrapolations from the field observations, it is likely that the target of reaching about one hundred thousand people with civic education will be reached. That this number corresponds to little more than 1 per cent of the registered electorate suggests that, in the future, the programme should make some strategic choices with regard to target groups in the citizenry.

- The PSU, led by an international expert on development and civic education pedagogic, has placed much emphasis on the virtues of participative learning. The approach is highly commendable in the Angolan setting, but the UNDP has also found that the task is cumbersome and though the principles of participative learning are universally welcomed,

the civic education "promoters" sometimes fail to practice acquired techniques. The most practiced technique was speeches ("palestras") before a crowd and then opening up for a round of questions which seldom led to real debate or in-depth exchanges of views and concerns.

- Linked to the question of communication methods, is the question of the message conveyed. Most civic education sessions observed were linked to electoral procedures or peace and reconciliation issues, but the report emphasises the need to investigate ways of enhancing the relevance of messages conveyed – for the individual as well as for society.

- The report argues that for the continuation of the programme, though some strategic choices should be made based on a choice of emphasis: Maximising impact in terms of social/political change; building CSOs; maximising the roll out of civic education "knowledge packages"; or rolling out to specific (needy) sections of the citizenry.

1. Introduction

The title of the report, *"How can the elections help us quell hunger?"* relates to a question raised by a participant to the review team after a civic education session in Bailundo. In a way, the question sums up the gist of this report by pointing to the ultimate goals of promoting civic education: to help solve fundamental challenges, as experienced by ordinary citizens, by reordering the way politics and governance is organised.

PURPOSE OF MID-TERM REVIEW: The purpose of this study has been to 'assess the results achieved during the previous (ongoing) phase assessing the plan budget/resources and methodology used to reach the planned outcomes and outputs.'

Furthermore, the review set out to consider the context of the programme, with its opportunities and constraints, so as to 'provide the embassy with conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations that can be used by the embassy in its discussion of possible continued support to the Trust Fund and of future support of democracy development in Angola in general.' It should therefore be noted that the team interpreted its role as *primarily* providing the *embassy* with conclusions and recommendations, and *secondarily* to its other stakeholders.

REPORT STRUCTURE: **Part 1** presents the UNDP trust fund for civic education; its stakeholders, set-up, purposes and organisation. **Part 2** sets out the review mission's method, scope and delimitations. **Part 3** aims to interpret and describe the political, institutional and social environment in which civic and electoral education takes place - a background for reflections on the future of civic education in Angola. **Part 4** is the "mid-term review" of the programme's achievements compared to its agreed outcome and objectives: its M&E system; a more 'qualitative' assessment and reflection on the programme in its social and political context. **Part 5** aims to fulfil the review mission's purpose to 'provide the embassy with conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations that can be used by the embassy in its discussion of possible continued support to the Trust Fund and of future support of democracy development in Angola in general. The last part (**part 6**) sums up key findings and lessons learned.

TRUST FUND BACKGROUND: Elections have been anticipated in Angola since the warring factions in the country signed its peace agreement in 2002, amid great speculations as to when the elections would take place. By creating the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Interministerial Committee for Elections (CIPE) in 2006, the preparations for the elections finally got underway, and a voter registration process started in 2007.

Wanting to contribute to the election process, though with no official date set for elections and with no signal from the Angolan Government that any contributions from the international community related to the election process would be welcomed, Norway together with several other bilateral donors started to discuss supporting Angolan civil society and civic education projects.

Although the UN's presence in Angola has steadily decreased over the last ten years (end of Observer Missions) and in particular since the peace agreement was signed in 2002 ("end to emergency – start of national reconstruction"), UNDP still has a role to play: In particular, as noted by the Norwegian Embassy, with regard to human rights and good governance.[1] Dialogue between the donor community and UNDP on how to engage in the election process commenced in early 2006, although it was clear that UNDP's mandate did not allow for direct assistance to the elections without explicit invitation from the Government. However, UNDP got the authorization of the Department of Political Affairs that it could prepare a civic education project under its Governance Programme. The Support to Civic Education project was agreed with the Government of Angola (Ministry of Planning) in November 2006, and the Civic Education Trust Fund was established soon afterwards.

TRUST FUND ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURES: The executing agency for the project is UNDP. The Civic Education Project is located under the Democratic Governance Cluster (and

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[1] This point is emphasised by the fact that the UN Human Rights Office agreement with the Angolan government was terminated, and the office closed in May 2008 (See Scanteam, 2008).

practice area) with its internal Framework Objectives: Fostering Democratic Governance, and Access to Information.

A *Project Support Unit* (PSU) was established under the day-to-day management of an international senior civic education expert, supported by a programme officer, a financial/administration assistant and a driver, all Angolan. The PSU is responsible for managing project inputs, output delivery and project reporting.

It could be noted that the "project board" envisaged in the project document should include the "donors, national counterparts, UNDP, Ministry of Planning and CSOs". Norway's representatives expressed early on that it would not participate in the board, opining that that would imply "mixing roles" and dilute UNDPs ultimate responsibility for the project. In any case, the board has not taken a profiled role. The donors have agreed on separate meeting dates with UNDP for reporting.

The call for proposals to the fund was published in the *Jornal de Angola* (the main newspaper) in January 2007, and stayed open for the following six months. The submitted proposals were evaluated by a *Technical Advisory Committee*[2], chaired by UNDP, who in August 2007 made recommendations to the UNDP Resident Representative for approval. The selection criteria applied had been decided by all stakeholders, including donors, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the CNE.

THE CIVIC EDUCATION AWARDEES: The PSU obtained approval from UNDP's Approval Committee for Procurement in New York to contract the services of 22 national Civil Society Organisations (see annexes for a list) in November 2007[3] - often referred to below as "partners" or "partner CSOs".

FINANCIAL INPUT: Since the fund was established in 2007, it has received funds from three donors: Sweden (USD 1 million), USA (USD 226.000) and Norway (USD 772.800), in addition to UNDP own funds (USD 400.000).

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[2] The Technical Advisory Committee consisted of stakeholder representatives from the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), the National Election Committee (CNE), Development Workshop (Canadian NGO), the United Nations Commission for Human Rights in Angola (UNCHO) and UNDP.

[3] Most of the CSOs/NGOs are idealistic organisations, though a few are interest group-based organisations (women, disabled people – though none are economically based interest groups, such as trade unions). As we shall see, a part of the organisations' and activists motivations to participate in civic education remains its opportunities and financial incentives. They were operating in the provinces of Bengo (1), Benguela (2), Bié (1), Kuando Kubango (1), Huambo (2), Huila (2), Lunda Norte (1), Moxico (1), Uíge (3), Zaire (2). Two organisations covered several provinces through mass media, and 4 NGOs would by cover several provinces (COIEPA, Plataforma Eleitoral, World Vision, Mãos Livres).

2.   Method and scope of review mission

This report originates from a mission where a team of two consultants *simultaneously* carried out the reviews of the UNDP Trust Fund for civic education and Development Workshop's programme on civic and electoral education. In the space of two weeks, the review team visited implementing partners to the UNDP Civic Education Fund in four provinces: Kuanza Sul, Benguela, Cabinda and Huambo – and in between tried to fit in meetings in Luanda. The following UNDP Civic Education Fund-supported activities of civic and electoral education were observed by the team (in addition, five similar Development Workshop-supported activities were observed in close-by locations):

Date	Organisation/Partner	Location	Participants	Activity
21.05	Radio-novela project group	Luanda, Radio Ecclesia	Listeners	Radio theatre
24.05	COIEPA promoters	Sumbe	Pupils (20), Sobas (10)	Palestra
24.05	Círculo Rastafari	Lobito	Pupils (6 girls, 7 boys)	Palestra
25.05	SOLCICAMPO	Benguela, Bº 25 de Março	Local residents (25 M, 12 W)	Three shadow meeting
27.05	Rede Eleitoral	Cabinda town, Bº Lombolombo	Women church members (50)	Palestra
28.05	Rede Eleitoral	Bucu Zau, Igreja Evangelica	Church members, (21 W, 15 M)	Palestra
28.05	Mãos Livres	Cabinda town	Local residents (40)	Palestra
31.05	Arquidiocese do Huambo	Bailundo, Bº Stº Antonio	Local residents, (25 W, 10 M)	Palestra
01.06	FAPED promotores	Huambo	Local residents	
01.06	INACAD, Huambo	Huambo, Aldeida Dondo	Local residents (25W, 20 M)	Three shadow meeting

This "double mission" created some methodological *advantages*, allowing the team to:
- *Observe* education sessions and assess the meetings in terms of organisation, ambience, and communication style, as well as its pedagogic approach, and not least, the message conveyed.
- *Interview* the local promoters before and after the sessions, and learn from local challenges.
- Appreciate the civic education promoters' working environment *in loci.*
- Draw comparisons, which usefully illustrated differences in tackling the challenges of civic and electoral education in Angola.

The "double mission" had some methodological *drawbacks*:
- Time spent on travelling to see numerous "sessions", reduced time to meet with and explore relationships with stakeholders outside of the DW-nuclei and UNDP-supported groups.[4]
- Switching attention between two programmes/organisations impacted to some degree on the level of detail that could be considered.

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[4] In particular, it is regrettable that we did not have time to visit with representatives of CNE. At the time of our appointed meeting with the CNE on Thursday May 29, the key person fell seriously ill.

3.   The context

Angola has enjoyed effective peace since 2002 – with the exception of the low-intensity conflict-situation in Cabinda. As peace settled, few would have predicted that it would actually take another six and a half years to realize the first elections since 1992, and the second elections ever.

The civic education programmes in Angola intervenes in a context where citizenship and citizenship rights appears to be an alien concept for large parts of the Angolan population (Marques Guedes 2005). The ties linking many peoples of Angola to "the nation" are weak, a consequence of the particular trajectory of state-building which Angola has gone through. The nationalist movements consisted of mutually hostile leaderships not only displaying competing political agendas but also differing definitions of "the nation" and its key identifying characters (Messiant 1998; Newitt 2007). The tumultuous post-independence period of almost incessant war has hardly been conducive to the integration of the country under one "nation-state" with one "citizenry". It cannot simply be taken as given that "Western" ideals regarding relations between governments and populations have intrinsic meaning to all peoples throughout the territory of Angola, such as "the common fate of Angolans"; that Angolans share rights and duties as citizens; that government should be accountable to and serve its citizenry. This fundamental challenge underlies all others meeting the promoters and activists of civic education: the extremely low average level of (civic) education,[5] as well as a remarkable lack of access to (varied) information about national and international politics and society.

There is a general lack of knowledge on basic features of democratic governance, citizenship and rights, particularly in rural areas. That's why the programmes for civic and electoral education are highly relevant – if one believes that informing people of their rights is conducive to securing them.

The particular importance of the elections to the promotion of citizen participation and "empowerment" in Angola is that there are in fact no other significant formal and institutionalised channels of state-citizen consultation – although some local governance experiments are taking place.

Observation and talking to promoters and participants in the civic education inspired the reviewers to sum up central aspects of the context for the campaigns as *enthusiasm, fear and authoritarianism.*

ENTHUSIASM: The civic and electoral education campaigns in Angola take place in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections on Sept. 5, 2008. In all the events the team observed, 20-100 people turned up; old and young, women and men, local authorities and village traditional authorities – to learn or hear the message the promoters conveyed. The sessions were carried out with apparent good spirits among all, and people would listen attentively despite various communication difficulties.

FEAR: The level of popular worry that elections would again precede a period of instability, similar to the 1992 events,[6] became evident during the events. Participants often raised questions about the association of elections and the eruption of war as first issue. The promoters responded valiantly with patience, historical comparison and encouraging appeal that this time around things will be different. People still appear to have a certain fear of talking in public about political parties.

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[5] Statistics on literacy levels are not very reliable, yet it is usually regarded that literacy levels are among the lowest in Southern Africa.

[6] The 1992 debacle was catastrophic to democratic development in Angola. The war reached unprecedented levels of intensity, destruction and killing, and for a while, political liberalisation came to an abrupt end.

AUTHORITARIAN ENVIRONMENT: By any measure, Angola is still a *de facto* one party state under the MPLA party, combined with a high degree of centralisation under the personal power of the President of the Republic (Hodges 2002; Messiant 2007; Vidal 2007). He also appoints, in practice, the government. Civil power appears to be centred on the MPLA party and the local government structure, in Angola called the "local organs of the state".

The above organigram serves to illustrate the unfailing central control[7] of the appointment of local administration leaders.[8] It is also widely asserted that having the "right connections" in the party and government structures is a prerequisite for carrying out successful business in the country

and, many say, even to get a job in the civil service. Finally, the conception that many *sobas* ("traditional authorities") are working for the benefit of the MPLA is also widespread. Many *sobas* openly parades their membership of the ruling party, accepting and using its gifts (motorbikes with MPLA-stickers, TVs and cars) or ostentatiously exhibit symbols of MPLA, like its banner outside the *soba*'s house.

Politicians of the opposition and independent media voices have argued that the governing party has set up the game board so as to create advantages for the ruling party, and impede opposition parties.

The degree of multipartyism in present day Angola must be seen in this context. There is so much at stake for today's powerholders (which are intimately linked to the MPLA-party) that losing power in elections is certainly not contemplated easily. This is not to argue that the party-state is a "monolith" unable or unwilling to reform and work for multiparty democracy – and certainly we met many government officials along the way who sincerely supported the civic education campaign and the message of realising the liberties enshrined in the liberal constitution. However, there are conflicting agendas at play – and there are forces in the state apparatus which act in ways that disallow a level playing field for the opposition and the incumbent – and the presence of these forces have created an, at times, intimidating atmosphere for the promoters of civic and electoral education.

One example is that the *formadores* of one provincial team of DWs programme appears to have felt intimidated by the presence of an element of UTCAH which ostensibly had no other role than to "coordinate" the NGO activity – but which had the additional effect of being interpreted by the *formadores* as surveillance which led them to exercise self censorship. Other promoters complained that their work in many *comunas* was difficult since they were viewed with suspicion by local

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[7] Unita and a few other opposition parties do have some cadres in appointed positions in the central and local government structures as a result of the GURN agreement after 1997. However, they are widely seen to be bereft of real power and influence, and serve merely as token concessions to the opposition from the MPLA.
[8] The organigram is adaption to the provisions embedded in the "constitutional law" and the Law-Decree 2/07 on the Local Organs of the State.

authorities and by *sobas*. They were often threateningly accused of "working for the opposition". Some also had a hard time getting permission to carry out civic education, and some complained that no one would accept that photographs were taken during the session. Mistrustful people were also said to refuse to sign the forms proving their participation. This picture should be modified by the verification that most promoters claim to enjoy a good relationship with the local authorities.

Local violence is also an issue, and promoters in various *municipios* said that they had actually intervened in the local society to help settle local conflicts, many of which were linked to inter-party struggles such as the battle of the hoisting of party banners.

4.   Findings of the end review

In the UNDP Project Document agreed with the Government of Angola, later agreed with the Norwegian Embassy (donor agency), the **outcome** of the Civic Education project is stated as follows:

> "Greater Promotion of pro-poor growth, human rights, good governance and decentralization in accordance with international norms by strengthening national capacities at all levels and empowering citizens and increasing their participation in decision-making processes".

The associated **outputs** as stated in the UNDP Project Document are:

1. Improved civic awareness and access to media/information increased;[9]
2. Civil Society Organisations trained in basic project management, civic education and conflict prevention;
3. Civic education assistance co-ordinated

These statements bear witness to the somewhat bumpy road during the write-up of the project document.[10] Logically, the outcome statement should not have included an activity to be carried out by the programme ("greater promotion"). The expected "outputs" bear no obvious relation to the stated "outcome", especially not when broken further down in the log-frame.[11] It is the definitive impression of the reviewers that UNDP should have given more attention to the process of writing up a much clearer and stronger project document.

The three "output" statements are useful to review the results in the sense that they each hint to what will be the results left in "the heads" of, respectively, 1) ordinary citizens, 2) the NGOs/CSOs, and 3) the UNDP & national stakeholders in civic education. The following sub-chapters look into the output results in that sense, whereas chapter 5 is more geared to the "outcome" statement.

Generally on expectations and outputs

The donors to the fund clearly indicated early on that their interests were in supporting a (donor) coordinated effort towards the processes that would lead to elections in Angola. Norway eventually expressed later that it also regarded other objectives such as civic education on general human, civic and women's rights as objectives on an equal footing. Meanwhile, UNDP required an invitation from the Angolan Government to participate and be involved in the election process. Hence, the review team found a gap between the motivation and objectives of the donors and the possibilities and the objectives of the UNDP project itself.[12] In short, UNDP have delivered a very good capacity development project in accordance with the anticipated outputs in the Project Document (see below).

The elections is the "big thing" in Angola this year, and although the donors to the fund are pleased with the good results from the capacity development of the participating civil society

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[9] The ProDoc output set as "access to media increased" is in some posterior documents exchanged for "access to information".

[10] A similar shortcoming was also noted in the Review of Norwegian Support to UNDP, 2006.

[11] For instance, consider point 1: While "improved civic awareness" is an output of a civic education campaign, "access to media increased" is *not* (an output more appropriate for a programme aiming to promote mass media dissemination and diffusion).

[12] It is important to note that UNDP strongly expresses that it never had any intentions to take the role of organizing electoral support *per se* insofar as it had not received an invitation from the Angolan government – and that this was duly communicated to various donor stakeholders in late 2006 (at a time where the election dates were not yet known).

organisations, the expectations were geared towards stronger involvement in the elections process. Donors' otherwise enthusiasm for the project was somewhat held back by a few factors: The project document write-up process could have been given even more attention by the UNDP; the long inception phase of the project; the strong focus on service delivery of capacity building/development rather than the qualitative content related to the elections.

After the initial slow inception, generic project activities, such as human resource mobilisation and acquisition of project equipment, were speedily and satisfactorily completed in 2007.

Training and capacity development

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT BY PROJECT UNIT-CIVIC EDUCATION TEAM: The civic education team/project unit (PSU) has undoubtedly delivered a very solid result in terms of capacity development. In this regard, the reviewers would like to underscore the world class skill and professionalism of the UNDP Civic Education Team in general, and the Senior Civic Education Specialist in particular. Feedback from the implementing partners to the Civic Education fund is unanimously positive with respect to the negotiation process that led to the contract signing, the training provided by the UNDP team and the follow-up through the monitoring and evaluation process and regional training/co-ordination seminars.

The project unit receives praise from stakeholders for having travelled extensively around the country to meet with all the 22 organisations and provided them with follow-up training both *in loci* and in writing. This feature has undoubtedly contributed to the dedication of many organisations as well as having reduced the amount of difficulties with respect to finance and activity reporting. The project unit (headed by a foreigner freshly arrived in Angola) must be eulogised for not having underestimated the immense task of developing capacity simultaneously in 22 organisations (many very small, young and inexperienced), but on the contrary, having initiated a "hands-on" approach.

TRAINING: Implementing activities and training only commenced in late 2007/early 2008, which means that to date the implementing partners had been operational for only 4-5 months. UNDP invited both DW and the CNE to contribute to their training sessions in both Luanda and Huambo.

All the organisations visited acclaimed the training they had received – *in particular* in terms of participatory learning methodology. This claim corresponds very well with the emphasis on participatory learning methodology (cf. training materials). There is, as we shall see, still some way to go for most organisations, even when it comes to understanding the participatory methodologies.[13]

MONITORING & EVALUATION: The PSU established, through negotiations with the 22 CSOs, realistic, recordable bench-marks for project implementation. Compliance with the benchmarks allows for the release of funds to the partners in four tranches according to a pre-agreed percentage scale – 20 per cent, two times 36,5 and then 7 per cent – of which the last is a "bonus" for successfully submitting final narrative and financial statements to the UNDP.

The implementing partners are monitored by the UNDP Civic Education Team (PSU) through a rigorous financial- and activity reporting schedule, during field visits by the team and in regional coordination meetings. The UNDP M&E efforts appear to be well functioning to the effect that the UNDP Team has identified strengths and weaknesses with the individual partners that are being addressed before further payments from the fund.

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[13] An example from an observed session of a regional training/co-ordination seminar arranged by UNDP for implementing partners in the Benguela, Huambo, Bie and Kuando Kubango provinces: Although the organisations brought in their experience in transmitting various messages to their identified target groups, discussions were still very focused on technical, pedagogical issues, rather than **messages** and **content**.

It is the review team's opinion that the ambitious M&E of 22 implementing partners may prove to be a handful for the UNDP Civic Education Team.[14] We question whether this is sustainable over time; in particular if or when different organisations reach different benchmarks of implementation. Some partners may get ahead in terms of capacity building and need more focus on, for instance, content, while other partners still struggle to cope with the reporting regime.

AWARD POLICY: This review's ToR asks for an assessment of the budget and resources used to reach the planned outcome and outputs. Here we shall simply comment that the flat rate of 100.000 USD (the UNDP decided on this maximum rate to each organisation) may have been suitable for a first phase. Future programmes should adopt a more flexible award policy depending on the proven capability of each organisation – for some of whom 100.000 USD is a lot, while for others it is only a moderate sum.

Coordination

At the start-up of the discussions around a Civic Education project among the donors and the UNDP, it was anticipated that UNDP would also play a role, through the fund, in coordination of donor inputs to various stakeholders, such as the National Election Platform. "Civic Education assistance co-ordinated" is indeed one of the anticipated outputs described in the UNDP Project Document that.

PARTNER COORDINATION: there is no doubt in the reviewers' minds that the UNDP Civic Education Team is skilfully able to coordinate the partner CSOs to the Civic Education Fund. The observed effort and the M&E system put in place by the team indicate that efficient coordination takes place. Furthermore, based on the feed-back from interviews among Coordinators and Activists from the implementing partners, the coordination was appreciated and deemed valuable by the partner CSOs.

DONOR COORDINATION: As the review team found a disparity between the motivation and objectives of the fund's donors and the project objectives of the UNDP project itself, it is doubtful that the Civic Education Fund has created the intended coordination mechanism: sharing common objectives is a precondition for coordination. All donor representatives interviewed during the field research of the evaluation indicated that their interest in supporting the fund was clearly or directly linked with the processes leading up to the forthcoming Angolan elections. UNDP on its side have been clear throughout the processes linked with the fund that this is a capacity development project of the CSOs – and through these CSOs disseminating civic education in various facets. It is a little unfortunate for the future of the fund, perhaps, that the common objectives were not developed in the early phases of the project.

Network

The selection criteria for eligible partners to the fund were biased towards the technical competence, or prospect, of the prospective CSOs. The partner organisations do not share a common platform – such as for example the national church networks – in which to disseminate the message. To some degree the partner CSOs have started networking as a result of the training and coordination seminars facilitated or promoted by the PSU and there is a demand for more. As long as the common denominator for the partner organisations to stay within this network is the financial support and the M&E system managed by the UNDP, the sustainability of this network is presumed weak. None of the partners encountered during the field work for this review had a clear idea, not to mention strategy, for the future of their civic education organisation when the UNDP Civic Education Fund would stop financing their activities. This observation raises legitimate concern about the "sustainability" of the civic education network should funding evaporate.[15]

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[14] The original project document catered for another national Project Assistant who was initially contracted but who later chose to discontinue the contract with UNDP. The PSU reckoned that recruiting a new team-member would not be worthwhile, due to the long recruitment process.

[15] Here it should be noted that CNE's own civic education campaign, which kicked off in late June 2008, was poorly coordinated with the UNDP – although this appears to have happened for reasons beyond UNDP control.

By way of a side comment to this review: It was found that other important stakeholders to the anticipated elections, such as political parties and platforms, do not engage with CSOs or in civic education in any significant way. The evaluation team understands the difficulties of working with political- and election related issues in the Angolan context, but simultaneously felt that UNDP should have a position and enough "weight" to create (higher level) initiatives for dialogue between different civil society groups and political parties (no donor or other international body – perhaps with the exception of the NDI – has taken this role). Such rapprochement would, eventually, be conducive towards the ambitious, described outcome of the project. Capacity building/development alone will not do so, and UNDP's mandate is certainly to go beyond capacity development of civil society organisations, although not specifically mentioned in the civic education prodoc.[16] However, the civic education sessions could provide opportunities for brining up questions of the role of political parties in a democracy.[17]

The efficiency of the network created by UNDP to disseminate information to a larger part of the population could be questioned, because: i) the focus on content of messages has been weak and ii) that there is a lack of a domestic, *Angolan* platform for the network. Partners and projects were *not* selected with an eye to provide coverage across the country. The activities witnessed during the field study for this report was quite similar in form, *palestras* or Three Shadow Meetings, with some noteworthy exceptions, such as the *Radio Novela "Os Eleitos"* performed on the *Radio Ecclesia* in Luanda. The fund could take advantage from reducing the number of partner CSOs and increasing diversity among the partners to bring the message via more varied channels of information.

Outreach of programme

HOW MANY WILL RECEIVE CIVIC EDUCATION? No consolidated figures were made available to the review team regarding total outreach. However, some brief estimates[18] sufficed to make the projection that the planned figure of beneficiaries (see annexes) will indeed be reached. However, only minority – perhaps as little as 1 per cent of the registered voters – can be said to have been directly affected by the programme. As we went to community meetings, many villagers eagerly attended – many more chose not to attend.

That is not a judgement upon the programme or UNDP. Setting up an organisation to reach so many people in the very adverse working context of Angola is rather to be seen as quite an achievement. It can be summed up in the extreme by the statement of one promoter in Cabinda: "We have to confront all sorts of constraints and dangers: If we go bicycling to one of the *comunas* we might even run into a gorilla on the road!" Human hindrances are usually more of a challenge. The monitoring reports of several organisations bear witness to UNDP's concern that some of the organisations were viewed with great suspicion by the local administrative authorities and the *sobas*.

CIVIC EDUCATION & WOMEN: There was a fairly good gender balance among the participants to the civic education sessions (see table part 2). The sessions the review team observed in fact had a large majority of women participants. It appears that the promoters have done a good and conscious effort to convince women to participate through their announcement in the communities. Yet "gender sensitivity" needs to be viewed in more sophisticated terms than percentages.

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[16] It was also held out in the 2006 report on the UNDP country programme (Scanteam, 2006) that the UNDP was hesitant to use its leverage as an international organization (as part of the UN system) to influence the Angolan government on fundamental priorities around poverty reduction, and in the present case also on good governance and critical discussions around democratisation.

[17] For literature with African examples: (Lipset 2000; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Lindberg 2006; Catón 2007; Rakner and van de Walle 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007).

[18] The average participation of the meetings we attended stood at about 35 people. It varies greatly how many meetings the organisations manage to realise and some work repeatedly with the same group of people. If we estimate that the 22 organisations can hold on average 10 meetings a month each (a very optimistic estimate) then 7700 people will receive some civic education each month, or 92000 a year (about that which is planned, see annexes). This is a respectable figure, but it constitutes only 1.1 per cent of the registered electorate (8.26 million).

The information gap is not only a female problem. Shortage of information and formal education is only part of the complex of problems which constitute women's oppression. Women and men share the same rights as citizens before the Angolan constitution and before international norms related to human rights. Yet two factors restrict the application of constitutional law in Angola: Firstly, the legal and judicial apparatus is poorly developed, something people are well aware of. Consequently, knowledge about citizens' rights according to national law is made more relevant if discussed in relation to *how* they can be exercised. Secondly, civic and electoral education in Angola also takes place in a context of legal pluralism, where local customary notions of social regulation often provides an additional layer of legality to the Angolan positive law. Hence, how the rights bequeathed by the constitution play out in the hearts and minds of local people can only be untangled in a local context.

It is highly recommendable to see women's particular information and education needs in their local context of power relations and legal pluralism. We believe that the approach must be truly interactive to cater for the problems and local concerns of women involved. Such interactivity (participatory learning, or learning by applying new knowledge to a well known context) is key to securing the relevance of civic and electoral education to women in particular and the citizenry in general.

Motivating the promoters

Providing the promoters with authority and motivation is the key to a successful campaign of any programme of civic education based on direct communication with people in *bairros* and villages.

REMUNERATION/SUBSIDY: Tardy arrival of funds and/or unclear arrangements regarding remuneration/subsidy seemed to go hand in hand. In many instances it appears to have led to worry, uncertainty or irritation on the part of the promoters/activists and, according to the UNDP Project Unit's own report, even to threats of boycotting. Some promoters were of the understanding that they were "entitled" to a certain number of *palestras* per month, indicating that their prime motivation was the money rather than their civic deed. The frustration around remuneration/subsidies was heard many times during the field visits, both in the UNDP supported organisations as well as the DW staff. Hence, the issue is grave, and the question of subsidies for the respective categories of people involved – and the motivation/incentive facilities in general – should be openly discussed (apparently not for the first time). The various organisations supported by the UNDP have differing practices when it comes to subsidising the promoters and covering costs. Some promoters only receive USD 50 a month; others double this amount, though what they actually do in return also varies.

It is not economically feasible for the UNDP trust fund to finance a professional corps of promoters, and neither is it likely to be desirable. A strong part of the promoters' motivation has to be his/her "civic" dedication to promote democracy and citizenship. Discussing these things openly is likely to provide the best chance of striking the right balance between "volunteering" and a fair remuneration – something which is all the more important since so many organisations are involved.

TRANSPORT ISSUES: There is also confusion among some promoters about the covering of transport costs. Should they be covered from their subsidy? Or should there be an extra-subsidy for transport? Some promoters lamented that they were not able to reach the more distant communities of the *municipios*, often located tens of kilometres away. To reach them the promoters would have to pay expensive transport, or walk, which some promoters insisted was detrimental to their image: "How can we speak with authority if we are arrive in the village after having slept in the bush, have a ragged appearance and are forced to beg for something to eat?"

Each UNDP-supported organisation is in a much better position than the end-review team to find well adapted arrangements. We insist though, that the question of transport should be subordinated to general issues of strategy with regard to target groups discussed in part 5. Whichever transport solutions are chosen locally (based on a central strategic decision), it needs to be agreed and communicated to a larger extent than what was observed during the review.

KITS AND MATERIALS: Some of the organisations involved in the civic education, such as COIEPA, Circulo Rastafari and Rede Eleitoral had designed and printed t-shirts for their promoters.

This was reported as having contributed positively to staff self-esteem and is likely to have made it easier to enter villages and communicate as "campaigners".

Style and methods of communication

The review team observed a total of 15 sessions. Nine could be characterised as *palestras* (lectures) whereas two were "under the shadow of a tree conversations" and one with a theatre performance. The PSU noted excessive lecturing as a drawback in some of the feedback reports to the NGO's promoters. Even so, at one point it argued that the *palestra* is a form of communication appropriate both for promoters and the audience. The review team does not agree, and would encourage the PSU to redouble efforts of training the promoters in alternative pedagogical methods.

The *palestras* do have their advantages in that they provide a sense of "predictability" – and therefore security – for the promoter. Reading out loud from a law text is an example. However, it had the visible effect of creating a distance between the "audience" and the promoter, sometimes inappropriately underscored with a table podium and a physical distance between the promoter and the audience. Other promoters had a more relaxed and oral style, efficiently and convincingly mastering the switch between Portuguese and local languages. The latter group, though authoritative and reassuring, tended to lecture in a way which reduced scope for actual dialogue by heightening the threshold of inputs, comments and questions from the participants. Many *palestras* were followed by "question rounds" which received fairly little response before the meeting was rounded off.

The principles of interactivity and participatory learning are amply present in the pedagogical philosophy and in the materials the UNDP project unit uses in its *formação de formadores*. However, the methods observed during the *sessions* in the provinces indicated that there is some way still to go. The participatory method is not only a cosmetic and humanistic nicety – it is more fundamentally a tool to ensure that the message conveyed is the most relevant and best targeted, and that the learning is internalised as people feel the knowledge they get is of the kind they can use.[19]

Many standard tools are available for interactivity which did not appear to be much used by the UNDP–supported organisations which the review team met with: Group discussions, flip-chart summaries, problem- and solution oriented brainstorming and discussions – and among students and youth: role acting. Some techniques, like dancing and singing, are mainly ice-breakers to facilitate discussion. In the liveliest sessions we witnessed (one good example, SOLCICAMPO's sessions in Benguela) singing and dancing really animated participants and brought forward their smiles. It clearly had the effect of giving people the confidence boost to engage in dialogue as well.

It should be noted that in its consolidated comments to a draft of this report, UNDP came up with a well-pondered list of six lessons learned on the issue of methods of communication.[20]

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[19] We link this question to the issue of giving sessions in local languages. During a UNDP regional "exchange of experience" meeting between promoters, the question of local language was raised – implying that translation difficulties were a serious challenge. Obviously without us having the linguistic knowledge to delve into the "world" of, say, the Umbundu language, one might question if it was the "technical and law-text prone" approach taken by some promoters that created (obvious) translation difficulties. If the method had started more interactively, by letting local people express in their own languages what the meaning of the terms actually might mean, and what the point of learning them might be – then surely a common linguistic platform should be possible to find. The word "accountability" may not have a direct translation in Umbundu – it doesn't even have a direct translation in Portuguese – but its content (that people in government must answer for their actions to the people who have elected them) is never impossible to discuss. The discussions could start with local examples, and be extrapolated to the national level.

[20] These were, in short: 1) Plan and budget for more follow-up of CSOs to *ensure* that participatory learning methods are applied; 2) recommend a limitation to the number of participants in a civic education session; 3) when larger *palestras* are nevertheless needed, they CSOs must be required to follow guidelines for "debate structure" to ensure some participation; 4) issue guidelines for recruitment of promoters to ensure quality staff in civic education; 5) modify attitude of some CSO "chefes" who are not tending to their subordinates training needs; 6) uphold quality of interactive performance, upon noting the drop of quality between the initial stages and the second field visits by the PSU.

5.   Overall issues for concern

The weekly debate programmes on issues of peace and citizenship at Radio Ecclesia (sponsored by the DW programme for civic and electoral education) is an expression of good practice where the national heavyweights in the church communities use their influence to expand the public space for debate. On a similar note, a youth theatre group produced an apparently popular radio-*novela* with various messages of civic and electoral education. These radio-programmes illustrate the potential for variation in communicating the messages of civic education.

Who is the target group?

Who should be targeted for training, and who should not? Who should receive little/quick training and who should receive intensive training? Should work on "high levels" with strategic partners (government entities, church organisations, etc.) be privileged in relation to direct community work?

With the UNDP-supported organisations' point of departure, the "need" is simply too vast to allow for comprehensive coverage of "all" Angolan citizens. Consequently, one has to make tough choices: strategically made, or based on some clear and agreed criteria which are deemed to amplify the impact of the programme and increase the likelihood of achieving the goals.

The technical criteria used by the UNDP technical committee did not allow for a strategic choice of target groups neither with a view to geographic outreach nor to population strata. The result appears to be a rather random target group (apart from a certain focus on women), or no target group at all. Some organisations are church based and work principally among their own congregations. Others work (ostensibly) with their own pre-defined constituencies (youth, students, physically handicapped people, prisoners). Other organisations simply claim to inform "communities" based on a predefined geographic area (urban or remote rural). Some promoters lamented that "many more could be reached" if only they had the means and to reach the remote areas; at the same time the urban coverage was far from exhausted.[21] This indicated to us that strategic guidance was not forthcoming.

In order to reach the ambitious target of contributing to "empowered citizenry, good governance, decentralisation", one could not possibly expect that a policy which rather randomly distributes civic education among population strata and geographic areas will result in the optimal choice of beneficiary populations. Particularly since the varying methods, quality and intensity of training is not specifically targeted either. A few suggestions might help to structure discussions on the strategy:

- ◦ *Rights based approach:* The most needy of civic education (gender, province, etc.), or the most vulnerable (the poorest, handicapped, etc.).

- ◦ *Strategic intervention:* Focus on groups deemed more likely to contribute and create pressure toward a culture of openness and a democratic public sphere; or who could pass on messages effectively (urban youth, school teachers, sobas, etc).

A further criterion is the choice of intensity of training vs. numbers that can be reached. Should one "spread it thin" or concentrate on a few? Both have advantages and associated costs. Usually, giving a lot to many is the most expensive (and unrealistic), though skilled use of channels of mass communication (for instance, interactive radio broadcasting or church sermons) could, at least theoretically, provide high intensity training to many. The discussion of numbers versus intensity of training reinforces the issue of choosing target groups, but also the choice of channels of

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[21] Why was it necessary to reach the remote areas/populations? UNDP defends this mode of operation by referring to the technical criteria used to evaluate the awardees and that point 2 of its "output" statement explicitly aims to train these CSOs. Building stronger and more capable CSOs may be a good contribution to civil society development in Angola, and it was not the task of the UNDP to pre-qualify specific NGOs.

communication. The CSOs favoured tool, the "community meetings"/*palestras*, is only one of many possible dissemination channels. This choice should be continuously reconsidered.

Repeated & participative community sessions

Intensity of training

Radio broadcasting

Quick **rural** community sessions

Quick **urban** community sessions

Figure: Trade-offs between intensity of training vs numeric outreach. Intensity of training is "the amount of time and effort" spent on each individual receiving the messages of civic education.

More channels, and consequently strategic choices, could be placed in the chart to orient discussions. Any ambitious programme of civic and electoral education must combine various target groups and more than one channel of dissemination. Yet when all cannot be given priority, clear guidance is needed and the involved stakeholders should be duly informed about the strategy. One strategic choice is whether or not to focus more on the *content* of the civic education programme.

The message

Observations made during field visits, and the interviews with the promoters suggested that more attention could be given to the *content* and the *message* conveyed.[22] The PSU concentrates its feedback to the organisations to procedural and pedagogical techniques, as well as reporting routines.[23]

Of the CSOs visited, only two promoted "non-electoral" rights themes directed at specific interest groups (symptomatically the 'two special cases', see annex). This underscores the breadth of the ambition of the UNDP trust fund, but also the challenge of assuring quality civic education in both *electoral* and *other rights-focussed* civic education. One should in the future consider how, in the frame of one programme like this, to further strengthen the PSU to ensure follow-up of the CSOs in widely disparate topics (given that is the aim). The examples used to make our points in the following are from electoral training sessions, the topic most frequently chosen by the CSOs.

THE INFORMATION MUST BE CORRECT: Some cases of confusing or outright misinformation were overheard! In several instances, promoters said that elections are about choosing our government – which is not entirely precise information in the run-up to Angolan (legislative) elections.

THE INFORMATION MUST BE RELEVANT: In another instance, the promoters entertained a lengthy discussion about the constitutional requirement that a candidate for president need be an Angolan citizen. This, for one, does not appear to be the most relevant of issues for a lengthy plenary debate. More importantly, it could create confusion between legislative and presidential elections.[24]

Relevant information is more than a selection of laws to be presented to the audience. The information should satisfy the *information needs* of the audience, thus contributing to real empowerment: to enable people to exercise rights more efficiently. Informing illiterate people on

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[22] UNDP comments that the transmission of some messages from the UNDP's (and other) training material stops at the point of the CSOs, for a variety of reasons linked to their capacity.
[23] Cf. project unit's after-field-visits feedback letters to the CSOs, and training materials.
[24] It should be noted that in the specific case, the promoters duly clarified this point.

the roles, rights and duties of the various entities of the electoral apparatus might be less relevant than explaining the underlying meaning of legally bound roles: That each entity contributes to a whole which should ensure a level playing field so that no party can rig elections to its own advantage.

Whereas many promoters read from laws and explained technicalities of the process, the questions which were raised by the audience often focussed on the fear of repetition of the 1992 debacle, why soldiers are on the road if there is peace (Cabinda) or simple but fundamental questions like: "What can the elections do to help us with the agriculture or put children in school"? Civic education implies explaining and convincing people that democratic principles of government are somehow better at addressing the real needs of people (oriented around physical, social and economic security) than governments under guidance of other ideals. Once given the motivation to vote and to embrace the message of democracy, then its technicalities (the various steps of the voting process, other civic rights, etc.) will be much more easily grasped by people.

Some promoters were good at explaining that voters should vote according to trustworthiness and what the party programmes of each respective party indicated. Other promoters tended to treat the elections simply as an end in itself – which begs the question why anyone should bother to vote? Some reverted to a very typical "African" way of transmitting a message: that of packaging it in parables and anecdotes. The parables often tend to be linked to family matters (parents and children, husband and wife), or to nature (such as sowing seeds to harvest at a later point). The most skilled and charismatic promoters masterfully used parables and jokes to convey their message, others were less successful. Parables aren't always suitable to explain or discuss concrete challenges, and could even dilute a message. To use one example: Reducing the question of peace building between two former warring enemies to a question of "peace in the house" between husband and wife (to "keep the children from suffering") is to make the complexities of the Angolan history appear banal. Some parables also seemed to have been quite "improvised" by the promoter. Promoters' lessons learned sessions could well be used to discuss which parables work to explain particular points and discuss the "value added" of conveying particular messages in allegories.

INCREASE OPENNESS: The generalised association of political parties with danger and fear appear to lead most promoters to speak of political parties in the abstract, or by using pseudonyms such as "*partido Banana*" and "*partido Laranja*". This has also been the recommendation of the UNDP.[25] The review team disagrees despite valid arguments. In the long run, such "mystification" rather contributes to fear instead reducing it: Is mentioning the name of the party somehow dangerous? Being open about the existence of several parties and their names should be part and parcel of a civic and electoral education campaign. Being concrete is also to educate in a situation where lack of information is a problem in itself. If the well-informed and confident people promoting civic education do not dare speak the names of parties and open a frank dialogue which even touches on the content of their programmes and the real options available to citizens, then who can?

TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND PUBLIC SPHERE: It is certainly a challenge for a non-domestic body such as UNDP to intervene to ensure that the public space is open for frank and civic debate on all aspects of society, politics and government, and that pressure is made on the government to guarantee this openness throughout the country. But the organisations with which the UNDP trust fund works are mostly Angolan and are at liberty to intervene. UNDP can assist them in creating the scaled-up network they need if they are to have leverage before the party-state.

UNDP emphasises that the programme is pioneering and serving as an "ice-breaker" in terms of civic education. UNDP *is indeed* leading the way in an area where the government has been traditionally mistrustful of NGOs and CSOs. Nevertheless, it is too early to say if this is setting the standard for future civic education programmes. It is probable that other political developments will be more significant for the future of civic education in Angola, rather than the programme influence itself.

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[25] UNDP gives several compelling reasons: i) so as not to privilege the well-known parties; ii) not to put the promoters or the CSOs as "political" risk; iii) avoid potential "activism" by promoters, iv) follow CNE recommendations.

It is our view that supporting civic education directed as information towards the popular masses, is not enough. Donors should therefore:

- ✓ Look for bold initiatives which contribute to increased openness in the public sphere by facilitating networking, constructive debate and rapprochement between political parties themselves and with other parts of civil society.

MOTIVATING THE PROMOTERS: Motivating the promoters of civic education is essential as long as the methodology is very much centred on direct community contact which the promoters carry out.

- ✓ UNDP should collect information about "best practise" when comparing the organisations' "motivation" policies, and then make clear recommendations.
- ✓ UNDP should redouble efforts to disseminate alternative pedagogical methods. The *palestras* are too much of a "one-way" communication to be efficient as a participative exercise.

TARGET GROUPS & MESSAGE: This report initiated by highlighting a comment overheard by a civic education session participant/audience who essentially raised the question of "what democracy and rights can do for me". It remains a challenge for civic education promoters to make the messages of rights and democracy appear highly relevant to the recipients and their "life-worlds", thus contributing to their "empowerment": The old dictum that "power is taken, not given" could be used to illustrate the need for future civic education programmes to convert "information" into inspiring knowledge to increase a recipient constituency's collective sense of available options to act upon, that is, empowerment.

- ✓ UNDP must tackle the finding that not all CSOs/individual promoters provide messages which are consistently correct and relevant.
- ✓ UNDP and other donors/stakeholders should consider embedding future civic education with development programmes which take the local development scene as a starting point – notably support to decentralisation/local governance.
- ✓ Efforts to continuously develop and sharpen the message of civic and electoral education so as to increase the relevance for citizens/population groups in their varying local "life-worlds". The move from focussing the message from "individual enlightenment" to "collective empowerment" could be carefully considered.

The choice of target groups in the citizenry is of less importance if the future weight is put on capacity development of CSOs, but the programme would then fall under a different category from "civic education".

- ✓ The question of who is the prioritised target group should be the objective of serious debate for a next phase. The priorities must be duly communicated.

Future UNDP programmes for civic education should strive to make strategic choices with respect to *target groups* and *channels of communication*.

Pictures above are from various civic education sessions: 1) COIEPA, Sumbe: Pupils and *sobas* in Kwanza Sul; 2) Solcicampo, Benguela: Promoter and supervisor; 3) Rede Eleitoral, Cabinda: Promoter and organiser; 4) Circulo Rastafari, Lobito: Students at Catholic Church.

In a rather cautious way, the programme has combined the peace message with gravitation towards individual enlightenment – to preach the gospel of rights, so to say. The question is if future programmes of civic education should now move a step forward to set its aim on the next challenges of consolidating democracy: to put across that democracy is more than a set of procedures (or 'a methodology' as one promoter had it) to *elect* a legitimate government. That would imply providing people with tools for collective action, and to explaining the meaning of democracy in terms which are controversial in today's Angola, for instance principles which involve that:

- a people could recall a poorly performing government through elections
- the law is above the executive (the rule of law, as opposed to arbitrary government)
- people have the right to organise to fight for their interests
- all citizens are equal before the law, and that no one is above the law
- government is accountable to its citizenry
- transparency is a precondition for accountability
- the state has committed to the duty to ensure provision of public services for citizens.

These principles need not read like a political science curriculum. Brought down to a local level, and discussed as part and parcel of the quest for resolving the difficulties experienced by ordinary people throughout Angola, they should give intrinsic and immediate meaning. Building these principles and terms into discussions about the local governance – which provide the immediate governance context of all people – could actually be an efficient pedagogic move.[26]

UNDP supports many activities in the field of local governance in Angola. The next "stage" in Angolan democratisation is, according to the Government that associated with "decentralisation". This policy statement opens up many possibilities of discussing democratic procedures at a very local and concrete level, to which future civic education campaigns could be linked.

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[26] Development Workshop has indicated that its plans for civic and electoral education efforts should be closely linked to its many activities promoting participatory local governance and decentralisation. Such a move could provide an excellent platform for learning through civic education linking local practice with abstract theories of democratic governance – and give them real practical applicability in a local context where the idea of transparency and accountability in a *município* administration seems much more of a possibility than the same applied to the military-petroleum complex wielding power in Luanda.

6.   Summary of findings and recommendations

HIGH RELEVANCE: The programme has proven merits, and has *high relevance* for the development of a democratic public space and to inform a citizenry with a large need for civic and electoral information and education. However, its current strength and focus is on developing capacity of the 22 partner CSOs (point 2 of the output statement), and less on the messages conveyed to the recipient populations (point 1) which would be more directly addressing the goal/outcome statement.

✓ UNDP should consider reducing number of partner CSOs to allow for a more qualitative M&E in the future, including a stronger focus on the civic education contents.
✓ Increase diversity among partners and channels of disseminating the "message".

INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES REVIEW: The UNDP Civic Education Team/Project Unit has delivered an *excellent* capacity building/development project for the implementing partner CSOs. However, some fund donors expressed that the fund programme had somewhat diverted from original expectations that it would be more closely contributing to the whole electoral process.[27] Misperceptions could have been avoided if the project document had provided clearer links between overall outcome, expected results (outputs) and activities.

✓ It is both the donors' and the implementing agency's (UNDP) responsibility to ensure that the parties are actually agreeing upon the expected results.
✓ Outcomes should be tangible and "measurable", and while clearly directed at ambitious development goals (subject to all other influences, and therefore harder to assess for programme impact) they should logically follow programme activity and outputs.
✓ The UNDP should put all necessary effort into producing a clear and concise project document text, including a log-frame which facilitates monitoring of outcome.

AIMS AND IMPACT: Maximum 1 per cent of the registered voters will receive the civic education directly from the trust fund related activities (except some mass media messages). In addition, many of the training sessions are of a momentary character from which no "deep impact" can be expected.
✓ In order to approach the very ambitious outcome statement[28] the UNDP programme should be aware that its strength cannot reside in the numbers of people it can realistically train, but in the *quality* and *targeting* of the messages conveyed.
✓ Is it possible, in the frame of one programme like this, to ensure due follow-up of the CSOs in both *electoral* and other *rights-focussed* civic education? Alternatively, the UNDP chooses a more limited focus – in particular if elections continue to be such a dominant topic.
✓ A narrowing of the topical focus would also make it easier to restrict the list of eligible CSOs.

COORDINATION AND HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE: UNDP is presently not in a position to take the lead in coordinating all donor efforts on civic and electoral education. UNDP could, however:
✓ Take a lead in renewing dialogue between political parties and the civil society organisations involved in civic and electoral education.
✓ Take high level initiatives to improve open dialogue and encourage a tolerant public sphere – thereby preparing the ground for future civic education.
✓ The UNDP should explore ways of using its international weight to promote bolder messages in civic education, even where citizen rights confront existing power structures.
✓ UNDP should use its international expertise and legitimacy to spearhead arguments in the public space when the national organisations are restricted to do so.

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[27] Meanwhile, particularly one donor expressed satisfaction with the way the fund has turned out despite the above observation. The UNDP nevertheless contributed to the electoral processes through the Angolan CSO's civic education, of which a large part was about the election procedures.
[28] For short: pro-poor growth, human rights, good governance, decentralization, empowering citizens and increasing participation.

Em Português: Sumário executivo, conclusões e recomendações

"Como podem as eleições ajudar-nos a debelar a fome"

Relatório Final – Uma avaliação intermédia do apoio Norueguês ao Fundo de Apoio para Educação Cívica – Junho de 2008.

Sumário executivo

- Nos fins de 2006 o GdA autorizou o PNUD a realizar um projecto de educação cívica. Foi estabelecido um fundo de apoio às actividades de educação cívica, suportado pelas embaixadas da Noruega e Suécia e ainda pela USAid e pelos fundos do próprio PNUD. No final de 2007, tinham sido seleccionadas e subsidiadas 22 organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) e associações de organizações para a realização de actividades de educação cívica por todo o país.

- O objectivo da revisão intermédia é avaliar os resultados alcançados e aconselhar a embaixada da Noruega sobre as questões de apoio à educação cívica e democracia em Angola. A revisão foi realizada por uma equipa de dois consultores – numa missão que foi simultaneamente de revisão de um programa de educação cívica e eleitoral implementado pela Development Workshop, tendo lugar no período entre 21 de Maio e 3 de Junho de 2008.

- Os consultores produziram este relatório depois de terem reuniões com a unidade do PNUD de apoio ao projecto, bem como com outras figuras chave do PNUD. Adicionalmente, as viagens às províncias de Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo e Cabinda deram informação substancial para o relatório. As visitas a diversas cidades nas províncias deram a oportunidade de observar *in loco* muitas sessões de educação cívica realizadas por algumas das 22 OSCs.

- O contexto em que a educação cívica teve lugar em 2008 pode ser caracterizado em termos do geralmente fraco conhecimento sobre direitos cívicos e sistema político. Três dinâmicas influenciam também a educação cívica: o considerável *entusiasmo* pela paz e democratização, o *medo* de uma reacção negativa após as eleições similar à das eleições de 1992 e o *autoritarismo* da vida política.

- Olhando para trás, pode dizer-se que o Fundo do PNUD para Educação Cívica parece incluir diversas agendas, parcialmente reflectidas nos documentos do projecto: a) um desejo de contribuir em geral para a democratização e o processo eleitoral, b) um desejo de estabelecer um veículo organizacional para, concretamente, dar "educação cívica" a um grande número de cidadãos, e c) o objectivo de desenvolver a capacidade de organizações da sociedade civil seleccionadas. A declaração de objectivo do Documento do Projecto adapta-se a a), mas a urgência do programa significou que os aspectos práticos de b) e em particular de c) tomaram a dianteira.

- A revisão elogia geralmente o excelente desempenho da unidade de apoio ao projecto (UAP) – a qual conseguiu num curto período organizar e implementar rotinas de monitoria e avaliação (M&A) para as muitas organizações envolvidas, bem como proporcionar uma grande quantidade de formação e acompanhamento *in loco*. Combinou isto com a realização de um impressionante programa de sessões de formação sobre questões substantivas de direitos cívicos (como a lei eleitoral) e humanos, incluindo o uso de materiais de aprendizagem produzidos em Angola (da CNE, ministérios e algumas ONGs). A formação e acompanhamento foram, sem excepção, elogiados pelas OSCs.

- A nova experiência trouxe muitos desafios para as OSCs implementadoras, muitas das quais parecem funcionar satisfatoriamente, bem como para o PNUD, que já retirou importantes lições aprendidas e tomou medidas correctivas para melhorar no futuro o desempenho geral do programa. O ambiente político, as capacidades organizacionais altamente variáveis das diversas OSCs e os níveis de formação do seu pessoal forneceram desafios à UAP do PNUD.

- Com base nos relatórios das OSCs e nas extrapolações da equipa de revisão feitas a partir das observações no terreno, é provável que o objectivo de atingir cerca de cem mil pessoas com educação cívica seja alcançado. O facto de este número corresponder a pouco mais de 1% do eleitorado registado sugere que, no futuro, o programa deva fazer algumas escolhas estratégicas no que respeita aos grupos alvo na colectividade.

- A UAP, conduzida por um especialista internacional em desenvolvimento e educação cívica pedagógica, colocou muita ênfase nas virtudes da aprendizagem participativa. A abordagem é altamente recomendável no cenário Angolano, mas o PNUD achou também que a tarefa é pesada e, embora os princípios da aprendizagem participativa sejam universalmente bem acolhidos, os "promotores" da educação cívica falham por vezes na prática das técnicas adquiridas. A técnica mais praticada foi a das palestras perante uma multidão e depois uma sessão de perguntas que raramente conduziam a um verdadeiro debate ou troca em profundidade de pontos de vista e preocupações.

- Ligada à questão dos métodos de comunicação, está a questão da mensagem transmitida. Muitas das sessões de educação cívica observadas estavam ligadas aos procedimentos eleitorais ou a questões de paz e reconciliação, mas o relatório enfatiza a necessidade de investigar formas de melhorar a relevância das mensagens transmitidas – tanto para os indivíduos como para a sociedade.

- O relatório argumenta que, para a continuação do programa, devem ser feitas algumas escolhas estratégicas baseadas numa escolha de ênfases: maximizar o impacto em termos de mudança social/política; desenvolver OSCs; maximizar o desdobrar de "pacotes de conhecimento" de educação cívica; ou lançamentos para secções específicas (necessitadas) da colectividade.

Sumário de conclusões e recomendações

ALTA RELEVÂNCIA: o programa provou ter méritos e é *altamente relevante* para o desenvolvimento de um espaço público democrático e para informar uma colectividade com uma grande necessidade de informação e educação cívica e eleitoral. Todavia, o seu actual ponto forte e enfoque está no desenvolvimento da capacidade dos 22 parceiros de OSCs (ponto 2 da relação de resultados), e menos nas mensagens transmitidas para a população recipiente (ponto 1) que tratariam mais directamente a declaração de objectivos/resultados.

- ✓ O PNUD deve considerar reduzir o número de OSCs parceiras para permitir uma M&A mais qualitativa no futuro, incluindo um enfoque mais forte nos conteúdos da educação cívica.
- ✓ Aumento da diversidade entre os parceiros e canais de disseminação da "mensagem".

REVISÃO DE INTENÇÕES E RESULTADOS: a Equipa Projecto de Educação Cívica/Unidade do PNUD realizou um *excelente* projecto de desenvolvimento/capacitação para as OSCs parceiras. Contudo, alguns doadores de fundos exprimiram que o programa de financiamento tinha de certa forma divergido das expectativas originais de que contribuiria mais estreitamente para o processo eleitoral

no seu conjunto.[29] Más percepções podiam ter sido evitadas se o documento do projecto tivesse fornecido ligações mais claras entre o resultado geral, resultados esperados (produtos) e actividades.

- ✓ É da responsabilidade dos doadores e da agência de implementação (PNUD) assegurar que as partes estão efectivamente de acordo sobre os resultados esperados.
- ✓ Os resultados devem ser tangíveis e "mensuráveis", e embora claramente dirigidos a objectivos de desenvolvimento ambiciosos (sujeitos a todas as outras influências e por isso mais difíceis de avaliar para o impacto do programa), devem logicamente seguir as actividades e produtos do programa.
- ✓ O PNUD deve fazer todos os esforços necessários para produzir um texto claro e conciso do documento do projecto, incluindo um quadro lógico que facilite a monitoria do resultado.

OBJECTIVOS E IMPACTO: no máximo, 1% dos eleitores registados receberão educação cívica directamente das actividades relacionadas com o fundo (excepto as mensagens de alguns meios de comunicação de massas). Adicionalmente, muitas das sessões de formação são de carácter momentâneo do qual não se pode esperar um "impacto profundo".

- ✓ A fim de abordar a muito ambiciosa declaração de resultados[30], o programa do PNUD deve estar consciente que o seu ponto forte não pode residir no número de pessoas que pode realisticamente treinar, mas sim na *qualidade* e *objectividade* das mensagens transmitidas.
- ✓ É possível, no quadro de um programa como este, assegurar o devido acompanhamento das OSCs, tanto na educação cívica *eleitoral* como na educação cívica *focada em direitos*? Alternativamente, o PNUD escolhe um enfoque mais limitado – em particular se as eleições continuarem a ser um tópico dominante.
- ✓ Um estreitamento do enfoque corrente tornaria também mais fácil restringir a lista das OSCs elegíveis.

COORDENAÇÃO E DIÁLOGO A ALTO NÍVEL: o PNUD não está presentemente numa posição de liderar a coordenação dos esforços de todos os doadores para a educação cívica e eleitoral. O PNUD pode, contudo:

- ✓ Liderar a renovação do diálogo entre os partidos políticos e as organizações da sociedade civil envolvidas na educação cívica e eleitoral.
- ✓ Tomar iniciativas a alto nível para melhorar um diálogo aberto e encorajar uma esfera pública tolerante – preparando assim o terreno para educação cívica futura.
- ✓ O PNUD deve explorar formas de usar o seu peso internacional para promover mensagens de educação cívica mais ousadas, mesmo onde os direitos dos cidadãos se confrontam com as estruturas de poder existentes.
- ✓ O PNUD deve usar a sua experiência e legitimidade internacional para lançar argumentos no espaço público quando as organizações nacionais sofrem restrições para o fazer.

É nosso ponto de vista que apoiar educação cívica dirigida como informação para as massas populares, não é suficiente. Assim, os doadores devem:

- ✓ Procurar iniciativas ousadas que contribuam para maior abertura da esfera pública, facilitando o trabalho em rede, o debate construtivo e o restabelecimento de relações amigáveis entre os partidos políticos entre si e com outras partes da sociedade civil.

MOTIVANDO OS PROMOTORES: é essencial motivar os promotores de educação cívica desde que a metodologia seja muito centrada no contacto directo com a comunidade levado a cabo pelos promotores.

- ✓ O PNUD deve recolher informação sobre "melhores práticas" ao comparar as políticas de "motivação" das organizações, e depois fazer recomendações claras.

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[29] Entretanto, um doador em particular exprimiu satisfação pela forma como o fundo tem funcionado, não obstante a observação acima. O PNUD contribuiu mesmo assim para o processo eleitoral através da educação cívica das OSCs Angolanas, da qual uma grande parte era sobre os procedimentos da eleição.

[30] Em resumo: crescimento pro-pobres, direitos humanos, boa governação, descentralização, empoderamento dos cidadãos e aumento da participação.

✓ O PNUD deve redobrar esforços para disseminar métodos pedagógicos alternativos. As *palestras* são uma comunicação demasiado "num sentido" para serem eficientes como exercício participativo.

GRUPOS ALVO & MENSAGEM: este relatório começou por realçar um comentário ouvido casualmente, feito por um participante numa sessão sobre educação cívica, que essencialmente colocou a questão "o que é que a democracia e os direitos podem fazer por mim". Permanece um desafio para os promotores de educação cívica fazer com que as mensagens sobre direitos e democracia pareçam altamente relevantes para os recipientes e os seus "mundos", contribuindo assim para o seu empoderamento": o velho ditado "o poder ganha-se, não é dado" pode ser usado para ilustrar a necessidade de futuros programas de educação cívica converterem a "informação" em conhecimento inspirador, para aumentar o sentimento colectivo do eleitorado recipiente sobre as opções disponíveis para actuar, isto é, o empoderamento.

✓ O PNUD deve procurar resolver a constatação de que nem todos os promotores individuais/OSCs passam mensagens consistentemente correctas e relevantes.

✓ O PNUD e outros doadores/parceiros devem considerar integrar a futura educação cívica em programas de desenvolvimento que tomem o cenário do desenvolvimento local como ponto de partida – especialmente apoiar a descentralização/governação local.

✓ Devem ser feitos esforços para desenvolver e intensificar continuamente a mensagem de educação civil e eleitoral, de forma a aumentar a relevância para os grupos de cidadãos/população nos seus diferentes "mundos" locais. A mudança de foco da mensagem, de "esclarecimento individual" para "empoderamento colectivo", deve ser cuidadosamente ponderada.

A escolha de grupos alvo na colectividade é de somenos importância se o peso futuro for posto no desenvolvimento da capacidade das OSCs, mas o programa inserir-se-á então numa categoria diferente da "educação cívica".

✓ A questão sobre de quem é o grupo alvo prioritário deve ser o objectivo de um sério debate para uma próxima fase. As prioridades devem ser devidamente comunicadas.

Os futuros programas do PNUD para educação cívica devem esforçar-se por fazer escolhas estratégicas relativamente aos *grupos alvo* e *canais de comunicação*.

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UNDP et. al (2007 & 2008). Approximately 30 training-related documents (as provided by Project Unit), with content ranging from civic and electoral information to pedagogical tools

People interviewed and consulted

All meetings for both the UNDP and DW supported teams and organizations are listed, as in many respects "both missions" informed each other).

Date	Organisation/group	Location	Participants
21.05	Representatives of UNDP-supported organisations: • FAPED • Plataforma Eleitoral • Lawuleno • Search for common ground, Moxico • Rede Eleitoral, Bengo • AASAA, Lunda Norte • Igreja Metodista, Uíge • AJUDECA, Zaire • OADEC, Zaire	UNDP offices, Luanda	Round table discussions
22.05	Meetings with representatives of DW's partners: • CEASTE • CICA • FONGA • AEA	DW offices	Round table discussion

Date	Name	Role, organisation	Where
31.5	Florinda Sambambi	Promotor, coordenadora provincial do núcleo	Bailundo
31.5	Pedro Satchitota	Promotor, Coordenador prov. adjunto	Bailundo
31.5	Magazini Kambozo	Promotora de Bailundo	Bailundo
31.5	Cesar Katimba	Promotor e assitente de finanças do núcleo	Bailundo
31.5	Afonso Kangingi	Soba, Bairro Kalueyo	Bailundo
25.5	Aurélio Kissombe	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Simão Ezequiel	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Domingos Santos	Promotor, DW, município de Balombo	Benguela
25.5	Joaquim Vitor	Promotor, DW, município de Lobito	Benguela
25.5	João da Silva	Promotor, DW	Benguela
25.5	Dona Adriana	Formador, DW	Benguela
25.5	Benedito Sayendo	Pastor CICA, formador do Núcleo, DW	Benguela
25.5	Leonardo Pinto Engerio	Promotor, Solcicampo	Benguela
26.5	Palmira Diogo	Promotora, DW & Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
26.5	Onesimo Setucula	Coordenador nacional, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
26.5	Ivo Mabiala	Coordenador do núcleo provincial, DW	Cabinda
26.5	Próspero Ngaia	Coordenador adjunto do núcleo	Cabinda
26.5	Antónia Rodrigues da Costa	Formadora, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
27.5	Mateus Nhaca	Presidente, Plataforma Eleitoral	Cabinda
28.5	Simão Madeka	Coordenator of civic education, Mãos Livres	Cabinda
28.5	Sr da Silva	Presidente, Mãos Livres	Cabinda
31.5	Julio Quintas	Coordenador técnico, centre region, DW	Huambo
1.6	Jonas Chilimo	Coordenador da educação cívica, INACAD	Huambo
1.6	Altina Violeta Vapor Vitor	Activist, INACAD	Huambo
1.6	4 promoters and representatives	FAPED	Huambo
24.5	Dickyamini Bocolo	Formador, Círculo Rastafari de Benguela	Lobito
24.5	Carla	Activista, Círculo Rastafari de Benguela	Lobito
	Fritz Affolter	Senior Civic Education Expert, civic education programme leader, UNDP	Luanda
	Eunice Inácio	Gestora, Sector da Paz e Cidadania, DW	Luanda

	João Gil	National coordinator, PECE1, DW	Luanda
	Henriques Freitas Cabula	National coordinator, UNDP trust fund	Luanda
	Vibeke Skauerud	Programme officer, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
	Lise Stensrud	Minister councillor, Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
21.5	João Castro "Freedom"	Secretário geral, LIDDHA e FONGA	Luanda
26.5	Paula Cristina Fernandes	European Commission	Luanda
26.5	Áurea Machado Pereira	Project manager, European Commission	Luanda
26.5	Isabel Emerson	Country director, NDI	Luanda
26.5	Clarisse Kaputu	Vice-min. De MINARS, Spokeswoman of UNITA	Luanda
26.5	Azevedo Kanganje	Secretário para assuntos eleitorais, UNITA	Luanda
26.5	Filomeno Vieira Lopes	Spokesman, FpD	Luanda
29.5	Maria Cramér	First secretary, Swedish Embassy	Luanda
29.5	Mervyn Farroe	Oficial de supervisão de programas, USAID	Luanda
29.5	Ranca Tuba	Democracy and governance team leader, USAID	Luanda
29.5	Allan Cain	Director, Development Workshop	Luanda
2.6	Fabrice Beutler	Gestor de programas, DW	Luanda
4.6	Ana Graça	Assistant resident representative, Governance unit, UNDP	Luanda
4.6	Gita Welch	Resident representative, UNDP Angola	Luanda
23.5	Vieira Chitunga	Reporter da ACCIDANA	Seles
23.5	Baptista André	Soba de Aluwaio	Seles
23.5	Domingos Aguiar	Soba adjunto de Aluwaio	Seles
23.5	Ricardo Kalei	Coordenador provincial, COPOLO (NGO)	Seles
23.5	Ngunza Fernando	Regedor geral do município	Seles
23.5	Simão Gando	Promotor, DW	Seles
23.5	Fernando Domingos	Coordenador DW, município Gabela	Seles
24.5	Silva João	Promotor de DW e dir. prov. ACCIDANA	Seles
24.5	Edvânio, Ana Gasolina & Lauriana	Civic education activists, COIEPA	Sumbe
24.5	5 sobas	Listeners to a civic education session	Sumbe

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Annexes

Output and activity framework

The **status** column reports UNDP's assessment by **March 15, 2008**.

Outputs	Indicative Activities	Status
1.) Improved Civic Awareness and Access to Information Increased	1.1. Dissemination of Civic Education Guidelines to partners in Angola	Completed
	1.2. Review and selection of eligible projects	Completed
	1.3. Funding of Projects	One Project completed; 22 in progress
	1.4. Monitoring and Evaluation	In process
	1.5. Evaluation	Not yet initiated
2.) CSO's trained in basic project management, civic education and conflict prevention	2.1. Mapping and assessment of CSOs' civic education capacity	In process
	2.2. Conduct needs assessment with a focus on project management, civic education, conflict prevention	In process
	2.3. Adapt and/or develop appropriate training materials and tools concerning civic education	In process
	2.4. Conduct Refresher Training and create network of trainers	In process
3.) Civic education assistance coordinated	3.1. Recruitment of Staff Unit	Completed
	3.2. Establish and equip the coordination unit working space	Completed
	3.3. Contract external audit assessment	Not yet initiated
	3.4. Establishment of an M&E system	In process
	3.5. Coordination of key civic stakeholders	In process

List of 22 organisations

Overview of shortlisted grantees proposed for funding with proposals that focus on civic education in Angola.

No.	Name of Grant Applicant	Target Municipalities	Thematic Focus	Number of Direct Beneficiaries a) *Training*	Number of Direct Beneficiaries b) *Non-formal Education*	Number of Direct Beneficiaries c) *Conference or Campaign Participants*	Number of Direct Beneficiaries d) *Visitors of Exhibitions*	Number of Direct Beneficiaries e) *Recipients of Printed Media*	Number of Direct Beneficiaries e) *Recipients of Radio Messages*	Total Number of Direct Beneficiaries	Comments
Bengo Province											
1	Rede Eleitoral Angola	Ambriz, Ícolo, Bengo, Nambuangong, Quiçama, Caxito	Women Civic Education; Civic and Political Rights	24	6000	0	0	0	0	**6024**	*Unusual Gender Focus: this CSO employs only with Female Activists*
Benguela Province											
2	Solcicampo Benguela	Municipalities of Baia Farta, Balambo, Benguela, Bocoio, and Lobito	Civic and Political Rights Education	17	3000	0	0	0	0	**3017**	*This CSO has higher training / travel costs because of its wider spread across multiple municipalities*
3	Circulo Rastafari de Benguela	Zonas 6, 7, 8 in Lobito; 4 communities in Bocoioh	Civic Education for Communities	27	6210	0	0	0	0	**6237**	*This CSO achieves low cost/beneficiary ratio due to mobilization of volunteer extension workers*
Bié Province											
4	Associacao de Apoio e Desenvolvimento ao Campo ADAC	Kuito, Andulo, Kunhinga	Human and Citizen Rights	33	3842	0	9000	0	0	**12875**	*Although this organization has a low cost/beneficiary ratio given its conference/campaign strategy component, the number of beneficiaries in terms of quality education input is 3842 (i.e. 99999,90 / 3842 = USD 26.03.-*
Cuando-Cubango Province											
5	Igreja Congrecional Evangelica de Angola (IECA)	Menongue, Kuito Kuanavale and Caiundo	Conflict Resolution; Human Rights; National Reconciliation	24	6000	0	0	0	0	**6024**	
Huambo Province											

#	Organization	Locations	Focus							Total	Notes
6	Instituto Nacional de Apoio a Crianca Desnutrida, Desamparada, e Deficiente Fisica [INACAD]	Huambo, Kalima e Chipipa, Provoaçoes de Boas Aguas, Cruzeiro, Municípios da Tchicala Tcholohanga e Ukuma	Civic and Political Rights Education	28	4600	0	0	0	0	**4628**	
7	Commissao Arquidiocesana de Justicia e Paz Huambo	Londuimbali, Bailundo, Vila Nova, Katchiungo, Hungo, Ukama, Longongo	Conflict Resolution; Human Rights, National Reconciliation	16	2400	230	0	0	0	**2646**	*This agency provides on average more days of training to beneficiaries than other grantees hence higher cost/beneficiary ratio*
Huila Province											
8	Associacao de Mulheres Empresarias e de Negocios da Huila - AMEH	Quipongo, Jamba e Kuvango	Women Civic Education; Civic and Political Rights	18	5000	9000	0	0	0	**14018**	*Although this organization has a low cost/beneficiary ratio due to anticipated high attendance of its foto exhibition strategy component, the number of beneficiaries in terms of quality education input is 5000 (i.e. 99999,81 / 5000 = USD 19.99 cost per project beneficiary).*
9	Associacao para a Promocao do Desenvolvimento Comunitario - MAFIKU	Chicomba e Kallaquembe	Women Civic Education; Human and Citizen Rights	20	5000	0	0	0	0	**5020**	
Lunda Norte Province											
10	Associacao de Amizade e Soliedaridade Angolana - Alemanha	Lucapa, Chitato, Kuilo, Chambulo, Dundo, Lubalo	Elections Education	24	6000	0	0	0	0	**6024**	
Moxico Province											
11	Search for Common Ground & FIERCO	Luena, Leua, Lumeje-Camaja	Institutional Strengthening; Conflict Resolution	60	4000	3150	0	1000	0	**8210**	*SFCG is an international NGO seeking to strengthen institutional capacity of its Angolan Partner Organization FIERCO by implementing this project together. SFCG/FIERCO use a participatory group methodology exercised with different groups gathering spontaneously. Although the*

											number of estimated direct beneficiaries is higher than average, frequency of educational interaction is expected to be less than other agencies.
Uige Province											
12	Accao para Promocao Social dos Direitos Humanos - APSDH	Sanza Pombo (Kimatumbi, Mongo Vunda, Serradora, Kibula, Kifuassi, Kifutila Kambengi, Kizulu, Panda Minanga, Kikossie Bunga, Kingombo)	Human and Citizen Rights Education	16	3200	0	0	0	0	**3216**	
13	Associacao Cristiana de Jovems ACJ	Uige, Songo	Human and Citizen Rights Education	18	4500	0	0	0	0	**4518**	
14	Igreja Metodista [IMUA]	Negage (Cangundo, Caua Grande, Caua Missao, Capoupa, Aledia da Missao, Cauenda, Cabala, Sao Paolo, Quindando, Quituia, Dala, Bamba Matamba, Catumbo, Caua Control, Caua Capin, Cafamoso, Banza Negage, Kissengo, Terra Nova, Kinsete, Cacongo, Caua Bravo da Rosa, Cassamba, Linguila, Nengo, Kipanzo, Bravo, Cacongo Centro, Caua Central, Tinguita, Cazanga, Cangulo, Kahiri)	Human and Citizen Rights Education	18	3200	0	0	0	0	**3218**	
Zaire Province											
15	Associacao Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitario em Angola AJUDECA	Soyo (Sumba, Quelo, Mangue Grande, Pedra de Feitiço, e Soyo-Sede)	Institutional Capacity Development, Political and Human Rights Education	100	5000	0	0	0	0	**5100**	
16	0ADEC	Mbaza Congo, Kuimba	Human and Citizen Rights	20	5000	30	0	0	0	**5050**	
Project Proposals Proposing the Use of Mass Media (Newspapers, Radio Programs) as a Means for Strengthening Civic Education											
17	Radio Ecclesia	Benguela, Cabinda, Huila and Luanda	Access to Information; Civic, Political and Human Rights	10	0	0	0	5100 000	0	**510001 0**	
18	Grupo Socio-Cultural Lawuleno	All 18 Provinces	Access to Information; Human Rights	0	4000	0	10000	0	0	**14000**	*Will produce and distribute 10000 bulletins which service rural community target groups across Angola*
Project Proposals of 'Platform-' or Umbrella Organizations Proposing Civic Education Activities in Multiple Provinces											

19	Plataforma Eleitoral	All 18 Provinces	Duties and Priviledges of Citizenship; Political and Civic Rights Education	33	8000	0	0	1200	0	**9233**	*Plataforma Eleitoral is an umbrella organization of 'Rede Eleitoral' units across the country, and therefore eligible for a USD 200,000.- grant.*
20	COIEPA	All 18 Provinces, with educational emphasis in Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul and Malange	Citizen Rights and National Reconciliation; Conflict Resolution	48	9820	0	0	500	0	**10368**	*COIEPA is an umbrella organization for various church groups in Angola, and therefore elegible for a USD 200,000.- grant.*
21	World Vision	Luanda, Moxico, Benguela, Bie, Kwanza Sul, Cuando-Cubango, Huambo	Institutional Strengthening; Citizen Rights Training for Handicapped People	52	7473	100	0	0	0	**7625**	*World Vision is an international NGO proposing to strengthen institutional capacity of its Angolan Partner Organization FAPEH, which is an Angolan Umbrella Organization for grassroots CSOs serving handicapped people. It has thus qualified for receiving a grant up to USD 200,000.-*
22	Mãos Livres	Luanda, Malange, Cabinda, Lunda Norte	Citizen Rights Training for Members of the HIV Community (including Prisoners)	20	6960	0	0	0	0	**6980**	*This organization works with members of the HIV community in rural areas, as well as prisoners with HIV. Hence, logistics and transportation costs are higher than in projects focusing an average target groups*
22	**TOTAL**			**626**	**109 205**	**12 510**	**19 000**	**5 102 700**	**0**	**5 244 041**	**Were one to discount beneficaries of radio and print media messages, and focus instead on training and 'learning encounters', the averaged cost would be around USD 20.- per person**

Two special cases

The following section is annexed in order to illustrate the challenges both in M&E as well as in capacity development confronting the UNDP. The reader should note that these examples, as somewhat problematic, should *not* be taken as typical of the rest of the partner CSOs.

The review team encountered two partner CSOs, *Mãos Livres* (Cabinda) and FAPED[31] (Huambo) that have selected civic education themes not directly linked with the election registration process or the elections itself. The two organisations appeared among the poorest performers among the implementing partners to the UNDP Civic Education Fund. Both Mãos Livres and FAPED are national organisations with their head offices in Luanda and provincial delegations implementing various projects directed towards the human- and individual rights of vulnerable persons or groups. Both organisations are based on a high degree of central management and little authority or autonomy delegated to the provincial delegations.

MÃOS LIVRES:[32] In Cabinda, Mãos Livres receive financial support from the fund for a HIV/AIDS project among vulnerable populations in the prisons, and the army and police service in the province. Mãos Livres has not been able to gain access to the intended target group, and will thus not achieve its agreed progress within the Monitoring and Evaluation system set up by the UNDP. As the main target group is not available, Mãos Livres continue to work in and around Cabinda town, but with an unclear or undefined target population, something which also dilutes the message, or content, of the civic education.

The review team sat in on an HIV/AIDS *palestra* in one of the Cabinda town *Bairros*. The Mãos Livres civic education promoters showed great enthusiasm and dedication when giving their session, but the message (intended to focus on the human rights of persons infected with HIV/AIDS) was not effectively brought across; the session was more of a friendly reminder that HIV/AIDS is sexually transmitted, use of contraception is needed, and so on. That very message, it could also be noted, was communicated in Portuguese only, something which may also have further reduced the effectiveness of communication.

FAPED is an Angolan umbrella organisation for local groups working among physically disabled persons in the provinces. Related to the UNDP Civic Education fund, FAPED on national level receive its financial support through a North American NGO, World Vision. The reviewers are uncertain to what degree World Vision provides any value added to the capacity building of FAPED, or how effective it is in disseminating its thematic messages. In Huambo, testimony from the FAPED civic education team indicates that they receive little support from World Vision. For instance, World Vision had supported FAPED with transport only once – when some journalists were visiting the project! Although the review team was not able to observe FAPED during a civic education session in the provinces, a leading FAPED Civic Education team was met for an interview. The interview disclosed some confusion about the intended target groups (the disabled persons or the whole population?), and very little comprehension of the project, for example how the UNDP fund works in relationship with FAPED on national level and the link to World Vision. FAPED took part in the regional training/co-ordination seminar provided by UNDP in Huambo during the review.

RECOMMENDATIONS - TWO SPECIAL CASES: The review team found that the trust fund does not provide the right mechanism or institutional vehicle to support these organisations.
- ✓ Mãos Livres should seek technical support from organisations more closely linked with the theme HIV/AIDS, for example UNAIDS, WHO, UNICEF or similar, to situate their project in a more appropriate institutional setting.

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[31] Federação Angolana para Pessoas Portadores de Deficiências

[32] Mãos Livres is an Angolan "legal aid"/human rights based organisation that receives funds from various international sources, including the Norwegian Embassy, for its legal aid and human rights work throughout Angola. The organisation often chose to pursue difficult cases defending human rights.

✓ In the case of FAPED, UNDP should consider supporting the organisation directly, and even consider direct support to the provincial FAPED Teams for capacity building.

Terms of reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE
for
A review of Norwegian support to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):
TRUST FUND FOR SUPPORT TO CIVIC EDUCATION – ANGOLA
(hereafter called the "study")

BACKGROUND
Following more than 10 years of anti-colonial liberation struggle and 27 years of brutal civil war, Angola has enjoyed an effective peace since a peace agreement was signed on the 4th of April, 2002. First time elections were held in 1992, but were cut short after the first round of presidential elections, when the opposition party UNITA pulled out after accusing the ruling party MPLA of fraud. War started again, and lasted until the peace agreement in 2002.

New elections have been anticipated in Angola since the signing of the 2002 peace agreement. However, real preparations only started in 2006, with the creation of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the interministerial committee (CIPE) in charge of ensuring the logistics in connection with the registration and election process, and with the start of the actual voter registration in November 2006. In his new-year speech, the president announced elections on the 5th and 6th of September 2008. However, the dates are not yet formally approved, and elections still need to be officially announced.
Wanting to contribute to the election process, but without any official dates announced for the elections,

Norway (together with a few other bilateral donors) early on decided to support Angolan civil society through civic education projects. The rationale behind the decision was that civic education would be useful, regardless of an election date, and it allowed the embassy to contribute to the election process without depending on an official invitation from the Angolan authorities.

Despite a booming economy, Angola still faces a series of problems. The most serious challenges continue to be poverty, a limited peace dividend for the majority of its population in the context of massive financial incomes and economic growth, and a resource distribution gap which fails to produce progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. Literacy rate for adults (over 15 years old) is 67,4%, and for youth between 15 and 24 years old it is 72,2%.[33] When it comes to media, only the state owned radio and television channels broadcast nationally. There is only one daily newspaper, the Jornal de Angola, also controlled by the authorities. The few privately owned provincial radio stations are in most cases owned and controlled by members of the ruling MPLA party. There is a high degree of self-censorship by the media in the provinces. In Luanda, the situation is better. There are two main radio stations in addition to the state controlled media, namely Radio Ecclesia, owned by the Catholic Church, and Radio Despertar, owned by the opposition party UNITA. In addition, there are a number of weekly, private newspapers voicing rather strong criticism towards the government. However, the quality of the articles is often poor, and the price too high for the general population.

Furthermore, Angola is a country where donors in general and the UN system in particular have limited political leverage. The country's fortunate financial situation and new relationship with China makes it difficult to achieve an open political dialogue, including over human rights problems. In addition, Angola's experience with the UN has been rather mixed, in particular during the period of the Security Council mandates in the country. The UN presence has decreased steadily over the past years and is changing as development assistance is rapidly diminishing. The role of the UN is still important, however, particularly with regard to human rights and good governance.

Norway has provided support to the United Nations Development Programme in Angola since the signing of a Cost-Sharing Agreement (CSA) in 2001, for which NOK 28 million was pledged and disbursed, to support selected components of the Angola-UNDP Country Co-operation Framework for 2001-2003. Scanteam conducted a mid-term Review of the CSA in September 2004, and an end-review was concluded in March 2006.

Programme description
The UNDP Trust Fund for Civic Education was established in 2006 for a period of two years from 2006 to 2008. The fund has received funds from three donors (in addition to UNDP funds): Sweden (USD 1 million), USA (USD 226,000) and Norway (NOK 5 million or USD 772,800).

Programme description:
• Outcome: Empowering citizens and incrasing their participation in public policy decision-making
    processes.

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[33] UNDP Human Development report 2007 / 2008.

- Outputs:
    - 1.1. Improved Civic Education awareness and access to information increased.
    - 1.2. CSO's trained in basic project management, civic education and conflict prevention.
    - 1.3. Civic education assistance coordinated.

- Implementing partner: *UNDP*
- Responsible parties: *Selected CSO and other civic stakeholders.*

A total of 22 civil society organisations were selected for support by the Trust Fund. 16 of the organisations work in one of the following 10 provinces: Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Kuando-Kubango, Huambo, Huila, Lunda Norte, Moxico, Uige and Zaire. In addition, 4 networks or umbrella organisations are covering all 18 provinces , and finally, 2 CSOs use the media to carry out their work and aim to reach all 18 provinces.

MAIN PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of the study is to assess the results achieved during the previous (ongoing) phase assessing the plan, budget / resources and methodology used to reach the planned outcomes and outputs. The assessment should take into consideration political, economic, social and/or cultural opportunities and obstacles in the environment that are affecting democratic development and citizens' access to information in that respect. Opportunities and obstacles may refer to actors, groups and organisations in the public sphere and civil society including informal institutions as well as the relations between the civil society organisations/groups and the state, and the underlying structures of political, economic and social power. Thus, by the environment is meant the public space where the organisations of the state interact with societal actors/organisations on issues of democratic development.

The assessment shall, in particular, pay attention to factors of influence on outcomes and outputs arising from the post-conflict situation of present days' Angola.

The study shall provide conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations that could be used by the embassy both in its discussion of possible continued support to the Trust Fund and of democracy development in Angola in general.

SCOPE OF WORK
The work shall be guided by the Norad Development Cooperation Manual and comprise, but not necessarily be limited to, the following tasks:
1.   Assessing the results achieved during the ongoing phase in comparison with the planned outputs and outcomes, and the efficiency of the methodology used to reach the planned outputs and outcomes, furthermore to assess the realism of the projects supported by the Trust Fund and the relevance of the objectives.
2.   Assessing how UNDP coordinates the activities under the Trust Fund for Civic Education with other related activities under UN organisations as well as the collaboration and interaction of UNDP with government organisations such as the National Election Commission (CNE) and the interministerial committee (CIPE) and civil society organisations active in the field of civic education on democratic development.
3.   Assess the monitoring system that UNDP has in place to ensure efficiency in use of resources by CSOs, and effectiveness in achieving outputs by the same CSOs.
4.   Assessing the UNDP's plans for the continuation and / or closure of the Trust Fund.
5.   Assessing the gender dimension and the inclusion of issues of particular concern to gender and other vulnerable groups (youth, handicapped) as well as minority groups in the programme.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY
4.1   The Team
The study should be carried out by a team of two consultants, both with experience from and knowledge of Angola and / or the region and with proficiency in Portuguese and English. In addition, the team should have a thorough knowledge of the governance situation in Angola, be familiar with the UN system including UNDP, and have a good knowledge of democratic development in an African context, preferably from post-conflict situations.

The consultants should familiarise themselves with MFA's strategy for its development co-operation with Angola over the next planning period.
Consultants will be hired by Norad. Responsible Norad adviser can be consulted throughout.

4.2   Sources of documentation, respondents and methodology
The study will be based on secondary data (including relevant files in the embassy and in the UNDP), interviews and field visits. Interviews should be undertaken with the Embassy, UNDP, organisations supported by the trust fund and organisations operating in the same area but not supported by the trust fund, media, government, parliament and political parties, the donor community, and academia, as relevant. Interviews may be undertaken one-on-one or in groups.
4.3   Time frame and financing
-      The time frame of the study is estimated to be 5 weeks for the team leader, who will be responsible for the report and 4 weeks for the other team member. Both will spend approx. 15 days in Angola.

The assignment will be undertaken alongside a similar review of the National Civic and Electoral Education Programme of the Development Workshop. The stipulated time shall cover both reviews.
- The review, including the field work is expected to take place during the period 20 May to 10 June 2008.
- The embassy and UNDP will assist the team in making arrangements for their stay in uanda and the provinces / communities to be visited outside of Luanda. To the extent possible, the embassy and UDNP will assist the team in preparing a mission programme of meetings / interviews with relevant stakeholders, etc. Local transportation in Luanda will be the responsibility of the team
- The study will be financed over and above the Norwegian contribution to the trust fund and Norad will be responsible for the costs related to the study.

REPORTING
- The consultants shall, before leaving Luanda, debrief the Norwegian Embassy, the UNDP, other donors and other relevant partners on the main findings and conclusions at a meeting in the Embassy.
- A draft report shall be presented in electronic form no later than one week after the consultants have left Angola, for feedback from the Embassy, UNDP, and Norad. These shall be given two weeks to comment on the draft report. The final report shall reflect these comments and acknowledge any substantive disagreements. The final report shall be ready by end of July 2008.
- The report shall be written in English and should not exceed 20 pages (excluding the annexes). The report shall consist of an executive summary, methodology used, major findings, conclusions and recommendations. TOR shall be attached.
- The executive summary, including main conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations, shall be translated into Portuguese.
- The final report shall be delivered both in electronic and paper form (2 copies).

END

Recent Reports

R 2008: 9
Lange, Siri and Liss Schanke (editors): Decentralisation and Gender
Coordination and Cooperation on Maternal Health Issues in Selected District Councils in Tanzania.
In cooperation with PMO-RALG and the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam. Bergen, 2008, 63 pp.

R 2008: 8
McNeish, John-Andrew and Ana Cecilia Arteaga Böhrt: Evaluación: Cooperación del Fondo de Asistencia Internacional de los Estudiantes y Académicos Noruegos (SAIH) con las *Unidades Académicas Campesinas* (*UACs*), Bolivia. Bergen 2008, 42 pp.

R 2008: 7
McNeish, John-Andrew and Ana Cecilia Arteaga Böhrt: Evaluation: Norwegian Student and Academics' International Assistance Fund (SAIH) Cooperation with the Bolivian *Unidades Academicas Campesinas* (Peasant Academic Units (*UACs*). Bergen, 2008, 42 pp.

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Strand, Arne (team leader) et al.: Return with Dignity, Return to What? Review of the Voluntary Return Programme to Afghanistan. Bergen, 2008, 70 pp.

R 2008: 5
LANGE, Siri, with Elias M. Songoyi: The Norad Programme in Arts and Cultural Education. A Mid-Term Review of the Programme Period 2006-2008/9. Bergen, 2008, 44 pp.

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SUMMARY

This report is the mid-term review of UNDPs trust fund for civic education in Angola. The trust fund was set up in late 2006, with support from the embassies of Norway, Sweden and USAid, topped up with UNDP's own funds. By late 2007, 22 CSOs or umbrella organisations had been selected and supported with grants to carry out civic education activities throughout the country. The most common activity is civic education sessions, where a specially trained promoter talks to a popular gathering.

The review generally commends the outstanding performance of the UNDP project support unit (PSU) – which in a short time managed to set up and implement M&E routines for the many involved organisations, as well as an impressive schedule of training sessions on substantive civic and human rights issues.

Improvements were recommended by the reviewers to enhance the programme's impact: To sharpen the message to the recipients' needs for empowering information, to redouble training in participative methods, and to prioritise target groups.

The report argues that for the continuation of the programme some strategic choices should be made: Maximising impact in terms of social/political change; building CSOs; maximising the roll out of civic education "knowledge packages"; or rolling it out to specific (needy) sections of the citizenry.

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