


Determinants of Late Development

A Study of Turkey's Late Industrialisation
Attempt until 1946

Mete Pamir

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Bergen, December 1993


Note on transliteration

Ottoman and Turkish names and words referred to in the text are given in modern Turkish spelling. The same convention is also applied to words that have some currency in English (i.e. *şeyh* rather than *sheikh*), as well as to words of Arabic origin (i.e. *vakıf* rather than *waqf*). Turkish spelling generally conforms to English with the following qualifications:

- a* : as u in cut
- c* : as j in jam
- ç* : as ch in chair
- e* : as e in bet
- g* : as g in gate
- ğ* : slightly prolongs the preceding vowel
- I, ı* : as i in children
- İ, i* : as i in sit
- j* : the French *j*
- ö* : as the French *eu*, the German *ö*, or the Norwegian *ø*
- ş* : as sh in shop
- u* : as oo in soot, as the Norwegian *o*
- ü* : as the French *u*, the German *ü*, or the Norwegian *u*

Abbreviations used in the text

ADNR	Association for the Defence of Nationalist Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, <i>Anadolu Rumeli Müdafaa-ı Hukuk-u Milliye Cemiyeti</i>
AMP	Asiatic Mode of Production
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress Party, <i>İttihat ve Terakki Teşkilatı</i> , popularly referred to as Young Turks
DİE	State Institute of Statistics, <i>Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü</i>
DP	Democratic Party, <i>Demokrat Parti</i>
EOI	Export Oriented Industrialisation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substituting Industrialisation
K_n	n th Kondratiev Wave, where n is 1, 2, 3 or 4
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NICs	Newly Industrialising Countries
PDA	Public Debt Administration, <i>Düyun-i Umumiye</i>
PRP	Progressive Republican Party, <i>Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası</i>
RPP	Republican People's Party, <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası</i>
SSA	Social Structures of Accumulation
SEEs	State Economic Enterprises, <i>Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri</i>



Preface

This study offers a frame of reference for analysing the origins and outcome of late industrialisation attempts. It uses elements of institutional and comparative historical analyses to work out an explanation of Turkey's development trajectory from the early 19th to the mid-20th centuries. Developed through critical reflection on the literature of historical sociology and sociology of development, the analysis sketched here is meant to be amenable to further research on divergent paths of industrial transformation. Particular emphasis is placed upon the ways in which the nature of inter-relations between the international development context, socio-institutional relations in industry and agriculture, the conditions of nation-building, and the subsequent political regime proved detrimental to the outcome of the late industrialisation attempt in Turkey.

Chapter One introduces the argument and puts the study of Turkish development into context using the polarization of the modernisation theory and the dependency approach as a polemical device. In Chapter Two, the social and political development background of the Ottoman economy is traced back to its origins in the 13th century. In the specification of the international context in Chapter Three, a periodisation of the international system between the early 19th and the mid-20th centuries is developed on the basis of discussions focusing on the long waves of development, technological paradigms in industrial production, national modes of development in dominant countries and institutionalised power relations in the international trade, monetary and security regimes. At the most abstract level a central concern in this chapter is to explore the dialectic of structure and agency in the context of the global economy — the extent of independence, which can be accorded to national economies and polities during their adaptation to the constraints of international economy. To investigate this dialectic a heuristic division between external and internal, and between international and national development contexts is employed, and the groundwork for further discussions of the impact of international structuring conditions on Turkey is delineated.

Chapters Four, Five and Six are devoted to the analysis of the Turkish development path in the 19th century, the 1908-29 nation-building phase, and the 1930-46 state-led industrialisation period under one-party rule

respectively. While observing the interrelations between the international and national contexts, the exposition in these chapters emphasises the partially independent nature of national development. In Chapters Four and Six, the origins and outcome of the industrialisation dynamics are discussed with respect to the interplay between three set of factors intrinsic to the socioeconomic structure of Turkey: (i) the socio-institutional relations in agriculture (property relations, organisation and mobilisation pattern of agricultural classes); (ii) socio-institutional relations in industry and commerce (organisation of labour, organisation of merchant, banking and industrial capital, forms of entrepreneurship); (iii) the role of the state (administrative and educational reform capabilities, the bureaucracy's nation-building efforts, the increasing scale of state intervention in promoting industrialisation). Chapter Four locates the aborted industrialisation attempt of the 19th century in the particular nexus between Anatolian agriculture and industry, and the role of the imperial Ottoman state dependent upon the pattern of social and political mobilisation within the Empire. Chapter Five takes the discussion from the final crisis of the Ottoman regime prompted by the defeat in the First World War and proceeds to analyse the nation-building efforts of the nationalist revolutionary leadership and the structures and activities of the new state organisation as a radical continuation of the 19th century Ottoman reforms. In Chapter Six attention is directed to the initiation and subsequent outcome of state-led industrialisation attempts under the impact of World Depression. The roots of the deadlocked Turkish development before the post-1945 boom in the world economy are found in the specific set of circumstances constituted by the prior evolution of Ottoman state and society, the interwar world economy, socio-institutional relations in agriculture and industry, the nature of the nation-building effort, and the political regime of the new Republic. Finally in Chapter Seven, some lessons are drawn from the particular path of "unsuccessful" industrialisation represented by the Turkish case, for the purpose of generating a multicausal explanation of the outcome of industrialisation attempts.

This study grew out of the experiences in my formative years during the convulsive decade after 1975 in Turkey. My initial interest in this conflict-ridden period culminating in the 1980 military coup and the subsequent economic and social transformations in the 1980s was supplemented by an interest in comparative history after I resumed my studies in another periphery of Europe —Norway. Through research on development theory and studies of comparable contemporary countries I came to see the crisis in the latter half of the 1970s in Turkey within the broader context of a transition from one development strategy —Import Substitution

Industrialisation (ISI)—to another—Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI). This report was originally thought of as an attempt to sketch a framework for understanding the Turkish development trajectory through the origins of the ISI regime in the 1960s and the economic decline in the 1970s to the protracted growth in the 1980s.

A preliminary analysis of the last 30 years of Turkish industrialisation, however, revealed that the roots of the 1970s crisis lay in the constellation of social forces given by the prior evolution of the Turkish society. This was especially true for the parallels between the 1960-79 ISI period and the *étatiste* policies of the 1930s and 1940s. The economic policies emphasising the protection of the internal market under the aegis of a strong interventionist state had a definite forerunner in the state-led industrialisation phase between 1930 and 1946. Thus, the initial aim was to explain the watershed of 1980 by analysing the two distinct periods preceding and postdating 1980, and to devise a theoretical framework looking at the interrelations of class and state structures and the complex interplay over time of domestic and international developments. This necessitated the application of a similar framework to the late Ottoman and early Republican period, and more historical research concentrating on the “deep structures” of the Turkish social formation. However, the historical elaboration soon grew in scope and finally took the form presented in the following pages, postponing the initial concern to a later study.

The following pages do not reveal new data; instead they attempt to make an overall argument about the Turkish development trajectory, using sociological theory in general and elements of development theory and historical sociology in particular, by drawing evidence mostly from “secondary sources”. As the bibliography indicates, I have been able to draw extensively upon the recently growing body of literature on Ottoman and Turkish economic and social history. Apart from finding the necessary sources, or breaking with the dogmatic assumptions of Kemalist historiography dominating the Turkish education system, or considering the slimness of research on the particular areas of Ottoman/Turkish development, one major problem has been to dissociate the narrative from the points debated by specialists about particular areas not relevant to the concerns of this study, and to adopt the evidence presented in these works to my analytical purposes and thereby present a coherent argument. The extent to which I have succeeded in accomplishing this task is for the reader to decide.

The treatment of Ottoman/Turkish historical development here is symptomatic and suggestive rather than systematic and exhaustive. Different phases and facets of Turkish development are given unequal

weight depending on their relevance to my theoretical and analytical concerns; the account attempts to shed light on the particular areas of the socioeconomic history of Turkey in so far as they provide clues to the basic *problemstellung* of this report: the interrelations between economic development and sociopolitical struggles and structures, between international and national development contexts.

I have tried to write a text which will be accessible to readers not familiar with Ottoman/Turkish history. But while doing that I have also attempted not to lose the interest of those readers familiar with the Turkish case. In order not to disrupt the continuity of the historical exposition, I have tried to keep the references to comparative cases and to theoretical remarks and controversies in the notes at the end of each chapter. At most places these notes can be read as a parallel text discussing the theoretical sources and the comparative context of the points referring to Turkey. The text below is, thus, the result of a compromise between at times conflicting objectives of historical narrative and historical sociological exposition, and aims to take both those readers who are familiar with and those who are unacquainted with Turkish history along the tracks of sociological approaches to industrial development. A guiding light throughout the report was the firm belief that the study of the Turkish case will contribute to and will benefit from development theory and that the Turkish development pattern will eventually provide a litmus test for the various standpoints in the central controversies of development theory.

The analysis attempted here is situated midway between the historical and the political, the sociological and the economic; it is, therefore, only natural that it satisfies neither. It is provisional, inevitably fallible, nevertheless expectant of criticism and further development. If it still seems worth attempting, it is because of the expectation that this hybridisation will lead both to a better analysis of Turkish development and to the enrichment of the particular disciplines. Thus, most of the sections below have a tentative, exploring character and they must be seen as rudimentary elements of a research programme to be developed at a later stage rather than a detailed report studying the particular areas of Turkish political economy.

1. Introduction: Late development and the Turkish state

1.1 Turkish development and major controversies in development theory

Much of the scholarship on the Turkish development path has been located at the extreme ends of the spectrum of development theories represented by dependency and modernisation theories. The modernisation approach to the study of the 19th century Ottoman and early Republican periods of Turkish development (Lerner 1958, Lewis 1968, Mardin 1969a and 1969b, Huntington 1968, Eisenstadt 1987) sees a unilinear progression from the golden age of the 14th to the 16th centuries to the period of imperial decline in the 17th and 18th centuries and then to a refashioning on Western models in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In the explanation of the “stagnation” of the Ottoman Empire prior to the 19th century, the modernisation perspective stresses the role of “traditionalist” Islamic cultural properties (law, moral code, and customs) which inhibit the development of “modern” Western attitudes and institutions. The driving force behind the reform of institutions is explained as a desire to meet the new requirements under the modernising influence of the West. The process of modernisation is said to have started with the military reforms at the end of the 18th century, continued through the administrative and educational reforms of the mid-19th century *Tanzimat* period and finally achieved the culmination of its 1789 French Revolution ideals in the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

The modernisation perspective’s emphasis when analysing the efforts of the Ottoman state to fill the gap created by its persistent decline and to catch up with the Western imperial powers, is on the ideological borrowing of “Western ideals”, and institutional and legal reforms. Neither the impact of the industrialised capitalist economies in general nor the structural position of the Ottoman economy within the world economy in particular is theorised. In the analysis of the tensions within the Empire itself, the emphasis is on the conflicts between reformists and Islamic reactionaries in the bureaucracy. With respect to the relations between the agrarian and

commercial classes, and the state the modernisation approach is again silent.

The dependency approach on the other hand, pulling the pendulum too much in the opposite direction, subordinates the role of state and class formation and economic structures inside the Ottoman Empire to the exigencies of centre states and bourgeois classes. According to this view, the Ottoman state becomes a peripheral state, a passive medium without any autonomy; its industrialisation attempts are seen as half-hearted and the 19th century reforms are regarded as attempts to facilitate foreign capital's imposition. Such imposition is said to have started as early as in the 16th century with the Capitulations — the easing of restrictions on trade benevolently granted to France — and to gain momentum with the 1838 Free Trade Treaty with England. In this account, late Ottoman bureaucratic reformism introducing political guarantees concerning minority rights, and legal reforms introducing Western jurisdiction is explained through the intervention of foreign capital or foreign states, and is closely correlated with the loss of the fiscal autonomy of the Ottoman state. The predominantly non-Muslim bourgeoisie of the Empire is seen as an extension of the interests of metropolitan capital and regarded to be a "comprador" bourgeoisie.

Within this dependency tradition, there are diverging views concerning the nation-building period. In one version (Avcıoğlu 1973), the 1908-18 Young Turk rule of the Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP) leads to a confrontation with imperial powers and compradors, and culminates in a national liberation struggle under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The formation of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist bureaucratic reformism of the early Republican period are seen as an anti-imperialist struggle effecting a fundamental break with the Ottoman past, and state-led industrialisation as a model of self-reliant development representing a progressive attack on imperialism and even a step towards socialism. Another version regards Kemalism as a continuation of 19th century reformism and rejects its claim to be a radical departure from the earlier dependency relationship (Başkaya 1991). Yet another version of this dependency approach views the Young Turk and Kemalist bureaucrats not as part of the bureaucracy of the old regime but as representatives of a rising "national bourgeoisie" against the comprador faction of the bourgeoisie composed of Greeks and Armenians (Akşin 1980, Tanör 1992, Ahmed 1988).

There are several problems associated with this "simplistic" dependency approach to Ottoman/Turkish development. As a result of its one-sided emphasis on external determinism, it views the Turkish trajectory as an

underdevelopment associated with a transfer of surplus to the European core rather than a nondevelopment structured by class and state relations *within* the Ottoman Empire itself. It basically neglects the barriers the Ottoman state erected against private property rights and capital accumulation prior to the 19th century. In the analysis of the 19th century, this dependency approach gives undue emphasis to "integration with the world economy", and neglects the fact that the Ottoman state was not subjected to direct colonial rule and kept its autonomy *vis-à-vis* foreign powers by playing their inter-imperialist rivalries against each other. Moreover, an excessive focus on the impact of external trade diverts the attention from the internal social structure and undermines the role socio-institutional relations in agriculture played in promoting the non-development of industrialisation, which were again inextricably related to the nature of the Ottoman state.

With respect to the Young Turk and Republican period, the dependency tradition either sees a simple continuity with the 19th century dependency pattern or a complete reversal of fortune effected by an anti-imperialist War of Independence and a state-led industrialisation. In both cases, it undermines the changed nature of the world economic and political context in the first half of 20th century which created a strategic vacuum to be filled by the newly emerging nations and states. This position is accompanied by a "class-reductionist" approach which sees a "national" bourgeoisie, whose mobilisation chronologically and causally prior to the nation-building phase is implausible and unsubstantiated, as inciting and dominating the Young Turk and Kemalist movement. A central weakness in this interpretation of Turkish nation-building is an unqualified application of the English or French bourgeoisie-state relationship to the Turkish case, and a reversal in the society-state relation in the Ottoman Empire whose agrarian structure, characterised by an absence of the West European hereditary feudal tenure, meant a dominance of state over social classes.

A more nuanced variant of the dependency approach aims to overcome the weaknesses associated with the above simplistic application of the dependency paradigm to Turkish development and to solve the problem of conceptually synthesising the external and internal factors affecting the development trajectory. It tries to resolve the problem of applying a rigorous class analysis to non-capitalist and non-feudal societies (Keyder 1987, 1988:159-63, Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987), by using a genealogy of concepts derived from Althusser and Wallerstein. This "revised" dependency approach studies the Ottoman society as a social formation characterised by a dominant Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) in which the central authority of the state controls the appropriation of the

surplus produced by independent peasants and imposes strict limitations on the accumulation of land in agriculture and wealth in commerce. With the impact of the "world-economy" from the 16th century onwards, the rise in international trade and the activities of the merchant capital lead to a dissolution of AMP. Given the crucial location of trade in providing the link between AMP (composed of the surplus appropriation of tax-collecting state officials from peasant producers) and petty commodity production in the urban guilds, the weakening of the administrative controls on internal and external trade results in the disarticulation of the Ottoman system, and its "peripheralisation" within the world-economy.

The pull of world-capitalism in the 17th and 18th centuries leads to a change in agricultural relations of production; the emergence of powerful landlords, tax-farmers, producing for export entails enserfment of the peasantry (Wallerstein, Decdeli and Kasaba 1987:90-2). According to this approach then, under the impact of world trade from the late 16th century onwards the Ottoman system loses its internal integration and becomes "incorporated" into the world-economy as a supplier of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods (İslamoğlu and Keyder 1987:47-53).¹ Integration into the world circuit of capital brings with it the commercialisation of agriculture and the emergence of a *de facto* landed upper class of tax-farmers controlling large commercial estates, employing an enserfed peasantry and share-croppers.

Although the 19th century witnesses a decline in the influence of tax-farmers as a result of the centralisation drive of the Ottoman state, the growth of commercial agriculture and growing imports of European manufactured goods gain momentum and lead to a decline of petty commodity production in urban guilds and destruction of proto-industrial activity in the countryside, whose development is considered to be an essential prerequisite for successful industrialisation (cf. Mendels 1972, Köymen 1971). Meanwhile, the increasing foreign debt of the Ottoman state and the growing strength of the merchant capital of foreign origin in collaboration with the native capital of non-Muslim minorities further undermine the economic and political integration of the Empire, and effect the transition of the Ottoman Empire from a state mechanism of Asiatic type to a colonial state serving the needs of merchant capital (İslamoğlu and Keyder 1987:61).

This revised dependency perspective, too, has the danger of falling into simplistic arguments subordinating the role of the state to the exigencies of the world economy. Thus, Wallerstein, Decdeli, and Kasaba (1987:95) equate the "internal" — in relation to social classes — and "external" — in relation to other states — weakening of the Ottoman state, and claim that the

internally “strong” state apparatus of the Empire until the end of the 16th century was progressively transformed into the “weak” state apparatus typical of the states located in the peripheral zone of the world economy. What the modernisation approach sees as the creation of a more efficient state apparatus in the 19th century becomes in their view the creation of one which facilitated the operations of the world-economy.

One version of the revised dependency approach (Keyder 1988) regards the bureaucracy as a social class by virtue of its position in the surplus extraction relationship in AMP (cf. Baily and Llobera 1981). Contrary to the account of what we called the simplistic dependency approach, the late Ottoman and early Republican reform drive is regarded neither as an expression of foreign interests, nor as an anti-imperialist attempt. Bureaucrats are not considered to be representing the interests of a rising bourgeoisie either; bureaucratic reformism is rather interpreted as a reaction to the new conflicts generated by the growth of a new bourgeoisie — a development resulting from greater incorporation into the world capitalist system. In order to safeguard their social position — to keep their surplus-appropriating status and perpetuate their ability to politically dominate the economy — the bureaucracy opposes the economic power of the increasingly influential merchants and money lenders. The CUP and the Republican regimes are interpreted as the culmination of a bureaucratic reaction against the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie. This perspective, too, suffers from a kind of class-reductionism. Giving priority to the determining character of relations of production, the state bureaucracy is regarded as a dominant class anchored in AMP. Thus the opposition between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie is purported to derive from their conflicting class interests: the bureaucracy is increasingly bent on restricting the growth of market processes, which the bourgeoisie benefits from. The hostility of the nationalist bureaucracy to the non-Muslim bourgeoisie is explained in the context of a general conflict of interest between the bureaucratic class and the bourgeoisie — Muslim or non-Muslim (Kasaba 1988a:226).

Contrary to the “productivist” accounts common to dependency approaches, the approach to be adopted in this study will not insist on ascribing a causal primacy to conflicts within the production sphere in explaining societal evolution. While analysing the structuring effects of external socio-economic relations delineated by the dependency approach, we will emphasise the centrality of both economic and cognitive responses to uneven international development. As we will argue, just as important as the contexts of instrumental action are those conflicts located within the normative or cognitive spheres — e.g. nationalism. In this light, the bureau-

