

The institutionalisation of the Tanzanian opposition parties: How stable are they?

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1 Introduction

The climax of democratic consolidation on the African Continent has, generally speaking, taken place in the de-jure transitions from single party rule, where incumbent regimes monopolised nearly every facet of political and economic life, to a system of plural politics where alternative parties were legally permitted to organise and challenge the existing political order. For many of the incumbent parties on the continent as well as international donors, multiparty elections were and still are considered to be the clearest expression of a 'new' liberal political order and the pinnacle of democratic decision-making. However, the majority of those that follow and conduct research on the African political scene point out that the emergence of opposition political parties and multiparty elections is an insufficient measure of democracy, whereby most African states appear to be in the midst of a stalled transition.

In Kenya for example, Daniel Arap Moi's approval of the adoption of multiparty politics in 1991, and the subsequent elections in 1992 was unsuccessful in overturning the incumbent Kenya African National Union (KANU). Furthermore, the opposition parties themselves appeared unable to maintain any significant degree of internal cohesion, as the main opposition organisation, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), split into FORD-Kenya led by Oginga Odinga and FORD-Asili led by Kenneth Matiba.

The Multiparty experience in Zambia was considerably different, yet equally problematic in several respects. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), after defeating President Kaunda and the incumbent United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991, experienced massive defections and fragmentation. More importantly, in a manner resembling the experiences under UNIP, the MMD itself has resorted to repressive measures in implementing unpopular World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs (Ihonvbere 1996).

The adoption of plural politics in Tanzania in 1992 and the subsequent multiparty elections in 1995 never generated a united opposition front similar to the early stages of FORD in Kenya and the MMD in Zambia. Generally speaking, aside from a few failed attempts at forming united fronts, opposition politics in Tanzania remains relatively fragmented, weak, and seemingly disorganised. In short, similar to the experiences in Kenya and Zambia, multiparty politics in Tanzania appears to be strikingly absent of strong opposition parties capable of driving the consolidation of democracy in a forward direction.

This article focuses most of its attention on the five main Tanzanian opposition parties that have operated in varying capacities since the early 1990s. Specifically, this article seeks to describe the institutionalisation of the five main Tanzania opposition parties, primarily focusing on trends in

institutional building as well as the main factors that appear to limit institutional development.

2 Defining the Model

While the roles and importance of political parties in developing democracies might be subject to controversial debates in academic circles, this article understands that contesting elections and winning political offices are one of the most direct and legitimate links between the state and society. On a theoretical level, these links serve as one, perhaps the most important method that the electorate has in influencing the direction of government policy. Political parties themselves can be seen as organisations that rally together to contest elections and express common agendas, with the immediate goal of winning political positions in the government. In their attempts in effecting government policy parties can be seen as channelling the forces of social cleavages, whether class, religious, or ethnic based, through mutually accepted institutions for cleavage mediation, such as legislative assemblies. The capacities in parties serving as links between state and society will largely depend on their ability in operating as institutions.

As institutions, parties are generally understood as being stable and durable expressions of particular social cleavages, whose existence in the political environment is both taken-for-granted and path dependent in the sense that past platform and ideological statements constrain future platform possibilities. Indeed, such an understanding is unequivocally suggestive of the fact that institutionalisation processes are subject to the constraints of time. Therefore, an analysis of the institutional developments of the Tanzanian opposition parties must be sensitive to their relatively adolescent nature.

Figure 1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalisation

	Attitudinal	Structural
Internal Order	(1) <i>Value Infusion</i>	(2) <i>Organisational Strength</i>
External Order	(3) <i>Reification</i>	(4) <i>Party Autonomy</i>

Source: Randall & Svásand 1999: 9

The institutionalisation model used in this article was designed by Lars Svásand and Vicky Randall, and consists of the four institutional dimensions depicted in figure 1, capturing most of what has already been stated about party institutionalisation. The model includes two dimensions that concern issues related to internal party values and structures: value infusion and organisational strength, and two dimensions that relate to values and structures in external environment: party autonomy and reification. Institutional developments within these four dimensions contributes to the development of party stability, longevity, and overall party institutionalisation.

The first dimension in the Randall-Svásand model is *value infusion*, which describes the strength of the affiliations that party members and supporters have with their respective parties. As the authors of the model point out, value

infusion is partially determined by a party's affiliation with some form of social base as well as the strength of the affiliations between party members and party leaders. In this article, the analysis of the Tanzanian opposition parties therefor, focuses on the relationships between party supporters and party platforms, including social, religious, and tribal relationships. In this respect, "the more the party members and supporters identify with the party as an expressive phenomenon, and the higher the degree of voter loyalty, the more institutionalised [the party] is" (Randall & Svásand 1999: 9). The assumption here is that, as expressions of social cleavages, party platforms will reflect the interests of particular groups of supporters; party membership is based on an identification with party platforms.

Equally important for the forthcoming analysis, in parties where leader loyalty is strong, the ultimate weakening of the identity between party members and their respective parties may prevail. All other things equal, parties with strong links with members and supporters will be institutionally stronger than parties where members are more fluid and have weak party loyalties.

The second dimension of party institutionalisation is found in cell 2 in figure one, labelled as *organisational strength*. At the formative stage of party construction, certain organisational arrangements are laid out, either formally or informally, such as methods of task execution, internal factional mediation, and decision-making, as well as the structuring of the internal composition of the organisation in the form of committees and administrative agencies. Over time, procedural stability will likely set in as parties acquire certain types of organisational traditions or routines in how they conduct decision-making and task executing procedures; the parties themselves will develop a more systematic structure and seemingly automatic methods of making decisions and executing tasks. The nature of these routines will likely be shaped by the degree to which methods of decision-making, conflict resolution, and task execution are defined in party statutes (Randall & Svásand 1999: 12-17).

The analysis of organisational strength in this article pays particular attention to the development and institutionalisation of methods of task execution and decision-making. Of special importance for the forthcoming analysis are the presence and operations of party decision-making and executing organs from the national level all the way down to the grassroots. Aside from the functioning of party organisations, the analysis below will also focus on the intensity of unmediated party factions as signs of poorly defined methods of decision-making and conflict resolution as well as a contribution to further organisational decay. Equally important, the forthcoming analysis also focuses on the availability of financial resource as a component to organisational development.

Political parties do not operate in a vacuum. They effect and are effected by the external environment in which they operate. Randall and Svásand's model captures two external dimensions of party institutionalisation. The first is referred to as *reification*: "the extent to which a political party becomes installed in the popular imagery and as a factor shaping the behaviour of political actors" (Randall & Svásand 1999: 21). A party that is reified in the

minds of the electorate possesses certain symbolic traits, mostly revolving around the policies or ideologies it claims to represent as well as its overall behaviour in the party system. As an institution, the names of a party, when pronounced, read or heard, signifies or symbolises a certain historical product of the party's platform and past performance. In the minds of the electorate, the party is placed on an abstract continuum where the party's platform, ideology, and constituencies are compared with those of other parties.

The reification analysis in this article briefly focuses on some of the key factors that are understood as effecting the disposition of the electorate's attitudes regarding these five opposition parties. These factors include (1) the general perceptions toward multiparty democracy and the incumbent regime, (2) opposition participation in parliament, and (3) the performance of the opposition parties during election campaigns. The reification assumption is that parties with a well-established image in the electorate are more likely to operate as institutions than parties with no established image. It is also assumed that parties symbolising popular issues, unity, and energy are more likely to possess long-run viability than parties symbolising disunity, corruption, and stagnation (Randall & Svásand).

The final dimension depicted in figure 1 is labelled as *party autonomy* and is the least straightforward concept in the Randall & Svásand model. On one level, party autonomy is a condition where the party itself is "not at the mercy" of any one particular extra-party organisation (Randall & Svásand 1999: 9). Phrased differently, party autonomy seeks to define the degree to which a party's existence depends on the existence of any one particular extra-party organisation.

Extra-party organisations may consist of NGOs, interest groups, other political parties, as well as the state itself. The potential exists for parties to be formed by extra-party organisations, or over time, can grow to be dominated by an extra-party organisation. Where extra-party organisations are the sources for party legitimacy, party autonomy is said to be constrained as the party itself is nothing more than an operational appendage of a higher power; it is seen as an expendable tool whose potential for stability and adaptability are functions of the dictates from the higher organisation.

On another level, the autonomy of a party will be constrained if the chief source of party legitimacy rests in the hands of a few party leaders. This aspect of party autonomy, while not exclusively in the external environment as portrayed in figure 1, is detrimentally important for party autonomy. Without accounting for the possibility of party personalisation for example, it might be erroneously concluded that a particular party is sufficiently autonomous, when in reality, the source of party stability, legitimacy, and the allegiance of the party members rests in the hands of one or a few party leaders rather than in the hands of a distinct party institution (Randall & Svásand 1999). The party autonomy analysis of the Tanzanian Opposition parties will focus on various aspects that potentially limit party autonomy, such as the monopolisation of party contributions by extra-party organisations or party leaders and trends in power personalisation.

3 Background to Multiparty Transition

For all practical purposes, Tanzania up to 1992, was governed as a one-party state for nearly thirty-years. Single party rule in Tanzania, comparatively speaking, was more democratic in nature than many other single-party regimes in Africa. For the most part, regular elections have been held every five years since 1965 and the airing of complaints against the state or TANU/CCM was at least tolerated to some degree. However, compared to KANU in Kenya or UNIP in Zambia, the single-party regime in Tanzania monopolised politics in such a way that left no political space outside the TANU/CCM party apparatus. While citizen complaints would be heard, alternative views that seemed to counter the justifications and legitimacy of single-party rule and socialism were generally not well received with the CCM. In this sense, single-party rule promoted a legacy of political apathy and fear against expressing opposition (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992).

Even regularised elections were to a large degree meaningless in outcome. Although voters had power in changing who held political positions, they had no real ability in effecting policy output since all political candidates were from TANU/CCM, thus homogeneous in outlook. In effect, politics became a contest of personalities rather than policies or platforms, further eroding government transparency and accountability and increasing apathy as many voters regarded acts of voting as a waste of time (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992).

In relation to personality, struggles for political power did not occur on a horizontal level, i.e. between parties and polices. Instead, political struggles occurred within TANU/CCM in a vertical fashion where personalities and patronage were more important virtues than ideas and merit (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992: 6). As this article unfolds, we will see the possible influence that these colonial and one-party legacies have on today's opposition parties in the Tanzanian multiparty system.

The push for the adoption of multiparty politics in Tanzania was the result of domestic forces as well as forces in the international environment. On the international level, the collapse of the one-party states in Eastern Europe prompted the questioning of the future of the Tanzanian one-party state on the part of several long-time leaders of the incumbent party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), including Julius Nyerere. At the same time, pressures from international financial lenders such as the IMF and World Bank mounted as aid conditionalities expanded from the economic structural adjustment sphere into the realm of 'good governance', including the adoption of plural politics and the observance of human rights.

Equally important for the drive toward multiparty politics were the swelling pressures from the domestic environment. A particularly crucial group that spearheaded the domestic drive towards the adoption of multiparty politics were the urban elites who increasingly looked upon the political game as better structured under a system whereby competitive politics did not

necessarily involve vertical struggles within the CCM itself. Many of these elites, after the official adoption of multiparty politics in the summer of 1992, were found leading most of the emerging opposition parties. Among the most prominent of these leaders were individuals such as Edwin Mtei, formally a finance minister, Bank of Tanzania Governor, and a director in the International Monetary fund, latter constructed and lead the Party for Democracy and Development (CHADEMA); Mabere Marando, formally a government security agent and civil rights lawyer who eventually became the chief architect of the National Convention for Construction and Reform party (NCCR-Mageuzi); Chief Said Fundikira, the first minister of Justice of independent Tanzania prior to resigning from his position in 1963 in protest to the obvious prospects of one-party rule by TANU. Fundikira would later form his own party, the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD). Other prominent personalities included James Mapalala, a popular human rights advocate that eventually helped create the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW) before the party merged with a Zanzibar party called KAMAHURU, lead by Khamis Mloo, to form the Civic United Front (CUF).

By the 1995 national elections, other prominent opposition leaders emerged by either breaking away from existing opposition parties or defecting from the CCM to the opposition ranks. With out a doubt, the most popular opposition figure today – Augustine Mrema, former Minister of Labour, grudgingly defected from the incumbent regime into the NCCR-Mageuzi’s Chairman position, subsequently propelling the party into the most prominent opposition status. John Cheyo, a prominent business man from the Bariadi district in Shinyanga, emerged out of the UMD to form his own party, the United Democratic Party (UDP).

Table 1: Results of the 1994 Local Elections

Party	Number Candidate Fielded by Party	of Number Seats Each	of Percentage of Successful Candidates	Percentage of Total	
CCM		2409	2327	96,60 %	96,72 %
CHADEMA		478	22	4,60 %	0,91 %
CUF		332	21	6,33 %	0,87 %
UMD		170	3	1,76 %	0,12 %
UDP		153	16	10,46 %	0,67 %
TADEA		52	2	3,85 %	0,08 %
TLP		41	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
PONA		39	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
NCCR-M		32	15	46,88 %	0,62 %
TPP		27	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
NRA		22	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
NLD		19	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
UPDP		12	0	0,00 %	0,00 %
		3786	2406	63,55 %	100,00 %

Source: National Electoral Commission 1994: 1997

Indeed, the elite nature of the opposition movement in Tanzania is reflected by the social composition of the founders and leaders of these opposition parties. As Mmuya and Chaligha conclude, the Tanzanian opposition parties as well as the multiparty system are “the product of legislation rather than the spirit of a movement” and are “by and large socially engineered from the top” (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994: 47).

The lack of popular protests and movements within the apex of the drive for multiparty politics was reflected in the almost catastrophic performance of the opposition parties in the 1994 local elections, where the 12 opposition parties secured a paltry 3,3 percent of the district council seats, as evident in table 1. Tables 2 and 3 reveal that by the 1995 general elections, opposition support appeared to pick up pace as five of the opposition parties secured 20,1 percent of the parliamentary seats with an impressive 40,8 percent of the votes cast. Table 3 shows the impressive performance of Mrema in the 1995 presidential race, himself a large factor contributing to the gains in opposition support since 1994, particularly evident in the large number of votes cast for the NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995.

Table 2: Results of the 1995 Parliamentary Elections

Party	Percentage of Votes	Total Seats
Chama Cha Mapinduzi	59,22	219
NCCR-Mageuzi	21,83	19
CHADEMA	6,16	28
Civic United Front	5,02	4
United Democratic Party	3,32	4
Others	4,5	0
Total	100	274

Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45-46

Table 3: Results of the 1995 Presidential Elections

Candidate	Number of Votes	Percentage of Votes
Benjamin Mkapa (CCM)	4 026 422	61,8
Augustine Mrema (NCCR-M)	1 808 616	27,8
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF)	418 973	6,4
John Cheyo (UDP)	258 734	4,0

Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45

4 Party Institutionalisation in Tanzania

4.1 Value Infusion

Five of the main opposition parties are examined in this article: the NCCR-Mageuzi, United Democratic Party (UDP), CHADEMA, Civic United Front (CUF), and the Tanzanian Labour Party (TLP). All of the parties, except the TLP, are parliamentary parties, as indicated in table 2. Thanks to the overwhelmingly popular Augustine Mrema leading the party since his defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi in early 1999, the TLP can rightfully expect to gain parliamentary seats in the upcoming national elections.

The bulk of this value infusion section consists of two specific tasks: (1) identifying particular cleavages that potentially identify with each party, (2) defining the affiliations between party leaders and party members that potentially contribute to the weakening of member-party affiliations. The achievement of the first task is complicated by the fact that none of the opposition parties appear to espouse any clear party ideology, a trend acknowledged by numerous authors. Rwekaza S. Mukandala sites that the “current [Tanzanian] movements consciously eschew formal ideologies” ...and have failed to articulate “a world view” (1995: 31-33). All of the parties claim to espouse narrowly different interpretations of social democracy and capitalism. All five parties recognise the importance of indigenisation or, as backed by the UDP, preferential treatment for Tanzanian businesses, and the eradication of government corruption. In short, based on the level of platform articulation and variation, if the leaders from all five of these parties convened to discuss appropriate government policy, the dialogue would likely be overwhelmingly free from divergent opinions. Perhaps the best expression of the seemingly homogeneous nature of the opposition ideologies was best exemplified by Augustine Mrema during his defection from the CCM to the NCCR-Mageuzi about six months prior to the general elections, when publicly stating that he believed the policies of the CCM to be superb, he simply had differences with some of the party leaders (Sundet 1996: 29).

While lacking well-defined ideologies and platforms, at the same time, the parties have articulated a certain degree of policy priority within their platforms, where all five examined in this article appear to differ on a nominal level. For example, CHADEMA and the UDP emphasise economic reforms over all other issues and have the most conservative welfare state outlook. For CHADEMA, the focus is on financial reforms and for the UDP it is the redefinition of property rights. The NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP on the other hand both place heavy emphasis on agriculture development and the development of a capitalist welfare state. It is also the heavier responsibilities of the welfare state within their platforms that makes the NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP fall to the left of centre on the political spectrum. The Civic United Front naturally focuses much of its attention on the Union question and the Human Rights abuses by the Zanzibar CCM and appears to occupy a position in the centre of the political spectrum.

Table 4: Occupation of Founding Members

Occupation	NCCR-M	CHADEMA	CUF	UMD
Peasant/Farmer	58,7 %	35,0 %	45,0 %	47,5 %
Public Servant	x	x	x	x
Private Business	29,5 %	50,1 %	26,1 %	52,2 %
Politician/Other	11,7 %	15,0 %	28,9 %	0,4 %
n =	1703	2000	3000	2000
	Mean	Median		
Peasant/Farmer	46,6 %	46,3 %		
Public Servant	x			
Private Business	39,5 %	39,8 %		
Politician/Other	14,0 %	13,3 %		

Source: Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 49


In this article, it is understood that the potential for value infusion between the party and its members and supporters is highest when there is some congruence between party platform and the social composition of the party members. In relation to their platform emphasis, there does appear to be some differences between each party in the social composition of their respective supporters. Table 4 lists the occupation of founding members of some of the more prominent opposition parties in 1994. Evidence suggests that for CHADEMA, it is businessmen and women that predominately contribute to the party rank and file. For the UDP, although not listed in table 4, other evidence indicates that the major party supporters are middle class professionals and businesspersons (Maliyamkono 1995). The NCCR-Mageuzi at one time appeared to have the broadest membership base, including the underprivileged in both the rural and urban areas, lawyers, university students, lecturers, professors, and urban professionals. By far, the largest supporters for the NCCR-Mageuzi, when compared to the other parties, are rural farmers, peasants and the youths, strongly coinciding with the platform emphasis of the party (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994). Due to the large number of members that crossed over with Mrema in 1999, it is likely that the social composition of the NCCR-Mageuzi support is reflected in the social composition of the TLP supporter today. One might also speculate that many of those that have traditionally supported Mrema during his presidential bid, support the TLP today, including a mix of urban professionals, youths, and rural and urban poor (Maliyamkono 1995).

Issues revolving around religion play an important factor in Tanzanian politics, although parties are prohibited from advancing the causes of one religion over another, as dictated under section 9.2(a) of the 1992 Political Parties Act. Nevertheless, religion has been evoked in varying level, particularly evident during political campaigns. For example, in the Iringa Urban constituency, voters were encouraged to vote for the NCCR-Mageuzi candidate rather than the CCM Muslim parliamentary candidate (Omari (A) 1997: 59). In the Temeke by-election, Mrema kept close company with a Sheikh in order to appeal to the large Muslim population in the Temeke

constituency, even though Mrema himself is a Roman Catholic (Maliyamkono 1997: 12-15). CUF mobilised support by appealing to Muslims on both Zanzibar and the Mainland (Omari (A) 1997: 62), by far the most dominant religion on the Isles. All-in-all, aside from the overwhelmingly large number of Muslims within the CUF rank and file, it is unclear the extent to which religion serves as a solid basis for opposition support.

Although strictly prohibited by the Political Parties Act, evidence suggests that each of these five parties aggregates support based on ethnic considerations, and may provide additional strengths for value infusion. Figure 2 graphically depicts the support that each region contributed to the CCM, CHADEMA, CUF, UDP and the NCCR-Mageuzi. The Kilimanjaro and Mara regions are heavily dominated by the NCCR-Mageuzi and coincides with the ethnic and regional origins of the top party leaders in 1995. The Kilimanjaro region is also highly supportive of CHADEMA, a party said to be dominated by the ethnic Chagga, predominately found in Kilimanjaro and Arusha (Moore 1996: 589). The UDP is perhaps the clearest case of a party where support is almost totally dominated by two regions, both of which are mostly composed of ethnic Sukuma, coinciding with the ethnic background of the party leader John Cheyo. Indeed, as indicated in figure 2, over 65 percent of the UDP's support in the 1995 parliamentary elections originated in Shinyanga and Mwanza. Finally, the regional concentration of CUF's support is predominately restricted to the Pemba portion of Zanzibar, an area which contributed to nearly 30 percent of CUF's support while consisting of less than two percent of the voting population in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Although CUF's support on Pemba is tied to considerations of ethnicity, support for the party is also tied to the particular historical experiences of Zanzibar politics, too lengthy for discussion in this article.

Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Party Support in the 1995 Parliamentary Elections




Source: Mmuya 1997

A closer look at the election data reveals that regionally concentrated support is also suggestive of the fact that affiliations may have as much to do with the relationships between party leaders and party members as they do with parties and party members. Indeed, each regional stronghold for each party coincides with the home regions of the top party brass. Comparing the support for the NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections to that in the 1995 national elections for example, indicates that the party's sheer vote volume in Kilimanjaro was largely the result of Mrema's popularity. Being a native of the Kilimanjaro Region as well as an ethnic Chagga, all of the constituencies within the region that heavily contributed to his presidential votes as well as the votes for the party in the parliamentary race, were weak supporters for the NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections. In fact, the only party to win district council seats in the 1994 local elections was CHADEMA. Instead, nearly 75 percent of the seats won by the NCCR-Mageuzi in 1994 were in Kagera and Mara, coinciding with the home regions of Prince Bagenda and Marando, the two top party leaders prior to Mrema's defection from the CCM.

Similar trends are noticeable in the loyalty that Bariadi contributed to the UDP in 1994 and 1995. Of the UDP's 16 victories in the 1994 local elections, 12 occurred in the Bariadi District. Figure 3 indicates that this trend was duplicated in the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections.

Leader loyalty is even more obvious where key party leaders defect from one party to another, taking the bulk of the party members with them. Mass defections are most clear in Mrema's defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi to the TLP and Cheyo's earlier defection from the UMD that spawned the foundation of the UDP.

Therefore, while evidence suggests that party affiliations appear to loosely coincide with particular social status or ethnic interests, a large portion of these affiliations are likely defined by the relationships between party leaders and party members, having at least two broad implications for value infusion. First, strong links between party leaders and members weakens the ties that members have with their respective parties. Thus, when leaders shift from one party to the next, most members follow the leader not the party, reducing the stability of the party and its prospects for institutional development. Secondly, where clientele networks prevail and are structured on charisma or quid pro quo transactions, the party leaders themselves have few incentives in articulating coherent platforms or ideologies since such formulations do not serve as the basis for affiliation or loyalty. In this respect these networks are not about promoting groups interests per se. They are more about promoting the particularised interests of key patrons and their particular clients. Professor Samuel Mushi from the University of Dar es Salaam best qualifies these two shortcomings by pointing out that "The imbalance between personalities and party programmes in opposition parties, whose leaders are said to be larger than the parties is a major stumbling block for the maturity and institutionalisation of the parties" (Guardian 08.08.98).

Figure 3. 1995 Parliamentary and Presidential Results in Shinyanga

Source: Mmuya 1997

Source: Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee: 1997

4.2 Organisational Strength


The effects that organisational strength has on party institutionalisation seems straight forward: How can these five opposition parties develop into viable parties without some form of organisational capacity by which to conduct party operations.

The analysis of the organisational strength of these five parties occurs on two distinct levels. On one level, the organisational strength of a party is dictated by a party's degree of penetration into the local level, allowing a greater and more targeted capacity for mobilisation, recruitment, campaigning, and voter education. On this level and in comparison to the CCM, none of these parties appear to have an adequate level of penetration except in a few select regions considered to be their respective strongholds. Perhaps only the NCCR-Mageuzi, in the past, began to intensively develop their organisational presence at the grassroots levels. As for party institutionalisation, the lack of a grassroots penetration detrimentally effects the ability for these parties in strengthening its relations to local level party supporters and reduces their ability in communicating to the electorate, thus weakening their value infusion and reification potential.

A second level of analysis for organisational strength concerns the structuring and functioning of party decision-making and executing organs. According to

the Randall-Svåsand model of party institutionalisation, parties having adequately defined and adhered to methods of decision-making and task executing are more likely to develop organisational stability than parties where methods of decision-making are constantly up for grabs, thus being vulnerable to personal power ambitions and factionalism.

Figure 4. Party Organisational Structure



Layout duplicated at the
Regional Level
District Level
Ward Level
Branch Level
Cell

Source: Mmuya 1998

The formal organisational arrangements of each of the five parties resembles the organisational layout in figure 4. In reality, the lack of adequate finances paired with weakly defined procedural arrangements contributes to significant redefinitions of who and which organs conduct party decision-making. In all five parties, important policies are oftentimes conceived, drafted, and adopted within the executing organs, involving little or no inputs from the decision-making organs. In addition, these weakly defined organisational arrangements, in some cases, have proven ineffective in mediating the highly personalised nature of party faction, resulting in further organisational deterioration. The conflicts within the NCCR-Mageuzi, between former Chairman Mrema and former Secretary General Mabere Marando that ended in Mrema's defection to the TLP, serve as a good example of the destruction caused by unmediated cleavages (Mmuya 1998). Ultimately, due to these personalised and unmediated cleavages, the party was reduced from a status as one of the most promising opposition organisations to a party with a highly questionable future. The parties that have exhibited organisational unity tend to be small in size where challenges over leadership power remains minimal. Perhaps the only two parties that have exhibited some degree of procedural

stability paired with larger amounts of power sharing among party leaders are CHADEMA and CUF.

In sum, without sufficient organisational strength and coherence, it will be difficult for these parties to recruit and mobilise local level support. In addition, the lack of adequately defined and adhered to decision-making procedure renders these five parties more vulnerable to personal power struggles, consequences of which were evident in the destruction of the NCCR-Mageuzi.

4.3 Reification

On par with what was discussed earlier, reification is the degree to which a political party becomes taken for granted as an integral component of the party system. The party name and symbols become commonly associated with certain values, ideologies, and practices, whether good or bad in nature. The focus of this section therefor, is on the values, ideologies, and practices that Tanzanians associate with the major opposition parties and the efforts that these parties have made in bolstering their image in the electorate.

A survey conducted in 1994 revealed that around 50 percent of the population in Tanzania did not have any knowledge of the new political parties. In addition, the survey itself consisted of a sample of 46 percent urban, supposedly the most informed citizens. While there is little doubt that opposition party awareness has increased since 1994, there are other findings from this survey that appear more threatening to the ability of these opposition parties in establishing a positive popular image. A wide number of those interviewed in the survey indicated that they were unable to differentiate between the arguments proposed by the opposition parties with those proposed by the ruling party. Whatever the cause of this perceived lack of policy differentiation, the important fact is that these parties are unable to present themselves to the electorate as clear alternatives to the CCM (Ngware 1996).

Equally troublesome for party reification are the large number of opinions that thought the opposition parties were “fragile, disorganised, [lacking] leadership, resources and policies” and were unable in effectively challenging the CCM (Ngware 1996: 21).

These opinions may have been partially overturned by the relatively high level of parliamentary participation on the part of some of the opposition parties since the 1995 elections. While remaining outside the shadow cabinet (filled by the UDP and CUF), the NCCR-Mageuzi remained the de-facto opposition leader in Parliament up until early 1997, when the Marando-Mrema conflict rendered the party to a state of paralysis (Mmuya 1998). Afterwards, the UDP essentially took over as the de-facto opposition leader for Mainland issues, while CUF continued to express its interests over the Isles. Today, parliamentary activity is widely reported in the print media, where at least every few days articles are seen describing opposition parliamentary debate.

Elections and campaigns serve as an opportunity for parties to market their policies and gauge the electorate's attitude regarding these policies. In nearly every respect, none of these opposition parties have managed to fully capitalise on the use of election campaigns as vehicles for marketing party platforms. Instead, campaign tactics in by-elections and during the 1995 national elections emphasised personalities over parties and the CCM's track record over alternative policies (Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 1997). In some cases, parties were represented by two different candidates each carrying different party flags and symbols within the same constituency, an act that probably portrayed disunity and promoted confusion among the electorate (Limbu 1997). Perhaps the largest series of by-election blunders took place in 1997 in the Maketa, Muleba, and Arusha constituencies. In the Maketa and Muleba by-elections, the NCCR-Mageuzi was unable to field candidates simply because the two party factions were unable to agree on a common candidate. The Arusha by-election would have been a certain victory for the NCCR-Mageuzi had the two factions agreed to field Nyerere's son, Makongoro Nyerere, instead compromising on a weaker candidate. (National Electoral Commission 1997). All-in-all, due to these internal squabbles over by-election candidates, the NCCR-Mageuzi was seriously discredited.

Party practices and efforts aside, reification is also influenced by the general attitudes that the electorate has regarding multiparty politics. Affirmative attitudes toward multiparty politics are more likely to generate acceptance of the new opposition parties than attitudes of pessimism. Yet, as indicated in table 5, the 1991 Presidential Commission on multiparty change revealed that over 77 percent of the Tanzanians wanted to continue with the single party system (Presidential Commission Vol. 1). Gero Erdmann's 1994 survey data is relatively consistent with the findings of the Presidential Commission. While 55 percent of the urban sample supported multiparty change, the rural sample, representing the largest population segment, gave the same support at only 43 percent. In the same survey, only 35 percent believed that multiparty politics would strengthen democracy. Instead, the majority believed that multiparty politics would strengthen tribalism, weaken national unity, and will contribute nothing to the development of the country (Erdmann 1995: 9-10).

Table 5: Continuation of the Single Party System

	Yes	No
Tanzania Mainland	79,7 %	19,0 %
Tanzania Zanzibar	56,4 %	43,0 %
Tanzania Total	77,2 %	21,5 %

Source: Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty Systems Vol. 1 199: 69

Table 6: Possible effects of the Multiparty System

The multiparty system	Rural	Urban	Total
Is a threat to national unity	68,4 %	54,1 %	61,8 %
Will strengthen tribalism & factionalism	67,1 %	51,9 %	60,1 %
Is hopeless	62,5 %	45,5 %	54,7 %
Will strengthen democracy	29,1 %	42,0 %	35,0 %

Source: Erdmann 1994: 10

In the final analysis, there is a strong likelihood that the attitudes regarding these five parties remains largely pessimistic today. While parliamentary participation is strong, particularly on the part of the UDP, it is unlikely that such participation is well followed outside the urban areas. By far, the state owned Radio Tanzania, often accused of CCM favouritism, is the most widely used media source in the country (Ngware 1996), and may be unlikely to grant credit to the opposition performance in parliament. Furthermore, the inadequacies of election campaigns have failed in articulating party platforms and policies that could enable a stronger basis for party reification. Finally, positive party reification is significantly challenged by the persistence of high levels of pessimism toward the effects of multiparty politics altogether, pessimism continually exploited by CCM propaganda.

4.4 Party Autonomy

Based on the discussion in the reification section above, since the adoption of multiparty politics in Tanzania was met with considerable scepticism, one might suspect that the domestic drive for multiparty change originated from political elites rather than grassroots mass movements. While some of the founding members of these parties may have had common origins, the founding leaders of these parties were almost unanimously urban elites possessing a substantial access to financial resources. The elite nature of the construction of these five parties, coupled with the organisational legacies of the CCM and the one-party state, has powerful impacts on the functioning of these parties today. Specifically, all of the parties discussed in this thesis, to a varying degree resemble what one might call elite parties, where a handful of political elites construct, finance, and manage their own political organisations for the purposes of acquiring political power. On an even more narrow level, one might attribute some of these parties as entrepreneur parties, where foundation and construction processes are carried out by one elite.

The subject of this final empirical section concerns the degree to which that these five parties, as political organisations, are distinctly autonomous entities from extra-party organisations or a handful of party elites or party entrepreneurs. In short, parties that rely on one extra-party organisation or a few party leaders will “be less institutionalised than [parties] in which the preservation of the organisation is not at the mercy of such factors” (Randall & Svásand 1999: 9).

There are several specific issues that concern the party autonomy of these five opposition parties. The first issue concerns the fact that all of the parties were funded and founded by either one individual party entrepreneur or a handful of party elites. In the UDP, party formation took place under the sole initiative of the current party leader, in what appears to be a private business venture under the authority of one party entrepreneur. In other cases, such as the NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP, parties were originally formed by a group of elites, and over time became plagued by personal rivalries and claim staking, ultimately becoming “susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality” based on charisma and/or patronage (Olukoshi 1998: 30). Still, other cases, such as CHADEMA and to a lesser extent CUF reflect situations where parties were formed by groups of political and/or business elites and have managed to thwart attempts at party personalisation, but nonetheless remain heavily dependent on a small group of elite party leaders.

A second issue related to party autonomy strictly concerns the primary revenue sources that each party depends on. In some respects, financial dependence appears to rely on monopolised sources rather than a broad array of contributors. Of course, some of the ‘narrowness’ in party contributions relates to the narrow cleavages that some of these parties represent. Yet, representing narrowly defined cleavages does not totally explain the apparent dependence that each of these parties have on private business donations. While CHADEMA and to a lesser extent the UDP were founded largely by and financed from the business sector, all of the parties have come to be heavily dependent on private business donations of some form. This same trend is reflected in the CCM itself as it is forced to make ‘behind the scenes’ concessions to businesses in exchange for financial and electoral support. The opposition’s reliance on the business sector is perplexed by the fact that the CCM is able to monopolise these concessions through exclusive access to the state, thus placing the incumbent regime at a strategically superior position for attracting business affiliates. In short, over reliance on financial support from the business sector has the potential of contributing to party instability should these sponsors shift their loyalties elsewhere, such as to the CCM.

Another detrimental issue for party autonomy is the cases indicating that party contributions are not channelled to the parties for organisational or membership development in general. Instead, as evidenced by the personal financial support lured by Mrema, a number of the private donations are allocated directly to specific party leaders in hopes of enhancing their position in the party and the electorate (Mmuya 1998). There is the likelihood that these trends at some level are expressed in all of the opposition parties in the form of personal alliance relationships. For party autonomy, personal alliances are relationships that take place outside the party itself (Randall & Svásand 1999: 17), elevating the role of the party leaders, possibly to the point that party survival is dependent upon the party leader and his personal alliances.

The monopolisation and/or personalisation of party contributions are compounded by the inability of these parties in deriving substantial portions of their party finances from party membership fees due to the sheer level of poverty found in Tanzania. In addition, the parties are unable to offset the

reliance on business finances by linking up with the relatively vibrant forces in civil society due to the Societies Ordinance Act that essentially prevents the existence of such co-operation. All in all, this situation contributes to the weakening of party autonomy by pushing party dependence into the hands of the most financially endowed organisations and individuals, most of which are found in the business sector.

5 Conclusions

Judging from the discussion thus far, one might conclude that each of these five parties are significantly unstable or exhibit vast vulnerability to destabilising effects and are thus institutionally weak. Such a statement is supported by at least three pieces of evidence. First, all of these parties, to a varying degree, appear to be synonymous with their respective party leaders, most evident in the TLP, with the charismatic populist Augustine Mrema, and the UDP, with the well financed John Cheyo. With the seemingly strong affiliations between the party leaders and their respective supporters, as discussed under value infusion, coupled with the over-dependence on the personal finances of the party leaders, as discussed under party autonomy, party stability is simply a function of the stability of their party leaders.

The blurring of the distinction between party leaders and the parties themselves is compounded by the second factor limiting party stability. Specifically, each party, to a varying degree, appears lacking in adequately defined or adhered to methods of decision-making or conflict resolution, a fact pointed out by some of the party leaders themselves. All of these parties were essentially formed and organised based on informal methods of decision-making, yet rendered almost useless as party membership grew and more complex issues found their way into leadership circles (Mmuya 1998: 98). In the final analysis, weakly defined organisational procedures offers almost no ability in constraining personal power ambitions and party factionalism, further eroding party stability, as evident in the NCCR-Mageuzi.

A third key factor that limits the stability of these five parties is the fact that all of them have yet to become institutions symbolising specific ideologies or platforms outside their ability in criticising the incumbent regime, as identified under reification and value infusion. As C. K. Omari points out:

“The major problem for many opposition parties in Tanzania is that the candidates specialise in criticisms but fail to move to the next stage, i.e. the campaign and policy formation phase” ((B) 1997: 83).

The values, symbols, and images that have been associated with these five opposition parties thus far appears to partially reflect the underlying symbols and values that have been associated with the Tanzanian multiparty system in general, as evident by the Nyalali Commission, Erdmann, and Ngware studies. In sum, parties that have not come to symbols positive and stable values have a questionable long-term viability, particularly when faced by a thoroughly entrenched incumbent regime such as the CCM.

Yet, it would be a vicious mistake to conclude that all five of these parties offer no hope in developing institutional stability in the future. Such a statement is clearly supported by four trends that have developed over the past several years. The first aspect concerns the strength in value infusion between parties and their supporters. While the empirical analysis suggests that party

platforms and ideologies are weak and that the strength of the links between party members and parties are weakened by the strength of the affiliations between party members and party leaders, evidence also indicates that there were obvious trends in the social background of some of the party supporters, particularly obvious in CHADEMA, CUF, and at least at one time in the NCCR-Mageuzi. In the NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA in particular, the dominant social sector within each party appears to reflect the primary emphasis within each party platform (agricultural emphasis for the NCCR-Mageuzi and business for CHADEMA). In CHADEMA the current party rank and file are overwhelmingly drawn from the small business and cash crop sectors and, over time, may develop into a traditional affiliation base within the party, even if the basis for these affiliations today are between leaders and members. Even in the UDP, evidence suggests that party membership is largely drawn on ethnic lines and may offer a strong basis for party support in the future, eventually forming a core support group for the party itself. In this particular case however, this eventuality will depend on the party leader's willingness to remain in politics; without John Cheyo the UDP would likely cease to exist.

A second positive trend observed in Tanzanian opposition politics is that the opposition parties, despite their unwillingness in focusing on platforms, has largely succeeded in helping to politicise issues related to corruption and transparency. John Cheyo and Augustine Mrema have been the two most audible voices in attacking the CCM over the loss of revenues and transparency due to the corruption disease. On a theoretical level, by politicising corruption, a probable product of patron-client relations within the neopatrimonial state itself, erodes the basis by which the CCM maintains support and legitimacy with their respective clients, potentially pushing their support into the opposition camp. During the 1995 presidential campaigns, Mrema made painstaking efforts in politicising the unethical practices in the government and the CCM. Naturally, the current President, Benjamin Mkapa, afraid of defeat in the 1995 presidential race, began to focus much of his campaign attention on corruption as well. In fact, his seemingly clean political record was one of the reasons why he was chosen as a CCM presidential candidate in the first place. Therefore, while the opposition parties may be electorally and institutionally weak, they have managed to force the CCM and the government to address issues of corruption and transparency and may bolster their image as an effective challenge to the incumbent regime.

Efforts in politicising issues and events have also been carried out by some of the parliamentary opposition parties. As alluded to in the reification section evidence suggests that these parties are beginning to play a type of watchdog in the Parliament and have successfully politicised opposition objections to CCM legislation, particularly in relation to the recent legislation that allows the presidential candidates to win elections with simple majority. Today, rarely does a week go by without seeing a newspaper article discussing Cheyo's objections and alternatives to CCM legislation in parliament. As was indicated under reification, parliamentary participation is a clear method for establishing a party track record as well as assisting in platform articulation.

Another positive sign that may assist in the institutionalisation of these parties and the consolidation of multiparty democracy in general is the active role that some parties are beginning to play in grassroots education in participation and democracy. Electoral participation is particularly important in periods of transition because it allows individuals at the grassroots level the chance in helping shape new political institutions and government policy rather than leaving the task to political elites. In particular, CHADEMA's women's wing is heavily active in organising neighbourhood meetings for educating people on their rights and duties within the new multiparty system. Attendees are encouraged to participate in elections, civic organisations, and party activities (Interview 28.10.99). Similar activities were observed in the youth wing of the NCCR-Mageuzi (Interview 22.10.99). These types of activities help strengthen the local level presence of the parties while, at the same time, promoting a participatory atmosphere at the grassroots level.

At this point in time it is safe to suggest that all five of these parties are, to a varying degree, institutionally weak. Perhaps CHADEMA and CUF, do to the relatively stable nature of these parties, paired with a less personalised power arrangement offer a clearer prospect for further institutionalisation and stability. The current arrangement with respect the UDP and the TLP on the other hand, greatly depends on the desires of their respective party leaders, rendering these two parties as highly susceptible to de-stabilising effects. Due to the party's questionable future the NCCR-Mageuzi today should be seen as an example of the effects of the destruction and instability that can result from factional fighting and power personalisation.

However, compared with the TLP, CHADEMA's support is relatively limited and small in number. In this respect, if Mrema is willing to ride his political career out in the TLP, over time, the party may develop into a stable and durable political party, potentially eclipsing its smaller rivals. An equally important aspect for party institutionalisation concerns the future of CUF, a party not only divided between a Mainland faction and a faction representing the Isles, but also between those CUF members on Zanzibar who support the Union between the Island and the Mainland and those that want to see the formation of an independent Zanzibar. If given the power to govern, this division has a tremendous potential for tearing CUF into two, apparently incompatible camps. All-in-all, while Tanzania may formally exist as a multiparty system, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the future existence of these new parties that have emerged to challenge the legitimacy of the CCM's single-party rule.

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Summary

In 1992, legislation formally ended the nearly 30 year domination of the one-party state in Tanzania, part of a democratisation wave that appeared to sweep through Africa in the late 80s and early 90s. In Tanzania by 1993, there were a total of 51 parties formally registered or in the process of registering. Today, this fragmentation has been reduced to 13 legally registered political parties.

This article, as an abstract from an MPA thesis, focuses on the institutionalisation of the five main opposition parties that have emerged since 1992: the NCCR-Mageuzi, CHADEMA, CUF, UDP, and TLP. Specifically, through the use of a four dimensional party institutionalisation model, this article discusses some of the key factors that limit these five parties in operating as stable institutions in a political environment still dominated by the incumbent regime, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi.

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