


Politics, Administration and Agricultural Development

The Case of Botswana's Accelerated
Rainfed Arable Programme

Kjetil Børhaug

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Summary:

This is a case study of a large programme for arable farming in Botswana from 1985 to 1990. The focus is upon the organization of the programme. The study seeks to explain why the programme developed into an ineffective and costly modernization effort. The objective of the programme was to commercialize arable farming in Botswana. However, most participating farmers used it to subsidize their established mode of production, without moving in the direction of a more commercialized system. To explain the failure of the programme the analysis makes use of organizational theory as well as a ruling elite perspective.

Sammendrag:

Dette er en undersøkelse av et omfattende offentlig program for å utvikle jordbruket i Botswana fra 1985 til 1990. Studien tar for seg organiseringen av programmet. Den søker å forklare hvorfor programmet mislyktes. Den opprinnelige hensikten var å kommersialisere jordbruket i Botswana. Imidlertid brukte bøndene programmet som en kilde til subsidiering av eksisterende produksjonsformer, uten å legge om produksjonen i retning av mer kommersialisering. Analysen søker forklaringer på programmets fiasko i så vel organisasjonsteori som i en "styrende elite modell".

Indexing terms: Stikkord:

Agricultural policy	Landbrukspolitikk
Public administration	Offentlig administrasjon
Modernization	Modernisering
Organization theory	Organisasjonsteori
Botswana	Botswana

To be ordered from Chr. Michelsen Institute, Department of Social Science and Development, Fantoftvegen 38, N-5036 Fantoft, Norway. Telephone: +47 5 574000. Telefax: +47 5 574166

Contents

Preface	vi
Map of Botswana	vii
Key facts and figures	viii
Introduction	1
The Programme in brief	1
The analytical approach	3
The structure of the report	5
1. Theoretical framework. Political-administrative system, policy-making and implementation	6
1.1 Introduction	6
1.2 Open systems	6
1.3 Governmental administrative organizations	6
1.4 The political authorities	10
1.5 The political — administrative relationship	11
1.6 The clientele	12
1.7 Decision-making processes	14
2. Methods of research	16
2.1 Introduction	16
2.2 The case study approach	16
2.3 Qualitative and quantitative data	17
2.4 Process and action	19
2.5 Problem structures and models of action	21
2.6 Organization structure	22
2.7 The implementation of ARAP	23
3. The political and socio-economic context	25
3.1 Introduction	25
3.2 Resources for agriculture	25
3.3 Historical developments	27
3.3.1 Pre-colonial Tswana society	28
3.3.2 Colonialization	30
3.4 Independence	34
3.4.1 The post colonial regime	34
3.4.2 The role of the bureaucracy	37
3.5 Post-colonial development strategy	39
3.6 External relations of dependence	41
3.7 The agricultural sector	42

3.7.1	Rural households	43
3.7.2	Arable farming	44
3.7.3	Drought	48
3.8	Summary	49
4.	The Ministry of Agriculture, professional approaches and the elaboration of ARAP	51
4.1	Introduction	51
4.2	Ministry of Agriculture: Problem structures	52
4.2.1	Problem structures and models of action	52
4.2.2	Demands for a mass oriented agricultural development	62
4.2.3	Response to demands for new policy goals	64
4.3	The initiative and design of ARAP	67
4.4	The design of ARAP	69
4.4.1	The components	70
4.5	Participation in the planning process	72
4.5.1	Norms for project planning	72
4.5.2	Interests and premises left aside	73
4.5.3	Some centralizing factors	76
4.6.	Summary	78
5.	The planning of ARAP: The Ministry of Agriculture and powerful actors in the environment	80
5.1	Introduction	80
5.2	The role of the political authorities	80
5.2.1	Consequences for ARAP	81
5.2.2	The political leadership	84
5.3	ARAP appraised in MFDP	86
5.3.1	MFDP and its role in project planning	86
5.3.2	Administrative views on the ARAP proposal	87
5.4	Donors	88
5.5	Summary	91
6.	The implementation of ARAP	92
6.1	Introduction	92
6.2	The implementing organization	92
6.2.1	Central level implementing structure	93
6.2.2	The field service	94
6.3	Implementing ARAP	96
6.3.1	Workload and changed priorities	97

6.3.2	Effective mobilization	99
6.3.3	Access to ARAP assistance	100
6.3.4	Ineffective control	102
6.3.5	Effective mobilization and ineffective control. The transformation of the bold modernizing attempt into a general transfer of money	104
6.4	Summary	106
7.	Some effects of ARAP	108
7.1	Introduction	108
7.2	Effects for the clientele	108
7.2.1	Sustainability	108
7.2.2	Effects for various groups	109
7.3	Political effects	112
7.4	Some impacts on the field service	113
7.5	Unintended effects	114
7.6	Summary	116
8.	Conclusions and discussion	118
8.1	Introduction	118
8.2	The case of ARAP — major conclusions	118
8.3	Alternative explanations	122
8.4	Ruling elite models in Botswana	124
8.5	Problems of the ruling elite model	128
8.5.1	Politization of policy making?	128
8.5.2	The focus of the ruling elite model	129
8.6	Ruling elites and institutions	132
8.7	The aftermath of ARAP	135
	References	138
	Appendix 1: Interview data	147
	Appendix 2: List of persons interviewed	152
	Appendix 3: Organizational charts	155



Preface

This report is a revision of my thesis "Politics, Administration and Agricultural Development. The Case of Botswana's Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme", submitted in November 1990 to the Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen. CMI has provided financial support for this revision, in which I have aimed at clarifying the original analysis, considering additional policy documents, and improving some technical aspects.

Several persons and institutions are gratefully acknowledged for support and advice throughout the time I worked on the thesis. First, my two tutors, Thorvald Gran and Arne Tostensen. Furthermore, Bente Alver who gave valuable advice on data collection and interpretation. Thorvald Gran has also given friendly advice in the revision of the thesis.

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Finally, thanks to Espen Børhaug for much needed assistance in the very final stage of the work with the thesis.

Bergen, July 1992

Key facts and figures

Official name:	Republic of Botswana
Date of independence:	30th September 1966
Constitution:	Multi-party democracy
President:	H.E. Dr. Q.K.J. Masire
Official language:	Setswana and English
Area:	581,730 km ²
Mean altitude:	1000 m above sea level
Population:	1.15 mill. (1986 de jure estimate)
Rate of natural increase:	3.5 per cent
Population density:	2 per km ² (1986-estimate)
Life expectancy at birth:	56 years (1981)
Primary school enrolment, net:	92 % (1985)
Secondary school enrolment, net:	23 % (1985)
Gross domestic product (GDP):	P 1,524 mill. (1984/85 estimate) (approx. USD 950 mill)
Gross national product:	P 1,302 mill. (1984/85 estimate) (approx. USD 810 mill.)
GDP per capita:	P 1,430 (1984/85 estimate) approx. USD 890)
Principal contributor to GDP:	Mining: 47 % (1985/86 estimate)
Principal export:	Diamonds: 76 % (1985)

Principal trading partners (1985):	Exports	Imports
South Africa	6 %	74 %
Europe	85 %	12 %
SADCC and others	9 %	14 %

Currency: 1 Pula = 100 Thebe

Exchange-rates:	1975	1980	1985
USD per Pula:	1.2	1.3	0.5
NOK per Pula:	6.4	6.7	3.6

Foreign reserve cover: 16 months of imports, (1985)

Debt service ratio: 5.4 per cent (1985)

Labour force (1984/85): 368,000 (37 % of population)
of which:

employed, agriculture 33 per cent

employed, other 26 per cent

un- & underemployed 41 per cent

Population below absolute poverty income level:
(1980-estimates, cited by IBRD)

- urban 40 per cent

- rural 55 per cent

Consumer price inflation (per cent per annum):

1981-83	1984-85	1986-87 (first half)
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10.9	8.4	10.1
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Source: Granberg and Parkinson 1988

Map of Botswana

Source: Granberg and Parkinson 1988

Introduction

This study seeks to explain how Botswana's largest programme for development of arable farming developed into an ineffective and costly modernization effort. The Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP) was launched in 1985, and terminated in 1990. It will be described briefly below, and in the subsequent chapters be the main topic. The analytical framework applied is one that focuses on the interplay between administrative organizations, political authorities and target groups, assuming that in most public policy development all these factors and the interplay between them will influence how a policy is shaped.

The main relevance of the present analysis lies in the importance of the ARAP programme itself. It was a major programme, and it is an important topic in the debate on Botswana's development problems. However, the chosen analytical framework will also allow for a discussion of the relevance of alternative models for explaining rural development policy in Botswana.

The Programme in brief

ARAP was a set of subsidies intended to encourage arable farming among all groups of farmers engaged in rainfed arable production. The design of ARAP was to give grants in cash to the farmers who destumped, ploughed, row planted and weeded their fields. The amount of cash paid to participating farmers increased with increasing field size, up to 10 hectares. In addition, seeds and fertilizers were distributed for free to the farmers, and 85 per cent of costs for fencing of fields were covered by the Government. Farmers could utilize one, a few or all of these assistance components according to their own choice. These offers were provided to farmers repeatedly for 5 years, from the 1985/86 season to 1989/90.

The objective of the programme can be summed up as an attempt to commercialize the arable farming of Botswana farmers.¹ Historically, arable farming had predominantly aimed at the subsistence needs of the

¹ The word *Tswana* is the core of a variety of forms. Botswana is the name of the country, while *Setswana* is the name of the *Tswana* language. A person of *Tswana* origin is labelled a *Motswana*, while the plural form of *Tswana* persons is *Batswana*.

households, and in many households crop production was even below subsistence needs. ARAP was designed to encourage the farmers to expand their arable production by means of improved methods, improved inputs and expansion of arable field sizes. In combination, this should give household farming a decisive assistance: Adoption of all the methods and inputs provided by ARAP would enable farmers to produce a surplus that could be marketed and generate cash incomes. This surplus, it was envisioned, would enable farmers to reinvest in continued commercial arable farming. Ministry of Agriculture's stated objectives were to increase arable production to a level of national food self-sufficiency, to increase rural incomes generated from arable production and to optimise rural income distribution (MOA 1988: 1).

ARAP was open for all farmers, and as most farmers in Botswana are rather poor, ARAP became a major means to alleviate poverty problems in the rural sector. All farmers were given the opportunity to escape poverty by entering commercial crop farming. During its implementation period, ARAP was by far the largest programme for arable agriculture development, and reached more poor farmers more than any other programme.

ARAP did reach all farmers with assistance, but the developmental effects of the programme are rather doubtful. According to a sector study carried out for NORAD in 1986, it is "doubtful whether ARAP contributes significantly to the development of the arable sector" (Øygard et al. 1986). As a modernization effort, ARAP sought to influence and change the production profiles of Botswana farmers. However, most participating farmers used the programme as a subsidy of their established system and level of production, and continued mainly in the same type of low input production, which does not even cover subsistence needs for most farmers. The main change caused by ARAP was that average field sizes increased, but in most households the increase was definitely not enough to expand production beyond subsistence levels. Finally, without ARAP, field sizes are likely to become smaller again.

The Ministry of Agriculture states that "crop yields despite the very favourable 1987/88 cropping season [of good rainfall] are still very low to sustain arable production" and furthermore, "household income has not been significantly improved [by ARAP] nor is it likely to be sustained" (MOA 1991: 20-21). Those farmers who had already adopted improved methods and production input continued to apply them, but the adoption rates did not increase significantly among ARAP beneficiaries (Farrington 1987; Rashem 1987). The changes achieved were thus modest, and their sustainability without continued ARAP support is questionable.

Even if it was clearly popular among farmers that the government financed farming operations for which they would normally have to carry the costs themselves, the group benefiting most was the wealthiest farmers. This small group of farmers often own tractors. ARAP subsidized ploughing also when the ploughing was done by a contractor, which opened up a huge and profitable market for tractor owners.²

The modest achievements were reached at a very high financial cost.³ Furthermore, ARAP has had negative side effects. Scarce implementing capacity was concentrated upon ARAP, and other presumably important programmes suffered (Farrington 1987; Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 238, 240). ARAP has hastened long term developments of deforestation and soil erosion, and accelerated the movement of arable farming westwards into more fragile areas of mixed grazing and farming land (Eskeli 1989; Stange et al. 1990: 7-8).

The analytical approach

It is generally recognized that the civil service plays a crucial role in the making of public policy. The analytical perspective has to account for this and focus on what factors determine civil service action and attitudes. Not least the Botswana civil service is often pointed out as a key actor in policy making processes. Gunderson makes this a central point to the extent that he labels Botswana "The Administrative State" (1970), in which the civil service in reality is unchallenged in its influence on public policy's objectives and means. Also Polhemus (1983) underlines the bureaucratic dominance in policy making processes of Botswana.

However, any attempt to explain agricultural policies in Botswana should take into account the political importance of the rural, agriculturally dominated areas. The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which has won every election since 1965, has the rural population as the core of its electorate. It is important for the regime to demonstrate that it has the welfare of the rural poor in mind (Holm 1988b: 198). The welfare services for the poor that have been developed are an important component in this strategy of mobilizing political support in the rural areas. Increasingly,

² Over the years 1985 to 1989, approximately P60 mill. were spent by the Government on ploughing subsidies (P1 = NOK 4.0 1985). A large proportion of this ended up as income for tractor owners, acting as ploughing contractors.

³ The total costs reached about NOK. 400 million over the five years ARAP was operational, calculating 1 Pula to about NOK 4.0. (Granberg and Parkinson 1988; MOA 1991).

agricultural modernization programmes for the poor farmers have also played a role for purposes of political stability. The extraordinary economic growth Botswana has experienced has not reached the rural peasantry very significantly, and this is increasingly becoming a political problem.

It is commonly acknowledged that implementation processes often changes the content of programmes and projects. If money, personnel, expertise and technical equipment are not provided it will change the policy or at worst, it will prevent the policy from materializing at all. Furthermore, most policy statements, guidelines and directives that the implementing agencies receive from decision makers as orders to implement are open to many interpretations. It can often be interpreted in many ways what emphasis to place on various elements in the policy, how to combine elements that are partially inconsistent, and what things really mean. These interpretation processes are significant factors that affect the outcome of policy implementation. Finally, there is the problem of mobilizing the target groups. Hyden (1983) talks about the "uncaptured peasantry", pointing to the experience that the peasantry is difficult to engage in modern structures of state and market, both because they often do not perceive such engagement as attractive, and because they have an alternative economy to base themselves on. Even if his theory about peasant autonomy is a controversial one, it refers to the central problem that implementation depends on the target group's perceived rational interests, and the choices they make according to these interests and rationalities.

Finally, the influence of donors is an important factor when analyzing how public policy is made in Third World countries. Donors are heavily engaged in Botswana, and might well have a considerable influence on the planning and implementation of programmes in which they engage.

An analytical perspective is needed to account for how policy making is influenced by the complex structures and processes indicated in the above sections.

The policy making process that developed ARAP has not been examined by other writers. But many observers in Botswana offered their opinions about why ARAP became as outlined above. Two ideas seemed to dominate. The first was that contrary to how policy is normally developed, in the case of ARAP, the ruling elite of politicians and civil servants acted in too much of a hurry and did not plan things as well as they should and could have done. The other explanation was that ARAP was not really meant to be a modernization effort, but was solely meant as crisis relief since there was a severe drought in Botswana from the early eighties. This explanation argued that to look for the modernization achievements of ARAP would be to expect it to be something else than it really was. Both

of these explanations have a grain of truth, but they can not explain ARAP, and on some points they are wrong.

These two perceptions about why ARAP went wrong are based on varieties of a ruling elite perspective. In the first version the ruling elite did not perform effectively enough, whereas in the latter version, it did perform effectively when considering its "real" intentions.

The idea of a ruling elite in control of public policy is a quite widespread one in Botswana, and major scientific works are elaborations of it.

Gunderson (1970) and Picard (1980; 1987) have formulated the clearest general ruling elite models for the case of Botswana, and the ruling elite idea permeates much of the debate on Botswana politics in general. This model focuses on a ruling elite of power holders, and examines its interests, strategies and consequent actions. The ruling elite model tends to consider the administrative organizations as mere tools, implying that they are neutral and can be put to use for any politically defined purpose, which is not a realistic assumption. Furthermore, the ruling elite model tends to ignore that the ruling elite members are themselves members not only of an elite, but also of institutions, and influenced by this. In the concluding chapter, these problems of the ruling elite model will be discussed, based on the case study of ARAP.

The structure of the report

In chapter 1, an analytical framework along the lines sketched in the above will be outlined, drawing on the works of Knut Dahl Jacobsen (1964; 1967). In chapter 2, methods of research and the data material will be described. The rural economy, the role of agriculture within it and a description of agriculture itself will be the topics of chapter 3. An outline of agricultural policies since in the years prior to ARAP will also be given. Chapters 4 to 6 will outline the administration's influence on ARAP (ch. 4), the political interventions in the planning process (ch. 5) and the implementation of ARAP (ch. 6). Chapter 7 will discuss somewhat more broadly the effects ARAP has had. Chapter 8 will sum up the analysis and go on to discuss the implications of it for the agricultural sector, and the case study will be related to the ruling elite model that will be presented, suggesting some added dimensions to that mode of analysis.

1. Theoretical framework. Political-administrative system, policy-making and implementation

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, an analytical framework will be elaborated upon, drawing on Knut Dahl Jacobsen's works (1964; 1967). The motivation of this choice of perspective is to enable the analysis to examine the interplay among administrative actors, the political authorities, and the target groups. Conceptualizations of these principal elements as well as of the relationships between them are needed.

1.2 Open systems

Jacobsen's approach to the explanation of public policy focuses on a three-component structure; administration, political authority and clientele (Jacobsen 1964: 3-10). The point of departure in Jacobsen's model is the concept of open systems, where the environment gives support and makes demands on the system. This concept applies at different levels. The political-administrative system, or the state, is in need of support and therefore it has to respond to demands. Not least the political authorities are important at this level.

Also the administration as such is seen in the same perspective; as open and dependent on support. The support needed has to come from the political authorities, but also the clientele and donors might be important here. This open perspective links Jacobsen's model to the tradition within organization theory focusing on organizational dependencies and their capabilities to adapt to a changing environment (Scott 1981).

1.3 Governmental administrative organizations

Jacobsen rejects the idea that administrative organizations are neutral tools that can be put to use for any decided purpose. On the contrary, administrative organizations are basically political phenomena. He makes

it a general point that the interests of social groups are best attended to by the state when they are made routine considerations in administrative organizations (1964; 1967). This is so because administrative organizations are, in most cases, biased in their perceptions of what are important problems, tasks, values and what are acceptable solutions. This bias leads to attention to the interests of some groups and to the ignorance of others. Jacobsen labels these perceptions problem structures with corresponding models of actions, underlining their stability and structured occurrence.

The problem structures and models of action are important in policy analysis because of the influence administrative organizations have in determining public policy. In most cases, the tasks that the administration has to solve are general objectives set by political authorities, and these goals normally have to be operationalized and specified by a professional administration. The problem structures and models of action determine the administrative organization's specific action to solve any task it is told to solve. Agreed, general goals will be specified into concrete public policy by the administration, and the way this is done will imply further political choices. Politics is, in Jacobsen's perspective, about who has their interests attended to in administrative organization's stable problem structures and models of action.

Most administrative organizations are biased, but they are so in a rather disguised way. Even though the organization's views are presented as technical and neutral premises, in most cases these premises are selectively biased to the benefit of some social interests and to the detriment of others. This does not imply a rejection of administrative organizations' ability to activate in what is perceived as clearly political matters. Here, however, we are concerned with the political implications of what is framed as professional and administrative issues. Professional assessments and views are often presented as correct, according to professional standards, but they often imply political choices. Or to use another formulation, administrative organizations have an interest profile relative to society implied by their professional approach. The terms to conceptualize this politicized professional approach are problem structure and models of action.

The models of action and problem structure are interrelated. Problem structures will influence what are seen as appropriate means. But available means might also often influence problem structures so that the administrative organization's means become relevant.

Organizational units as such do not have problem structures and models of action, but the people who populate organizational units do. The incumbents of organizations are the carriers of problem structures and models of action. However, problem structures and models of action are

maintained by organizational means. Socialization and organizational control reinforce and reproduce them (Lægneid and Olsen 1978; Njoroge 1983). The individual actors of the organization will then behave in ways strongly influenced by these organizationally maintained problem structures and models of action. If the civil servants in an administrative organization depend on this organization for their careers, i.e. do not want to leave or have no alternative career path, the strength of these factors controlling individual behaviour will most likely be increased. Thus, problem structures and models of action are not easily changed as they entrench the whole organization. Furthermore, when definitions of problems and appropriate actions are framed as professional values, it is not legitimate to change these when the reasons for such a change are not professional, but demanded by outsiders.

Jacobsen suggests a connection between problem structures, models of action and organization structure, in particular, how the administrative organization organizes its relationship to the clientele. We will return to this in section 1.6. But the general point should also apply for the structuring of the other parts of the organization. In Jacobsen's analysis of the Norwegian agricultural administration in the last century, the administrative organization is fairly small at the central level. In the case of Botswana's Ministry of Agriculture, we face a much more complex organization, and this has consequences for the understanding of the concepts introduced above. Some concepts will be presented in order to facilitate the analysis of Ministry of Agriculture's (MOA) internal mode of operation and the impacts this had on ARAP.

Egeberg (1984) points out two basic features in the structuring of modern governmental organizations: specialization and coordination. He points out that hierarchy is the most common coordinating mechanism in governmental organizations. I will use the concept of administration in this somewhat wide sense: the specialized and hierarchical formal governmental administrative organizations of professional civil servants, biased in their professional approach to outside problems and tasks.

Specialized organizational units concentrate their attention on a limited set of problems in the organization's total task environment. Within organizations there are thus formed specialized sets of perceptions of problems and ways to handle problems. Influenced by formally defined goals and means, formal rules, profession, experience, organizational history and by adjustments to the environment, problem structures and models of action are developed in a semi-autonomous way in various parts of the organization, and they might be more or less consistent (Egeberg 1978).

In the case of planning major programmes, these will often be of a complex nature, affecting many different issues on the administrative organization's agenda. Consequently, major programmes will affect the tasks of quite a number of organizational sub-units. If a programme is not designed and planned in an adaptive way to various issues seen as important, the programme might have negative consequences for issues deemed important by the organization or parts of it. The linking together of various organizational units in a coordinated process thus becomes a means to secure effective policy making and planning.

Coordination is more than a mere question about time, capacity and well designed planning routines. We have seen that the organizational units that have to be coordinated may have interests and values at stake that are difficult to combine. Coordinating policy-making processes is often difficult because it requires compromises and trade-offs.

Some actors might find that the best way to solve the tasks they are in charge of is to avoid cooperation with others. Or they might find that problem resolution requires control over what others do. Thus the coordination in specialized organizations is influenced by tactical considerations. The ability to control who is linked to decision-making processes or de-linked from them gives one power to influence the contents and interest profiles of policy-making.

Coordination, i.e. linking and de-linking, is often attempted through hierarchical means, like formal rules of participation and procedures to link units together in decision-making processes. Such a control of an hierarchical organization will often have limited effects. First, it will hardly ever be complete, there will normally be some room for choice at lower administrative levels. Secondly, hierarchical control has a limited ability to facilitate mutual trust, cooperation, innovation and joint problem solving.

When a policy is decided upon and ready for implementation, new problems of control arise: the ability to control the activities in the implementing parts of the organizations. Often hierarchical control measures are applied. Reporting procedures and evaluations are important tools. Control of the careers of lower level staff is also an important control mechanism.

The administration, according to Jacobsen, is dependent on support and it faces demands from the environment. The support from the political authorities will be important for most administrative organizations. But also the clientele is a category that administrative organizations depend upon. The success of administrative organizations depends on their ability to realize their objectives, which are often dependent on certain clientele responses. In many Third World countries, the peasantry is not a potent

national political actor. This may ease the administration's problems, as there are no articulated demands to adjust to, but it may also make it more difficult for the administrative organization to perform effectively, because a clientele that is not well understood is also difficult to manipulate for change.

Donors are also important actors in the environment, often administrative organizations depend on donors for funding and expertise.

This does not mean that administrative action is determined by the environment. The professional ministry will be powerful itself, because of its expertise, capacities and responsibility for the sector. It might be the most powerful actor in the policy-making process. But still, it is dependent on support and will have to adjust to demands.

1.4 The political authorities

In an open system perspective, the political leadership is dependent on support from many sides. When discussing Third World countries, international dependence is often focused on. For instance, international capital and the Republic of South Africa are forces of strong significance in the case of Botswana. The processes of demands, pressure and support involving Botswana and its international environment are, however, not the key interest here.

Within these limits, the political authorities attempt to generate support from society. In Botswana the formal framework of these processes of meeting demands and mobilizing support is a form of multi-party system, with regular elections.

The mechanisms for mobilizing support are many, they include appeals to ethnicity, to tribal loyalty and to class. They include the building of patron-client networks, and finally they include delivering public policy that people want, in return for electoral support (Polhemus 1983; Holm and Molutsi (eds) 1989). It follows that major programmes like ARAP are critical for the political authorities because such programmes affect the level of support for the regime.

One might well analyze the political leadership in terms of problem structures and models of action. The political authorities also face a complex and ambiguous environment, which needs simplifying in order to be handled. Political authorities develop experience and routine about what means will solve what problems. However, their perception of society, its problems and potential may be quite different from the perception held in the administration.

1.5 The political — administrative relationship

Jacobsen (1967) places quite some political dynamic in this relationship and the conflicts and tensions that develop between politicians and administrative leaders.

Basically, the relationship is one of interdependence. The administration is in need of support from the political leaders who are their formal superiors as well as the source of legitimacy for the administration's decisions. The political authorities are dependent on the administration in order to act in society.

The relationship is also, within the norms of the Westminster model inherited by Botswana, one of division of work. There are some tasks that the political authorities should decide, like setting goals and guidelines for the administration's activity. Some issues are of specialized, technical nature and should be left to the professionals in the civil service.

It might be envisioned that one or both of the two actors do not accept these norms for division of work. The civil servants might in some contexts engage in what is commonly seen as political decisions. Or, the political authorities might interfere in the specific, obviously technical considerations of the administration. Many authors see the latter situation as the most pressing problem. Hyden, for instance, labels this the "supremacy of politics", referring to a situation where the political leaders see political considerations as the only legitimate ones, and thus undermine the professional performance of the administration by intervening too much in technical aspects and by enforcing unrealistic objectives. However, the distinction between political and administrative considerations is difficult to define clearly.

According to Jacobsen, how this relationship should be balanced and what degree of administrative autonomy should be allowed will never be solved once and for all. It is not an issue that can be objectively defined, and it is not very fruitful to try to define the optimal balance. Rather, we should focus on the dynamic processes that in various situations influence how various actors set the distinction.

In Jacobsen's model, to what extent the political authorities try to control the administration will vary over time. Increasing political control he labels contraction. Easing control and leaving more discretionary power to the administration he labels as detraction.

As long as the administration is seen as responsive to political demands detraction will tend to remain, whereas in the case of dissatisfactory adjustment to political demands, contraction will often result in one form or another. Contraction will often take the form that the political authorities interfere in what the professional civil servants see as their professional

domain of how to define means in the policy, and what policies are realistic. Contraction processes thus often result in tensions and conflict which may lead to changes in the problem structures and models of action of the administration. However, contraction attempts may lead to deadlock and deteriorating relationships. It is a continuous process of power and adjustments.

Several factors constrain the ability of political authorities to influence policy-making and implementation. The magnitude of public policy makes it problematic to exercise political control over all programmes. And a number of programmes are planned and implemented without much political guidance and interference. But also for the large and politically most significant programmes there will probably be constraints on the political authorities' ability to direct processes. The administration's monopoly on expertise often gives it a very strong power in policy-making, especially when political parties do not have any alternative or counter expertise. However, if the political authorities direct their limited capacity towards a specific policy making process, they will most likely have a strong influence.

1.6 The clientele

In chapter 3, I outline in some detail the development of the rural economy where most dwellers derive parts of their livelihood from agriculture. The economic strength of the rural population is very varied, and the social structure is quite complex with many partly competing interests. Public policy affects the various interests that the rural citizens have in the rural economy.

Analyses of interests often distinguish between objective and subjective interests. Many development programmes have encountered the problem that target groups define their interests in ways that are not objectively correct. Lack of knowledge, superstition and the like are well known problems for development programmes. On the other hand, the professional development assistance officer does not always possess the objective truth about what is rational. Suffice it here to underline the point that target groups' interests are not obvious nor unambiguous, they are interpreted and defined, and might deviate from how they are expected to be.

Socio-economic structures are complex. The situation and context for the individual client are complex as well, consisting of varieties of ways to manage in a structure that both provides options and constraints. The notion of farming system is an attempt to conceptualize how a farmer is not only

a producer of a given type of output, but is engaged in continuous and complex processes of choice and adjustment (Øyhus 1991).

When faced with a policy, the clientele makes choices adjusted to the multi-faceted situation its members face at that point in time. Choices concern both whether to relate to the policy at all, and how to relate. It is an obvious point, but often ignored by policy makers. Hyden (1983) makes this point forcefully when arguing that African traditional farmers have the possibility to exit from interaction with state and market and retreat to the economy of affection. They make rational choices, and they have the option of making choices. The semi-autonomy provided by the economy of affection is a controversial issue. But that does not alter the point that farmers make choices, according to what seems rational for them according to the interpretation they make of their situation.

Thus, as pointed out by Hyden, mobilizing farmers to interact with state or market is a difficult task. It is difficult to predict what various groups will see as a rational action. Or more precisely, it is difficult to predict when farmers' interests and perceptions are not articulated and included in policy making processes — which is often the case in African countries. One reason why farmers' premises and interests are not adequately considered is that political and administrative decision makers do not have identification with the clientele groups. Such an identification, and the ability to interact with clientele groups and to perceive and accept their premises are often missing, and problem structures that do not have clientele premises as one of their sources will be rather blind regarding what is rational and relevant from the clientele's perspective. Many public policies therefore face problems in mobilizing target groups.

As noted, Jacobsen makes the point that administrative organizations develop problem structures and models of action, which correspond to some social interests to the detriment of others. These problem structures manifest themselves in public policy. Furthermore, they also manifest themselves in the organizational structures. Over time, there will be a correspondence between organization structure and problem structure. One aspect of this is the organizing of implementing agencies. If, for instance, an administrative organization has problem structures corresponding to wealthy farmers' needs and interests, this will be reflected not only in officials' professional values and in the organization's policies, but also in the organizing of the structure through which clientele members are reached. One dimension of this will be the implementing officers' social relation and attitudes to various groups. But also other matters are important. For instance, who initiates the interaction for assistance? If the clientele member has this responsibility, then very often better-off clientele

members predominate. What are the requirements for assistance and who can in practice fulfil seemingly neutral requirements? Another aspect is the capacity of an implementing agency, and the ability to be accessible, for instance, in Botswana's sparsely populated rural areas.

Implementation thus depends on several factors. First, that implementation capacity is available and that it can be controlled by policy makers who set goals and define the ways to achieve goals. Secondly, that the policy is seen by the clientele as providing something of relevance and that the implementing agency is accessible.

1.7 Decision-making processes

Public policy is often made only gradually. And its phases can vary from case to case. From one phase to the next, actors in the administration, political authorities and clientele may vary in participation and influence. The structure of a decision-making process refers to how individuals participate in the differing phases of such a process. Participation cannot always be predicted in advance. In some cases participation is strictly regulated in rules of participation rights. But rights are not always used; potential participants might abstain. Participation may also be defined as obligatory for some actors, but duties are not always respected and duties might well lead to formalism, i.e. formally fulfilling duties but not really participating. Often there is room for choice both concerning participating at all, but also to what degree and in which phases. Participation in decision-making processes is thus only partly influenced by rules and formal set-ups. The investigation of such processes has to bear this in mind (March and Olsen 1976).

Various actors in a specialized political-administrative system often view problems and strategies differently according to the tasks and problems they regularly work on, according to routines for problem solving and according to professional approach. Various routines and problem structures have an interest profile. And when the different individual parts of a political administrative system vary according to what their problem structures are it makes a difference for social interests how political and administrative actors are active or not in a decision-making and planning process. Politics and influence are about what problem structures are linked to a decision making process, and about what interests are favoured by a specific understanding of a problem. Implementation further influences policy forming in many cases. Resources, clarity and realism are important factors here, but it is also important to see implementation in the light of how

problem and organization structures fit client problems, interests and rationalities.

In this chapter, some concepts for the policy making analysis have been introduced. The topic for the next chapter on methods is how these can be operationalized, and the data material that has been available to assess these key concepts.

2. Methods of research

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will first make some comments on the case study approach. Next, I will discuss some main concepts used for the study of the ARAP case and outline the kind of data material that will be used to discuss these concepts. I will distinguish between qualitative and quantitative data material, and then go into more detail on the various kinds of data that will be used for various purposes.

Qualitative data make up a large part of the data material. Such data are often difficult to represent correctly for the reader to control the use of them on all points. To some extent, this is inherent in all use of qualitative data. In order to counteract this problem, this chapter is relatively detailed and in addition I have presented in an appendix the technical aspects and practical problems of collecting interview data in open, personal interviews.

2.2 The case study approach

By the term case study approach I mean the in-depth analysis of one object of study, in this case, the shaping of a development programme. A case study approach implies the examination of as broad a variety of variables as possible. Not all dimensions and variables will prove equally relevant in the final analysis, some will be reduced to footnotes, others will gradually gain in importance. Such flexibility is one of the advantages of a case study approach.

The case study approach offers considerable flexibility not only in the identification and selection of variables, but also in the development of ways to measure variables. I have not found many organization studies from Botswana, which makes it very difficult to select the relevant variables in advance. More important, the lack of such studies increases the problems of how to measure variables. The case study approach offers a degree of flexibility regarding these issues that is important. Variables can be gradually identified, their nature, the relationship between them and valid ways to measure them can be more clearly understood and developed in due course.

The case study approach also underlines the need to analyze the case in a wider context. In this case, it is especially necessary to relate the policy-making process to characteristics of the policy making organizations in general, and to the environment, especially the target groups, donors and the political authorities. A contextual analysis is also understood as one in which historical development is important. The case should be seen as a stage in a development. Not necessarily a rigid evolution, but a development in which experience is interpreted and related to.

Case studies are often criticized for not being representative of any larger population. On the other hand, norms of representativity should not be equally rigidly understood in all cases. A case might be of outstanding importance in itself. As a major development effort in Botswana during the late eighties, it is the argument that ARAP is such a case, one that it is important to have some knowledge about.

However, the case of ARAP will also, as indicated in the Introduction, be applied for the discussion of problems that are of wider scope than ARAP only, for instance, how ARAP was a step in the dynamic development of agricultural policies.

Finally, the ARAP case will be used for a discussion of whether the ruling elite model is a fruitful one for explaining public policy making in Botswana. Such a discussion requires not that ARAP is representative for any population of policies, but that the case is one which the ruling elite model is supposed to explain. ARAP is such a case, as will be argued in chapter 8.

2.3 Qualitative and quantitative data

In this study, qualitative and quantitative data are used in combination. When done cautiously, and providing we are always aware of the implications of the varying representativity of the different kinds of data, this seems a fruitful approach.

The term qualitative data covers a variety of data and data collection techniques. A clear definition of the concept is difficult to find. Grønmo argues that in addition to the variety of techniques applied, what characterizes qualitative data is that they are collected under conditions of closeness to the object under study (1982: 24-25). Kirk and Miller emphasize the interaction with people on their own turf as the critical aspect of qualitative data (1986: 12). The ideal of closeness points to the need to examine a phenomenon gradually over a certain time span, and to be open for surprises. It also points to the need to understand the underlying meaning of actions, concepts, values and relations. Qualitative

data are therefore quite time consuming to collect, and relatively few units can be examined.

Emphasizing the case approach as one of gradual understanding will demand flexibility and adjustments with regard to focus as well as reconsidering what specific data are relevant and how they can be collected. This can more easily be done with qualitative data, as they allow more for adjustments regarding the variables to look for and how to measure them than quantitative data.

The term quantitative data refers to data that are collected about many objects. The information generated about certain variables of the objects is thus comparable and quantifiable, i.e. it can be represented in numbers. These numbers can in turn be analyzed and patterns and tendencies can be discovered (Hellevik 1977: 8). Quantitative data are most often generated from a representative sample of a population, or in rare cases, about a whole universe when this is possible. This approach requires in most cases a predetermined focus, and predetermined and precise instruments for measuring values of selected variables. This kind of data allows representativity, but it is not easy to make adjustments later.

The concept triangulation refers to the combination of different methods to analyze a problem (Jick 1979). Combination of various methods here means generating various types and sets of data. The combination of methods can strengthen the data from which conclusions are drawn, and it can give a better and more detailed understanding of a problem.

Such triangulation can have several forms. It can be a combined use of qualitative and quantitative data about the same variable. This is to some extent done in the present analysis, as the understanding of the quantitative data is enriched by interviews, and by the judgements made by authors of evaluation reports and various documents.

Also within the qualitative and quantitative analyses, triangulation is a strategy that can reinforce the basis for conclusions. In the case of the effects of ARAP, several sets of sample surveys can be compared and give a stronger data basis for the discussions.

The most important combination of data, however will be the combination of qualitative interview data and qualitative document analysis. In the case of the analysis of the planning process, documents and interviews often give only a partial picture of actions and their background. In these cases comparisons strengthen and enriches the understanding. Various kinds of informants, i.e. with different organizational affiliation, view things differently and should be combined, as argued above.

Jick also refers to the use of contextual data as a kind of triangulation, and this is not least important when the ambition is to understand ARAP in the light of a historical development.

2.4 Process and action

The representativity problem is not the main challenge here. Rather, the problem is to reconstruct the process in terms of participants, interactions and behaviour. The approach must be gradually to identify these factors.

The problem regarding the participation in the process is to reconstruct action and interaction in the planning and implementation of ARAP. Whose participation to look for and in what forms cannot be decided in advance. The examination of participation in the decision-making process, i.e. action and interaction, had as one starting point the formal structure and formalized procedural rules for planning and implementation. A second starting point was a focus on the specialized units in the ministry whose working tasks were probably affected by ARAP. This approach also gave an overview over the ministries of Agriculture and Finance & Development Planning as well.

As participants were thus gradually identified, knowledge of who they interacted with and about what gradually facilitated the reconstruction of the planning process.

A picture emerged of a centralized process, and thus the collection of data about the rationale and way of thinking on which ARAP was based could be concentrated on relatively few persons at the higher levels of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The various actors who could have been expected to participate but who did not, were approached to find out why.

The data on participation in the decision making process are mainly interviews with actual or potential participants. Some of these were transferred to other positions, but a sufficient number of participants could be traced again and interviewed. With only a few exceptions, they were willing to be interviewed.

The next element in reconstructing a process, the information on what participants meant and did, was harder to acquire and to interpret.

ARAP was at the time of this field work under heavy criticism, see for instance NORAD's country study (Granberg and Parkinson 1988). Most actors would only reluctantly be associated with the ARAP programme. Besides, as the planning process had been influenced by intervention from political leaders, and there had been diverging opinions, ARAP was a sensitive issue for many civil servants. The triangulation thus became

important in order to avoid these problems. Data were scattered, in the sense that informants gave only partial information on specific issues. For instance, the question of why the Minister of Agriculture played the role he did, could only be answered by combining data from several sources. First, no one had a complete and authoritative answer. Second, views often differed. Third, sources often divulged only parts of what they knew. An analysis of the question required the putting together of many pieces of data. This requires a qualitative approach to get data at all, and it requires a careful use of several sources to put things together. As a rule, no data are used that cannot be supported by several sources.

A further triangulation was to ask for written documents in interviews. The access to these was difficult, but quite a number of reports, memos and the like were obtained. The use of these in combination with interviews gives a more solid base for conclusions.

It should be emphasized that the combination of data from various interviews and documents often gave different images, pointing in several directions. In a qualitative data set, and as underlined in the theoretical perspective, chapter 1, in what way various actors think differently about the same problem, event or solution is of considerable interest. There is, except for some information that consist of hard facts, no single objective truth, but many. A main achievement was when these could be identified.

The problems of data reliability are considerable in a case like this.

Time is a crucial issue. When asking questions about what happened several years ago, not all selectivity is organizationally determined. Things can be remembered wrongly because of the lapse of time, and because of this, control questions can be important on questions about facts, for instance, on points of time for specific actions.

When informants have interests at stake in the matter asked about, or when they for other reasons remember things selectively, this can also cause information to be withheld, and it can lead to after-rationalization.

Some informants are more open than others, and it is necessary to assess this. The tone and way in which things are said can contain information, thus substantiating the ideal of closeness in qualitative research. Closeness is difficult to achieve, especially when studying civil servants, but the personal, open interview techniques applied here (see Appendix 1) nevertheless resulted in closer interaction than quantitative research could achieve.

The principal solutions to these problems are first, a flexible approach whereby data are continuously interpreted and compared, and secondly, what is here labelled triangulation.

It is also important to understand the character of interaction. What is interaction about, how is it initiated, who dominates and why? There is a risk that asking civil servants about interactive patterns will yield normative answers. A qualitative approach is better suited to assess the difference between norms and reality. Interactions can be viewed differently by different actors. What the Ministry of Finance regards as problem-free coordination of line ministries, (see 6.4), can be seen by any of these as problematic interference in its business. These differences are important to detect, and qualitative data are suitable for that purpose.

2.5 Problem structures and models of action

One of the independent variables in this study comprises the characteristics of the actors in the political-administrative system, which influence their actual behaviour. These are conceptualized as problem structure and models of action. Contrasted to the process of planning ARAP, this type of variables refers to the characteristics of the administrative organizations and political authorities in general, as well as variations within these. One might argue, then, that all civil servants and politicians should be interviewed and a representative survey measuring these factors made.

Apart from the practical problems involved, it should be noted that typical attitudes in an organization do not necessarily correspond exactly to the critical problem structures and models of action. We are primarily interested in the problem structures and models of actions of those who make decisions and influence actual policy. For this, and for practical reasons, interview data on these issues are based on a limited number of civil servants, 8 persons in 14 interviews. This includes civil servants involved in the case of ARAP, and it involves 2-3 more that obviously are often influential even if they were not active participants in the case of ARAP. Even if centralization varies somewhat from case to case, MOA is obviously a very centralized ministry, and successfully identifying key elements of the problem structures and models of actions held by these key individuals made a quite strong data base.

The study of problem structures means mapping perceptions of problems, goals and solutions. Often these perceptions are expressed in core concepts: for example, the concepts of social justice, self-sufficiency, risk-avoiding farmers and the like. The identification of key elements of models of actions and problem structures focused on how values and concepts like these were operationalized and understood. The key concepts in public documents and in the informants' vocabulary proved to be good starting points for the collection of problem structure data in interviews.

The data used are a combination of qualitative interviews and document analysis. The documents consist of various major policy documents, the National Development Plans and various reports. Naturally, when examining the historical roots of present ways of thinking, the documents will be a more important source. On some points, literature could help here (Picard 1987; Veenendaal and Nolefi year unknown; Purcell 1982).

*Documents.*⁴ Documents are usually secondary data; they are representations of ideas and meanings, they are representations of what has been done, and they represent evaluations and judgements. Documents are written for specific purposes and reflect the perspectives of those who write them; they are thus a reflection of the various problem structures and interests that can be found in the political and administrative system of Botswana. However, being only reflections, they cannot be read as explicit and concise expressions of opinions and values. They tend to underplay conflicts and problems and they are often quite normative.

The documents used for this analysis are varied. They include relatively general policy documents, such as the National Food Strategy, a policy document on Economic Opportunities, and National Development Plans. I have also acquired some printed speeches, for instance the Minister of Agriculture's presentation of ARAP to the National Assembly. Furthermore, documents describing specific projects and programmes have been used, project memos, evaluation reports and National Development Plan descriptions of projects. Implementing units report routinely on the progress of programmes, and some of these reports have been available. In most cases, it is known who has written the documents, at least which organizational unit the author belongs to.

2.6 Organization structure

The formal structure is a point of departure. In various reports and in NDPs the formal hierarchy and specialized tasks are outlined briefly. However, it is important to know in more detail what these units are actually doing, to whom they relate and what their actual tasks are — this concerns both ministerial headquarters and the Field Service at various levels.

As regards MOA headquarters, interviews are an important source. In total, 20 MOA civil servants were interviewed, some of them several times.

⁴ All documents I got hold of were written in English, and as I do not have any knowledge of Setswana, this was an advantage.

All of them were asked to define their task, what they did in order to fulfil their task, whom they cooperated with and about what. This gradually formed a quite broad knowledge of the MOA's working system related to crops especially, but also personnel working on livestock and environmental issues were included.

The Field Service is large and geographically spread and could not be covered in the same way. However, a survey of some aspects of the field staff's tasks and situation was presented in Eskeli (1989). The main source in addition to Eskeli's report comprised statistics and reporting of what the personnel did and what problems they had, etc.

Various data sources are drawn upon, mainly documents. National Development Plans and evaluations of programmes during the last 20 years will give insights into tasks and the ability of the Field Service to fulfil them. In addition, annual reports have been available, presenting a review of the Department of Agricultural Field Services and the Division of Crop Production and their activities for one year. Unfortunately, these reports are not produced regularly.

2.7 The implementation of ARAP

When it comes to the actual operation of the transactions between clientele and the implementing Field Service in the case of ARAP, the data basis is quite good. Farmers' knowledge of and interests in ARAP can be examined and the problems of implementation can be analyzed quite deeply. Like most implementing agencies, also the Field Service implementing ARAP reported each month to the ARAP coordinator in the Department of Agricultural Field Services, MOA headquarters, Gaborone. These reports are processed and commented upon by the ARAP coordinator. These reports have been available, and they give quite good data.

These data sources are used in combination with documents and interviews, especially interviews with civil servants working in the Department of Agricultural Field Services. The documents include first, annual reports on ARAP prepared by the ARAP coordinator, and second, evaluations of ARAP. The Ministry of Agriculture had an evaluation carried out by a consultant in 1988 focusing on environmental effects of the destumping component. This report also includes a survey of field staff problems. The Ministry of Agriculture also had three smaller evaluations carried out in 1986/87. They were made by MOA personnel. An executive summary was made of these three. A study was also commissioned by NORAD when NORAD assessed the programme to decide whether it should be supported. The team NORAD engaged was led by G.Øygaard. The

guidelines for ARAP, prescribing the procedures to follow and the tasks of the field personnel were also important data. These data were understood better after interviews, but a shortcoming is the lack of interviews with field service personnel on the regional, district and local level which could have improved understanding of various issues, by enriching the interpretation of the statistical material.

As is often the case in African countries, statistics are generally not of very high precision. But the ARAP coordinator's statistics give major trends and patterns. Eskeli's report is based on a representative and stratified sample both in terms of socio-economic indicators, gender and in terms of location in Botswana. The evaluation reports carried out by MOA personnel seem to be based on somewhat more arbitrary, and smaller samples. To some extent, I have attempted to use the evaluations in combination. The MOA evaluations cover all ARAP components, but with a low representativity. To some extent the improved representativity of the Eskeli report can be used as a cross-check. The largest problem of the ARAP Coordinator's statistics is that these operate with too wide categories of farmers. A more accurate categorization of beneficiaries on socio-economic dimensions would have improved the analysis. The consultancy report data are broken down like that, and so are those of the three MOA evaluations.

These data have to be used with caution, and only to analyze major trends. The detailed comparison of numbers is problematic with the available material. Still, it enabled me to analyze major implementation issues, and the statistics available are quite good, compared to the problems experienced in countries with a less efficient administration than Botswana's.

3. The political and socio-economic context

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, some crucial aspects of the political and economic development of Botswana will be outlined. Emphasis will be put on a description of the rural economy and the importance of agriculture in it. Furthermore, it is important to examine the historical roots of the rural economy. This background chapter is necessary first to understand the problems that agriculture and thus agricultural policies encountered, and second, to understand what interests were affected by ARAP.

3.2 Resources for agriculture

Even if Botswana has a large territory and a small population, resources for agriculture are not abundant. Large parts of this semi-arid country are not suited for agricultural production at all. Some areas are suited for pastoral production, if water can be supplied. And some tracts of land, especially in the eastern part of the country, can be utilized for crop production (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986).

The country is best suited for cattle production (Isaksen 1984). Botswana's only comparative advantage in agriculture is large grazing areas. The national herd of cattle counted 3 million animals in 1984. Beef and hides count for 20 % of exports, and the sector, including the abattoirs in 1984 counted for 20 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (Isaksen 1984). The introduction of borehole technology early in this century facilitated access to new grazing areas for herds of cattle, and the cattle industry has expanded steadily for several decades, with some set-backs from prolonged droughts.

Even in areas where crop production is widespread, the land is not particularly well suited for crops. The soils are not very fertile, lacking minerals, and rain is often inadequate. Arable agriculture is mainly rainfed

agriculture, with some smaller areas where irrigated agriculture is possible.⁵

The low rainfall is a basic problem and makes crop production in particular risky. On average, annual rainfall varies between 350 and 650 mm (Cook 1978). Rainfall is not only low, it is also unstable. Rain may come in one area and not in another. Furthermore, rain is needed first for ploughing and then throughout the growth period. If the rain is not distributed over the season the harvest will be lost. Low rainfall is a problem also for cattle. But the preservation of grazing land is not as dependent on the distribution of rain throughout the year as the arable fields are (Vierich and Shepperd 1980). Only when a long lasting drought comes do grazing lands deteriorate so much that losses of cattle increase. Thus, livestock production is more robust than arable production.

In the traditional agriculture, land is communal. Arable land is allocated to the farming household by the Land Boards. There are also communal grazing lands which all farmers can use. After the Tribal Grazing Land reform (TGLP), however, large tracts of grazing lands have been leased to wealthy cattle owners, giving this group an exclusive right to the use of these areas.

Under customary law, any tribe member had the right to land and this is still the rule. As noted, resources for agriculture are not abundant, and there are few reserves left for increasing the area for agricultural purposes. As experienced under the land reforms of the seventies, there are no reserve grazing areas (Parson 1981). As regards grazing land, this resource is scarce, and overexploited (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986).

The situation is somewhat different for arable land. New land is increasingly allocated in the grazing areas. As long as this possibility exists, there will be no acute shortage of arable land (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986). But land in the grazing areas is often less suited. There are often higher costs to cultivate it due to transport, fencing and distance to welfare service centres in the cases where people move to be near their fields. Even if the grazing land thus cultivated is a relatively small portion of the total grazing area, it is taken from grazing lands under pressure. Moreover, it might well be that the grazing area thus cultivated is more valuable as grazing land than the areas still open for grazing. Still, Arntzen argues that in 20 years, arable expansion has taken over only 3 per cent of the total grazing area in the Kgatleng district (Arntzen 1980).

⁵ The potential for irrigated agriculture is limited, among other factors due to limited water resources and the huge capital requirements involved.

Ecological pressure and degradation are mainly a problem related to overgrazing. The national herd is growing, new and more vulnerable areas have been opened up for grazing as a result of borehole technology. Especially in the eastern parts of Botswana, grazing land resources are too heavily exploited (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986). Ecological problems are also related to land management and land tenure. Not owning the grazing lands, farmers have no individual responsibility for the management of it, and economic needs cause farmers to over-exploit grazing land resources. Some would argue that if farmers owned their land, they would manage resources better. However, the grazing areas leased by the large cattle owners, and thus disposed of by one farmer only, are also often poorly managed.

Near larger settlements in particular, ecological problems apart from overgrazing are increasing. Pressure on wood resources is too strong, both because wood is used for energy purposes, and because new land is cleared for arable farming. Arable land is also increasingly located further west, in more vulnerable areas where removal of vegetation makes these new fields vulnerable to erosion. Local reports indicate erosion as an increasing problem (Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986). Another ecological problem is related to traditional methods in arable agriculture. These are adapted to a situation where large amounts of land of relatively low quality were available. Thus, fields could be abandoned after a period and a new field allocated. But this system of land use has gradually been undermined. Because of population increases, arable land is no longer easily available near the villages. New fields are allocated in the grazing areas with the disadvantages this entails. Therefore, especially the poor farmers keep their fields longer. Erosion and exhaustion of soils are increasingly becoming a problem in arable agriculture.

3.3 Historical developments

The Tswana tribes became linked to the monetary economy of the Europeans relatively early, through trade and later through migrant labour and sale of cattle. Gradually the autonomous tribal economies became linked to the South African economy as a labour reserve, leaving the rural areas in stagnation. These processes can be traced back to the period before the British established the Protectorate, but they were accelerated by formal colonialization.

Independence has brought impressive changes in many fields, but the rural sector has not benefited very much from modernization. Even if there have been processes of basic change, there are also strong elements of

continuity when it comes to structures of political and economic power. A general tendency is that political and economic elites have become delinked from the ordinary citizens in the rural areas, who are left behind in dependence and powerlessness.

3.3.1 *Pre-colonial Tswana society*

The present day inhabitants of Botswana make up only a minority of the Tswana population in Southern Africa, the majority lives in the Republic of South Africa. Previously, also the tribes now residing in Botswana lived there, but for centuries they were pressed back, and steadily closer to the marginal lands on the fringe of the Kalahari desert. First the Boers, and later the British caused this pressure.

In pre-colonial Tswana societies, the economic basis was a diversified one. Control of economic resources was centralized in the hands of the chief and the nobility, but made available to all by systems of exchange and dependence (Duggan 1983).

As regards agriculture, agro-pastoralism was the dominant mode of production. Cattle had a number of functions economically, socially, politically and culturally. The elites, i.e. the chief and the royal clan, owned most of the cattle. Cattle was made available to those who did not have any through informal exchange systems, for instance the *Mafisa* system. Under this system, cattle owners lent cattle to those who had only a few or none. The cattle was at the borrower's disposal, and he could use them for milk supplies, or as draft power (Gulbrandsen 1980: 163). This system provided people with cattle, and the elites used this system to build and maintain support among their followers.

The economy was based on abundance of land for hunting, grazing and crop production. The tribes were mobile and moved within larger areas. Larger projects, like clearance of land, were done at the chief's orders by age-regiments. These regiments also had important functions in warfare and hunting. Hunting played an important role, both for the tribes' own needs, and it provided commodities for trade. The Tswana tribes also traded crafts and products produced in the tribe (Tlou and Campbell 1984).

Through trade, the tribes' relationships with the outside world were early monetarized. Trade was controlled by the chief and the royal clan. Items bought were luxury items, tools, guns and grains. But the relationships within the tribe remained un-monetarized. Exchange of resources was more flexible this way. Rich and poor were linked together in networks of trust, favours to be received or given as compensation for other favours (Duggan 1983). The common people depended on the elites for resources, notably

cattle but the elite also depended on the common people. The latter provided labour for tending cattle, cultivation and clearing of land, for hunting and warfare. This was labour for which the economic elites depended. The economic structure is described by Duggan as one of mutual dependence, organized in informal exchange systems.

The economy was thus quite diversified. Its structure was built on concentration of resources in the hands of the chief and the royal clan, and resources were made available for the tribal followers. In times of crisis the reserves controlled by the chief made him able to support the commoners, for instance by buying food.

In pre-colonial Botswana, people were organized in large, centralized and autonomous tribal societies. The centre in such chiefdoms was a major village, with as many as 10 000 inhabitants. This was the seat of the chief. Smaller villages and even smaller settlements in the kingdom were led by local headmen who were loyal to the chief. The political control in these societies was in the hands of the chief and the royal clan, and the core of political control was to secure the loyalty of headmen at lower levels — that is the loyalty of all sections of the elite, and through them, the loyalty of the commoners. The basis for this power was diversified. The chiefs' political control rested to a large extent on the control of land, cattle and trade (Gulbrandsen, lecture 1989; Tlou and Campbell 1984). The resources at the chiefs' disposal, notably cattle were used to build patron-client relationships. Notables on lower levels had the chiefs' cattle at their disposal in return for political loyalty and they secured the chief control over local communities in his kingdom. Moreover, the reserves generated through trade and cattle also made the chief able to support his commoners when needs appeared and thus loyalty could be ensured.

The chief was chief by inheritance. In some cases chiefs were removed by rivalling clans and the new chief could redefine ancestral lines to suit the new rule (Gulbrandsen, lecture 1989). The strong material basis of the chief was linked to responsibilities for his commoners in times of crisis, i.e. war, droughts. Ignoring these responsibilities could in some cases undermine the chiefs' legitimacy. Political power was justified in religious terms, and the traditional authority of these elite clans has remained strong until the present day.

The common people in the tribal societies had some countervailing power to use against their leadership in the *kgotla* institution. This was a meeting place for the tribe, where decisions were made based on consensus. That is, the chief made the final decision but it was his duty to listen to what his followers' opinions were. In addition to its function as an arena where the chief could consult his people, the *kgotla* was also the judicial institution.

All free men of the tribe had access to the *kgotla* meetings. The chief probably dominated the decision-making in the *kgotla*, since the headmen leading the various sections of the tribe were dependent on the chief and secured the support of the tribe, but they were also powerful advisors to the chief. A chief who did not adjust to advice could, in extreme cases, be removed. In other cases, opposing factions left the tribe to form their own or to be taken into another tribe.

Important aspects of the Tswana traditions are concentration of both political and economic power, but within both spheres there were strong elements of mutual dependence between elite and followers.

3.3.2 Colonialization

As indicated, the Boers of South Africa came into contact with the Tswana tribes as they trekked to the north and east, and this together with trade routes crossing Tswana land meant that the Tswana tribes were linked to the European economy to some extent before the protectorate was established.

The British colonialization was not a result of British interest in Bechuanaland itself.⁶ Rather, it was a necessary step for securing South Africa and its links to the north. The Germans pressed on from Namibia, and to the East, the Portuguese were expanding too towards the interior, threatening to close the road to the North from South Africa. The motives for the colonization were thus not any interest in the Protectorate's resources. Bechuanaland was therefore not developed as a separate economic entity.

When the British established the protectorate in 1885, much of the powers of the traditional elites were left intact, and they became the link between the colonial administration and Tswana society (Gunderson 1970). The British protectorate administration in Mafeking was quite small and the tribal chiefs became the lower level in the administration. This contributed on one hand to give the chief a more independent position vis a vis the common people, and he could no longer be removed by his tribe. In cases of conflict the chiefs often had British backing. Furthermore, the chiefs also received payments as administrators of the protectorate administration. The chiefs got a small salaried administration of clerks and assistants, in the tribal administration. On the other hand the British gradually reduced the chiefs' powers, for instance their judiciary powers, and thus weakened their

⁶ The protectorate that later became Botswana was named Bechuanaland by the British.

role. The British also put the chiefs in a difficult position when unpopular decisions were implemented through them, for instance taxation. The chiefs remained the central power-holders in the districts, but constrained by the British. Gunderson describes this system as a-political; the chiefs and the nobility gradually ceased to be decision makers, and became constrained administrators under British control (1970).

The lack of British interest in developing the territory meant that no new economically strong groups developed. In contrast to many other British colonies, there was no modern group of entrepreneurs such as plantation owners, mining entrepreneurs or large export cash crops producers, de-linked from the traditional economy in Botswana at independence. The policy of the British regarding economic and social development was one of neglect. Infrastructure and welfare services were largely ignored. Some very modest agricultural extension efforts were started, and the cattle owners were assisted with veterinary services, breeding programmes and at a late stage with an abattoir that was established in the protectorate (Tlou and Campbell 1984: 188-191).

The cattle owning elites became involved in commerce relatively early, as they became linked to the South African economy as producers of beef. They were also able to utilize borehole technology, and the British started early to provide services for cattle production (Parson 1981). As the large cattle owners became sellers in a cash economy, they gradually de-linked from the traditional non-monetary system of exchange, and became more economically independent. Resources previously accessible for all based on *Mafisa* and other exchange networks became increasingly scarce (Duggan 1983). The chiefs and the rural elites in general became sellers of cattle in a cash economy. Parallel to their increasing political independence outlined above, there was a growing independence relative to the peasants also in economic terms.

An important consequence of Britain's establishing the protectorate was the development of Botswana into a labour reserve for the South African economy (Cownie 1984). The notion of a labour reserve refers to a pool of labour that can be activated to the extent needed from time to time. It is a reserve in the sense that it has an independent reproductive base and thus does not have to be employed permanently. This reproductive base also had the function of keeping wages at a low level. Colonial policies were to a large extent geared towards necessitating labour migration from Bechuanaland to South Africa, while maintaining the reproductive base in the rural Bechuanaland. Several features of colonial policies contributed to this development.

- * Tswana tribes were pushed back from the relatively better areas for crop production. First by the Boers and later both by British settler policy and expropriation of land. The best arable land was expropriated by the British to the railway company, and for white settler farmers. The pressure into more marginal areas thus went on over a long time.
- * Taxes were introduced for every household, creating a need for cash. This could mainly be met through migrant labour. Other cash generating activities, notably trade, were regulated so as to keep the Africans out of it. Local trade was further undermined by competition from imported products. Wildlife based commodities became the Africans' main commodity. And as pressure on wild life increased, the resource basis for this trade was reduced. This left the Africans with two main options for acquiring cash: selling cattle and migrant labour.
- * The chiefs maintained their position, as noted above. They also had important functions in the labour reserve structure as they acted as mobilization agents, recruiting workers in their tribe for the mines. As such, and as paid tax collectors, they also made profit for themselves.

In traditional society, crop production was one component in a multi-activity strategy. The result of the colonial impact was that crops became one component in a multi-activity strategy composed in another way. The male labour withdrew from the activities of livestock, hunting and gathering, crafts and trade. Instead, they became wage earners in South Africa. Only the wealthiest citizens stayed with their families, having an economic basis in cattle. Later, when formal employment in Botswana became an option, it was the members of the wealthiest households that got these jobs. The reason was that they could afford the necessary education. For most households, the male head worked seasonally as a migrant labourer, and provided some needed cash. The payments were low, and employment unstable, thus his family had to remain in the rural districts and cultivate food for the household's subsistence needs. If the household had some cattle this would strengthen the household's economic basis but only a very small portion had sufficient numbers of cattle to rely on this means of livelihood. Furthermore, the capacity to invest in small herds of cattle, which also facilitated crop production, depended on cash incomes.

Arable agriculture was left to women and children. The availability of labour for the farm was thus limited, keeping arable production marginal. Male labour for crops was, and still is, mainly ploughing and clearing of land (destumping) (NORAD 1989: 7). For the household, it was more rational that the male labour took employment elsewhere, because this was less risky and more profitable than crop farming.

It should be noted that these developments are complex, and that, for instance, cultural preferences also contributed to this development. The central point is that arable production was not a main activity for any household, its function was to provide the household with food for subsistence. The labour of women and children, with minimum levels of investments in implements and other inputs, did not give a higher output to provide any surplus. This minimum arable farming in combination with some cattle, crafts and migrant labour made up a combined strategy for survival.⁷

The main problem which gradually made this a strategy of poverty for many households, was the increasing lack of components in the strategy that could be combined with crops. Employment in South Africa has never been a secure income source for all Batswana, and gradually the proportion of the male labour force working in South Africa has been reduced while the development of alternative jobs has not kept up with needs. Cattle have never been equally distributed, and many Batswana owned no cattle. As the cattle owners gradually delinked from the traditional economy, cattle could not as easily as before be disposed of by other means than ownership. The households without cattle and without wage labour entered into a vicious circle of poverty. Crops depended on other sources of income, in particular livestock. Thus, for those left with only crops, it became extremely difficult to produce. As commercialization of livestock developed, exchange systems deteriorated and cattle became less available for the majority of farmers. Without cattle as draftpower, crop production became very difficult.

The poverty problems and the stagnation of arable farming in Botswana as outlined here are still some of the basic problems in Botswana agriculture. An additional problem when compared to pre-colonial times was that the Tswana tribes were now pressed back into the fringes of the Kalahari, areas in which arable farming was increasingly costly and risky. Family labour was increasingly insufficient in order to produce, also draft power and ploughs were needed, due to lower yields per hectare.

At independence, Botswana's economy was above all a rural economy. The rural economy was characterized by a small minority of large cattle holders partly engaged in commerce with cattle, and by a majority of rural

⁷ In the 19th century, the plough was brought to Botswana by the Europeans. Arable production in Botswana had always required large fields, and even more so as the tribes were pressed into more marginal areas for crop production. Thus, the plough freed labour and provided draft power. This might have contributed to the increase in migrant labour.

dwellers marginalized within agriculture. Those relatively best off among these could supplement their incomes with migrant labour and some cattle.

3.4 Independence

Britain granted independence in 1966. Crucial for the understanding of Botswana's development is the fact that there was no real nationalist liberation movement in Botswana. Few really believed that a viable state could be based on the Bechuanaland protectorate for a long time to come. The BDP leadership which took over power when the British withdrew had not fought for the state they received political responsibility for.

3.4.1 The post colonial regime

Gunderson (1970) describes the BDP regime as a group of young men, originating from among the wealthy cattle owners (1970: 334-336). They had received education, and they worked at lower levels in the colonial administration. They had advanced as far as Africans could in the colonial social order. At independence, they assumed control of the state and thus they got an independent power base. They became the national power elite.

They did not represent any social movement or broad group. Gunderson treats them as a quite autonomous group, and not as the mere representatives of the cattle owning traditional elite from which they originated. There was no liberation movement, and according to Gunderson even the later BDP leader had doubts concerning whether independence was realistic only a few years before it was actually granted. The absence of a mobilized rank and file, and of significant mobilization at all, is a phenomenon that has remained. One might expect that this would give the new regime considerable freedom to develop a political programme of their choice.

However, not representing a genuine political movement, they had very few impulses and grievances upon which to form a political and economic project or platform. They had for their own part distinct economic interests related to employment in government positions and cattle investments, but that does not make a political project, at least not one of social change and transformation. The contrast to other African countries is striking. The BDP did not have any real political project, except for taking over the state that had been established upon the British withdrawal (Polhemus 1983).

When Botswana became independent, the new men in control of BDP took over power as they had won an election a year earlier (Picard 1987). One important reason why this party became the strongest was active British support given to it (Gunderson 1970). But the very basis for this electoral success, that has been repeated in subsequent elections, was the electoral mobilization of a conglomerate of interests. First, the rural majority. A key resource for the BDP in mobilizing them was its leader Seretse Khama's appeal as *de facto* chief for the largest Tswana tribe. The traditional rural elites were partly for the same reason mobilized in support of BDP. Equally important, the chiefs came to regard the BDP as having a more favourable attitude to their own position than the Botswana People's Party, BPP (Gunderson 1970: 345). Only later did some opposition re-appear among the chiefs. An opposition that was in most cases co-opted or controlled. Furthermore, fearing the more radical BPP ideas on racial issues, the white community also supported BDP. This community was small, but influential. Notable in this group were the leaders of the governmental administration. The protectorate administration was led by expatriates, and supporting BDP was also career maximizing, in addition to the promising prospects of BDP's moderate profile on development strategy — or more precisely, BDP's lack of a new programme for economic transformation that could compete with ideas and strategies held by the administration. Support from the financial and organizational resources of the administration gave BDP a decisive advantage in securing support in the electorate.

It can be said, roughly, that BDP has gradually come to mobilize support on both its traditional appeal and on a more modern appeal, i.e. delivering goods and services in exchange for votes. However, these two forms of securing political support from the commoners are not easy to distinguish. Traditional Tswana culture sees support for the political leadership as something which is conditioned by the political leaders' willingness to take on the responsibility for the welfare of their followers. Still, BDP did, in the Bamangwato tribal areas especially, mobilize people by asking for their loyalty to the rightful heir to the tribe's chieftainship, who happened to be Khama. In the remaining tribes, however, BDP's appeal is more to argue that tribal discrimination will not occur under BDP. In fact, BDP has been so eager to make sure that no tribes are favoured, that inefficient resource allocation has sometimes resulted.

The skilful mobilization of various groups by different appeals is important to understand the relatively stable support for BDP. The white community, whose members were important as long as they controlled the bureaucracy, was mobilized on a policy of continuity and moderate policies,

especially on racial issues. The core of the bureaucracy's support for BDP was that they in return kept the responsibility for development strategies and modernization, and that africanisation proceeded slowly.

One reason for BDP's ability to maintain the support from a majority in the electorate is the inadequacy of the alternatives for political mobilization and articulation. The other political parties are hardly developed as organizations, and in elections, these parties are weakly organized especially in the rural areas. Many candidates for parliament are relatively wealthy and to a large extent they organize and finance their campaigns themselves; these wealthy candidates are usually BDP candidates.

The absence of real competition to BDP is explained not only by the opposition parties' limited organization and resources, but also by their inability to develop an elaborated alternative political platform. Nengwehkulu argues that opposition parties do not challenge the existing political and social order, but merely attempt to replace the elite persons in power positions (Nengwehkulu, unpublished). Botswana National Front (BNF) has gradually become the most important opposition party, trying to develop a profile of more equal distribution of resources. But even if BNF was strengthened by a chief in 1969, BDP managed to strengthen its position in the 1974 general elections. The BDP has its stronghold in the rural areas whereas the BNF has been more competitive in the urban areas, making the rural electorate even more important for the BDP.

Traditional institutions, like the *kgotla* and the headmen, have a potential as channels for popular political articulation, but they remain local in scope. Governmental representatives meet people in *kgotla* meetings where opinions might be voiced. However, as the example of TGLP (Tribal Grazing Land Policy)⁸ shows, the *kgotla* institution is not necessarily used for hearing opinions (Picard 1987). Rather, it is an administrative tool for the government, enabling it to inform and mobilize people, rather than to listen. Other political institutions at the local level, like Village Development Committees, have problems mobilizing people. There are few if any mass mobilizing, extra-party organizations.

A basic political problem for the new regime after independence was how to handle the potentially competitive power of the chiefs. The strategy towards them was partly to reduce their power, partly to give economic compensation in return for loyalty and to coopt them into the modern state system. The power of the chiefs was gradually built down as Land Boards

⁸ TGLP was a land reform launched in 1975. It was a very controversial one, and a massive information campaign was launched, utilizing also the *kgotla*. However, it was not really an attempt to open a debate. It was more a propaganda exercise.

took over land allocation responsibilities. Further, the tradition that stray cattle was the chiefs' property also ceased. A district administration was established, and gradually it took over responsibilities from the chiefly controlled tribal administration. A House of Chiefs was established in which the chiefs have an advisory role only.

The economic compensation given to the traditional elites has mainly been support to their interests as cattle owners. They have kept their large share of the national herd, they have been decisively favoured by the TGLP land reform, there is hardly any taxation on cattle and governmental services for cattle owners have been further developed.

In short, the BDP's electoral strength has never been seriously challenged. But it has also been carefully guarded.

3.4.2 The role of the bureaucracy

BDP's abstention from administrative reform and radical Africanisation, from radical policy changes aiming at social transformation and from experiments with the social order is explained, then, by the support from and dependence on the Westernized and politically moderate civil service, especially its higher levels, long dominated by expatriates. More recently, the civil service has gradually become africanised, even if there are still a significant number of expatriates. But the effect of recruiting Africans, educated in the West, living in the Westernized capital and recruited and socialized into a bureaucracy with exactly the values of moderate modernization measures and Western values is not necessarily that marked. The conservatism of bureaucracy and the institutionalization of values will probably reduce the effects of Africanisation on norms and values in the civil service. Thus, even if the expatriates no longer control the civil service, the expatriates' problem structures and models of action have remained quite stable.

Administrative continuity is one important reason why the administration has maintained a relatively high standard. Corruption and mismanagement are not as serious problems in Botswana as in many other African countries. The administration has expanded. Both at the district level and at the central level the number of administrative units has increased and so has the number of governmental employees. In 1968, central and local government employed 6975 persons, in 1980, 23 500⁹ (Peat 1984: 193).

⁹ These numbers do not include employment in education and community and social services, which increased from approximately 2 600 in the early sixties to approximately

The administration has also grown more complex with an increasing number of specialized units, as demonstrated in our analysis of MOA's planning of ARAP.

Financial conservatism is still a characteristic of budgetary policies. During the years following independence governmental revenues were still very small and British financial assistance was necessary to balance the budget. Later mineral revenues increased decisively but this has not led to uncontrolled expenditure. Botswana is now in a good financial position. One MFDP (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning) civil servant expressed the view that financing programmes is not the largest problem any more. Rather, the problem is the lack of implementation capacity. MFDP has been frequently criticized for the strict principle of keeping expenditure low and allowing exchange reserves to build up. However these reserves give Botswana a freedom of action which is important, especially when faced with market fluctuations for minerals, notably diamonds.

The administration is structured with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning as the highest ranking ministry. It is referred to as the senior ministry, with a coordinating responsibility and control of governmental expenditure and planning. The other ministries are often referred to as line ministries. All their projects and investments have to be accepted by MFDP. Normally, this is done as part of the planning process of the National Development Plans (NDPs). The district administration is under the supervision of Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL).

Detailed data are not available on the various professions in the administration. But an outstanding feature is the dominance of economist. In every ministry there is a planning unit that coordinates and controls all the ministry's projects. These planning units in most cases consist of economists in positions as Planning Officers. They are hired and trained by the MFDP, which regulates promotions too. MFDP determines working procedures and professional standards for Planning Officers in voluminous manuals. Planning Officers from all ministries meet regularly for conferences, as the planning cadres. It is likely that this corps of economists under the control of MFDP greatly strengthens MFDP's control over policies. It secures the prominence of MFDP premises and objectives at the early stages of project planning. MOA is an exception as their Planning Officers are outside this system. MFDP's control in agricultural policies might thus be more fragile.

10 000 in 1980 (Peat 1984; 193).

MFDP coordinates the planning system. Every fifth year a plan for investments is made, and a mid-term review of the plan is undertaken. MFDP gives both a financial framework for the line ministries and policy guidelines for the forthcoming plan period. Line ministries make proposals for projects in their sector for the plan period and present them to MFDP. All projects in the plan have to be accepted by MFDP, and this is the power that makes the MFDP coordinating efforts real. Thus, the NDP presents all projects to be implemented in the period and how they are related to policy objectives. The appraisals of projects made in MFDP include many aspects — for instance how they fit policy guidelines, how viable they are and whether they are financially sound. The effectiveness of MFDP's control through NDP is more difficult to assess. But for the line ministries, acceptance for a project in the plan, or inclusion of extra projects during the plan period is in most cases necessary in order to get projects funded and implemented.

3.5 Post-colonial development strategy

When the BDP regime established itself, it did not have a well developed political platform and it did not impose drastic policy reforms of any kind. It was left to the administrative leadership not only to design specific policy means, but also to develop a modernization strategy and the policy objectives to fulfil this overall strategy. This was done in a way characterized by Gunderson (1970) as a continuation of the colonial policy, a policy that maintained the stratification of society, leaving the poor rural majority outside the developmental process. Here some general aspects of post-colonial policy will be outlined, while a more detailed examination of agricultural policy will be presented in chapter 4.

The Government's direct engagement in productive activities has been low, the policy has been to improve services and infrastructure and to encourage private enterprise. Both Socialism and Marxism have been explicitly turned down as ideological guidelines (Polhemus 1983). In the policy paper "National Policy On Economic Opportunities" (GOB 1982) approved by the National Assembly, it is stressed that good results have been achieved in developing infrastructure and social services, and that within this framework, people themselves must be responsible for the utilization of available resources to improve their living conditions. The Government's role is defined as one of giving "support to the private sector" (GOB 1982: 6).

The emphasis placed on planning in the governmental sector do not imply a direct government engagement in the development of the

production, but are limited to the planning of government's use of resources. Private enterprise is encouraged, and the state has not tried any active, governmental industrialization. Likewise, parastatals play a relatively minor role. The principle underlying this restricted governmental role in the development process is a belief in the market forces and in private initiative. This, it is anticipated, will lead to the diversifying and further growth of the economy. The government's task is to provide infrastructure in a wide sense for private enterprise. This careful attitude to public responsibility and public spending is commonly known as financial conservatism in Botswana. One of its roots many argue, is the rather extreme policy of Protectorate self-financing, maintained by the British colonizers for many years. In a poor protectorate this led to rather careful attitudes on public spending, attitudes that change only slowly.

At independence, Botswana was dependent on British grants to balance its very limited budget. The later strength of public finances is mainly based on mineral revenues. The potential for mineral exploitation required heavy investment in infrastructure, and the Government took on heavy costs, which left other sectors largely unattended to. This was justified by the potential for later investments if the mineral sector could be developed quickly and provide public revenue.

As public finances improved in the late seventies and eighties, based on mineral revenues and beef export from large scale cattle industry, the strategy for development was to invest in infrastructure, communication, education, and health services reaching also the poor. The progress made in these areas has been impressive, but development programmes have been carried out carefully, the Government always taking care not to overextend its obligations.

Even if public finances are strong, and welfare infrastructure relatively well developed, the poverty problems have remained severe. Employment for an increasing work force is a major problem, and in the latest NDPs, stronger emphasis is laid on the development of productive activity signalling a more active public policy towards this goal. The objective is embedded in the concept of economic diversification. And some modern sectors have expanded, especially construction and retail trade, but when considering the magnitude of the poverty problems, the diversification is simply not sufficient.

This is not to argue that a policy could realistically be conceived of that would remove poverty problems quickly. But it remains a fact that it is rather unclear how the rural poor in the rural areas can be employed outside agriculture. Industrialization is a problematic option because of the proximity to South Africa (see section 3.6).

The main trends in agricultural policy to be further outlined in chapter 4 are that resources were allocated to the strongest and commercially viable agricultural enterprises. This includes large scale livestock production and the very small number of commercial freehold farms. Agricultural extension services, credit and veterinary services have been open for all, but very few farmers have used these means to improve production, and agriculture is best described as stagnant in a labour reserve structure.

3.6 External relations of dependence

Botswana is in many respects a dependent country. It is dependent on South Africa, on the world market for its few export commodities and on donors. The dependence on South Africa is many-sided. Exports and imports are dependent on transport through South Africa. Moreover, South African companies are important in the mining sector. South Africa's powerful position in the diamond markets is well known. Imported goods mainly come from South Africa. Furthermore, a large number of Batswana are dependent on employment in South Africa. The number of migrant workers in South Africa has stayed around 20 000 (Peat 1984: 193). However, when we consider the increase in the total labour force, the relative importance has decreased, but is still large. The military power of South Africa is a threat especially as South Africa has proved willing to use it also in Botswana.¹⁰

Botswana has expressed clear criticism of South African apartheid and is a Front Line state. But the power structures of the region and Botswana's dependence on South Africa have necessitated a rather careful line on these issues.

Dependence on South Africa is of course a very heavily felt problem, and Botswana was among the initiators of the South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) which has an objective to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. Botswana's inability to impose economic sanctions against South Africa illustrates its dependence. Botswana is a member of the South African Customs Union (SACU), where the Republic of South Africa is the strongest economic power. The member states have no customs barriers between them, and customs from imports to the SACU area are divided among the members according to an agreed allocation key. The incomes from SACU are still important for

¹⁰ On some occasions, South African military forces have extended their actions into Botswana territory.

Botswana even if mineral revenues have lessened the dependence. The SACU agreement means that in practice, Botswana is included in the home market of South African industry.¹¹ SACU leaves limited options for Botswana to build up a diversified industry for the home market protected by tariffs. In addition comes the problem that the Botswana market is so limited, that a Botswana producer of industrial goods will often need a very large share of the market in Botswana to make a viable profit. This is one main obstacle to economic diversification.

Botswana's two main export articles are beef and diamonds. Beef export is based on an agreement with the European Community. The agreement gives Botswana higher prices than the world market would give. But it makes Botswana dependent on the EEC. The other export commodity is diamonds. The market prices fluctuate and the influence of South African companies on Botswana's diamond production and export is significant. Also other minerals and soda ash are exported, but this does not change the basic dependence on beef and diamond exports which are the corner stones of Botswana's economy.

Donors are heavily engaged in Botswana. Their financial and manpower resources make up a significant share of the total resource pool for development efforts. NORAD has been engaged since 1972, and part of the background for NORAD's engagement is the will to support a country under pressure from South Africa, especially as Botswana is also a democratic and non-discriminatory country.¹² Another reason for the large donor engagement in Botswana is of course the poverty in the rural areas, and perhaps even more important: the well administered projects. Most donors find it easy to cooperate with Botswana authorities and donors have less problems in Botswana than in many other countries. NORAD's experiences in cooperating with Botswana authorities are good in most sectors.

3.7 The agricultural sector

Botswana is a relatively rich country, measured in GNP per capita. In the early eighties, this measure reached approximately US\$ 1000 (Granberg and Parkinson 1988). A basic problem is that wealth and economic growth is

¹¹ Anyone who has been in shops and supermarkets in Gaborone and noted where products are made will have seen this.

¹² The flag of Botswana is designed to symbolize the peaceful coexistence of a black majority and a white minority (Tlou and Campbell 1980).

limited to the modern sectors of the economy, dominated by government and the mining sector. In 1982/83, 47 per cent of Real Output came from mining (Øygard et al. 1986). Government and mining are sectors which cannot employ sufficiently large proportions of the population (Isaksen 1982). Even if a significant number of Botswana still work in South African mines, the number has decreased and the relative importance of this employment is declining.

The concept of dualism refers to the relationship between the traditional and the modern sector of the economy in under-developed countries like Botswana, pointing to the lack of structural links between the two sectors. In as far as such links are weak, the growth in the modern economy does not spread to the economy as a whole. In the case of Botswana this variant of the dualism thesis is not a very appropriate description. Botswana's traditional sector is not self-sustainable like this, on the contrary, it was gradually restructured to become a dependent labour reserve, and is increasingly undermined by the scarcity of jobs. Most rural dwellers seek employment in the modern sector of Botswana or in South Africa, as a component in a combined strategy for making a living.

Approximately 80 per cent of the population, or 130 000 households live in the rural areas (Øygard et al. 1986). The main productive activity there is agriculture, even if a large proportion is not engaged in agriculture at any significant level. An estimated 70 000 households are engaged in agriculture. Among the rural dwellers, a large proportion is very poor. In 1974, 45 per cent of the population was under the Poverty Datum Line, P679. In 1987, when the Poverty Datum Line was estimated to be P1937, 70 per cent were below it in a typical large village as Mahalapye (Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 65).

3.7.1 Rural households

The production unit in traditional agriculture is the household. Household multi-activity strategies are reflected in common division of work in rural households. Cattle is a men's domain and most of the work related to cattle is done by them. The males are also those engaged in migrant labour. Women look after the children and are often occupied in some crafts or brewing. As regards arable production, women and children do an estimated 74% of the crop related work. The men do most of the work only in destumping, land clearing, ploughing and planting (NORAD 1989). Otherwise, the male head of the household works far away, or tends the cattle.

Those worst off in this structure are female headed households. In general, a female headed household is left without the contribution of money and labour from a grown-up male working in South Africa, in Botswana's urban centres or at the farm. Some of these women are married, but many husbands spend what they earn on their own pleasure and in practice, the family has to be taken care of by the female.

The problem they face is mainly lack of labour, both to seek employment outside the farm, and to work on the household's fields. Which reduces cash incomes and self-sufficiency in basic food. The absence of cash incomes from migrant labour will prevent investments in cattle, which has negative impacts on arable farming capacity. Apart from this, the general discrimination of women in society and lack of governmental support for women in particular is a problem.

Approximately one-third of the rural farming households are female headed. However, due to increasing poverty and social changes, the traditional family structures are breaking apart. In practice, this means that some households that might look as a solid unit are not so. First, it is a problem that not all migrant workers spend their money on household purposes, but consume most of it instead. Another problem, seen from the household's point of view, is that increasingly, the children in families are unwilling to remain controlled by the household. Their labour and incomes are to a lesser extent controlled by the head of the household, and this has as a consequence that more than the 30 per cent are in reality in a similar difficult situation.

3.7.2 Arable farming

Due to inadequate rainfall and poor soils, productivity is low within all types of farming systems, when compared to similar systems under better natural conditions (MOA 1991). The key problem for arable development in Botswana, however is that arable farming is less productive than both livestock and urban employment (Opschoor 1983: 161; Øygaard et al. 1986: 18; Arntzen and Veenendaal 1986: 77). It is thus rational for farmers to spend labour and resources on livestock, migrant employment (which necessitates investment in education for the children) (Solway 1986), crafts, and seasonal labour for wealthy farmers. Arable farming has a lower priority when the household decides how to spend resources and labour.

This tendency is accelerated by the fact that arable farming is also more risky than livestock, employment, crafts and smallstock. All these activities are vulnerable to inadequate rainfall, at least if it develops into a real

drought, but arable farming is very vulnerable to even small variations in rainfall.

Farmers therefore keep investments and labour input in arable farming very low. At a very minimum, arable farming can be operated by the households' women and children without much investment in implements and input factors (NORAD 1989). Many farmers limit arable farming to this, some farmers provide some implements or fertilizers to get more out of the labour of women and children, but normally the resources that tools and other input would cost are best spent for other purposes (Opschoor 1983; Vierich and Shepperd 1980).

Due to poor soils, and low-productive methods and few mechanical implements, yields per hectare is low. At the same time, the hectareage that can be managed by the household's women and children is limited, and the hectareage they can handle is too small to produce a surplus. The average field size of 4,5 hectares sounds huge, but it does not produce much in Botswana's traditional agriculture. Still, it is the limit of what can be managed in small scale farming (Opschoor 1983: 160).

Production volumes are consequently extremely low. According to Øygaard (1986: 10-11), the average farmer has to increase the arable production sixfold in order to meet the household's own subsistence needs. In short, no farmer in the traditional rainfed arable agriculture in Botswana makes a secure living based solely on crops.¹³

Rather, arable farming has been and still is only one component in the households' multi-activity strategies. The other components most often included in the strategy are cattle, smallstock,¹⁴ migrant employment, informal seasonal employment, crafts and brewing, and also various work for food arrangements (Vierich and Shepperd 1981). The increasing poverty problems in rural Botswana do not principally stem from arable deterioration, but from a shortage of the other components needed for a multi-activity strategy. As mentioned above, the importance of migrant labour to South Africa is decreasing both in absolute and proportional numbers, and too few jobs are established in the other sectors of the economy. Cattle production is difficult to engage in for those who have no

¹³ Traditional rainfed farming denotes farming on communal lands, which means most of the arable farming households. There are only 2-300 freehold farms, and some floodplain farms (*molapo* farming).

¹⁴ Smallstock is predominantly for subsistence needs. The smallstock animals sold to the BMC, the main buyer of animals for sale, make up a very small proportion of the national smallstock herd (MFDP 1985:177).

animals or other income generating activities, facilitating livestock investments.

Arable farmers producing crops are of mainly three kinds. One group invests very little in arable farming because except for their own labour they have very little to invest in any case. In these households, that are often female headed, labour is also scarce as there is no male labour available. The crop production in this group is non-existent or marginal. This is the group which occasionally drops out of agriculture, and survives on government food hand-outs and "work for food" arrangements. Crop production is often more costly for the poorest households; if they have to hire draft power this is a cost that cattle holding farmers avoid (Opschoor 1983: 168).¹⁵

Critical for crop production is the availability of draft power for timely ploughing. Some wealthy farmers have tractors, but for most farmers, teams of cattle are the draft power. Vierich and Shepperd argued (1980) that, for their sample, access to draft power was, besides rain, the main determinant for the decision to plough. Eskeli (1989) reported that in his sample, the main reason for farmers not ploughing was lack of draft power. The critical herd size for the farmer to be able to plough with his own resources is at least 20 animals, maybe as much as 40 (Vierich and Shepperd 1980). In herds of this size there will be enough oxen to form a span of 6-8 oxen (Vierich and Shepperd 1980; Øygaard 1986). Some farmers with smaller herds have to borrow animals, or use some cows; such work reduces their value, and might cause loss of calves. Those who are able to plough for themselves have got the advantage of being able to plough immediately when there is some rainfall. This is critical, and influences the harvest greatly.¹⁶ In their sample, Vierich and Shepperd (1980) found only 15% able to plough with their own draft power.¹⁷ For those with insufficient draft power, alternatives have been available, where other farmers lend them draft power, against payment or labour or other favours. This reduces the chances for timely ploughing. Solway (1986) reports that it is an increasing problem that farmers having a commercial, large scale cattle production are unwilling to lend out their cattle as this reduces the market

¹⁵ Cattle owners do have some costs of using their own animals, if these have to be brought from far-away cattle posts, but the difference probably remains.

¹⁶ Observations in Botswana during field work illustrated this. Two neighbouring fields showed a very marked difference in growth. One had been ploughed at the right time, the other not.

¹⁷ These numbers vary in different sources. But it seems clear that a majority of farmers are not able to plough independently.

value. The poor farmers, who have to rely on draft power from other sources, get higher costs. Øygard also notes that being without cattle is increasingly problematic for arable production as cattle owners become more reluctant to lend out their cattle (1986: 7). In short, the stronger the household's economic basis is, the better are the possibilities to engage in crop production. The poor farmers who are unable to establish themselves in livestock are as a consequence also unable to support any crop production of significance.

The second group are those who have some amount of resources and labour. But systematically, labour and resources are spent for other purposes. Cattle, education, and crafts are less risky, and more profitable investments. Off-farm employment gives a better and to some extent less drought prone income than self-employment on the households' fields. Money that could be invested in implements, fertilizers and improved seeds are better spent in livestock or education. Thus only the very minimum of labour that is left in the household, i.e. women and children, is available for arable farming, and only a minimum of resources are spent for the purpose of rationalizing this use of labour (Vierich and Shepperd 1980; Øygard et al. 1986).

Even slight improvements in methods or in field size would require more labour, and often also investments as well. It is not rational for farmers to do that.

The term medium scale farmer does not denote a very high standard of living. They are also generally poor, but better off than the first group.

The third group is very small; Øygard estimates them to be 4.7 percent of the farming households. They cultivate with improved methods, and they do so on large fields, 10 hectares and more. They are also cattle holders with large herds, and have thus access to draft power, even perhaps tractors. Investments in technical equipment is thus possible for this group.

This group produces crops with a higher productivity because improved methods are combined with large scale economic benefits. In Botswana's semi-arid climate, only production on large scale combined with method improvements is productive enough to compete for resources with livestock and employment (Duggan 1983: 124-126). Øygard et al. present data that seem to support Duggan's point, even if statistics like this should be used with caution. Øygard's data show that productivity makes a sudden jump when field sizes pass 10 hectares. Holdings of 1 hectare make up 2.3 percent of the national cultivated area, and 2.1 per cent of the national production. A similar pattern is evidenced for holdings of 1-2 hectares, and so on, up to 6-10 hectares. When the 10 hectare limit is passed, these holdings make up 27 percent of area cultivated, but produce 42 percent of

total harvest. It is only when holdings exceed 10 hectares that productivity makes a jump (Øygaard et al. 1986: 10).

For any farming household, investments in arable farming are limited to the amount of resources and labour that can be risked. Wealthier households can thus risk a larger absolute amount of resources, if they find it worthwhile to invest beyond a way to use casual household labour. The amount of resources that can be risked by wealthy farmers is large enough to pass the threshold of economies of scale. The amount of resources needed is substantial, because in order to operate 10 hectares or more, household labour is insufficient. Labour has to be hired, production has to be mechanized, and the draft power constraint has to be overcome. In addition there are the costs of fertilizers, fencing, and seeds. Only wealthy farmers fulfil these requirements.

The poor Batswana thus comprise the rural households who have been unable to build a multi-activity strategy. And the modernization strategy in Botswana, no matter how successful it has been on many points, has left the poor peasantry behind in stagnation.

The distribution of resources is very skewed, and the key variable determining distribution of resources and wealth is cattle ownership. First, the cattle holding households are able to maintain a higher level of arable production. Second, cattle holding and employment correlate. The incomes from wage employment are often used to build up a herd, while the children of cattle-holding households have better chances to get higher education and thus the jobs in the formal sector. A pattern of cumulative opportunities is evident, and cattle ownership is the key factor.

A small proportion of farmers own about half the national cattle herd, 5 percent of the farmers have 34 percent of the national herd. The numbers vary with different authors, but the picture is clear. A large minority does not have cattle at all. 30 percent of farming households and 45 percent of the rural population do not have cattle at all. Of those who have cattle, 50 percent have under 20 animals, 25 percent have between 20 and 40 animals.¹⁸

3.7.3 Drought

In normal years, rainfall is low and unstable, and for periods there are regular droughts. They last from one year and up to 4 or 5 years, and may

¹⁸ These numbers are from Øygaard (1986) and Selolwane (1986) Other sources might have slightly different figures, but the main tendencies is the same.

hit the whole country or only a few districts. In the early sixties there was a long lasting drought. A new long lasting drought struck in 1981/82, and lasted until the 1987/88 season when there were good rains again. In addition come the shorter and more local ones. Droughts are a factor to be reckoned with; it is not an extraordinary occurrence which may now and then interfere in a normal, non-drought situation. According to Holm there is drought of some kind in 7 out of 10 years, of which three are regarded as severe (1985: 464). There are few years in which all the agricultural areas in Botswana have adequate measures of rainfall. As noted above, crops are most immediately hit by a drought. In addition, sources of income in the traditional economy, mainly utilized by the poor are also hit very quickly. Drought may affect employment for better-off farmers, and gathering of veld products. The better-off farmers, who are those holding cattle and with access to stable formal employment, are better able to cope with the effects of a drought.

Employment outside agriculture is not vulnerable to drought. Livestock is hit severely only when the drought lasts for more than one year. The effects of a drought are first seen in the deterioration of the crowded communal grazing lands used by both large cattle owners and small ones. Large cattle owners often have access to privately owned boreholes in areas where this is a prerequisite for keeping cattle there, and in these areas grazing resources last longer in an acceptable condition.

However, when a drought lasts long, all cattle holders are hit, they have to sell cattle to compensate for lost crops, and they lose animals that die under drought conditions. This is more critical for households with a small number of cattle. The off-take from a large herd does not reduce its rebuilding capacity below critical thresholds, but equally important, the off-take from a small herd means that the owner can no longer plough independently. This leads to increased ploughing costs and/or less timely ploughing when rain finally comes. Thus, droughts hit the poor hardest and quickest, and tend to pull down again some households on their way to establishing a more solid and diversified basis for an existence.

3.8 Summary

Resources are marginal and unreliable for arable agriculture. Large grazing lands are the most important resource in Botswana's agriculture in general. Arable farming is risky, its productivity low compared to other types of activities.

Various groups relate differently to this. Most farmers spend some resources and labour on arable farming to cover more or less of the

household's subsistence needs. This makes crop production an integral part of a multi-activity strategy to make a living under harsh climatic conditions. The poor farmers are often those dependent on arable farming alone, with small opportunities to combine arable farming with other activities.

The development of this structure has been a long term process, and the post colonial modernization policy has not fundamentally changed this major poverty creating problem.

The rural population has not been politically mobilized except at election time, and has not been able to articulate demands and grievances, even if modernization policy has been allowed to develop in such way that the rural poor do not really benefit.

However, increasingly, this uneven development has become a major political problem; the ARAP programme should be regarded as the Ministry of Agriculture's response to demands for a better policy. This leads to the next chapter, the initiation and planning of ARAP.

4. The Ministry of Agriculture, professional approaches and the elaboration of ARAP¹⁹

4.1 Introduction

As has been indicated in chapter 3, during the seventies, the problems of rural poverty became more pressing for policy makers. The increased attention to these problems are explained by both donor attitudes, increasing differences between the prospering modern sector and the rural sector, and by the need for public policies that could generate political support as welfare infrastructure could not be expanded by new major investments. There was thus a growing pressure for a change in agricultural policy, aiming at more effective development of the small scale, traditional agriculture.

The study of agricultural programmes in the perspective outlined in chapter 1 directs attention to the administration itself, and to influences on the administration from outside actors. In this chapter the former will be discussed. What were the central problem structures in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)? How did they influence MOA's response to demands for policy changes? To what extent was the MOA's response to new demands suited to the needs of different target groups? To what extent did the MOA manage to link its increasingly complex structure together in a coordinated planning effort for the design of a complex, interventionist policy?

ARAP has to be analyzed as an element in the MOA response to demands for policy changes. ALDEP (Arable Lands Development Programme), and ARAP were the key elements in a broad development strategy for the modernization of the arable sub-sector, which was the MOA's response to changed demands. The analysis will first present some basic elements in the MOA's overall problem structure as it had developed

¹⁹ Throughout this chapter the various departments, divisions and units in the Ministry of Agriculture will often be referred to. In Appendix 3, an organization chart is presented which shows the formal structure of the ministry. Concerning the abbreviations for various units and departments, see the List of Abbreviations.

since the 1960s, and next show how this influenced both ALDEP and ARAP. The planning process of ARAP will be discussed in more detail as well, to show how the process became centralized and incapable of handling effectively the complexities of such an ambitious intervention.

Certain parts of the Ministry dominate in the analysis; the Division of Planning and Statistics, the Permanent and the Deputy Permanent Secretaries which are labelled the administrative top level of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Department of Agricultural Field Services with its variety of specialized sub-units.

4.2 Ministry of Agriculture: Problem structures.

4.2.1 Problem structures and models of action²⁰

MOA policy guidelines relate to the sector, to sub-sectors or to specialized niches of production more than to various groups in the sector. In, for instance, all the published National Development Plans (NDPs), this is a striking feature. There are very few references to the living conditions for various groups; policy goals are not formulated in terms of poverty and welfare, but in terms of production types. This does not necessarily mean that MOA officers are indifferent to poverty problems, but it is assumed that if the various production sub-sectors can be made more profitable, income and standards of living will benefit from it. The NDP 1976-1981, Agricultural chapter, states that

Government's policy in the livestock sector is to increase output and assure the long term future of the industry but at the same time to try to spread the benefits from the industry more widely (page 143).

The following description of policies in the plan document then relates to livestock production, and key problems in the sector. The only reference to how poor people can benefit from this sector is that they can be employed in abattoirs and beef processing (MFDP 1977: 143-158). The plan does not state that it is a goal for agriculture to fight inequality, only that

²⁰ The following analysis is based on interviews and documents. The detailed references to the data used are reduced, in order to ease the reading. Reference is made to chapter 2 and appendix 1.

Government policy is to provide every rural household with an opportunity to obtain some income from agricultural production (page 135).

But this thinking in sector terms has different implications for different groups engaged in it, as will be shown below.

The overall goal for the sector is modernization, and modernization is understood as the creation of efficient, independent and commercialized production units. The overall goal for the agricultural sector is defined by informants in mainly one way. What will have a future within agriculture, according to the civil servants interviewed, is a group of commercial, viable and rationally run farms. In the future, civil servants expect that the heavy use of subsidies will become unnecessary, as the farmers will be rational producers of surplus for sale. As expressed in the National Development Plan:

Government support of the agricultural sector will aim at promoting self-sustained growth so that subsidies will not need to be provided to agricultural producers in the long term (MFDP 1987d: 187).²¹

Viable commercial agriculture will contain a diversified production, even if livestock is expected to remain the most prominent sub-sector (see below). In most policy documents, for instance NDPs, the level of commercialization of various production types is discussed, and the expansion of them set as a goal. How this will serve the various groups of farmers is rather vaguely analyzed.

The problem is that the sector is not characterized by a dominance of commercialized, profitable units. Most farms are small, unproductive and produce too small volumes of output. What is lacking, according to the informants, is infrastructure for commercial agricultural production. Substantial efforts have been done in later years to redress this deficiency. Furthermore, the informants contend, the farmers lack the knowledge of modern, productive farming, the capital to invest in it, and the will and interest to take risk and make efforts.

In principle, the farmers holding the viable units — those with a commercial potential — could be of any socio-economic origin, according

²¹ The NDP's are made by the various line ministries, but under the coordination and policy guidelines of MFDP. Thus, the statements made in the NDP are seen as a reflection of viewpoints predominating in MOA, adjusted to the frameworks set by the MFDP.

to the civil servants interviewed. Everybody is seen as having the option to develop within agriculture. Also the poor farmers are seen as having a chance to make a living within agriculture, if they are willing to work and take the risks, and if they use the opportunities provided. However, many of the poor farmers are seen by MOA informants as not sufficiently interested, and thus their prospects are limited. The informants constantly referred to farmers "willingness" to take risk and make efforts to develop.

The large-scale farmers, relying mainly on livestock, are already to quite some extent developed as commercial producers in agriculture. The question is, then, who can join or approach the level of this group in terms of agricultural income. It is not expected that all farmers will transform into viable, commercial producers; many will find agriculture unpromising and leave for employment elsewhere. What kind of employment that might be is in principle not MOA's problem. Still, it is clearly an objective that the group surviving within agriculture should be as large as possible, but it is also realized that there will be fewer than the present number of farming households. But it is not assumed that farmers will be forced out, if they really want to engage in agriculture; it is envisaged that all those who wish to do so can continue, provided that some find it sensible to leave.

Generally speaking, the MOA offer to farmers since the 1960s have been information and training, that has been disseminated by the Agricultural Extension Service. Credit facilities have also been arranged. Until the policy changes that are the topic for this analysis appeared, the same offer was given to all farmers. It was considered to be just to give all farmers the same offer, even if their individual situation varied greatly in terms of access to resources.

Botswana's policy is often said to rest on four basic principles or values. In the Introduction to the National Development Plan 1985- 1991, the Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning states that

The nation's four development planning objectives of rapid economic growth, social justice, economic independence and sustained development ... remain unchanged from NDP5 (MFDP 1985d).

These objectives are often referred to, and MOA informants were asked to specify what this meant in agricultural policy. Regarding social justice, most of them pointed out that the values of social justice meant that all should have the opportunity to increase their standard of living. It was not understood as an ideal of equality in income, nor that people's living standard should be roughly equal but that all should have an opportunity to improve their situation. Given differences at the outset, to give everybody

the same chances to improve their position will not change the relative poverty. Rather, it implies accepting differences while trying to reduce absolute poverty levels. One high level MOA civil servant used ALDEP as an example and stated that ALDEP was to give people a chance, and it was the farmers' choice and responsibility whether or not to use this opportunity. Furthermore, recognizing that farmers differ in their use of programmes, this was seen as a problem of interest and motivation. Not all farmers were interested in using the options that were available. The MOA's task is thus not basically to remove poverty problems as such, but rather to offer a helping hand, and let the offer of assistance be available to all farmers interested in improving their own situation. The differing points of departure for varying farming households are recognized, but not to be interfered with.

It is realized that livestock is unevenly distributed. But even if cattle is definitely the type of production best adjusted to Botswana's natural and climatic conditions, and even if livestock ownership affects the capacity to produce crops very strongly, the skewed distribution of this asset is not regarded as a problem to be acted upon. NDP 1985-91 (MFDP 1985d: 170) describes the unequal distribution of cattle and in the same paragraph it is noted that those with no cattle are also those who produce the smallest amounts of crops. Still, this fact is not described in the plan as something to change, and consequently, the project review of the plan does not present any such project. In interviews, high ranking MOA civil servants stated that the distribution of cattle was not to be interfered with. On the question of what cattle-less farmers should do in order to build up a herd, the MOA Permanent Secretary answered that loans in the National Development Bank would provide the means to proceed. Picard (1987) quotes from a policy document²² stating that

... the living standards of all the population cannot be raised by redistributing the assets of the few people that are relatively well off.

On the contrary, far from being a major problem, the existence of large cattle holdings making good profits is seen as a major achievement. They are viable, self-sufficient producers, able to make substantial profits and contribute to the national economy. In fact, this group of large cattle owners represents one of MOA's successes and the MOA is not willing to do anything that would reverse what has been achieved here.

²² Picard 1987; 238. Quotations from Government of Botswana, Rural Development in Botswana. Government Paper no 1. Gaborone, Government Printer 1972; 3.

...we should, of course, do nothing which would make our cattle industry less productive, or would reduce its income earning capacity (see footnote 22).

Instead of trying to provide an option for more farmers within livestock, which is obviously the most reasonable thing to do if farmer's preferences were to be the basis of public policy, the problem is rather understood as a too high dependence on and preoccupation with cattle. The problem is how to make arable production more attractive for farmers as a main enterprise instead of livestock. The National Food Strategy (NFS) document states under the heading of "Commercial Farming Development" (MFDP 1985c :16) that

This Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme ... is intended to encourage investment in commercial dryland farming by farmers who might otherwise prefer to undertake the generally less risky operations associated with the livestock sector.

It is difficult to find a clearer expression that interests in the administration and in the administration's clientele are diametrically opposed. It is commonly known that farmers prefer cattle, not only for cultural reasons but also for economic, rational reasons as argued in chapter 3.

In the standard analysis of the relative development of the arable and livestock sub-sectors, as noted above, it is seen as a problem that farmers systematically prefer the livestock sector. The arable sector thus lags behind. The livestock sector, on the other hand, is quite well developed, but "occupied"; overgrazing does not allow much further expansion of the national herd. Even if there are still many improvements to be done within cattle rearing, this sector is making good progress compared to the arable sector. It has also generally had a higher priority within MOA expenditure. As late as in the NDP 1976-81, livestock development investments took 73 per cent of MOA total investments (MFDP 1977). The livestock sector has reached substantial results and has come very far, compared to the arable sub-sector.

Increasingly, MOA has come to see it as a problem that the arable sub-sector lags behind. The NDP published in 1977, states that

The Government's aim of ensuring that all Batswana benefit from development will not be achieved if arable farming is allowed to stagnate (MFDP 1977: 158).

This concern for the stagnation of the arable sub-sector is linked to the decreasing self-sufficiency in staple food. Increasingly, the MOA has seen it as a goal to increase national production volumes. In 1970, MOA stated in its chapter in NDP that self-sufficiency in basic food crops was a realistic objective, and that it was a problem that the self-sufficiency was decreasing (GOB 1970: 33).

High imports required foreign exchange reserves, and in particular, it caused increased dependence on the apartheid regime in Republic of South Africa from where food imports emanate.

Since the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the MOA was thus eager to support arable agriculture, both because it was seen as a sector that could expand and as a sector that would have to expand in order to let the cattle-less farmers improve their living standard, and finally, because the national self-sufficiency was seen as too low. The NDP of 1970 stated that

there is an urgent need to increase arable production for the following reasons:-

- (i) to increase the real incomes of those farming families who are unable to obtain a reasonable living from their livestock holdings;
- (ii) to achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency in staple foods (GOB 1970: 33).

The standard understanding of the problems in arable farming are rather vague on the reasons for the problems — arable agriculture is defined by what it is not. Arable agriculture has been defined mainly in sector terms as low-productive, with low levels of technology, receiving a small proportion of household labour, as risky and at a subsistence level for most farmers. The NDP 1968-73 focuses on low rainfall, on needs for improvement of traditional methods (GOB 1968: 22). Research should focus on improving economic return on labour and capital (p 26). In NDP 1976-81, the sector is described as suffering from low rainfall, lack of draft power, unreliable availability of inputs, problems of crop protection and lack of transport to the field. The need for new technology is also emphasised (MFDP 1977: 158). NDP 1979-85 also addresses the low and unreliable returns in arable farming, the need to increase productivity, unfavourable soils and climate, low productivity stemming from the inadequacy of traditional technology, and the lack of implements.

The reasons for these deficiencies are hardly discussed. When asked about what are the major tasks for arable agriculture development, civil servants typically answered by referring to harsh climatic and ecological conditions, and to low levels of technology and input. The NFS document refers to these main problem areas too, especially mentioning the low

rainfall and poor soils, making arable rainfed agriculture a risky venture. Yields are described as extremely low (MFDP 1985c: 3) and inputs of capital and labour are described as minimal. This is labelled a risk minimizing strategy. The lack of access to draft power is also noted as a problem. These are well documented problems to be found in any description of Botswana arable farming. As pointed out above, the main problems are defined as absence of knowledge of farming methods, lack of resources to improve methods, and lack of will to try and take risks.

Seen against the background of all socio-economic studies made of the traditional economy and on the reasons for low input in arable farming,²³ it is striking how policy documents and descriptions of programmes avoid an analysis of why farmers do not have the resources to invest in arable farming, and why they, even if they have resources, invest it for other purposes. The close links arable farming has to livestock is well documented, but somehow ignored in MOA's arable development programmes.

Arable agriculture and livestock have been treated as the two main pillars or sectors in agriculture, but they have been treated separately, by two distinct sets of public policy that are only vaguely related to each other in spite of the close interrelation between these two production types.

The formal set-up of the Ministry of Agriculture reflects the institutionalization of this way of thinking. At all levels in the ministry — Permanent Secretary and Deputy Permanent Secretary, the Planning Division, the Department of Field Service and field staff at regional level — the division of work is between livestock and crops specialists, who make their own crops or livestock related programmes. There might be arguments in favour of this arrangement, but it is not consistent with the inter-dependence between the two in multiple income-generating strategies as operated by most farmers. Only in recent years have programmes trying to treat these components as interrelated been initiated. The way National Development Plans for Agriculture have normally been written also reflects the division — the two sectors are described separately with few references to their interconnectedness in project designs. Projects are presented as related to crops or to livestock.

The arable development assistance that the MOA offered was the same for all groups of farmers until the demand came for extra efforts for the poorer farmers. The agricultural extension efforts, that started already before independence, included the promotion of row planting instead of

²³ See, for instance, Cownie (1987), Vierich and Shepperd (1980), Selolwane 1986 and Parson (1981).

broadcasting, more weeding, improved seeds, fertilizers, crop rotation, winter ploughing and harrowing. These ways of farming were promoted mainly by training and information — that is, a standard extension model. These are not very drastic changes, but they did require more input of labour (weeding, added operations to ploughing, destumping of more land), they required occasional investments (harrows and row planters) and they required annual investments (fertilizers, seeds) (Opschoor 1983: 160-161).

Until the seventies, arable farming assistance was mainly provision of advice and training, in order to spread knowledge about new implements available, and new methods. This is labelled the extension model. For this purpose the Agricultural Field Service was established. Extension efforts reached relatively few farmers. The centrepiece of extension activities in NDP 1968-73 was the Pupil Farmer Scheme. According to the plan document, the number of farmers participating at the scheme's various levels totalled around 2000 (GOB 1968: 22). It was in fact consciously designed to reach only a few farmers — destined to be progressive pilot farmers, showing the way for the rest. Only in the mid-seventies was this scheme abandoned; extension officers were now expected to serve all farmers in their area, which proved highly problematic. "The ineffectiveness of the new extension effort was a constant source of concern", according to Harvey and Lewis (1990: 96-97). This change in the extension model was the first change in the MOA design of policy means, in order to respond to the growing awareness of the rural poverty problems.

But who had the resources to use this offer? These production changes would increase yields per hectare; the question is whether these increases would be large enough to make arable farming equally profitable with livestock, when also increased risks were considered. Who could afford to lose these substantial resources from time to time? And among those who could, who would find it profitable?

For farmers to respond to this offer depends on two key assumptions or conditions. First, it is assumed that farmers have resources to invest in arable farming in the first place. Even if credit is available, it can hardly be expected that all costs and investments can be covered that way. Besides, credits are costly, and raise even further the demands for productivity. In practice, resources for arable investment have to come from cattle or employment. Secondly, it was assumed that if farmers adopted the promoted methods and implements, and took on the increased costs and investments promoted, productivity would increase sufficiently to make arable farming an attractive option for farmers when compared to migrant labour and livestock. If this condition could be met, farmers would find it attractive to engage in arable farming, and make the necessary investments.

The reasons for what is vaguely referred to as farmers' low "willingness" to make efforts and take risks, are related to whether they have anything to risk at all, and to the rationality of taking risks, which depends on the absolute amount of resources that can be risked. Most farmers could not risk enough in arable farming to make risk pay off, and for most farmers, the extension offer was not relevant for their perceived interests.

The first core assumption on which arable development programmes of the extension type were based, held mainly for better-off farmers. The wealthy farmers were thus those who used this offer. Considering the access to resources for both one-time and annual investments in arable farming, cattle owners had resources to do so. The huge number of cattleless farmers and small holders of cattle did not. Thus among these farmers, such a surplus had to be generated from crop farming, an unlikely prospect, if a sixfold increase was needed to reach subsistence levels. Besides, generating resources for arable farming through a crop surplus will only work in the years of good rainfall.²⁴ The problem of how to finance both the initial one time investments (plough, row planter, draft power) and annual purchases was left to the farmer.

In practice, as regards the poor farmers, such implements could not be purchased. They would have to be borrowed from neighbours, and thus become an annual cost to farmers, which could only be covered by a crop surplus, thus generating even higher demands for productivity of investments and labour.

The next assumption is that improved methods will increase productivity so much that arable farming becomes attractive. The technology, crops and methods that would make arable farming that productive are not yet developed, according to Opschoor (1983) and Selolwane (1986). Of course the improved methods promoted by the MOA increases productivity, but it does not make arable farming more attractive than livestock or employment. In addition comes the problem that risks are still higher. Opschoor points to the missing research results this far, and in its policy document of 1991, MOA describes increased efforts in arable research as a main task for the coming years, the reason being that the methods, crop varieties and implements thus far developed are simply not enough in Botswana's semi-arid climate.

Why, then, should anyone engage in arable farming at all, except at the level that could be maintained by the labour of women and children, and without much investment? The exception to the inadequate productivity

²⁴ Unless irrigation is provided, which is not an option — the costs are too high and the water resources too limited.

increasing potential is when yields per hectare increases are combined with large fields, and productivity can be increased further by economies of large scale (Duggan 1983; Øygard et al. 1986), as described in chapter 3 (3.7). Who then, can run arable farming on a large scale, that is at least 10 hectares? In principle everybody, as land is communal and allocated to all who apply for it. But to handle such large fields requires draft power, that is substantial cattle herds or a tractor.

The amount of resources needed to run large scale arable farming with improved methods can only be met by farmers with substantial resources, both for initial investments and for annual investments. Furthermore, it requires a very strong resource base to be able to carry losses of substantial resources from time to time, due to risky rainfall conditions. The arable farming on more than the average hectareage requires more than the manual work of household members, it requires hired labour, or what is best, a tractor to allow mechanization. It requires resources for investment. No farmer would invest more in arable farming than what could be risked, and it is mainly the farmer who can risk large amounts of resources who will get an output which is high enough to make risk pay off, because of economies of scale.

Only the wealthy farmers could really use the extension model, and they did so, for many years. The poor farmers did not have the resources to invest, and if they had a few, they did not have enough to make risk pay. And finally, they could not take on the large investments of arable farming beyond what the household's manual labour could handle. Consequently, the extension effort that was MOA's main arable development effort up to the late seventies mainly mobilized the small number of wealthy farmers, who could use it efficiently (Harvey and Lewis 1990: 101-102).

One might ask why research efforts were not intensified in order to improve productivity even more. The answer is probably that there was no perceived need; those for whom the technology and methods advocated were not beneficial had few if any spokesmen to articulate their grievances. It is illustrative that only in seventies was it discovered that a very large number of farming households had few or no cattle at all (Selolwane 1986).

The organization structure of the MOA on several points suited this problem structure and models of action. The basic division of work between livestock and crops specialists referred to above discouraged the development of integrated approaches to the farming in Botswana.

The Field Service is also an interesting aspect of this. At its lowest level, where interaction with the clientele took place, it consisted of Agricultural Demonstrators. They were technical specialists in all main types of production; they represented a pool of technical knowledge which could be

drawn on when advising and training the farmers. The field service could be approached by those interested in new techniques and willing to try new things. It was service institution, available to those who wanted its services.

The Field Service was not a large organization, and the AD covered a large area. In terms of farming household numbers per AD, capacity was not adjusted to the mobilization of all the potential clients, but only a few. Besides, in most areas, the AD was not easily accessible — only in later years has he been provided with transport, in order to move around in his large area, and thus early on he was not easy to reach for those living far off and with few transportation means. He served the few, and for this the organization sufficed.

4.2.2 Demands for a mass oriented agricultural development

Poverty problems in the rural areas increasingly became more pressing during the seventies, and the MOA was by most leaders seen as a ministry which would have to contribute to their solution. In the National Development Plan 1979 — 1985, agricultural development for the poor was given higher priority than before (Selolwane 1986). It was recognized that the modern sector could not absorb either the poor farmers in the rural areas nor the increasing numbers in the labour force. What was left as a labour absorbing mechanism for the foreseeable future was agriculture, as stated in NDP V (MFDP 1979: 133).

The background for these changes was complex. One reason was the problems caused by Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) for small holders of cattle. The TGLP reform led to increased shortage of grazing land due to the allocation of large tracts of such land to large cattle owners. The perception among people of TGLP as favouring the wealthy farmers was as important as the actual favouring of the same group. Selolwane refers to the simple fact that by the late seventies, research had documented the seriousness and magnitude of rural poverty.

The agricultural sector as such was under pressure from within; the dismal prospects for the poor majority was and still is an important cause for urban migration, by the plan described as “rapid” (p 133). (See also Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 52). The scale of urbanization was reflected in the low recruitment of farmers to agriculture; Øygard refers to research showing that 65 per cent of farmers were over 44 years old, and only 7 per cent were under the age of 35. In the total population 65 per cent are below

30 (Øygard 1986: 6).²⁵ The pressure on the towns was problematic in several respects, and it should be noted that it was also a significant political challenge for the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) regime as their electoral strength was located in the rural areas. The BNF (Botswana National Front) had not completely captured the towns, but the towns were still the constituencies where BNF had at least to some extent overwon its limitation as a *Bangwaketse* party only, and it has won seats in the towns, for instance in Gaborone in 1984.

The economy had shown a steady growth throughout the seventies due to mineral exploitation and the modern sector of the economy had greatly benefited from it. Thus the relative poverty of the rural majority had increased and become more visibly contrasted to the new wealth of the urban centres. The problem, as referred to in chapter 3, was that the job creation in the modern sector could not absorb the rural poor. It could not even absorb the population growth (Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 49). The picture emerging from the data is one of a traditional agricultural sector increasingly lagging behind other sectors. At the same time, the internal pressure in the sector stemming from the skewed distribution of resources and population growth made the situation worse.

Donor attitudes at this time were characterized by an increasing emphasis on food production and agricultural development, and this trend most likely influenced thinking in Botswana as well. Besides, important donors in Botswana, like NORAD and SIDA, had developed a strong emphasis on alleviation of poverty.

Both the political leadership and the donor community thus posed the demand to the MOA that agricultural development policies had to be changed so as to benefit the poorer farmers better. Expatriates working in Botswana at the time increasingly were concerned with equity and the influence of these individuals might have contributed too (Picard 1987).

Agriculture was not an easy solution to poverty, still, these problems were to a considerable extent put on the MOA agenda, and the most notable outcome was first ALDEP and later ARAP.

²⁵ These numbers should be treated with caution, as Botswana men often marry and establish a rural family base relatively late in their life cycles. The numbers still show some tendency.

4.2.3 Response to demands for new policy goals

The relative weight of various voices demanding a more effective and broad based development effort towards the traditional agriculture is hard to assess, but it is clear that MOA faced new demands to broaden modernization, especially in order to maintain political stability. It is also a safe statement to say that this represented a quite basic change for the ministry. Furthermore, it was the first time that the ministry faced a situation where its basic policy objectives were determined from outside the civil service. Finally, it was difficult to respond based on the institutionalized problem structures and models of action.

By the early eighties, MOA had started responding to political demands for increased emphasis on the poorer sections of farmers, those with few or no cattle and a below subsistence arable production.

MOA's response was to develop a complex and ambitious strategy for arable development. In spite of this sector's low potential and previous problems of activating farmers here, this was selected as the key area. There were several reasons for this.

In MOA's perspective, improved incomes for the poor within agriculture through production increases would mainly have to come from arable farming. Even if it was already then clearly perceived even outside the MOA that this was not a very promising strategy (Faaland and Isaksen 1983), it was never the less what the MOA saw as the only available option. To do something else would require a basic restructuring of the very basic policies of MOA and of its main success since independence — the large scale cattle production and the TGLP. But the MOA did not attempt anything like that, it stuck to its established problem structures and applied well known models of action.

The distribution of resources, notably cattle, was seen as adequate. This implied that there was little scope left for expansion of production within livestock. In fact, farmers were seen as too oriented towards cattle, and ARAP for instance was justified as an attempt to divert the attention from cattle to arable farming (MFDP 1985a). MOA thus emphasised that expansion of production had to come from other sectors than cattle. In practice, the main option that was left was arable farming.²⁶

Massive poverty alleviation objectives solved within arable farming would also have beneficial effects on one of MOA's major concerns,

²⁶ There are also other products, like horticulture, poultry and the like, but these require capital, new skills and implements to such an extent that they are not suited for a mass approach.

namely the low national food self-sufficiency. The overall framework for MOA's response was thus a National Food Strategy (NFS) that had national and household self-sufficiency in basic food as its overall objective. The means was to increase arable production among all households (MFDP 1985a). The emphasis on national production volumes is elaborated upon in a National Food Strategy policy document. This exercise was started in 1983, and in 1985 a policy document was worked out in cooperation with the Rural Development Unit, MFDP.²⁷ The total production of food grains averages 50 000 metric tons, or about 25 per cent of the domestic requirements of 200 000 metric tons. Under the drought in the early eighties production levels plummeted to 7 000 metric tons (MOA 1985A: 2). Agricultural Statistics (MOA 1987c: 12) show total crop production in the non-drought year 1981 to be 58 000 tons, while in the drought years of 1983 and 1984 it had sunk to 15 800 tons and 8 600 tons, respectively. Compared with Opschoor's (1983: 160-161) estimates of up to 90 per cent self-sufficiency in 1930 under non-drought conditions, self-sufficiency degrees had surely deteriorated.²⁸ The high imports needed required foreign exchange reserves, and in particular, it increased dependence on the apartheid regime in Republic of South Africa from where food imports emanated. Thus, the National Food Strategy (NFS) document, which presented ALDEP and ARAP and the rationale for these programmes emphasised the contribution these programmes could make to national self-sufficiency and set high goals for them in terms of national production volume (MFDP 1985: 46-47).

A variety of programmes were seen as essential elements in the National Food Strategy (NFS). The two key programmes in the NFS were ARAP and ALDEP. In addition, there were a variety of infrastructure investments notably for marketing of increased output, pest control and strengthening of marketing institutions. Also pricing was changed and increased significantly. A range of specialized programmes for development of new forms of production, like poultry, horticulture and fodder production were initiated, but these programmes required capital and expertise that made them an option only for a minority of farmers. Although it was not a MOA programme, an investment assistance programme, FAP (Financial Assistance Programme) was also seen in the NFS context. The FAP gave

²⁷ This unit coordinated the policy elements of several other ministries, not least the Ministry of Agriculture which is naturally a key ministry in this respect.

²⁸ 90 per cent seems somewhat high, but at least the two percentages give an indication of developments.

a subsidy in cash to those who invested rather large sums of money in productive enterprises, including agricultural enterprises.

The NFS represents MOA's linking of the new, politically decided objectives to previous problem structures and objectives. The NFS had food self-sufficiency as its overall goal, binding together a whole range of programmes. The means would be increased household arable production for consumption and sale. This, in combination with the establishment of some 50 huge, irrigated farms in the Pandamatenga area should boost national production totals, self-sufficiency in food should be established at all levels.

The rhetoric of the NFS was ambitious, and the MOA must have known that it was not realistic, as they readily admitted a few years later, in the sector policy document of 1991 (MOA 1991). As Picard reports for ALDEP, one of the programmes envisaged to contribute to the NFS objectives, MOA had very limited expectations to its ability to create employment and incomes in the rural areas (1987: 260). The ministry did not object to new policy goals, but adjusted its own concerns to suit the new goal formulations.

The mass oriented, productive programmes of the NFS were ALDEP and ARAP. ALDEP was launched in 1982, for the poorest farmers, and ARAP came later, for the medium scale farmers. ALDEP and ARAP were both directed towards arable development.

The problem analysis in ALDEP parallels the extension model. Small scale farming was seen as lacking methods and implements to improve yields, and fields were too small. ALDEP attempted to introduce row planters and other implements, in order to improve yields, it encouraged farmers to purchase draft animals in order to facilitate timely ploughing and because use of row planters and similar equipment need draft power. It aimed at field expansions, through fencing and destumping subsidies. These are the same aims as the extension effort had too. As Opschoor writes, ALDEP tried to do what 50 years of extension had been unable to encourage the small scale farmers to (1983: 174). The promoted expertise and implements were as before, although some smaller changes were made, for instance, agricultural research had designed equipment that better suited the physical conditions for arable farming. What was new was first, that ALDEP not only advised, promoted and encouraged, it also paid parts of the investments needed, and provided credit for the rest. Another major innovation was that it was targeted towards one specific group.

Thus, the specific means in the models of action had changed, but they remained dependent on the two core assumptions of resource access and potential for productivity increases. However, the subsidies were provided

only on the condition that farmers paid some of the investment, and took part in extension training for using the new input in an effective way (Purcell 1982).

The design is often described as a long term one — the idea was that ALDEP should gradually build a resource base for the poor farmers, and this would be done slowly so as not to exceed managerial and financial capacities. It was realized, that from the very difficult situation the target group members were in, changes could not be achieved over night.

As pointed out by Harvey and Lewis, the ALDEP packages did not increase productivity so much that arable farming could compete with, for instance, employment as unskilled labour (1990: 101-103). Selolwane argues that even with the substantial subsidy, the increased output would not be enough to cover the farmers' own investment costs (1986). Or, as Opschoor notes with reference to ALDEP, in order to increase productivity 2.5 to 3 times, farmers would have to increase their costs as much as twelve times, and still accept risks (1983: 173). In addition, the field sizes would have to triple. This leads to the conclusion that ALDEP did not promise to increase production volumes enough to provide a basis for continued annual investments in arable farming, and it did not improve productivity on small farms enough to make arable farming worthwhile when compared to other options.

Already in the early eighties, when ALDEP was launched, there was scepticism towards ALDEP in particular (Opschoor 1983) and the arable development ambitions in general (Faaland and Isaksen 1983). Also the MOA's own assessments on what could be achieved by ALDEP were modest, according to Picard (1987: 260). However, within the problem structures that are outlined above, ALDEP was what MOA could offer as a response to the poor. It was long term, gradual build-up of resources and expertise, to be guided by extension. It was realized that from a very low starting point, things would have to develop slowly, so as not to transcend the managerial and financial capacities of farmers (Selolwane 1986). Some of the poor farmers might have been able to use the opportunity provided, but it seems clear that MOA had more realistic ambitions than politicians on this. Nevertheless, an improved opportunity was provided for the poorest farmers, even if it was not expected by the MOA that the majority of poor farmers would be interested.

4.3 The initiative and design of ARAP

The initiative for ARAP was a result of discussions mainly inside Division of Planning and Statistics (P&S). The P&S also had informal discussions

with the Rural Development Unit of MFDP. RDU is a quite high ranking policy developing unit, that is often involved in key policy decisions. Exactly the date and the form of the initiative is difficult to assess. But it is clear that when the proposal was presented in 1985 it had been under elaboration, i.e. discussion and planning, for several years. That is, since 1982/83.

In 1982 ALDEP was ready for implementation and planning capacities were freed and available for new tasks. ALDEP was launched after prolonged preparation. It was a programme targeted towards the poorest section of farmers, which was new in MOA policy planning (Interviews, MOA officials). It was a more generous programme, offering transfer of resources for specific investments in arable farming. It is questionable whether it is correct that the medium scale farmers did not benefit (Selolwane 1986; Picard 1987), but it was directed mainly to the very poor farmers, defined as those with less than 40 heads of cattle. Thus, it was perceived that the poor farmers had got an improved assistance from government. The wealthy farmers were also rather well assisted. First, the TGLP of the seventies benefited the wealthy farmers. According to Picard this was part of the background for offering ALDEP, which should compensate for the negative effects TGLP had on the poorest farmers (1987). In addition, an investment subsidy programme for productive activities was launched in 1982, The Financial Assistance Programme (FAP). This programme subsidised investments if the investor could also provide substantial resources for investment himself. The wealthy rural households could therefore be considered as well catered for.

The group that had not yet benefited from new and more generous programmes, policy makers perceived, was the medium scale farmer group. In the document on the National Food Strategy this group is estimated to account for 15 000 farming households, with more than 40 cattle and a crop production only for subsistence (MFDP 1985c: 12). This group was also understood as having a potential for commercialization.

Given the understanding of the social justice value frequently referred to, it is not surprising that MOA civil servants regarded it as most unfortunate that the new and more generous assistance policies were not available for medium-scale farmers. Those civil servants interviewed about the initiation of ARAP stressed this point. In his presentation of ARAP in the National Assembly in September 1985, the Minister of Agriculture stated that:

...it has become apparent that there was a large group of farmers engaged in rainfed arable production who were not covered by either ALDEP or

FAP. It was therefore necessary to design a package programme that would be directed towards this group of farmers (p. 3).

4.4 The design of ARAP

The criticism of ALDEP had led to focus on the inappropriateness of ALDEP technology and methods, and ARAP is an interesting effort seen in that light.

The medium scale farmers who were still not attended to had already adopted some of the improved methods of arable farming, and as medium scale cattle holders, they also had the draft power needed to plough, use row planters, harrows and the like. They were seen as having a potential for commercial farming, and the idea behind ARAP was that they needed only one final push to pass the threshold into commercial arable farming. Commercial arable farming meant production with improved methods and equipment on large fields, around ten hectares. The medium scale farmers knew better than others the methods needed, they had the draft power, what was needed was the final support to enable them to pass the threshold for economies of scale. ARAP tried to maximize the productivity increases that could be achieved by established and quite well-known methods by encouraging increased field sizes.

ARAP was a bold effort, uncertain but worth a serious try. It was planned as a one time, massive attempt to expand the fields of the medium scale farmers up to ten hectares. It seemed as if these improved methods and equipment could be applied at large fields, productivity would increase so much that arable farming would be a viable option for farmers, so productive that risks would be worthwhile.

What ARAP was planned to do was to finance the clearing and fencing of more land, and to give the final push by giving a substantial grant for ploughing expanded fields. Furthermore, seeds were provided and fertilizers for three hectares. If farmers could pass the 10 hectare limit, the productivity might increase so much as to make arable farming attractive. However, it did not reduce risks, and the key problem was whether ARAP made the risk worthwhile to such an extent that farmers would spend resources this way on their own.

In essence, the MOA's proposal for a new programme represented an ambition to commercialize a group of farmers with the potential to become commercial producers of crops. This would also fulfil objectives of national production volumes and social justice. The means aimed at extensive and intensive production modernization in combination, trying to increase

productivity by means of improved methods combined with economies of large scale.

In principle, the means are of the same type as those used in ALDEP, i.e. the provision of input factors that the farming systems themselves did not generate on sufficient scale. The idea was that the transfer of all these inputs at the magnitude proposed would make farmers producers of a surplus, and motivate them to re-invest the profits of the crops in continued arable farming for new profit in the years after ARAP was phased out. ARAP should only give the decisive push into commercial production of crops. Compared to ALDEP or any other programme, ARAP was much more generous, it did not ask any contribution from the farmer in terms of money or obligation. The grants should cover the costs or more of doing the operations required, but only once.

4.4.1 The components

In mid 1985 a project proposal for ARAP was presented.²⁹ ARAP contained several assistance components; all farmers in the target group could receive assistance once from each component. Most components were to be limited by an upper limit of 10 hectares. Included in the proposal were provision of seeds, grants for destumping fields, ploughing grants and assistance for fencing of fields. Limited to 3 hectares only was provision of fertilizers. One component gave assistance for community water supplies development, and a Crop Protection Unit was to be established.

As noted above, the bias is definitely towards extensive modernization, although fertilizers in particular, and to some extent destumping and fencing, can be seen as means for intensive modernization.

Ploughing subsidy and seed provision were used as encouragement to expand field sizes, as are also destumping and fencing. Destumping eases ploughing and other use of mechanical equipment, and fencing facilitates cultivation of new fields, that often are in the grazing areas and in need of protection.

The emphasis on extensive modernization reflects the exclusion of ecological problem perceptions. Environmentalists stress that preserving the ecological foundation for agriculture requires more intensive and

²⁹ This presentation is based on the description given in the NFS document, published in August 1985, and thus written not long before that. The summer 1985 is also the time when the political leadership intervened in the planning of ARAP and changed it. Thus, guided by the interviews, I interpret the NFS presentation as MOA's ARAP proposal, which was later changed (MFDP 1985:16)

conservationist methods of agriculture. Eskeli is an exponent for these points of view.³⁰ He argues in his report (1989: v) in favour of constraining the destumping, and he states that

... policies should stress the role of conservation and improved farming practices in sustaining production and improving productivity

The amounts of cash involved are not specified in the NFS document, but they were, according to interviews, decided upon already.³¹ They were set to P50 per hectare ploughed with own or hired draft power, P50 for each hectare destumped (cleared) land, and a 85 per cent subsidy of costs for fencing. Seeds and fertilizers were to be distributed free.³² With an exception for fencing, these grants in all probability covered all real costs for ploughing and fencing even if labour or a tractor was hired.

The programme was proposed to be in operation for five years. The ploughing, seeds and fertilizer components were meant to be available only for one year, or two at most. The five year time frame was only for destumping and fencing. The core idea was to pay farmers once to plough, plant and fertilize a large field and hope that these rather progressive farmers would get so much out of it that they continued on the same scale.

The once-off principle can also be explained by the wish to avoid a long lasting drainage on financial and personnel resources, but the main idea was that one final assistance would be enough. The changes promoted by ARAP were mainly of a quantitative nature, not a change in the qualities of arable farming. The changes should therefore not be hindered by managerial shortages or gaps in farmers' technological expertise. The point was to make them realize the economies of scale.

The two key assumptions formulated above, concerning adequate resource basis and ability to risk enough to realize economies of scale apply also for ARAP, but there are some additional assumptions in this particular

³⁰ He has evaluated ARAP's destumping component with special emphasis on ecological effects, and he has previously worked in forestry projects in Botswana.

³¹ I have no indications that they were not all the time, from the first proposal, set in the same way.

³² The crop protection component, i.e. the establishment of a technical unit to counter these problems, differs from the rest of ARAP in that it is not an assistance to the production of the individual farmer. Interview data indicate that the MOA already had resources granted from a donor for this purpose, and the project was linked to the ARAP proposal. I will leave out this component in the remaining analysis, but note that implementation of crop protection campaigns when needs arise, as they did in the mid eighties, involves the field service personnel who became responsible for the ARAP implementation.

design that are worth pointing to. First, it was assumed that the clients had already adopted the improved methods — only fertilizers were introduced as this was less used. Secondly, it was assumed that assistance once only would be sufficient. This implied that the resource situation would be good enough among farmers to continue in large scale arable farming on their own. The once-off assistance was expected to make a critical difference. Included here is the assumption that the target group had access to draft power. Thirdly, it was assumed that the farmers wanted such an expansion if it was offered. There was an upper limit of ten hectares, there was no lower limit saying that only farmers who increased field sizes to over a certain level would benefit. Furthermore, there were no requirements about using all or most components combined, which was a basic idea. It was assumed that farmers would see that as rational on their own, or when guided by extension.

4.5 Participation in the planning process

In the above, I have discussed the initiation and design of ARAP and linked it to MOA problem structures. I have shown that there are elements of continuity in the problem structures but also that there are some innovations regarding the design of components. In a complex organization like the Ministry of Agriculture there are many sub-problem structures, i.e, various specialized parts of the ministry maintain specialized elements of the overall MOA problem structure. ARAP would affect other programmes and premises. How was ARAP coordinated towards this? In the theoretical perspective adopted, these questions concern the organizing of the planning process. Who were the actors, and what premises and interests did they promote or ignore? That is, how were various sub-problem structures linked together? I argue that the planning process was very centralized. I will show that important premises and interests were left outside.

4.5.1 Norms for project planning

The interview material suggests the normal organization of a planning process as follows. When an initiative is taken, the Planning Officer (PO) in P&S responsible for the policy area in question receives the case, and organizes a reference group.³³ Participation varies, but at least the PO and

³³ The POs in Planning and Statistics have divisions of work. Two of them are responsible for evaluations. One is responsible for arable agriculture, one is responsible for livestock

some representative for the implementing unit in MOA take part. Often also others, for instance the Rural Sociology Unit (RSU) are included. This reference group coordinates the planning, and presents a proposal to the head of Division of Planning and Statistics (P&S) and then to the Permanent Secretary (PS) or his deputy (DPS) and the minister. The Planning Officers Manual (MFDP 1986: chp. 4) — which is a detailed manual about how to plan projects — presents norms for the planning which stress the role of the implementing unit. The implementing unit is supposed to initiate projects and to make preliminary drafts. The responsible Planning Officer is supposed to assist in this work, to ensure that the Project Memos are of standard professional quality. The need to consult those who would be affected and to seek advice is strongly emphasized. Compared to the norms in the Planning Officers Manual, the MOA routines are thus somewhat more centralized, but the desirability of wide participation, and in particular the participation of the unit that will be in charge of the programme in question is strongly emphasised.

ALDEP is commonly referred to as a case where there was wide planning and consultation, while at the same time, ALDEP did not seem to benefit very much from this correct planning procedure in terms of policy design when compared to ARAP. On the other hand, ARAP might have benefited from the ALDEP experience and from the information that was collected for the planning of ALDEP. ARAP was planned in a more centralized process. A significant difference between the two programmes that probably stems from the centralized nature of the planning of ARAP, is that ARAP proved to lead to negative side effects, and inappropriate adjustments to important problems.

4.5.2 Interests and premises left aside

As elaborated in chapter 1, looking for problem structures that shape public policies means to focus on the actual problem structures of decision-makers, and a focus on the linking together of various sub-problem structures in a specialized and complex organization. This section concerns the latter. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on interview material, from informants representing these units or the P&S.

and for conservation. Still another is responsible for Drought Relief, poultry and dairy farming. (Interviews, MOA officials)

As ARAP turned out to include destumping of large fields, it naturally raised questions of soil conservation and preservation of scarce wood land resources (see above). In MOA there is a Division of Land Utilization under the Director of Agricultural Field Services (see appendix 3). The division includes a Forestry Unit (FU) and a Soil Conservation Unit (SCU).³⁴ These units were not engaged in planning ARAP at all. This is striking, because ARAP has significant environmental effects. As noted by Eskeli (1989: 78), Forestry Unit personnel recognized the potentially adverse effects of ARAP, but remained passive.

Women's issues are relatively new as a premise to be considered in developmental policies (NORAD 1989). The Women's Affairs Unit in the Ministry of Home Affairs is supposed to be consulted on programmes affecting women. As women are doing most of the work in arable agriculture (NORAD 1989), it is noteworthy that this was not involved in the case of ARAP. Consideration of women's problems can be seen as a mere normative demand, but in the case of agricultural policies it should be obvious that the problems facing female-headed households are of such significance for the ability of farming households to profit from programmes, that design and implementation have to take women's situation into account if the programme is going to be effective. The female-headed households have some constraints other households do not have.

Furthermore, the implementing agency is especially mentioned in the planning officers' manual (MFDP 1986), and is not only to be consulted, but also to play a central role in initiation and planning of projects. In initiating the ARAP project and deciding on how problems should be addressed, the Department of Agricultural Field Services, through its Division of Crop Production (DCP), would be the relevant implementing unit to consult. This did not happen, until at a very late stage in the process. MOA civil servants at lower levels described ARAP as imposed from the top echelons in the MOA hierarchy. The experience and insights in the sector's problems, generated through the units' monitoring of day to day implementation of arable programmes were not taken cognizance of in the planning of ARAP. Only in the final stages, when preparing for implementation, was the Field Service consulted on the practical aspects (see ch. 6).

³⁴ These are not the only units in the administration working on environmental issues, but they are probably some of the most obvious ones to be engaged in a programme like ARAP. The Soil Conservation Officer, for instance, participated in the initial stages of planning ALDEP (interview, SCU).

Even if the organization units specializing in the issues mentioned had played a part in the planning process, that does not necessarily mean that the outcome would have been different, but it might have been. At any rate, the centralization of the planning is noteworthy.³⁵ Some programmes, most notably ALDEP, are closely related to ARAP. In the project memos presenting ARAP, coordination with ALDEP is a stated goal. But there are no signs of consultation with the ALDEP coordinator. ALDEP was severely affected by ARAP's taking the bulk of implementation capacity. There was no attempt to mediate between these two major claims on implementing capacity.

ARAP was, according to informants in MOA, planned and designed mainly in P&S. Interview data suggest that the process was rather informal. The Chief Agricultural Economist, who is the head of the planning division, was responsible for the case. His interactions with others were of a rather informal nature. Interactions and discussions of both the initiative and the design of solutions were quite widespread in the P&S, according to higher level MOA officials. The programme proposal was also discussed with officials in RDU in MFDP,³⁶ but ARAP was made by the MOA top level, especially in P&S, without much interaction with others.

The centralization of policy planning and design also meant that possible channels for the articulation of farmers' interests were closed. This is the more important as farmers' interest organizations are not developed as national entities, and are unable to contribute in policy-making interactions with central administration representatives. The Field Service might be a potential channel, but as noted above, these parts of MOA were not active participants in the process. Applied research conducted by MOA's Rural Sociology Unit (RSU) generated a lot of research material for use in developing ALDEP.³⁷ RSU is, as the case of ARAP shows, not routinely linked to all projects. RSU is also so small that its capacity would not have allowed that. RSU seems to be given quite wide discretion regarding its own work priorities, but the information resulting from the research is not necessarily considered by decision makers (Interview, RSU officer). The absence of research units is noteworthy also concerning the absence of input from MOA's technical research department on production

³⁵ Even if these specialized units were not systematically integrated in the design and planning of ARAP, this does not mean that the interaction were non-existent. There might have been some informal contacts.

³⁶ The involvement of RDU is somewhat uncertain, only one informant refers to it.

³⁷ MOA is not the only ministry with its own applied research unit. For instance, MLGL has a similar unit, Applied Research Unit.

techniques; the Department of Agricultural Research. Seen against the background of the prominence attached to research in all NDPs, it is puzzling that this department was not more effectively consulted.

The districts should also be mentioned. The ARAP programme would be a major development effort in the districts. It would by its effects on land use influence physical planning in the districts, and a programme for agricultural development would be implemented in districts with quite different conditions for agriculture. Moreover, in other cases, districts are consulted on major policy initiatives. In ARAP this did not occur.

The low degree of mobilization of organizational resources in the case of ARAP is a major explanation for many of the negative side effects that ARAP later proved to cause, as will be discussed in chapter 7.

4.5.3 Some centralizing factors

How can a tendency towards a centralized participation structure of the planning process be explained? I will suggest, based on fragmentary interview data, that the explanation includes both characteristics of the top level of MOA, especially Division of Planning and Statistics (P&S), and features of the specialized units.

P&S has a powerful role within the MOA because of its formal powers. All projects, and most amendments to existing projects, have to be accepted by that division, which makes a recommendation to the PS and to the Minister. According to Planning Officers (POs) these recommendations are usually accepted. The responsible PO in P&S normally decides who is to be represented in the reference group for a project (Interviews, MOA officials). The Planning Officers Manual that contains a detailed prescription of appropriate planning procedures clearly assigns a central role to line ministries' planning units (MFDP 1986).³⁸ Still, the implementing or specialist unit is also assigned a central role, especially in initiation of projects.

In addition to the strong formal power of the P&S, we also find an ambition to influence project planning at least as much as the formal rules prescribe, maybe a bit more. Officials in P&S were asked in the interviews how they perceived their own and the P&S's role in the planning of projects. Their answers emphasised that they were in charge of the

³⁸ This Manual is according to MOA POs adhered to. It gives a very detailed description of all the detailed steps that should be taken in a line ministry when projects are prepared.

planning. They did not define their own role as one of providing only professional assistance to the technical units responsible for various kinds of programmes. POs perceived technical units as somewhat passive in the planning process, and they regarded this as a problem. The P&S's ambition seems to be to include the technical units in the participation structure for project elaboration, and at the same time make the final considerations and decisions itself. One informant defined the ideal cooperation and consultation between P&S and the implementing and research units as hearing ideas about how problems could be solved. The other units should give inputs to be processed and decided upon in P&S. Once a formal proposal was made by P&S, the same MOA informant claimed, consultation was over. This contrasts with, for instance, the Norwegian equivalent of consultation, the hearing. The hearing institution is to send the elaborated proposal to interested parties in order to hear their opinions. The underlying assumption is that there are often conflicting interests, and that compromises should be reached.

P&S officials express the view that the low participation of technical units and research units in project planning is a problem. These concerns, especially regarding DAFS, seem to be genuine. In 1989 P&S had plans for giving a PO an assignment to find ways to activate especially DAFS better. But, it was justified in terms of generating ideas. P&S seem to want to maintain its control over projects, but they realize that they need ideas coming from others.

The above discussion suggests that the low participation from technical units is to a considerable degree their choice. This is not very surprising, seen in the light of what seems to be a very dominant P&S. Participation combined with rather low influence is problematic in most organizations. The various technical units tend to define their role as pure implementors, or as autonomous specialists on limited domains. Based on thorough interviews with four Field Service officials, it is suggested that this group of officials regard themselves more as implementors than as participants in policy making and project design. It is illustrative that when asked about what the ideas and reasons for policies were, they referred to the top level of the ministry. It is also clear that they do not initiate projects very often. When giving examples about what they cooperated with higher levels about, they mentioned relatively technical matters. Data do not allow firm and representative conclusions about this, but it seems that Field Service officers regard themselves as loyal implementors of directives from higher levels. As the implementors of programmes DAFS also has a potentially quite influential position. But as the development of ARAP indicates, DAFS is loyal to directives from higher levels.

Cooperation across formal divisions of work seems to be rare. The Forestry Unit and Soil Conservation Unit are quite good examples of this restricted role. The officers in these units seem to regard themselves as technical specialists with a responsibility only for a limited area of specialist concerns. They don't engage very much in providing environmental premises to projects that are not strictly environmental. The ecological problems are approached by specialists in special programmes. The Forestry Unit's work, as described by one of the unit's officers, is to implement forestry projects: For instance, to organize the production of new trees to be planted by villagers, to organize the planting of woodlots in localities throughout Botswana, to regulate the commercial utilization of forests where such resources exist. The point is that concentrating on these activities also leaves the Forestry Unit outside the major agricultural projects affecting forestry problems. ARAP is an example of this. Conservation is also taken care of in separate projects. In his paper about soil conservation, Veenendaal (year unknown) stresses the need to link these units closer to the large programmes instead of preserving environmental issues for specialist programmes under specialist units.³⁹

The emerging picture is one of a ministry with tendencies of fragmentation. Even if the MOA is probably a very controlled ministry, in which hierarchical chains of command function, it also seems to be characterized by negative coordination, i.e. the avoidance of interaction and cooperation, apart from obeying orders. As the MOA has gradually intervened more substantially in the rural economy and as the complexity of the organization grows, this will increasingly become a problem of effective policy making.

4.6 Summary

In this chapter, some general elements of the MOA's problem structure before policies turned towards mass approaches have been outlined. It has been argued that the problem structure and models of action of the MOA were largely applied also for new purposes, forced onto the MOA from the outside.

In this chapter I have discussed the Ministry of Agriculture's elaboration of a programme proposal according to these lines, and argued that the problems of the old approach concerning poorer farmers basically remain,

³⁹ The preparation of a National Conservation Strategy might be an improvement in this respect. The strategy was at the time of field work under elaboration.

but with a possible exception for at least some of the medium scale farmers. ARAP was an intensified and bold attempt to achieve an objective that has proved very difficult to achieve, namely the commercialization of arable farming.

The planning and design processes were centralized to the higher levels of MOA, and important premises were left outside. The consequences this proved to have is one of the topics in chapter 7.

Even if ARAP, as presented in mid 1985, was a completely planned programme, it was still not finally decided. It was forwarded to the political leadership, who saw ARAP as a useful programme, but for different purposes. Which is the next topic.

5. The planning of ARAP: The Ministry of Agriculture and powerful actors in the environment

5.1 Introduction

Powerful actors in the environment include the political authorities, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and the donors. In this chapter their ability to influence ARAP, and the consequences of it, will be discussed. The main issue will be the role of the political leadership. It proved most decisive.

As shown in chapter 4, the MOA (Ministry of Agriculture) programmes included in the National Food Strategy (NFS), among these ARAP, were responses to new demands from the outside about overall policy objectives. When the political authorities intervened in the planning of ARAP, they did so in a very decisive way, giving directives also about how policy goals should be fulfilled. The administration reacted with loyal obedience, but also with some adjustments.

The ARAP proposal that had been forwarded by the MOA was a bold and uncertain one, based on many assumptions, and adjusted to the situation of one group that the MOA perceived had a commercial potential. Still, the assumptions were uncertain also when considering this group.

ARAP was one component of many in a national strategy. The various programmes in the strategy (NFS) were targeted, because one realized that different groups had to be approached differently. The political interventions destroyed this comprehensive approach. Instead of different offers to different groups, as a result of the political intervention, all groups were in practice confronted with ARAP. The assumptions of ARAP definitely did not hold when applied as widely as the political authorities decided upon.

5.2 The role of the political authorities

The initiative and design of ARAP was, as outlined in chapter 4, an administrative process. Moreover, it was limited to the small group of

leading policy makers in MOA, with consultations only with Rural Development Unit (RDU) in MFDP. The political authorities activated themselves at a rather late stage, but with important consequences. As a project proposal was ready in mid 1985, the Minister of Agriculture gave new direction to ARAP. What was a generous, bold once-off support to a limited group that could utilize the assistance to make a decisive jump into the group of commercialized farmers was now made available to all farmers throughout Botswana. Furthermore, the programme was by MOA designed as a once-off, massive transfer of resources, but annual Cabinet decisions repeated the once-off transfer every year from 1985/86 to 1989/90.

5.2.1 Consequences for ARAP

The consequences of the political intervention for the content and aim of the programme were that it became a programme for modernizing the arable sub-sector in general, and not just the part of it that comprised the medium scale farmers. The minister's decision crushed MOA's targeted strategy, as represented in the NFS. Because ARAP offered more assistance, had less client requirements, and was related to felt needs, it would obviously out-compete other efforts very quickly. Which it did. Besides, ARAP took more or less all the implementing capacity.

The arable development approach for the poorest farmers is, as discussed in chapter 3 and 4, a problematic one. The promoted farming practices would not solve the productivity problems, except when combined with economies of scale. In this is the inadequacy of ALDEP, and the potential of ARAP, because ARAP aimed at passing the economy of scale threshold. In doing so, it was based on some assumptions, that some better off farmers might fulfil. These are mentioned above, and relate to their relatively strong resource base. They would, after the once off assistance have draft power, resources to risk, adoption of improved methods, and an interest in expanding field sizes. None of these aims could be expected to be fulfilled by the poorest farmers.

The new groups which were included, i.e. the poorest farmers, were to a large extent without cattle, and thus without their own draft power as well as without resources that could be risked. They were also only to a very limited extent among those who had adopted improved methods.

To the extent that ARAP was a viable endeavour, it was so because it was directed towards a group of farmers — medium scale — with an already quite diversified economic basis. Considering the expansion of ARAP's target group, the majority of its members did not have this diversified agricultural basis.

The Project Memo (MOA 1985a) states that ARAP is meant to reduce dependence on livestock. This does not mean exactly the same for the two groups of farmers. For the medium scale farmers, ARAP aimed at improving their already varied and diversified economic basis. For the poor ones, it aims in reality at making them able to stay in agriculture without really solving their problems, and to do this in a way that would not require changes in basic modernization policies.

MOA was sceptical to the effectiveness of applying the once-off and massive support approach for the poorer farmers. One major grant would not solve their problem, and if the poor farmers should be persuaded to try the ARAP effort, it was perceived that this would be a waste of resources. To use this massive assistance approach for a long time was out of the question in MOA's view, because it would create dependence and destroy the farmers' incentives, as informants put it.

On the other hand, MOA did not expect many poor farmers to use ARAP, at least if one is to take the financial estimates seriously. They include expected costs for the various components and imply that only a minority of all eligible farmers would apply for assistance. The offer MOA provided in ARAP was a combined, massive effort for those who really wanted to try. And it was not thought of, it seems, that ARAP could be used for other purposes by those farmers who did not want to try the way MOA envisaged.

In the years to come, the political leadership decided every year to repeat the programme. That is, in the originally decided programme, approved after the new guidelines for eligibility, assistance should be given once for each component, over a few years. Repeating this meant that every year it was decided that all farmers would in the coming season be eligible for all the assistance components regardless of whether they had received support previously or not. Thus, the once-off principle was dropped, and instead a practice of massive, annual grants became operational for 5 years.

As this pattern materialized, scepticism increased in MOA, until in 1989, at the time of the field work for this report, hardly anyone in the ministry was really willing to defend the programme and argue in favour of it. The problems of the effectiveness of the ARAP approach when applied to all farmers became obvious. Moreover, the demands on implementing capacity became so large that all other programmes were seriously hindered by it (See chapter 6).

A programme which in principle would make 70 000 farmers able to destump 10 hectares each would naturally have consequences for the environment and for land use in the rural areas. As noted in chapter 4, MOA's own expertise on these issues remained passive. The Land Use

Officer in the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, (MLGL) reacted however. MLGL has the coordinating responsibility for land use planning. Some kind of agreement was reached, whereby local Land Boards under MLGL should limit the allocation of new land, so that destumping would be done mainly on allocated, but still not destumped land.

The changes in the target group definition made ARAP a masterly instrument to generate support to the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) from both rural socio-economic elites and from the poor rural majority. The expansion of the target group also meant the inclusion of the large proportion of farmers without their own draft power. ARAP paid for hired draft power as well as the use of the farmers' own draft animals. This meant that ARAP would create a large market for draft power hiring. Those with draft power to sell would benefit. The tractor owners, a small group of large scale farmers and cattle owners, could expect to benefit. And the group of BDP MPs defended not least this interest when supporting the minister, since they were large cattle owners and tractor owners themselves. At the same time, by its design of providing farmers with assistance that is visible, and responding to felt needs (lack of resources of various kinds), ARAP would obviously become a very popular programme among the majority of farmers. The political authorities in this case took care of both the political interests of generating support from the majority, while at the same time they could support the local elites. Thus, after the political intervention, ARAP emerged as a programme for intensive modernization for all groups, and it was at the same time an effective measure to secure the political support from all major rural groups because, unlike TGLP and ALDEP it was a modernization programme for all, and it was the most generous ever.

The minister's intervention put the process under time pressure. The fact that the minister took an interest himself might have speeded it all up. He took such an interest that he is labelled as the man behind ARAP by some. An additional explanation is that the drought crisis gradually became an argument in favour of ARAP. ARAP was promoted as a recovery measure (MOA 1985a). According to informants, it is a general principle that drought related efforts should have priority, and this might explain why ARAP, after several years of steady elaboration, came under time pressure. The reference to the drought has to be seen as a tactical argument, but it makes some sense to argue that in an attempt to rebuild agriculture after the disaster, agriculture should also be improved. On the other hand, the drought was not yet over and a recovery was premature at this time. Relief was needed more, and for this there already was an operative and effective programme under implementation. Holm and Morgan published in 1985 an

article describing Botswana's relief and recovery system as the most effective in all Africa. In the Aide Memoir of March 1985, there are no suggestions for improved measures for relief and recovery. Aide Memoirs are written routinely by an inter-ministerial working group, which regularly assesses the need for relief and recovery measures.

MOA did not resist the changes that were introduced, but tried to adjust ARAP as best as it could. Informants expressed the view that nothing could be done when the political authorities intervened. Furthermore, some informants stated with some resignation, that it happened quite often that political authorities intervened like this. MOA's reaction was rather to make adjustments to the proposal on some points. The Department of Agricultural Field Services was consulted on how the programme could now be implemented. It was decided that ARAP had to be implemented over a somewhat longer period of time, in order to reach those farmers interested. It seems that the components which were finally decided on to be implemented over two years were originally meant to be done in one year. Later on, as noted, the programme was re-launched and so all components were available repeatedly for 5 years.

The weeding and row planting components were not a part of MOA's original idea for medium scale farmers. These came in as a result of the expansion of the target group. The poorer farmers did not use these improved methods, even if they had been advocated through extension and ALDEP for a long time. Only a minority, the medium scale farmers, used these methods (Farrington 1987). This was an attempt to adjust the programme to the poor farmers known to abstain from new methods. It made ARAP a more intensive modernization promoting programme.

5.2.2 The political leadership

The minister acted when the proposal was put forward in mid-1985. The major impact was the expansion of the target group, and in the years following the launching in 1985, the political authorities repeated ARAP year by year. The minister acted, not only as head of the ministry, but also as a representative of the political authorities. He mobilized the support of the Cabinet, and he also had the support of BDP's MPs (Interviews, civil servants and observers).

Regarding the question of the minister and his supporters' motives, the answers are complex. The general reasons for the modernization of small scale arable farming is mentioned above, with special reference to the long lasting stagnation of agriculture. As modernization and new wealth had become highly visible and economic growth in Botswana was one of the

highest in Africa, the backwardness of traditional agriculture became more pressingly felt. These and other factors led to the formulation of new policy objectives in the late seventies. The new objectives emphasized that more had to be done to alleviate rural poverty. This in its turn led to ALDEP and FAP (Financial Assistance Policy) and the NFS strategy in general.

The results of ALDEP especially did not show up immediately, and in ARAP, it was perceived, the rationale was laid for even stronger means than the long term, step by step measures applied in ALDEP. Farmers had shown little enthusiasm for ALDEP, little had changed. In fact, at this time both ALDEP (Opschoor 1983), and the arable development strategy in general had come under criticism (Faaland and Isaksen 1983). Finally, as it became evident that ALDEP was insufficient, and as this perception was voiced by critics, the BDP suffered a set-back in the 1984 general elections.

The rationale in the minister's intervention was to use the thus far most radical programme design to solve pressing problems. The minister's view on agricultural policies was of importance. He expressed his scepticism regarding ALDEP, because this programme in his view helped the poor farmers only to continue in agriculture, but without giving them any real opportunity to become producers of a surplus above subsistence levels. ARAP, on the other hand had higher ambitions — and more important — stronger incentives and a shorter time perspective, aiming at reaching objectives within a few years. The minister considered that this exceptional opportunity should be given to all, including the small farmers.

It seems clear that the minister's own political position played an important role as well. He is described by observers as powerful and ambitious, probably the next president.⁴⁰ He became Minister of Agriculture in 1985. Taking over the responsibility for agriculture meant taking over the responsibility for one of the most problematic sectors of the economy, and he needed to show ability to act and achieve results.

These political directives were not just a question of the minister's opinions and attitudes. He had support in a broad coalition of political forces. Data indicate that large farmers, i.e. the cattle owners among MP's and possibly among civil servants, had been waiting for something that could benefit this group as well. In fact, MPs have maintained their support to ARAP also in later years when most others have begun to express doubt and criticism. The political leadership obviously must have seen the proposed ARAP as an opportunity to regain support, especially if it could be adjusted to reach the majority of the electorate. It would be popular

⁴⁰ The corruption scandals in 1992 that led to his resignation have drastically changed these prospects.

among ordinary farmers, as it was directed towards familiar problems experienced. At the same time, it would give the large farmers large incomes as contractors for ploughing. The 100 per cent subsidy and the procedures of giving assistance in cash for most of the components also made ARAP attractive.

In his discussion of Drought Relief, Holm argues that the relief efforts are regarded by politicians as well suited to gain popularity, mainly because of their character of being a help to the needy in very visible form. He notes that the Cabinet has been pressing the administration in order to spend even more money on relief efforts for this reason (1985: 476). Further, he states that

The [BDP] has recently come to see drought relief as a very effective means of reinforcing its rural support, the principal source of its majority.

ARAP was similar to relief efforts in that it was designed as direct, non-committing transfer of resources, which was attractive also in the political leadership's perspective.

The political demands on the MOA of the late seventies to take on a more active role in alleviating rural poverty represent a contraction (Jacobsen 1967); the political authorities intervened as administrative performance did not support basic goals. In the case of ARAP, the contraction went farther, interfering also in what means the MOA should apply.

5.3 ARAP appraised in MFDP

5.3.1 MFDP and its role in project planning

In short, any proposed programme from a line ministry has to be sent to MFDP's Division of Economic Affairs (DEA), and if relevant, it also goes to RDU and the Rural Development Council, which is a high level inter-ministerial committee. According to the interview material this is a very powerful body, where problems can be presented and acted upon quickly, as the ministerial top leaders are represented there. In the DEA, POs evaluate the programmes from line ministries. The POs are specialized, each PO is responsible for the evaluation of programmes from one or in some cases two ministries. The PO gives a recommendation to higher levels in DEA, and the programme or project is also assessed in the Macro Economic Unit. Final decisions are reached by the MFDP leadership giving

a recommendation to Cabinet or making a decision itself.⁴¹ As noted in chapter 3, the assessments made in MFDP can in principle be quite varied, but key issues are the feasibility and viability of projects. Furthermore, there is an assessment whether the projects are well prepared and all necessary considerations made. The appraisals also try to keep projects within the framework of policy guidelines, and simply stop or modify projects that are not well prepared. Especially in interviews with MFDP officials, the importance of ensuring that all projects are planned according to a certain technical standard is emphasized.

5.3.2 Administrative views on the ARAP proposal

The MFDP's attitude towards ARAP was one of scepticism in several respects. As the medium scale project idea was outlined and argued for in the National Food Strategy document, prepared by MFDP's Rural Development Unit in cooperation with line ministries, MFDP accepted the idea of a major, short term effort in favour of the medium scale farmers in order to commercialize their arable production. One additional reason was that ARAP would not imply long lasting recurrent costs.

The scepticism in MFDP concerned the application of the ARAP concept to all farmers. MFDP was not convinced that the use of so much money would pay off in lasting achievements, i.e. there was doubt concerning the viability of the project in financial terms. The ARAP expenses would also go beyond the financial ceilings decided upon for MOA programmes for the plan period (interviews, MFDP civil servants). Secondly, MFDP was sceptical about MOA's ability to implement such a large programme. This was a quite reasonable argument, as the field service was overloaded with work already before ARAP was launched.

However, ARAP was presented to MFDP as a programme with political clearance, and as a programme under time pressure. This put MFDP in a difficult position, in which it could not exercise its normal powers. The ordinary procedure was not followed, according to informants in MOA and MFDP. The issue was discussed and decided with MOA in meetings where higher level civil servants in MFDP and MOA were engaged from the beginning. A recommendation was written after these discussions (Interviews, MFDP and MOA civil servants).

⁴¹ Projects already accepted in the NDP, do not have to go all the way to Cabinet when a proposal is presented in the plan period, i.e. the concrete design of the ideas presented for a programme in NDP is decided in MFDP and line ministries.

Realizing that the programme concept in its new form could not be countered, MFDP focused on practical problems of implementation, trying to reduce the size of the programme. In the discussions between the delegations from the ministries, MOA argued that they could implement it, and refused to revise it. Faced with this attitude and political backing for it, MFDP gave in, hoping to be able to improve ARAP in due course, which has not happened (Interview, MFDP official).

One explanation for MOA's rejection of MFDP protests might be that the former ministry felt it was of some symbolic importance to be able to resist MFDP demands. Another, more likely reason is that MOA was loyal to the political leadership of the ministry, and to the strong political coalition behind the Ministry's political leadership. Likewise, the normally rather strong MFDP had to accept that ARAP was for all practical purposes already decided upon, even if its leaders clearly saw the programme as unjustified by normal criteria. This is illustrated not least by the justification that was given for it. As ARAP was accepted, the drought recovery aspect of its objectives became more central. One official stated that this aspect was stressed in the MFDP recommendation to Cabinet for formal decision, because it was about the only thing that could justify the huge amounts of money to be spent. The programme could not be justified in terms of modernization, as MFDP officials saw it. Thus, ARAP was decided as a combined modernization and recovery measure.

The recovery aspect is puzzling. The minister stated in September 1985, when presenting ARAP to the National Assembly, that ARAP aimed at increasing production and that it would also be a recovery measure. But in September, nobody could know whether the drought was over, as the season had not started yet. It is as if the launching of ARAP was based on the premise that the drought would end even if nobody knew whether it would actually end. The reference to the drought was mainly a tactical argument to justify a quite risky and not very promising modernization programme. It was risky in the sense that the bulk of MOA's money and implementation capacity would be spent on a programme which was so large that it might cause a breakdown in the Field Service, and that might very well not bring lasting results that could justify the huge spending.

5.4 Donors

Donors represent a powerful group of actors in Botswana, controlling resources and expertise. The influence of the donor community in policy making processes is one important element in any analysis of agricultural policies. In the case of ARAP, NORAD decided to sponsor the programme,

and NORAD used this as an opportunity to commit MOA to policy principles seen as important in NORAD.

Even if ARAP demanded financial resources beyond MOA's financial ceiling for the plan period, MFDP could finance it domestically — Botswana had the reserves to do so. However, donors were approached, and in december 1985 a formal request for financial assistance was presented to NORAD. Even if NORAD carried a substantial part of the financial burden, this has not given NORAD much influence over ARAP nor over general agricultural policies. This is explained by the way NORAD was activated by MFDP.

Before a formal request was presented, informal contacts had been made with potential donors for ARAP. Interviews (MOA and MFDP officials) suggest that in addition to NORAD, also the African Development Bank was approached. ADB later decided not to engage. Why was NORAD approached?⁴² It seems to have been registered by MFDP that NORAD was interested in an engagement in agriculture, a field in which NORAD had not been active in Botswana previously. Granberg and Parkinson indicate that the background for this interest in agriculture were new policy signals from Oslo. NORAD was formally approached because it was perceived by MFDP as interested, which they proved to be. Before the formal request, some documentation about ARAP was informally handed over to NORAD. After receiving the request for support, NORAD commissioned a study of the agricultural sector with special reference to ARAP (Øygard et al. 1986).⁴³ The team expressed some doubts about ARAP, and did not explicitly conclude about the programme. But the fencing and destumping components were seen to be justified, and financial support for these components was recommended (Øygard et al. 1986). Furthermore, the team recommended action to improve field staff capabilities, to support women oriented efforts and to engage in projects for environmental conservation in the sector. This also became NORAD policy, according to the contents of the Sector Agreement. The NORAD assistance was not a support for ARAP as such. Acceptance of some parts of ARAP and some preferences in NORAD's general policy were combined, and presented to MFDP.

⁴² In this analysis Crop Protection has been left out as this is a project of a somewhat different kind than the ARAP in general. However, in the case of crop protection, also other donors have been involved (MOA 1987; 68).

⁴³ The team consisted of one norwegian, Øygard, one dutch researcher, Amtzen and one Motswana researcher, Selolwane.

A Sector Agreement was concluded in 1987. The Agreement was for five years, and had NOK 50 mill as the ceiling for total expenditure. NORAD agreed to pay for destumping and fencing (Granberg and Parkinson 1988: 237). NORAD also agreed to support projects for extension staff training and infrastructure development of the field service. Both these are projects generated by Botswana and they suited NORAD's preferences. The MFDP representatives, who negotiated the Agreement with assistance from MOA civil servants on their side accepted an obligation to give higher priority to women's issues and to environmental problems in agriculture. Thus NORAD entered a bargain; it committed itself to support parts of ARAP and in return got an agreement from Botswana to engage in problems regarded as important by NORAD, especially women's issues. Women's issues had definitely not been a central concern in MOA policy (Interview, MOA higher level civil servants; WAU civil servants). And as argued above, environmental considerations in arable agriculture are organizationally located as special concerns to be dealt with in isolation from the main production related projects like ARAP.

MOA has not followed up the obligation to consider women's problems, according to both NORAD and MOA officials. The environmental problems will be considered in the coming National Conservation Strategy which is still not finally decided upon due to political conflicts. It is doubtful whether the sector agreement with NORAD has made any difference in this respect. And it thus seems that NORAD struck a bargain which did not give substantial contributions to NORAD's objectives for their involvement in traditional agriculture.

The reason for NORAD's lack of influence is that when Botswana authorities consider a single project, they have the reserves to pay for it themselves. They are not dependent on donor funding in the specific case, although donors' contribution to the governmental total expenditure are substantial. The dependence on aid is large on a macro level, i.e. donors are main financiers of investments. But the dependence is not necessarily effective at the level of single projects, because Botswana has the reserves to go on with at least some of the project donors do not approve of. If donors will support it, that is an advantage, if they do not, the project can still materialize without problems. This is so both because of Botswana's own financial strength, but also because MFDP has been adept at using this freedom of action. Thus, the financial resources NORAD could provide did not give NORAD any substantial influence.

Based on the case of ARAP, it should be suggested as an hypothesis, that even if the macro statistics show a very strong power positions for donor, this power does not always materialize. Whether donors do affect public

policy depends on the tactical capabilities of both the donor and of the Botswana counterpart.

5.5 Summary

The central points made in this chapter are first, that the political leadership took quite a strong interest in ARAP. The programme looked more radical and decisive, compared to the slow working and much criticized ALDEP. The political intervention was thus a contraction (Jacobsen 1967) that aimed at ensuring that the MOA would fulfil the goals that ALDEP obviously could not fulfil; development of the traditional, small scale agriculture. The ARAP programme was also seen as a very useful means to mobilize political support for the regime.

The political leadership decided that the ARAP support should be given to groups that the support was not designed to help. Even if the MOA clearly saw the problem in this, they reacted obediently and did not object to the changes.

The low influence exercised by the donor is a bit surprising — a very common assumption is that donors are very powerful. Most likely, in many cases they are, but in this case it seems fair to say that NORAD was out-manoeuvred. Looking at national totals of donor aid gives a picture of an overall donor power position. The transformation of this macro or overall power position to influence on specific project is a problem that needs further study in Botswana.

6. The implementation of ARAP

6.1 Introduction

In September 1985, ARAP was finally decided upon and ready for implementation. Analysis of public policy has to take account of how the policy might be transformed during the implementation. As discussed in chapter 1, this is first, a question of policy makers' control with the implementing organizations, i.e., the ability to guide the actions of implementing organizations. Secondly, it is a question of how the implementing organization is able to mobilize the target groups for change.

In this chapter I will first present the implementing organization. Secondly, I will show that ARAP became the very dominant programme implemented under the MOA, and discuss some reasons for this sudden change. Within a year ARAP became the dominant activity of the field staff. Good or bad, it shows the ability of the leadership at the apex of the political-administrative system to guide the implementing organization and to have its initiatives acted upon. Next we will show how ARAP proved to have a substantial mobilization capacity but a rather low capacity to control whether the mobilized target group used the assistance in a way that contributed to the fulfilment of the programme's objectives. The consequence was that farmers did not use ARAP as the major and comprehensive commercialization effort it was envisaged to be, but used it rather selectively adjusted to their own preferences. Most farmers took the ARAP assistance as a subsidy to maintain established production levels and systems, and the major change for the majority was limited to an increase in the field sizes; this could not alone trigger off the big leaps in production that were envisioned.

6.2 The implementing organization

The implementing organization refers to the managers of ARAP in the Ministry of Agriculture headquarters, and to the organization reaching down to the regional, district and local levels.

6.2.1 Central level implementing structure

The responsible department in MOA is the Department of Agricultural Field Services (DAFS). In DAFS, there is a Division for Crop Production which is the implementing unit. It is headed by the Chief Crop Production Officer. Under him a position of ARAP coordinator was established when ARAP was decided, and an agronomist was hired for the job from another position in MOA.

The ARAP coordinator has a small staff of technical assistants. It seems that the relationship between the ARAP coordinator and the rest of MOA, especially the Chief Crop Production Officer, is a relatively close one. There are few or none formal cooperative set-ups. They seem to cooperate informally as needs arise. (Interviews MOA civil servants). Apart from ARAP, only ALDEP has a coordinator who works on monitoring and managing one programme only. The normal organization is that one specialized unit handle several projects related to the same field. For instance, there are various horticultural projects under the horticultural section. The specialized units are permanent and they are supposed to identify problems within the field they are responsible for. Problems are approached both through specific programmes and through the ordinary extension activities done by field staff.

The ARAP coordinator is only responsible for the management of ARAP. However, he is an administrator, and he is not in a formal position to influence the programme significantly. He runs the programme from day to day. He is responsible for supplies needed in the field and he provides technical assistance to field personnel about how ARAP should be operationalized. He receives routine reports from field staff and produces statistics and regular reports about the activities going on under the programme. The powers delegated to him seem to be quite small. Modifications and changes of the programme must be recommended to higher levels in the Ministry, often they have to go to the very apex of MOA, at least when they imply financial matters. The ARAP coordinator seems to fit the description of DAFS personnel as loyal implementors given in chapter 4.

The reasons for the establishment of the position of a special coordinator were, first, that the workload would be so big for the central level manager, that one person would have to be employed with that only. Secondly, the organizational solution of a coordinator probably secures access to scarce implementing capacity. The ARAP coordinator deals directly with field staff at the regional and district level, which in turn interacts with the local ADs. So do the various specialized implementing units — each of them

relates to the field staff to get capacity and priority for their programme or in most cases, programmes.

6.2.2 The field service

The Field Service is a structure that is quite specialized at the middle and top of its hierarchy levels, and is linked to the clientele mainly through the Agricultural Demonstrator (AD) who has to perform a multi-specialist role, responding to demands from the specialized structure.

Each AD is responsible for agricultural field services in an Agricultural Extension Area that can comprise as much as 2000 farming households. The average is 364 farming households (Eskeli 1989: 36). There are 225 Agricultural Extension Areas. The size of the Agricultural Extension Areas (AEA) both in terms of geography and number of farming households contributes to the general work overload on ADs — especially as transport facilities are often lacking. A large number of AD's positions are vacant, as much as one-fourth (Granberg and Parkinson 1988).

The ADs' superiors are at the district level; the principal superiors are the District Agricultural Officer and the District Agricultural Supervisor (DAO and DAS). On the regional level there is the Regional Agricultural Officer, RAO (Eskeli 1989). The final level is the central ministry, the DAFS (see above). This four level structure is the core structure. All programmes implemented by field service go through this structure.⁴⁴ The civil servants mentioned are not specialized to work in only one field within MOA's responsibility, but they are responsible for almost all sub-sectors under the MOA.

In addition to this core structure, there are a number of specialists, notably at the central and regional level. They work in only limited fields under MOA. The Crop Production Officer at the regional level was important for the implementation of ARAP, but there are also a number of others, for instance, the staffing of the Southern Region comprises Ranch Extension Officers, Animal Production Officers, one officer for smallstock and one for General Duties, one Poultry Officer, and Land Use officers (MOA 1981), in addition to the RAO and the Crop Production Officer.

The various implementing units in DAFS in Gaborone interact primarily with the RAO and the relevant regional level specialist, and to some extent with the District Agricultural Officer. But basically, the regional level specialists are the links to the implementors at the local and district level.

⁴⁴ The Department of Veterinary Services has its own implementing structure.

At this level, specialization is limited, and all demands are concentrated in the DAO and the AD.

From higher hierarchical levels, the AD faces a lot of demands. He is expected to implement a large number of programmes and the specialized units in central level of MOA present their projects to the AD through the specialized field service at the regional level. In addition there are the demands to do general extension, and most specialized units probably also want their tasks to be worked on through extension as well as through programmes. The coordination of all this seems to be left to the AD and his attempts to plan and make priority choices regarding how to use his time.

The ADs' tasks are thus twofold. First, they implement the regular extension service of providing advice, training, demonstration and information to farmers. Secondly, the ADs are in charge of the implementation of the various development programmes.⁴⁵

This Field Service structure is manned by experts in agricultural production techniques and farming systems. Data are lacking on the exact content of their professional training, but for the lower levels, the emphasis is on methods and techniques for various kinds of production (Interview DAFS civil servant). Field staff are allowed to take further education and gradually planning and economics seem to be included. But basically, the field staff officers seem to be technical experts in agricultural production (Interviews, DAFS civil servants).

The Field Service is also a career structure; most high level civil servants advance gradually.⁴⁶ The control of the careers of subordinates is a powerful factor in securing discipline and loyalty in the service. According to the description of this system of advancement given by one informant, it is based on superiors formal and regular evaluations of subordinates. Advancements are to a large extent based on superiors' appraisals of subordinate field staff. Advancement usually also requires further education and the DAO decides which of his ADs are going to get the opportunity. This system might explain why the Field Service, as shown by the example of ARAP, seems to be a quite disciplined organization also under severe workload pressures like those caused by ARAP.

A distinction between an implementing organization's ability to mobilize and to control the clientele is applied here. By mobilization is meant the ability to create an interactive relationship with the clientele at all. By

⁴⁵ The description of basic structural aspects outlined here, is based on an interpretation of organization charts and more important, on interviews with DAFS civil servants.

⁴⁶ For instance, quite a number of the informants I interviewed had previously worked in field service on regional district or even local level.

control is meant the ability to use this interaction in order to influence the clientele to change behaviour in desired direction. For many years, the Field Service concentrated on extension. The target group were the progressive farmers, who in most cases happened to be the wealthiest ones.

The offer to the clientele was advice, training, and demonstrations of new methods, seed varieties and implements. This offer was relevant and attractive for those who had resources, who could risk some of these resources and who could risk so large an amount of resources that it would facilitate large scale arable farming, utilizing both intensive and extensive modernization in combination.

The mobilization capacity was very low, because few farmers had a rational interest in this. But it was not an objective to mobilize many farmers. The field staff thus remained a rather passive service institution for those interested, and the field staff remained quite small, and did not have any capacity for interaction with huge numbers of clients. This corresponded to the model of action of reaching the progressive farmers, in order to make them the pilots and examples for the rest.

The control potential was better. The farmers who wanted the extension services were in need of a good that only the AD had, namely knowledge and advice. According to his professional knowledge, the AD could influence his "pupil" to adopt the required practises and make the necessary investments for arable farming. Under ALDEP control increased, it was strictly defined what type of assistance a farmer could get, and there were eligibility criteria, including some amount of investment. The subsidy would not be given to those unable to fulfil these rather specific eligibility rules. An innovation in the case of ALDEP, at least when considering assistance to arable farming, was the application of standardized rules. Previously, much more was left to the AD's discretion and technical knowledge.

6.3 Implementing ARAP

A precondition for effective assistance to virtually all farmers over several years was substantial implementation capacity. Below will be documented the magnitude of the administrative requirements ARAP implied, and the extent to which field staff obeyed new directives and changed their priorities. Next will be shown the huge mobilization of farmers that was achieved by ARAP. However, the ability to control the farmers was small and the result of this was that ARAP developed into a rather purposeless transfer of resources to most farmers. ARAP mobilized those interested as planned, but it also mobilized a much larger group of farmers for whom

ARAP was an attractive good for reasons not thought of by designers. This problem was a new one — MOA had never previously had the problem that the mobilization was too large and varied, and it is therefore not surprising that its staff neither planned for that possibility nor were able to respond to this problem as implementation developed. The service organization proved to have problems regulating the access to a good when the demand was large and experience of distribution in such a situation was not far developed.

6.3.1 Workload and changed priorities

Effective implementation of ARAP required a large proportion of implementing capacities. This implied that it was necessary to order the field staff to leave aside many other tasks that they routinely worked on, were familiar with and had interests, tradition and skill for. The quick response in the Field Service to the new tasks is remarkable, and has several reasons.

The workload caused by ARAP was substantial. The farmers, when applying for assistance, had to follow certain procedures. They will not be discussed in detail, but some aspects of them indicate the magnitude of the workload ARAP put on the Field Service. Payment for work done on the fields, i.e. ploughing, row planting and weeding was transferred in cash to the farmer, or in the case of hired tractor ploughing, to the contractor, after an application form had been sent to the AD. The field officer then had to control that the work was actually done, before confirming and sending the application to the district level for payment. Payment for destumping also had to be verified by the AD and sent to the district level for final approval. As the amount of cash was calculated per hectare, verification also meant measurement of field sizes. Seeds and fertilizers were distributed to the districts and the farmers had to pick up these goods themselves. However, records had to be kept by field staff over who had received seeds and fertilizers (Eskeli 1989). The water development component required even more time consuming routines. However, this component was not much used. Probably partly because it required a lot of effort.

This work is administration, not extension. The development of proper routines for handling of applications and control on farm sites, application of guidelines of eligibility and record keeping were tasks for which the field staff was not trained, making these tasks more time consuming. A control in the AEAs in 1986 also revealed shortcomings in record keeping, according to the ARAP coordinator's annual report (MOA 1986b). The Annual Report for the Crop Production Division in 1987 also stated that

ADs were not well qualified for all these administrative tasks (MOA 1987b). Rashem also pointed this out in his evaluation (1987).

The implementation of ARAP was mainly regulated by general rules. Some were formulated as guidelines when implementation started, and additional rules, to clarify problems, were added each year when the orders to repeat the programme were sent. Hardly any discretion was left to the AD under ARAP. It is also worth noting that the AD was not allowed to decide that a farmer should *not* have the assistance — the rules were formed as rights with very vague eligibility criteria, so that there were no ceilings on numbers of beneficiaries and few, if any, groups were left outside. Under the extension model, the AD had discretion on this. Under ALDEP, there were stricter eligibility criteria that regulated access and ceilings on how many farmers to assist. In ARAP this was not the case.

In his evaluation of ARAP, based on data from 1988, Eskeli collected answers from field staff about workload. 80 per cent of the ADs answered that ARAP took from 70 to 100 per cent of their time (Eskeli 1989: 45).⁴⁷ Rashem (1987) also reports that in the AEAs he has examined, ADs were fully occupied with administration of ARAP, and he writes that DAOs were using much of their capacity on supply tasks, while the DASs were fully employed as payment officers.⁴⁸ When this happens in an already overloaded implementing structure, it means that field staff experience a profound change in their priorities. From a situation in which a large number of programmes and some extension were the dominant activities, ARAP alone became the dominant activity of the Field Service. The huge administrative demands caused by ARAP are also illustrated by the strengthening of the field service, implemented from 1986, when 400 Field Assistants were added to the 200 ADs to administer ARAP. In addition, clerks were hired to assist in the district level payment administration. And still, as Eskeli's material shows, ADs were mainly occupied with ARAP.

The changes brought about by ARAP in the Field Service were thus profound and gave rise to a new, rule-applying organization whereas the organization's tradition was that of a professional service organization.

The situation at the time ARAP was launched was thus that the implementing organization was already quite overloaded, and it is significant that within a short period of time, the Field Service changed its

⁴⁷ It should be noted that these answers were collected after the AD's had got the Field Assistants to assist them in administering ARAP.

⁴⁸ These percentages are regarded only as approximations. A frequently criticized field service might exaggerate the demands made on it to justify some of the failure in performance they are accused of.

tasks dramatically from extension and advice within many smaller programmes, to a large scale rule regulated administration of a resource transfer, which was what ARAP developed into. The priorities of the Field Service were drastically changed. ADs had to give top priority to ARAP and leave most other tasks aside, i.e. ignore them to a large extent.

The reasons for this drastic change of field staff activities are several. As noted above, at the time ARAP was launched, the position of an ARAP coordinator was created. A special coordinator signalizes the importance of a programme, and the coordinator can concentrate fully on getting his single programme implemented. This is significant in a situation where implementing capacities are undoubtedly scarce. There are no central level coordinating mechanisms giving various programmes priority or stopping programmes because there is not the implementation capacity for it. Rather, a specialized structure with many parts each trying to promote their programme raises many demands on the same overloaded implementing structure at regional and lower levels. In this situation of competition, a strong manager of ARAP might increase the chances of getting the programme through. The establishment of a special unit for ARAP was significant in this respect.

However, the single most decisive reason for the huge workload was the effective mobilization of farmers.

6.3.2 Effective mobilization

A major reason for the huge workload caused by ARAP was the effective mobilization of farmers. An information campaign was launched at an early stage. Field staff was briefed on the new programme by the ARAP coordinator and other Crop Production Division personnel (Interviews MOA civil servants). Moreover, farmers all over Botswana were informed about the new programme. The ARAP coordinator was of course active in this campaign, and so were other civil servants in DAFS. Furthermore, the minister himself took part in several information meetings which were broadcasted on radio. Both politicians and civil servants were instructed to inform about ARAP whenever they were on duty in the districts. The information campaign activities were often held at *kgotla* meetings.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ It is noteworthy that in a situation of time pressure under which the information campaign was conducted, the Village Development Committees were in many cases not activated as they usually are. The civil servants coming to a village instead cooperated with the village headman to secure the attendance of farmers (Interview MOA civil servants)

It seems that the campaign was successful. Both Farrington and Eskeli report that most people knew something about the programme in the districts they examined. This is often what fails when implementing agricultural programmes. Most farmers were informed about the new programme, and although data are not available on how ARAP was presented, it does not require much imagination to expect that the government's generosity was emphasized. The 100 per cent coverage of costs probably made it relatively easy to mobilize interest for ARAP. Another reason was that ARAP had components focusing on the problems farmers experienced, such as lack of draft power and the high risk associated with the use of scarce resources for arable farming.

The ARAP components focused on symptoms, i.e. experienced scarcities. The farmers are those who experience these scarcities, and it would probably not be difficult for them to see the use they could make of ARAP. As long as ARAP was operational, it met a formidable demand. The demand was high from the first season and in the coming years it increased. ADs met demands from higher hierarchical levels to concentrate on ARAP, but the most significant pressure probably came from farmers. Informants say that there were incidents of violence against field staff for not providing ARAP assistance quickly enough to all interested farmers. The programme was in principle open to 70 000 farmers, and as the interest for ARAP assistance became manifest, so large a proportion of the 70 000 wanted assistance that ARAP surely reached a larger target group than any agricultural programme had ever done before. In 1986/87 ploughing assistance alone was given to 56 000 appliers (see below), which is a number to be seen in relation to the number of AEA's with one AD each and very little administrative support. ALDEP, by comparison assisted 5961 farmers in 1985/86, which was a peak that far (MOA 1988e).

6.3.3 *Access to ARAP assistance*

In the above section it has been shown that ARAP reached more or less all farmers, after some years. The first season ARAP was operational, 1985/1986, it reached an impressive number of farmers. In 85/86 18 000 received ploughing assistance, in 86/87, 56 000, in 87/88, 95 000.⁵⁰ The

⁵⁰ This number obviously reflects a lot of cheating, there are not 95 000 farming households in Botswana. According to the Agricultural Statistics from 1988, nearly 70 000 farmers planted crops in 1987-88. However, the number given reflects the wide use of ARAP, covering most farmers.

other components show a similar increase, but at a lower rate — only ploughing and seeds reached the large majority of farmers (MOA 1988a).

As ARAP was repeated over several years, this meant that some farmers would receive assistance several times, while others would receive it fewer times. Those farmers able to utilize ARAP already the first year would have benefited more times than the others. The better-off farmers were the ones who first took advantage of ARAP. Rashem reports that in 1987, a large number of the poorer farmers had still not been reached by ARAP (Rashem 1987). This is also in accordance with what was indicated in the interview material. But Rashem's sample is too small to draw any firm conclusions. The ARAP annual reports give, for each component except seeds and fertilizer, both number of beneficiaries and number of hectares covered. It should be stressed that these numbers are regarded as rough approximations. But acreage divided by the number of beneficiaries shows that average field size ploughed under ARAP was around 7 hectares in 85/86, then it fell to 5 and then to 4 the following seasons, because gradually the smaller farmers were reached.

One explanation for the long time it took to reach the smaller farmers lies in the policy of ARAP to let the farmers themselves take the initiative. Taking an initiative is not only something that better-off farmers are more used to doing, it is also something that requires time and resources. Another explanation is that ARAP was similar to the Drought Relief programmes (DR). Some ADs understood ARAP as a new form of relief for the larger farmers, while DR could be used for the smaller ones (Farrington 1987). Finally, especially the poorer farmers hire draft power, and they hire tractors. Tractor owners are reluctant to plough on un-destumped fields, and the poorer farmers have less of their land destumped than better-off farmers (MFDP 1985a). Destumping under ARAP was not much used in 1985/86, but reached huge proportions the following years, which probably opened up more fields for tractor ploughing, and thus made ARAP's draft power assistance more available also to poor farmers. As noted in chapter 3, the rainfall frequency makes it crucial to plough and plant when the rain comes. This means that in the periods when ploughing can be done, there are too many farmers in need of tractors. The tractor-owning farmers are relatively few, and for them, it is rational to plough as large fields as possible, which means that the better-off farmers can arrange tractor ploughing first. The poor farmers have to wait, and have less chances to get timely ploughing. The lack of tractors is reinforced by the intensive use of them in these periods, causing mechanical breakdowns. The traditional way of ploughing, by spans of cattle, might be expected to ease this problem, i.e. that when no tractors are accessible, a farmer can use his own cattle, or

hire somebody else's. But cattle owners are reluctant to use their cattle for this purpose if they can avoid it. Use of animals for ploughing often means bringing them from grazing lands far away to the fields and this is costly.

The general conclusion is that the medium and large scale farmers were able to utilize ARAP at once, the smaller farmers were not. In the original once-off design, this was less important, but when ARAP became repeated annually, it resulted in a much larger transfer of resources to those who benefited already the first or the second season ARAP was operational.

6.3.4 Ineffective control

In the above it has been shown that implementation capacity was effectively directed to the new programme, and this process was intensified by the second precondition for effective implementation, the effective mobilization of farmers bringing about a substantial demand for ARAP assistance. However, the ability to exercise control over the farmers in the transactions that followed failed. Partly, because of the lack of capacity to follow up the provision of assistance, but also because ARAP did not contain sufficient provisions for such control, a control that proved to be needed as ARAP proved relevant for other farmer interests than envisaged. This is a basic reason why ARAP became not only a major thrust to increase arable production on a sustainable basis for those farmers able to do that, but also, for the majority, a general transfer of resources to the farming population, subsidizing its arable production at the various levels different groups already operated on, and with an element of expansion of field sizes as the only, and insufficient, change.

The heavy workload caused by the administration of ARAP had serious consequences. Both for other activities, as I will show in the next chapter, and for ARAP itself. Regarding the latter, it meant that the extension — advice and training — that was intended to guide the ARAP assistance had to be left out like extension in general. Thus ADs were without their only remaining possibility to guide and control the use of the assistance.

The intended target group for ARAP is in a sense unclear, it was in principle open to all farmers who were interested — the problem was that there proved to be many reasons for being interested. The concept of the whole programme was meant to be for those who would use all the support it offered in a combined effort to increase production and productivity decisively. This was MOA's original idea. When faced with farmers using ARAP for different purposes, field staff had no opportunity to influence who should be given the assistance. If a farmer applied for payment for farming work done, or asked for seeds or fertilizers, he had a right to

receive this, according to the ARAP guidelines.⁵¹ The only condition for receiving assistance was that the operations were actually done. There was no discretion for field staff regarding whether to give assistance or not.

In some cases eligibility criteria were unclear. For instance whether farmers cultivating a borrowed field were eligible, or what constituted a household (Farrington 1987). But apart from that, ARAP was open to all as a matter of right. ALDEP had quotas or targets of how many farmers to give assistance each year, which at least gave some possibility to prevent unwanted use of the ALDEP assistance. There were no such provisions in ARAP. If ARAP had aimed at the limited number of progressive, medium scale farmers and had linked the provision of assistance to extension/training which the progressive farmers had traditionally received, this would have been a smaller problem. But when ARAP was open for all and all were interested it made field staff unable to do anything but give out as much as possible.

It should be noted that the Field Service is just that, a service organization in the sense that it was established to provide information and extension to those who wanted it. The tasks of regulating and allocating resources were not what this organization was used to do, as shown above. When they faced a huge demand for their services, field staff might have been more inclined to adjust to demands because of their service tradition.

Given the decision to provide an individual farmer with assistance, the AD had very limited opportunity to influence what kind of assistance. If the farmer did not want anything else than seeds it was difficult for the AD to make sure that seeds were used in combination with the other components and used rationally, i.e. in a way that fulfilled the stated objectives. The contents of each decision of implementation was not left to the AD's professional knowledge, nor could he demand that certain obligations should be carried out.⁵² Thus, small farmers could for instance have ten hectares ploughed and planted even if the AD could foresee that the farming household had no chance to tend or harvest such a big field. Or, a farmer could plough 4 hectares as previously, and drop method improvements if he wished so. The AD's powerful role as the expert was no longer relevant and he was not given any discretionary powers enabling him to influence the contents of assistance.

⁵¹ Here one should note what is discussed above, namely that it was probably not equally easy for all sections of the eligible farmers to initiate this.

⁵² ALDEP guidelines for 1985-86 include as a condition for eligibility that the farmers must agree to undertake improved crop management and to attend training courses (MOA 1985; 2).

In short, the design of ARAP assumed that farmers were actually interested in expanding field sizes as much as possible, and in improving methods. This proved not to be the case, except for the original target group, for whom the programme was planned.

6.3.5 Effective mobilization and ineffective control. The transformation of the bold modernizing attempt into a general transfer of money

The huge mobilization and the inadequate control generate an image of a programme that got out of hand. ARAP became a general and rather purposeless transfer of substantial amounts of resources, mainly in cash.

Based on reports from field staff the ARAP coordinator each year produced statistics on the progress of ARAP. In the ARAP annual report from 1988, the figures were summed up for the three years ARAP had been in operation (1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88), (MOA 1988a). These figures show that the number of beneficiaries increased every year. Approximately 20 000 in 1985-86, between 50 and 60 000 in 1986-87 and more than 90 000 in 1987-88. For all three years ploughing and seeds were by far the most frequently used components. Whereas the components of row planting and weeding were used only by a minority. This is also the case for fertilizers, but here the provision of fertilizers was meant to be limited to a minority.⁵³ The minority who received support subsidies for using improved methods were, according to Farrington (1987), those farmers who had used these methods also previously. Thus, ARAP did not promote intensive modernization very much; data suggest that it caused relatively few to adopt improved methods they did not already use.

The extensive modernization, i.e. field size increases, fared better. Quite a number of farmers destumped and fenced their fields; in Eskeli's survey, all major groups of farmers were proportionally represented among those who destumped their fields (1989). But even if field sizes increased, for most farmers these increases were not large enough to reach beyond the confines of small scale farming. The number of beneficiaries receiving ploughing assistance and the number of hectares ploughed under this assistance when compared show that the average ploughed field size remained far below 10 hectares. The average field sizes increased, but

⁵³ Enough fertilizers were provided to give out to a specific number of farmers on a so-called first-come-first-serve basis.

definitely not enough to pass the economy of scale threshold, and thus bring about any basic change. In the normal year 1980-81, approximately 270 000 hectares were planted with crops. In 1987-88 the planted area was 367 000 hectares (MOA 1989). However, the increase per farm in field size was not that large. In 1987-88, when 67 300 farmers planted 370 800 hectares, this produced an average field size of 5.5 hectares. About 60 per cent of the farmers still ploughed under 5 hectares in 1987-88 (MOA 1989). These increases are not that large, since Øygaard reports an ordinary average of 4 hectares.⁵⁴ These numbers exclude the possibility that field size increases made farmers into anything else than producers of crops for subsistence needs. Most farmers seem to have chosen strategically, i.e. they used assistance to cultivate on a somewhat increased field size and with the type of input and method they had used previously. This is not to deny that the increases in total cultivated area were impressive, even if the numbers should be read with caution.⁵⁵ But this was not a large scale modernization or recovery by modernization. And it is an illustration of how unpromising arable farming in Botswana is that even these increases were not sufficient, and they were far below what ARAP in reality aimed at.

This pattern emerged from the statistics for both the drought years of 1985-86 and 1986-87, and from the non-drought year 1987-88. As long as there was a drought, this subsidy, of roughly speaking established production levels had the function of a drought relief with expansive elements. However, when the rain came back, the pattern of how farmers utilized ARAP was the same.

Needless to say, this was not the intention of the assistance. ARAP was meant to instigate both intensive and extensive modernization in a once-off concentrated effort to push arable production up to a commercial and viable level. The majority of farmers simply had different interests. In these average numbers, we can by all probability include quite a number of medium scale farmers who did use ARAP as intended, but it is difficult to obtain data to measure this, and assess whether they actually increased productivity on labour and costs sufficiently to sustain the achievements.

As most observers and some civil servants point out, ARAP did much good both as an actual relief and as a transfer of needed money. But it did not solve any basic problems of the sector, even if it took so much of MOA resources for 5 years. In the executive summary of the evaluations carried out by Farrington and Rashem it is somewhat ironically stated that

⁵⁴ It has to be stressed that these numbers are very rough approximations.

⁵⁵ Reporting on ARAP might for instance have improved registration of cultivated fields.

There might be other appropriate ways of transferring income (MOA 1988c).

The argument that ARAP was meant to be a relief programme by MOA is not evidenced by the data material for this thesis. It was too expensive, and there was a relief programme already. The aide memoir written in early 1985, contained no hints that the Drought Relief might need to be strengthened (see chapter 5).⁵⁶ The function of drought relief stems from the context of drought, not from decision makers' intention. Since 1979 there had been a drought relief programme implemented. This programme, coordinated by MFDP and implemented by several line ministries included food distribution, short term employment schemes,⁵⁷ water supplies and drilling and an agricultural relief. Agricultural relief was implemented by MOA, and included purchase of cattle, distribution of free seeds, a subsidy for ploughing for those who could not plough on their own and a destumping subsidy. Holm describes these efforts (1985) and he argues that Botswana's drought relief is the best Africa has seen thus far. His article has the title *Coping with Drought in Botswana: an African Success*. Still, even this successful programme was quickly surpassed by ARAP. DR ploughing, and partly seeds distribution and destumping, became less used as ARAP introduced similar components that were more generous, and which also allowed relief for larger fields. It turned out to be a very expensive form of relief.

It can be questioned whether DR was sufficient to keep farmers engaged in agriculture, but there are no evidence that there was a perceived need for a strengthened relief.

6.4 Summary

In this chapter we have shown that ARAP was implemented by an already overloaded field service. However, this staff reacted surprisingly effectively and quickly changed their work tasks completely. The reasons for this, apart from hierarchical authority, was the huge interest ARAP generated among farmers, and the huge demand for ARAP services.

⁵⁶ Aide memoirs are written regularly and asses the situation and possible needs for drought relief of various types.

⁵⁷ Labour Based Relief Programmes. On the local level, projects, very often infrastructure projects are identified, and money is granted for the hiring of people outside the agricultural season for a minimum wage.

All farmers were eligible for assistance, even if the MOA did not originally plan it to be so. The political authorities ensured this change. The widely varying categories of farmers eligible meant that ARAP intervened in a variety of living situations and thus, a variety of farmers' interests. The large interest for ARAP was in reality made up of quite many different interests, and only some farmers responded according to the rationality ARAP assumed farmers would have. MOA's original intention was to support only this minority through ARAP.

ARAP had few provisions to control the situation. The only possibility might have been regular extension and advice, which there was no capacity left for. ARAP was therefore used for many different purposes, and the most common purpose was to use ARAP as a subsidy for a roughly unchanged arable farming, with the exception of field expansions.

This pattern materialized rather early; the political authorities' contribution in later years was to prolong the life of a programme that did not have the intended effects on modernization. In the next chapter, we shall examine the effects of ARAP more closely.

7. Some effects of ARAP

7.1 Introduction

The starting point for this chapter is the conclusion reached in chapter 6 that ARAP became a very massive transfer of resources to Botswana farmers and that it was all rather ineffective as the programme's intentions are concerned. It is still too early to reach conclusions about all the effects ARAP has had on rural Botswana, but in as far as data allow it, some effects will be discussed. It has been argued in chapter 6 that ARAP became a general transfer of resources. Further evidence will be offered for the conclusion that ARAP did not basically change the situation of farmers as it was intended to but to state that ARAP became rather ineffective in relation to the formal objectives of the programme of course does not mean that ARAP did not have effects for the clientele.

In Jacobsen's model of policy making (1967), an important point is that the administration's relationships to other actors have consequences for the administration itself. When faced with new demands affecting its policy, an organization will have to respond somehow, and this will often have effects for the organization itself. Because of insufficient planning, ARAP led to several unintended and partly negative side-effects. These effects will be outlined, as they illustrate the problems emanating from the inability to draw on the expertise and knowledge of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

7.2 Effects for the clientele

7.2.1 Sustainability

The sustainability element in ARAP is crucial. It refers to whether positive achievements can be upheld after the programme was phased out. As noted, the programme resulted in increased field sizes, and in increased national production totals. I have also argued, based on literature on how much field sizes and methods needed to improve, that the productivity increases brought by ARAP were insufficient to make arable farming competitive with livestock and off-farm employment (Opschoor 1983; Duggan 1983;

Øygard et al. 1986; Selolwane 1986). If ARAP increased productivity as much as planned, then it could be expected that farmers would reinvest their profit in arable farming, which would mean that benefits could be sustained.

In his evaluation of ARAP's destumping component, Eskeli (1989: 31) collected survey data about how farmers used the money paid under ARAP for destumping. Half of the respondents used it to hire labour to do the destumping. 10 per cent used it for farm equipment and consumption, and only 7 per cent used it for farm equipment only. This indicates that most farmers did not spend the extra resources transferred by ARAP for investments to improve their arable production. It is not very probable that more farmers will do so when ARAP ends and the resources to be reinvested are those generated by the farmer himself.

7.2.2 Effects for various groups

When applying one set of means on a diversified set of target groups, the effects on the various groups can be expected to differ. This is also the case for the ARAP general transfer of resources to all farmers in Botswana.

A. The wealthy farmers. These are the farmers who have benefited most from ARAP, because they are the group owning tractors. The broadening of the target group of ARAP so as to include the small farmers lacking draft power opened up a big market for sale of draft power. Also farmers owning cattle and thus able to plough for themselves to a large extent hired tractors (Farrington 1987; Rashem 1987), as ploughing with cattle reduces the animals' sales value (Solway 1986). This means that the market for tractor ploughing was even greater.

It should also be noted that receiving ploughing assistance gives little output to the tractor hiring farmer when inadequate rainfall causes loss of harvest. For the tractor owner, in contrast, the income that tractor ploughing gives him is of course more secure. In total, during the three seasons 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88 almost P60 million were paid for ploughing under ARAP.⁵⁸ A very large portion of this went to the tractor owners.

The wealthy farmers also used the ARAP assistance for their own arable production. Eskeli found that farmers owning up to 150 cattle were using the destumping component. And so were those with more than 150 cattle, but the absolute numbers are very small here (1989: 12). The wealthy

⁵⁸ Annual Statement of Accounts 1989.

farmers are a bit under-represented compared to their proportion in the national farming population.

B. The medium scale farmers. According to Eskeli (1989), there is a small minority of farmers investing their money in farm equipment. Thus there is a small group willing to invest more in arable farming. There is also a minority of ARAP beneficiaries, who during all the seasons data are available for, have used not only ploughing and seeds, but also row planting, weeding and fertilizers. This indicates that there is a group who uses many components for improving methods and inputs. Both Rashem and Farrington (1987) stated that in their samples, those who used these method improving assistance components were those who had done so previously. It is probable that this is the group of medium scale farmers who invest in arable agriculture.

These farmers then, have stuck to the improved methods they had already adopted, and they have expanded field sizes. This is what ARAP tried to encourage. The only difference is that they have largely hired tractor ploughing instead of using their own animals, and it remains to be seen whether the expansions are so large that it will pass the threshold of economies of scale.

If improved methods are used on ten hectares farmers will get good harvests when the rain is sufficient. Another question is whether this will make them producers of a surplus. Farmers cultivating crops using improved methods, and who under ARAP do so on an increased area, might produce a surplus. At least as long as ARAP pays for it. But this raises the question of sustainability which is discussed above. Whether these farmers actually passed the critical threshold of productivity and whether they can take the risk to continue on this scale is difficult to say.

These farmers are cattle holders, and can in many cases plough independently with their own animals, but they seem to have hired tractors very often. As Solway reports, cattle owners are reluctant to use their animals for draft power in any case, as this reduces their quality and the price they can get on the abattoir. Probably, for a number of cattle owners, ARAP tractor hire subsidized their cattle rearing, and ARAP has thus freed resources in several ways, enabling them to diversify their activities.

C. The poor farmers. These farmers have few or no cattle. And this is the group which first drops out of arable production during a drought and thus is most in need of generous drought relief to continue (Vierich and Shepperd 1980).

ARAP encouraged this group to keep up some cultivation during the drought, and to do so on somewhat larger fields. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if this is enough to make them producers of a surplus of crops and even

more doubtful whether this will be drought resistant in the longer run, as argued in chapter 6. Even if maximum utilization of ARAP should result in a surplus it would not be rational for these farmers to risk this surplus on arable farming — the risk is too high, and continued arable farming would, as suggested by Opschoor, increase costs 12 fold. Most of the ARAP generated surplus would thus be consumed, and why should they risk it all that way? We can speculate what would happen if a poor female farmer with only a few animals did plough 10 hectares. That is, if she hired a tractor, weeded and row planted, used fertilizers and fenced her field, and then harvested all of it. In doing so she would probably have to hire some labour, and none of the ARAP cash payment would end up in her pockets. But she might have a good harvest. How good? Would it allow her to pay the tractor owner, the labour and the fertilizers herself the next year? It is difficult to say, but it is not very likely. And if this should work once, as soon as there was inadequate rainfall, she might be back where she started. The rational thing to do if ARAP financing produced a crop large enough so that some of it could be sold, would be to buy livestock. That is the basic logic that ARAP did not change.

A lot of the work done in arable agriculture, paid for under ARAP, is done by hired labour. Destumping and weeding are such tasks. Many female headed households are forced to hire labour, many wealthy farmers choose to do so. 49 per cent of destumpers used hired labour in their destumping. The poor farmers have probably benefited from this. It seems that they have used ploughing and seeds components to uphold a minimum of arable production on their own fields, and during the season they have worked for others weeding and harvesting when the rain came back and there was a harvest. This rural informal labour market is important, especially for the poorest sections of rural dwellers (Vierich and Sheppard 1980).

ARAP has probably undermined this group's access to resources in the long run. As Solway writes, the commercialization of cattle undermines the *mafisa* system (see above) and it also makes cattle owners less willing to lend out their cattle in an informal exchange system as has been the tradition. Several years of tractor ploughing have probably strengthened this tendency. A system in decline is difficult to re-activate after several years out of use. Thus ARAP has probably made small farmers more dependent on continued governmental assistance to get the resources needed for arable agriculture. Also Øygard warns against the increasing dependence on hired tractor ploughing resulting from ARAP (Øygard et al. 1986).

7.3 Political effects

The political significance of ARAP was alluded to in chapter 1 and 5. The question of how such programmes actually influence patterns of political loyalty and support needs more empirical research. But some issues should be mentioned.

First, ARAP is obviously a very popular programme. The adoption rate for some of the components shows that. MOA personnel's perceptions are also that ARAP has been popular. Second, the political intervention must be seen against the background of a BDP set-back in late 1984, and as linked to attempts to regain lost ground. In the general elections of autumn 1989, BDP regained lost support, and it is a reasonable hypothesis that ARAP contributed to the recovery.

The original ambition of the political leadership was, in essence, to put such emphasis on genuine modernization also for the poor farmers that modernization would actually occur. From this there would also be political stability gains. This proved not to be possible to combine as intended, but that does not mean that there were no political gains.

For all practical purposes, ARAP functioned as general relief. A drought relief when the drought was still a fact, and as relief also when the drought was over. Not surprisingly, there has been a significant after-rationalization for ARAP, saying that it was originally intended to be the relief it became. As pointed out by Holm, the politicians use relief for what it is worth, and the redefinition of ARAP into relief opened up new options for political propaganda. Holm describes the interests of political leaders in drought relief in general terms.

The politicians have made certain that they are regarded by the public as playing a critical role in drought relief. The character of the action taken every year is personally announced by the president in a special speech to the nation (Holm 1985: 476).

This speech, the "Declaration on the Drought Recovery Programme", from April 1989, also refers to ARAP. In general, it is striking how ARAP became after-rationalized as it turned out to function as a relief. The official justification of ARAP is to point to the drought crisis and to say that Government reacted boldly to assist the common people.

It should be noted, that the decision to repeat the expensive ARAP components for the 1989/90 season, after two post-drought harvests in 1987/88 and 1988/89, is difficult to explain unless it is recognized that the BDP Cabinet had the coming elections in mind. It is true that the most serious political defeat for the BDP in 1984 came in the urban areas,

notably Gaborone, where both seats were lost to BNF. But as Nengwehkulu points out, most urban dwellers have strong links to the rural economy; they often have their family there, engaged in agriculture (Nengwehkulu, unpublished).

Of course, ARAP is also popular among rural tractor owners, because they have earned substantial profits. And as noted, the MPs recruited from this group are still supportive of ARAP (Interview, MOA civil servants). The magnitude of the tractor ploughing subsidies was such that a transfer of capital is a more appropriate term than a transfer of resources.

Thus, ARAP was, in spite of its low modernization potential a very useful programme from a political perspective, even if this was so in another way than intended. This is not to say that ARAP decided the elections in 1989, but ARAP surely contributed to BDP's rather good result.

7.4 Some impacts on the field service

The heavy workload on field personnel led very quickly to serious problems, including corruption, inability to control cheating, and inability to meet demands quickly enough. A quick response to this was that beginning in 1986/87 field assistants were hired for the season; in 86/87 400 were hired, later the number was increased to 460 (MOA 1987b). These field assistants (FAs) are supposed to work solely on ARAP. They have eased burdens, although they had to be trained and supervised by the AD they were working under. There were one or two FAs in every AEA. The ARAP annual report for 1986/87 notes, however, that the additional 400 FAs were not enough to make the workload manageable.

The FAs might very well become permanent. ADs have expressed wishes that they should be so, but MFDP civil servants are worried about this as it would be contrary to policies of keeping recurrent administrative costs down. It is unclear what will happen to the FAs when ARAP is phased out.

However, this issue seems to be a part of a more general, increased concern about the low implementing capacities of field staff. Projects for improving living quarters and office buildings in the districts have been started. When the field work for this study was carried out the MOA was planning an internal project to activate field staff more in policy-making processes. It seems reasonable to suggest that the implementing pressures of ARAP have contributed to a better understanding of problems in the Field Service, and that this has contributed to a strengthening of this organization.

When implementors in a centralized, career controlling organization are overloaded with work from higher levels, an expected response would be some kind of resistance or resignation. Eskeli's survey indicates that this has not happened, they "maintain morale", as he puts it (1989). Of course this is difficult to measure, but absence of resistance or resignation is consistent with the impressive achievements of ARAP, in terms of farmers reached and administrative tasks carried out. However, ARAP has bred corruption, not a large problem in Botswana previously. Its magnitude is difficult to assess, but the ARAP coordinator regarded it a serious problem, as do other MOA officers. (Interviews, MOA officials 1989). It remains to be seen what effects this will have in the long run.

The Field Service changed in terms of what types of operations it performed. The major task became administration of resource allocation to an extent not experienced earlier. The expert and extension model was deactivated and administration and application of rules for mass processing of client cases became dominant features. The Field Service under ARAP has mobilized farmers, but at the same time the field staff themselves are strictly controlled as the blue-print elements of implementation are outstanding. This means that the Department of Agricultural Field Services (DAFS) has developed expertise and routines to perform tasks of mass rule processing.

7.5 Unintended effects

In chapter 4 it is shown that MOA central level planners of ARAP did not mobilize the different parts of the organization to make adjustments of the project during its implementation. Such adjustment was needed in order to avoid that ARAP would have negative effects on various sub-goals under the MOA's responsibility. In this section, some consequences will be indicated.

The MOA evaluation states that ARAP might have environmental drawbacks in a longer term, especially related to the destumping component (1988c: 9). It recommends a limit on how many hectares each farmer can destump, and more emphasis on measures to reduce the potential for environmental damages.

56% of the area destumped under ARAP has been woodland (Eskeli 1989: 72). And the removing of trees, especially in densely populated areas, creates firewood supply problems. The variation between districts concerning how many people who experience fuel wood problems is large, varying from 78% to 15% (Eskeli 1989).

Expansion of the arable fields, encouraged by ARAP, means a strengthening of the tendency to move arable fields to the mixed farming-grazing land areas. This will in many cases mean a move westward, into more fragile areas. The emerging mixed farming also has its problems as it means extra costs, i.e. fencing, and it requires transport to remote locations or hiring of labour. This will hit the poor farmers harder than the better-off ones.

Arable fields in Botswana are generally vulnerable to erosion and the poor soils soon get exhausted. The remedy has traditionally been to move to another allocated field. This is increasingly becoming more difficult, as suitable land near the settlements is getting scarce. This is one of the reasons why environmentalists recommend more intensive use of arable fields combined with conservation measures. The lack of conservation measures and the fact that expansionist components have dominated over the improved technology components are weaknesses in ARAP. Eskeli surveys the erosion problems, and finds them emerging on a large proportion of the fields examined, especially those that have been in use for several years. Larger fields are more vulnerable to erosion than smaller fields, and ARAP might thus worsen things, as the average field size is 4.5 ha., while ARAP pays for cultivation of ten hectares, and in many cases thus increases field sizes.

In order to avoid erosion, fields must be located properly, and it is an open question whether Land Boards have been able to manage the location issues of the large scale destumping, 70 000 hectares under ARAP, of these 40 000 hectares virgin land (Eskeli 1989). This comes in addition to the destumping under the Drought Relief (DR). In total 120 000 hectares have been destumped in the 1980s (Eskeli 1989).

In summary, ARAP is accelerating some tendencies that are potentially dangerous for the ecological basis for the rural population, and this might hit the poorer farmers more than the better-off farmers. As noted above overgrazing is the most serious environmental problem. ARAP's effects on the cattle production are difficult to assess. But a plausible hypothesis is that ARAP transfers have reduced the necessity for farmers to sell cattle when crops and rural employment disappear. Thus, ARAP might have increased pressure on the grazing lands during the drought.

As shown in chapter 6, ARAP inflicted a very heavy workload on field staff. This was one of the consequences of the political intervention and affected other programmes which were supposed to be implemented by the Field Service. Considering ALDEP beneficiaries, the numbers show a peak in 1985-86, the first season ARAP was operational. But in that year ARAP did not reach the proportions it achieved in the following years, and in

1986-87, ALDEP had a reduction to 4800 beneficiaries, and in 1987-88 it was the same (MOA 1988e). The plan, however, was to increase ALDEP activities. MOA officials all state that ARAP seriously hindered other programmes, but it is difficult to find exact data on this. What is most strongly pointed out is that the ordinary extension suffered — it more or less ceased (Farrington 1987).

ARAP was a very powerful intervention in agriculture, and the consequences for environment have been discussed above. There is also the question whether ARAP has diverted farmers' efforts away from more viable activities like cattle rearing. The MOA Planning Officers express to the fact that some livestock projects suffered because all farmers were busy doing ARAP activities.

ARAP applied the same design in all districts. However, conditions for agriculture vary between districts in ways which make ARAP less suited in some districts than in others. In some districts the types of seed used are not available from ARAP (Rashem 1987). In districts of dense vegetation, destumping is so costly that the ARAP subsidy does not cover all costs. In other districts, it is the reverse (Eskeli 1989).

The magnitude of ARAP was bound to have significant effects on land use. Land use planning has been a priority in later years. Under the auspices of MLGL, the Districts plan land use. The effects of ARAP on these planning exercises and the realization of the plans might very well prove to be problematic. The point regarding district variations is that the Districts could have made a contribution to the planning, as they are said to have done in the case of ALDEP. In the case of ARAP, planners on MOA top level failed to achieve this.

7.6 Summary

It has to be stressed that this chapter is neither a complete presentation of possible and relevant aspects of the impacts of ARAP, nor an attempt to conclude firmly on the issues raised. In chapter 6, it was documented that, for the majority of farmers, ARAP did not lead to changed farming production or production levels. However, for a minority, most likely the original target group, it did. In this chapter, the sustainability of these achievements is questioned.

A programme of the size of ARAP, not surprisingly, had political effects as well as repercussions on the administration itself. The after-rationalization of ARAP portrays it as an effective response to the drought crisis, even if this was not the reason why ARAP was initiated, designed the way it was, nor decided upon.

This chapter has also presented some side effects that are mainly explained by the inadequate planning process, in which important considerations and expertise were excluded.

8. Conclusions and discussion

8.1 Introduction

The topic for this analysis has been ARAP, and the reasons why ARAP became an ineffective agricultural modernization programme. In this chapter, the case study of ARAP will be summed up in brief.

Basic features of ARAP is in this report explained by the interplay between features of the administration, the political leadership, the donor and the clientele. In the literature which addresses the question of what explains public policy in Botswana, this analytical model is not that widely used. More common is a ruling elite model. This model, which explains public policy by the interests, intentions and power of a small ruling elite can be found in many varieties.

As the wide use of it indicates, the ruling elite model is a fruitful one, that deserves continued attention. However, the case study of ARAP reveals some weaknesses of the ruling elite model, and this chapter will elaborate on these. Finally, it will be indicated how the ruling elite model can be improved on some points.

8.2 The case of ARAP — major conclusions

The process that shaped ARAP has been divided into the following sub-phases: Initiation, design, political intervention and approval, approach of donors, implementation, clientele response and finally after-rationalization.

The analytical framework outlined in chapter 1 guides attention to how and with what effect main types of actors affected ARAP in these various stages.

The donor community, which is so often assumed to be a set of powerful actors, was in this case represented by NORAD. NORAD proved to be a rather powerless actor. Its attempts to shape ARAP were limited, and they were not successful. ARAP was mainly a product of forces and actors of Botswana itself.

The political authorities played an important role by generating pressure on the agricultural administration to come up with more active devices for development in the rural areas. To define this activity as the provision of

clear political goals would be an exaggeration, it was rather a request to do something. This demand was strengthened by general ideas of basic needs and poverty alleviation in the donor community as well.

The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) had to respond to this pressure in one way or another. The policies and programmes that the ministry had been running for some 20 years had proved incapable of mobilizing the large majority of farmers for basic change. The ministry had, by supporting the wealthiest strata, achieved very much in the livestock sector but without including the poorer majority in the progress. MOA had also achieved some progress in large scale arable farming; a small number of farmers did produce substantial harvests.

The ministerial response to the pressures was to rely on arable farming as the production form in which to generate surplus and income for the poor. It was the least promising sector generally speaking. The choice is explained by basic values of justice, profitability and large scale farming held by the ministry. These beliefs and values precluded the option of reorganizing the livestock sector in such a way that more people could make a living out of it. Furthermore, in an approach focusing on the *sector's* needs and development, arable farming was perceived as an important sub-sector which needed improvement.

Within a strategy of arable development, the MOA response included some innovations as regards means. The development efforts were designed in different ways for different socio-economic groups, cash subsidies were included to encourage farmers to modernize production and some technological improvements had been designed to be promoted by the arable development programmes. But basically, the MOA drew on its old models of action. The production systems promoted by the MOA were still of a kind that would mainly pay off for wealthy farmers able to risk enough resources to obtain large scale productivity benefits.

Not surprisingly, the first major programme of the MOA response — ALDEP — proved to have a low ability to mobilize farmers. MOA started to implement ALDEP in the early eighties, but it soon became clear that ALDEP was unable solve the basic problems that arable farming is rational only when combined with other activities and when operated on a large scale. The scale of arable farming is determined by the strength of other activities (livestock, employment). Small scale arable farming could not be the main base for a rural living if based on the promoted farming systems.

ARAP was planned as a complementary programme to ALDEP, aimed at somewhat quicker and more concentrated assistance to better off farmers that could be helped into commercial farming rather quickly, if the assistance was decisive enough.

Even if the programmes offered, ALDEP and ARAP, were not very promising in terms of general poverty alleviation in the rural areas, it should be emphasised that ARAP might have had a potential to function as the final and decisive support for farmers very close to a resource level enabling commercial large scale farming. Both ALDEP and ARAP were more interventionist programmes than the previous extension service for arable development had been; they aimed at helping more farmers and to do so more directly by means of subsidies. And they were quite massive ventures, thus having significant effects for the rural economy. Massive interventions require coordination with other activities in order to be effective, that is, to maximize gains and to minimize costs. In the case of ARAP, the MOA proved incapable of engaging in a process of broad participation of various specialists and people working on issues that would be influenced by ARAP, for instance, environmental issues as well as other MOA programmes, even ALDEP. This is an important factor explaining the negative side effects of the ARAP programme.

ALDEP was implemented in 1982, and ARAP was forwarded for political approval by mid 1985. At this point in time, ALDEP had already come under criticism and many observers realized the very limited potential of ALDEP in developing agriculture to the commercial extent envisaged. The ministry's response to the political demands seemed inappropriate, undermining basic interests of the political leadership. This was an important reason why the political leadership activated itself again, and interfered in arable development policy in a quite decisive way. The core of the political intervention was to make ARAP the centre piece of arable development in general. A programme designed for one limited group of farmers became an offer to all farmers.

In MOA's view, this expansion was unwise. The poor farmers, in MOA's view would most likely not be able to transform their very minimal production into viable commercial farming after such a once-off massive support. If poorer farmers started using ARAP, it would be waste of resources, and the poorer farmers might become dependent. On the other hand, exactly because this offer was not made for the poorer farmers, MOA did not expect many of them to apply for the ARAP support at all. The political intervention was accepted and included, with minor adjustments in case farmers from the added groups should want to try it.

ARAP was implemented in late 1985, and it proved to mobilize more or less all Batswana farmers. Most other MOA programmes were seriously curtailed by the dominance ARAP very quickly got. However, ARAP did not become an incentive for change and development. Instead, it became

a subsidy of existing arable farming patterns. Farmers simply used ARAP in different ways than intended.

In short, the politicians' expectation of massive arable commercialization was unrealistic, the MOA's expectations were incorrect as they mainly expected ARAP to be irrelevant for many farmers. The farmers proved both wrong and used ARAP as a certainly quite welcome subsidy, a subsidy that hardly induced the intended changes. This farmers' response was partly facilitated by the specific design of ARAP and by traits of the implementing field staff organization and traditions.

And finally, as this farmer response became evident, the political leaders not surprisingly saw that ARAP happened to be very popular, and prolonged ARAP to be operational until the next National Assembly election was won. An after-rationalization took place, framing ARAP as the helping hand from the leadership to their followers in a time of drought and crisis. Which ARAP certainly was, without having been intended to function that way.

The primary problematic of this report is to explain why ARAP turned out as an ineffective modernization effort. Emphasis has been placed on the role that organizational variables play, in particular the importance of routinized ways of thinking about problems, goals and possible solutions in administrative organization. It is a very common finding in Africa that political goals are transformed into something else when the administration operationalizes the goals into specific development projects and programmes. Very often however, the explanation for this is sought in the bureaucrats' political views and in their attempts to control the political power of the state. This model is not contested here, but the analysis of ARAP hopefully illustrate that when political demands and goals are transformed in governmental bureaucracies, the reason is not always bureaucratic conspiracy and illegitimate power ambitions. The professionalism and the organizational routinization of specific ways of perceiving things, and the routinization of means that can only solve well-known problems are factors that might have as significant explanatory power as the hypothesis about the bureaucratic conspiracy.

The study of ARAP also illustrates the importance of government — clientele interaction. A significant factor for explaining why ARAP finally became a rather purposeless transfer of money, is the farmers' way of relating to ARAP. Hyden (1983) argues that a basic problem is how to mobilize the rural population. ARAP shows very clearly that to mobilize a target group is only one condition for achieving the goals of public policy. Of importance is also what the mobilization is about, whether it is a mobilization based on the clientele's sharing of the goals of the

programme or, as in the case of ARAP, the target groups mobilize on a different basis. Even well-designed public policy means are rough instruments, and the outcome of using them in a complex socio-economic structure is not easily predicted.

8.3 Alternative explanations

In the Introduction, two alternative explanations are put forward. They represent the essence of what seemed to be common opinions at the time of fieldwork (1989) on why ARAP had developed the way it had. They are briefly mentioned in this analysis, as an illustration of ideas and ways of thinking among various observers in Botswana. These ideas are variants of ruling elite models, and as these two explanations are meant to illustrate, this theory permeates much of what is said and written about Botswana politics. Like the ruling elite model, the two explanations capture some truths but they are insufficient as explanations for ARAP.

The first alternative explanation that some observers seemed to hold was that ARAP went wrong because it was planned by the MOA planners in a hurry, and that they should have defined and planned ARAP more cautiously and consulted more.

This model captures some truth in as far as coordination was far too limited. But otherwise, it is difficult to argue that ARAP was poorly planned. It was a continuation of the ALDEP process, and ARAP itself was under planning and elaboration in the MOA for about two years. For the purposes it had originally, ARAP was well planned. That the political leadership when it approved of the programme also changed the target group is not a problem of poor planning. Furthermore, ARAP was a logical extension of the expertise, values and traditions of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the major problems relate to the appropriateness of this problem structure and corresponding models of action, and not to planning deficiencies. What *was* important in the case of ARAP was that the planners in the MOA were not the only decision makers. Also the political leadership were active as decision makers. These two groups of decision makers did not agree on what they should try to achieve nor how to do it.

The second explanation of why ARAP turned out as an inefficient modernizing programme states that it was not meant to be a modernization programme in the first place, and that it was intended to be the drought relief it developed into. Even if it is true that ARAP functioned as a relief, and also that the political leaders in particular have found this quite attractive, it is not a valid explanation of why ARAP developed this way, as I have shown in the above chapters. What is interesting about this

explanation is that it assumes ruling elite rationality and control, even when a ruling elite action is under sharp criticism, as long as the reverse is not evidenced. This supports the impression that the model of a powerful and rational ruling elite is a quite dominant one in Botswana.

These two explanations both suggest that the critical factor is the performance and choices of a single, small group of decision makers, and the source of this approach is elite theory. The elite theory is more or less explicitly applied quite often when Botswana politics are debated, and it is also prominent in scientific debate. In the next section Picard's (1980: 1987) ruling elite theory of Botswana will be outlined, and some problems of this theory will be discussed.

Some models are very formalized and precise, facilitating the derivation of very precise hypotheses. Often, such models also have very high ambitions to be of general validity. Models of this type are open to tests by critical cases, cases that cannot be consistent with all models in question. The models that are discussed here are not suited for this kind of testing. Picard explicitly regards his model as valid and useful for the situation that he faced in his empirical analysis, and thus he has no absolute ambition of general validity for his model.

Theoretical models are here seen as devices that direct attention to some elements in the empirical reality, assuming they are important. Other elements are assumed to be of less importance, and are thus not included in the model. Attention is directed by the inclusion of concepts, and by the definition of them (Allison 1971; Roness 1979). In this chapter, therefore, the ambition is to show that the ruling elite framework is a poor tool for empirical analysis because it directs attention in such a way that potentially important factors are ignored, and the factors included in the model get an overestimated importance. The question is not whether the ruling elite model is right or wrong. The ruling elite model captures important aspects of reality. The question is rather which model gives us the best guidance and directs attention to important factors, and furthermore, which model gives the most useful guidance to the understanding of the conceptualized phenomena. It will be argued that in cases like ARAP, the ruling elite model is a poor analytical tool, it ignores several important factors and it gives a too general understanding of important issues.

An attempt to criticize the ruling elite model of Picard based on the findings in the case of ARAP requires that ARAP is a case that Picard's model is applicable for, on its own premises. As will be outlined in the next section, Picard applies his ruling elite model to explain only major public policies in Botswana. This limitation stems from the assumption that a ruling elite will be most decisive when its interests are at stake — which

is the case in particular when major, sector dominating programmes are on the agenda. The programmes Picard discusses are such major policies, and so was ARAP. Furthermore, ARAP is obviously important to ruling elite interests so that ARAP makes a good case for problematizing the usefulness of the ruling elite model.

This does not mean that Picard claims to explain ARAP. But the model Picard elaborates represent very well common ways of explaining policies in Botswana, and the ambition is to show that this model is not good enough for that purpose in the case of ARAP. To design this as a criticism of Picard is mainly done for reasons of clarity.

8.4 Ruling elite models in Botswana

The ruling elite concept is influential in many analyses of Botswana policies, see for instance Isaksen (1981), Parson (1987) and Holm and Molutsi (eds. 1989). However, the most consistent formulation of the model can be found in Louis Picard's works (1980; 1987), drawing heavily on G.L. Gunderson's work (1970), which is a classic study of Botswana politics. Gunderson applied the concept of the "Administrative State", a state of a-political, bureaucratic dominance exercised by an integrated ruling elite of senior civil servants and political leaders that are not controlled by any segment of society. Picard elaborates on this model.

Picard's overall ambition is to examine the formation and evolution of Botswana's state structures. He presents a general description of political power in Botswana. He goes on to examine public policy and its relationship to the political and bureaucratic structures of the state. Furthermore, he wants to examine who benefits from this policy (1987: 3).

Referring to the debate over how to conceptualize the nature and function of the state, Picard concludes that this cannot be decided a priori, but is an empirical question of context and historical phase (1987: 8-10). His own conceptualization of the Botswana state is to identify a ruling elite of top civil servants and political leaders.

Picard's overall discussion of political power is not the issue here. In this chapter, attention is limited to Picard's application of the ruling elite concept to explain specific cases of public policy, whom the policies benefit and why they turn out to affect interests the way they do. Picard's writings seem to allow such a distinction. He presents the analysis of the forming of some major rural development programmes separately, drawing on his general description of political power (1987).

Picard defines the ruling elite as the holders of top level political and administrative positions. The embryo of the present day ruling elite is the

small group of educated men who formed the BDP regime in the early sixties, a regime which included an alliance with the administrative leadership.

The relationship between the two sections of the ruling elite is one where the administrative elite in practice does most of the policy making not only in terms of means but also in terms of objectives (1987: 13,17). This is emphasised by Gunderson (1970), and Picard makes the same point. The importance of the administrative section of the ruling elite does not stem from a victory in some struggle for power; it is mainly a practical solution, facilitated by agreement on goals and means in the ruling elite in general. The political elite's main task is to mobilize electoral support for this bureaucratically defined policy. In addition, the political elite does give some input to the planning and implementation of policies such as timing relative to election time and how things should most wisely be announced. The adjustments to political needs that are made are not presented by Picard as perverting or undermining the public policy of development in any way. Rather, the political input eases policies by providing a specific type of expertise; how to get acceptance for public policy, or how public policy can best be presented to have political effects as well. The relationship is perhaps best described as smooth division of work between the two elite sections. In Picard's framework, the administrative-political distinction is not applied to point to possible conflicts; nothing is said that suggests that these two types of positions are potential sources of diverging attitudes. They serve more as a practical operational definition of the ruling elite, and as an indication of various types of expertise needed. The main integrating factor of the ruling elite is its common interests. Other dimensions that might hold a potential for conflict are largely ignored in the ruling elite model.

The next question, then, is what determines the integrated ruling elite's choices and political objectives. The ruling elite's strategies in the rural development sector are explicitly related to the ruling elite members' own economic interests and interests for staying in power. Considering the latter, provision of welfare services has been important for maintenance of electoral support, and increasingly, agricultural development and drought relief efforts serve this function as well. Considering self-enrichment, this has taken the form of favouring large scale cattle ownership and developing infrastructure to support this. The ruling elite members benefit from this as they own large herds of cattle. The heavy investments in mining have paid off in terms of revenues for the government and has allowed spending for these various purposes, as well as spending on good government salaries. These interests are very widely defined, and Picard seems to assume that

the ruling elite is able to reach consensual and effective decisions on how to maintain their position and interests.

Still, Picard opens up for some sources of conflict in the ruling elite. Different values and ideological orientation can have effects on attitudes. In particular, Picard points to the young and idealistic expatriates. But these young and idealistic expatriates are only at the outer fringe of the ruling elite. Their differing values seem to be related to the fact that they are young and inexperienced about how things work in Botswana. The more experienced expatriates are treated as a part of the administrative elite. But in theory, education and national background are included as a potential source of differing political attitudes in the ruling elite.

The variables that Picard introduces to the explanation of the ruling elite choices are their socio-economic interests, social values and education, interests being the dominant force. Influenced by these forces that stem from outside the governmental apparatus, the ruling elite applies the state as an arena for action.

This ruling elite is the determining factor in policy making processes; other actors are largely absent in the analysis. Its relationship to the expanding state apparatus is instrumental, and the state is explicitly understood as a mechanism by which the dominant elite acts (1987: 16-17). As an instrument, the state apparatus is rather passive, and has little influence on the tasks that it is used to fulfil.

Picard indicates that the instrument has its imperfections. He mentions lack of expertise and implementing capacity. He also refers to inadequate role expectations in the bureaucracy, and to the absence of entrepreneurial effort and attitude in it (1987: 14-15). It is unclear what effects these latter imperfections have, and in his empirical discussion of rural development policy, these imperfections are largely absent. These indications do not modify his handling of the administrative organizations as a sufficiently effective instrument. They are pointed out in the introduction and then largely left aside.

The rural population is given a limited set of options in Picard's framework. They have a power as electors, and this power is by the ruling elite perceived to be real, and important to attend to. In terms of implementation, the rural population might also abstain from participating in the programmes, but on the other hand, the ruling elite has a substantial capacity to manipulate the rural population. There are no mechanisms for peasant influence except for voting, or abstaining from participation in public policy implementation.

However, the ruling elite is constrained in its choices. Drawing on the dependency school, Picard emphasises that the ruling elite is constrained by

international capitalism in general, and by the Republic of South Africa in particular. These constraints are quite narrow — Botswana suits the description of a dependent country. The ruling elite is thus in search of areas for autonomous power wielding, a residual found in the rural development sector (1987: 273). In fact, Picard states that he looks for areas where the ruling elite is not constrained. This should imply a search for possible constraints, but the constraints of bureaucracy and clientele choice and action as participants in public policy implementation are hardly touched upon.

Picard also makes it a central point that the ruling elite is autonomous relative to its own socio-economic class origin. The ruling elite originates from the wealthy cattle owners, but it is not the representative of this social group as it is not dependent on it (1987: 11). The socio-economic elite apart from the section of it that is also the ruling elite, includes the traditional nobility. The ruling elite has proved capable of countering the wishes of this group.

Picard goes on in detail to examine the formation of two major rural development programmes (TGLP and ARDP), and the actor who initiates, coordinates, plans, decides and controls the implementation of these policies is the ruling elite. These programmes are main political initiatives, controlled by the ruling elite in internal, harmonious cooperation.⁵⁹ Like ARAP, they are main occurrences of public policy in which the ruling elite had interests at stake, and this determined their high level of activity and thus the policy outcome.

Summing up this section, the independent variables of Picard's model are the ruling elite's interests, its ability to act upon the pursuit of these interests, its control over bureaucracy, local elites and farmers, and its ability to come up with agreed ideas and solutions. His findings describe an effective and supreme ruling elite. It is supreme by not having serious competitors for influence. It is effective by being supreme, by having agreed-upon interests, by being able to agree on how to pursue these interests and by being able to have its policies implemented.

The data from the ARAP analysis, when seen in the light of Picard's model, shows a ruling elite that was not effective the way it intended to be, and a ruling elite which did not control all phases of the policy making process, other influences were important.

⁵⁹ TGLP and ARDP (Accelerated Rural Development Programme) were major programmes that Picard discusses in detail, and he explains them by ruling elite activity in all major phases.

8.5 Problems of the ruling elite model

8.5.1 *Politization of policy making?*

Contrasted to Picard's findings of an effective elite which rules supremely is the case of ARAP where the actors who would equal Picard's elite had problems to agree on what interest was at stake and how it should be pursued. The political-administrative leadership did not agree on objectives, and the outcome of their various intentions and actions produced an outcome nobody had intended. Furthermore, in the case of ARAP, the influence from non-elite actors is important in various ways. This is summed up in section 8.2.

Some might argue that ARAP was a special case, not typical for the workings of the political-administrative system. It remains to come to a conclusion on this issue, but there are some indications that the differences represent a trend away from the situation Picard describes.

The factors complicating the image of elite supremacy and effectiveness might be related to processes of institutionalization which seem to have become more important in Botswana in recent years. The administration has grown in size and complexity (see chapter 3). Moreover, the Botswana civil service has increasingly obtained a very good reputation for efficiency and good management (Raphaeli et al. 1984). It has achieved much since independence and it has professionalised significantly. These factors, and the factor of time and rather continuous, incremental development and growth of the administration make it a reasonable hypothesis that the Botswana civil service has grown in strength and self-confidence.

The peaceful and consensual cooperation among elite members that Picard describes relates to the fact that political institutionalization was very weak at the time of independence. It has to be remembered that the BDP started out as a very poorly developed organization; Gunderson talks of the new men, around 100 in number who took power in 1966 without having fought for it, without any political project of their own, and who simply gathered under the BDP heading (1970). They have stayed in power for 25 years, and an institutional development of both the party and of political leadership could be expected during this time. Molutsi points to increased self-confidence and willingness to play an independent role in policy making among up and coming politicians (1989: 125-126). The case of ARAP probably reflects this tendency of a changed political leadership, that acts according to its own rationality, problem understanding and values that do not always coincide with the administrative considerations of a civil

service that has also grown stronger, more experienced and displays increasing self-confidence.

Finally, the policies and programmes have become more complex and interventionistic over the years, complicating both the administrative apparatus and the planning and implementation process.

However, whether ARAP reflects a general tendency or is an exceptional case, it shows that the possibilities for more complex processes than those found by Picard cannot be ruled out. The analytical framework we apply for analyzing public policy have to acknowledge this. We need models that are capable of detecting various actors and influences and which can analyze and explain problems of defining goals and means, and problems of unintended outcomes. The analytical model applied in this analysis is capable; it is designed with that as one of its purposes. It will be argued that Picard's ruling elite model is not suited to analyze this type of processes.

8.5.2 The focus of the ruling elite model

The ruling elite model is based on assumptions which the ARAP case prove to be problematic. These are assumptions that constrain attention, and that make Picard's model ignorant of important factors. The case of ARAP illustrates that these factors might be of relevance to explain how public policy develops in ways that benefit some and not others. The ruling elite model lacks concepts to analyze some of these important factors as the model ignores them to quite some extent. Furthermore, some of these assumptions make the model misleading. By ignoring important problems or by treating them artificially, the model will, in cases like ARAP, have a tendency to exaggerate elite effectiveness and supremacy, thus giving us a misleading image of political power in Botswana.

There are some assumptions in Picard's model that makes the ruling elite more dominant in terms of influence over public policy than it proved to be in the case of ARAP. First, there is insufficient recognition of the influence on public policy that target groups might exercise. In Picard's model, the choice for the target groups is to participate or to remain passive. But participation itself can take many forms and it can leave openings for target groups' strategic action, changing public policy drastically. The ARAP case shows this very clearly. By their use of a modernization programme, farmers made ARAP a drought relief programme instead. The difference is important. Furthermore, this sort of influence will in its turn be influenced by the implementing agency. Its

traditions, routines and role definitions might facilitate or prohibit target group choice and influence.

Secondly, Picard makes the explicit assumption that the state apparatus at medium and lower levels is an instrument for those in hierarchical control of it. He also illustrates this control by showing how lower level opposition towards TGLP was easily overruled. But hierarchical control does not always ensure the instrumental use of the resources and competence of an administrative apparatus. Hierarchical control can reject active opposition, but it cannot always ensure active cooperation, coordination and innovative contributions. Especially in programmes of massive interventions like ARAP, efficient action requires coordination with and adjustments to the many premises that will be affected. If that does not happen, the costs of a programme might be higher than the benefits. This is an influence, perhaps it could be labelled a negative influence of isolation. But it might be important (Crozier 1964), and it is difficult to label the administrative apparatus instrumental if it is reluctant to be mobilized and has the option of remaining passive in some quarters. In the case of ARAP, these problems were significant.

Influences of clientele and administration are largely left out in Picard's work. Because the administrative leadership is included in the ruling elite, the cooperation of the administrative apparatus is taken for granted, which is not always a realistic assumption. Some programmes do not depend on target group participation and response. Others do, and in such cases the forms and rationalities of various responses in interplay with the implementing agency have to be considered.

Analyzing public policy in a ruling elite framework would have problems if one was faced with facts like this. By assuming their insignificance, the ruling elite model offers no concepts or hypotheses about these issues. Furthermore, applying the ruling elite model more rigidly, according to its own logic, might also lead to a situation where such issues were not revealed at all. If the model does not look for it, it might see only ruling elite influence whereas in reality, ruling elite influences were not the only ones.

There are some assumptions that make the ruling elite look more effective than it was in the case of ARAP. First, the supremacy that the model will tend to ascribe to the ruling elite means that there will be found few external constraints undermining ruling elite choices.

Secondly, Picard's model comes very close to implicitly assuming that the outcome of ruling elite processes are intentional and relatively rational choices of how to understand and solve a problem. Whether the ruling elite members actually agree on problem definitions and solutions, and whether

the outcomes of decision making processes reflect rational, agreed choices are questions not investigated in Picard's model. The actual processes of clarifying interests, of solving possible contradictions of interests, and of development and choice of means are not given much attention. These internal elite processes go on in a black box, and are not examined. The ruling elite model instead focuses on how the output suits the assumed input; the ruling elite interests. A public policy is explained by assuming rational choice of policy output when the output suits the ruling elite interests.⁶⁰ This assumption is illustrated by Picard's treatment of differing views expressed by various members of the ruling elite in the case of TGLP (1987). They are interpreted as being the gradual elaboration of ruling elite decision making, which might well be the case, but it cannot be assumed. It can also reflect conflict, or indecisiveness that is not necessarily solved in the end.

The case of ARAP shows that the MOA ruling elite members and the political elite members did not agree on what problem ARAP should solve. ARAP was nobody's rational choice. This is related to the fact that the agricultural administration did not have the routine solutions ready for solving the problems posed by the political leadership, and thus avoided that objective. Both ALDEP as well as ARAP are instances where the agricultural administration had problems adjusting to new goals. The professional knowledge, standard understanding of problems and routine solutions represented a limited arsenal of governmental action (Allison 1971; March and Olsen 1989). If the arsenal of means is limited, it is also problematic to assume that choices of means will be effective and rational. The outcome of this process was a policy that nobody had intended; it was rather a mixture of different intentions that undermined each other to quite an extent.

If we want to explain public policy, and the explanation cannot be assumed to be rational choice of the ruling elite, we need concepts to analyze the internal ruling elite processes. How problems are seen differently, how solutions are chosen, what happens when there is no readily available solution to a problem. The ruling elite model does not provide us with many such concepts.

If the ruling elite decisions are assumed to be intentionally effective pursuit of ruling elite interests, and there is no examination of how this

⁶⁰ The ruling elite analysis of Picard of considers outputs at various stages, and does not simply assume on the basis of the final decision, but what is behind the decisions of various stages is not investigated empirically, but assumed to be rational.

process actually develops, the effectiveness of ruling elite decisions is only tested by the criterion of whether they really suit ruling elite interests.

Most outcomes would suit ruling elite interests as Picard defines them. These interests are political acquiescence in the rural areas and thus electoral support, and the ruling elite's own socio-economic benefit. Any modernization programme can be said to fit these interests. Any modernization failure can be seen as not really a modernization effort, but as a political project, that benefitted some whose support was needed. Whatever comes out of the black box, looks rational in relation to ruling elite interests, if that is what we are looking for.

Of course, an analyst using a ruling elite framework would not apply it as rigidly as suggested here. But these indications of the logic of a ruling elite model, what it focuses on and what it ignores, show that not only is the ruling elite model likely to overlook important factors, factors that the model has poor concepts to analyze, if they should be revealed. But there is also a risk that by focusing on elite interests and output of elite processes, ignoring other actors and in the end asking whether the elite benefitted in some way or the other, the ruling elite will look more supreme and effective than what it really is.

8.6 Ruling elites and institutions

The case study of ARAP has pointed out some problems of using the ruling elite model for explaining public policy. In situations of many actors, with differing interests and approaches to problems, the ruling elite model is not a very promising model in its present form. It might be argued that the ruling elite model should be abolished for the explanation of public policy. To state that a model is useless compared to another model, requires that the two models should be applied on many different cases. Thus, this section will assume that the ruling elite model has an important contribution to make, and will point to some aspects of expanding the ruling elite model in ways which adapt it to the problems pointed out in the above.

As argued by Gran et al. (1990), the elite concept is a useful analytical concept, if distinguished from the classic elite theory. But the elite should be seen as potentially complex and marked by conflicts, and the variety of dimensions along which conflicts can occur needs to be clarified. The ruling elite needs to be seen in the context of the broader political-administrative system in general, focusing on how this system influences various ruling elite members' perspectives and world views. Next, the ruling elite influences public policy within the constraints imposed by administrative capabilities and approaches. In the formulation of Gran et al.,

we should “study the [ruling elite’s] “decision room” and the opportunity situation in that room” (1990: 64).

Members of the ruling elite, as Picard defines them, have their ruling elite member role in common. This role gives them, as outlined by Picard, distinct interests and they develop strategies to pursue their interests, not least in the field of public policy. But they have other roles as well. They belong to institutions that are likely to influence their values, world views, problem understanding and attitudes on how to solve problems. This is what is included in the concepts of problem structure and model of action. As institutions have differing tasks and expertise, institutionalization processes will provide institutions with distinct problem structures and models of action. On some points they counter each other, when issues affecting several institutions arise, like ARAP. These characteristics of administrative and political institutions also influence the leaders of them, who form the ruling elite according to Picard. In fact, inter-institutional relationships are to a considerable extent relationships involving leaders of institutions. Thus, institutional belonging — and the specific influence this has on ruling elite members — is an important dimension in the analysis of ruling elite processes, perhaps one of the most important ones (Putnam 1976: 122).

The conflict or cooperation patterns that arise among leaders who are also institutional representatives can be quite complex. Ministries and political institutions are potentially heterogenous categories and they may form complex patterns, that also involve military organizations, interest organizations, donors and the like. These might all be seen as ruling elite members. It is an oversimplification to reduce the dynamics of these patterns of ruling elite conflict or coalition to mere self-interest and struggle for power and resources.

What can be called institutional complexity will create tensions, and the case of ARAP is an example of one kind of tension: political — administrative tension. There might be other types as well.⁶¹

The subject of the difficult balance between political and administrative issues is a prominent one in the literature. There is a common, and to quite an extent valid argument that the balance might become tilted so much towards one end that it is obviously destructive for all interests. Hyden’s argument is that too often, political leaders intervene too strongly in administrative affairs, affairs that administrators and donors consider

⁶¹ One interesting relationship would be that between Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and the line ministries or the MFDP and its relation to political leadership.

technical and professional considerations not to be dealt with by politicians (1983).

But technical and professional considerations are very often still political, and what is framed as the technically possible might often hide choices about what is desirable. Consequently, the political and the administrative domains are not easy to distinguish, and there is political power hidden in defining this balance, as well as a dynamic potential. As pointed out by Jacobsen (1967), there is no objective distinction between what is political and what is administrative and technical. Instead, the setting of this distinction in various situations should be seen as a variable, and one which can explain dynamics of political processes.

Complex, institutionalized organizations are not neutral instruments that can be used for any purpose (Allison 1971; March and Olsen 1989). Leaving aside the problems of shortage of personnel, money and equipment, this is important in several respects.

Institutionalized professional approaches often contain political choices and values, and a change of policy objectives might require administrative change as well, both in the organization's professional expertise and in its structure. If changes are required in what is by civil servants considered as professional issues, the civil service will often be resistant to such changes required from the outside. What is emphasised by, for instance, Jacobsen is that this is often related to firm views on what is professionally sound and correct. This problem will be seen in the relationship between political leaders and the leaders of the administration under pressure (see above).

But even if the leadership of an institution should accept that changes were needed in the organization, it does not follow that the administrative organization can change over night to solve new problems with means that have to be developed for this purpose. Organizational change and innovation will involve more than the leadership of an organization. The variety of specialized units and departments somehow has to be involved in innovation, learning and criticism. In the case of ARAP, even very incremental adjustments and coordination efforts to mobilize specialized units within the MOA failed, hierarchical command is not always sufficient to activate an organization in rather open learning processes. Institutionalized organizations can and do of course change, it is also quite possible for leaders to trigger processes of change. But to steer processes of change is difficult (March and Olsen 1989).

If it is correct that policy changes often require organizational change as well, and if it is recognized that these changes are difficult to obtain, this also means that the ruling elite is not a very flexible one.

The case of ARAP also suggests that interventionist public policy that is not based on the clientele's interests, rationalities and values is difficult to implement in a way that leads to the desired changes in clientele behaviour. One of Jacobsen's points is that development of problem structures and models of action, and thus specific policy suiting new clientele interests, can be difficult unless there is a basic identification with the clientele in question, leading to a sensitivity towards the needs it has. What are the conditions for such an identification? Gran et al. point to social mobilization that also includes the generation of new leaders, that have a different social identification, conducive to policy changes and who are allowed to enter the state apparatus (1990).

An implication of the notion of political choices implied by professional approaches, i.e. problem structures and models of action, is that the analysis of how ruling elite interests are ensured by means of public policy requires a focus on how these interests are institutionalized in the administrative organizations, so that they do not need to be acted consciously upon by the ruling elite members. Consider, for instance, the idea that the existence of large cattle owners is a major achievement and that it is a rational and desirable way of organizing the livestock sector. Naturally, this favours the wealthy cattle owners, and therefore also the ruling elite members themselves. But it is too simple to explain this by ruling elite actions. Rather, this interest is ensured by having become institutionalized as a professional and technically correct understanding of livestock production.

The points made in this section do not solve all problems of the ruling elite model, but they suggest some possible contributions to an adaption of ruling elite perspectives to a reality of policy making that is increasingly becoming more complex in terms of both actors, world views and solutions.

8.7 The aftermath of ARAP

As the quotations in the Introduction indicate, the conclusion of more or less all observers, and of the MOA as well, is that ARAP did not achieve its purpose, and that it was a spending that could not be justified in development terms.

The interpretation of the ARAP experience seems to be that development of the small scale farmers cannot be achieved by available policy means, and the MOA is to some extent retreating from the role it rather reluctantly accepted as a key actor in fighting poverty problems. In the sector policy document of early 1991, there are no signals indicating new programmes of this type under planning. Instead, a return to the extension and research model is advocated, and increased research efforts are signaled.

The MOA has changed in several respects after its ARAP experience. The increases in implementing capacity have been mentioned above, as well as the change in expertise. The Field Service is now an organization much more capable of administering mass programmes also in terms of experience and expertise.

The policy of returning to research and extension does not necessarily mean a return also to the elitist approach that previously dominated. Intensified research efforts are justified by the need for technology that can be relevant also for small scale farming (MOA 1991). Whether this will turn out so, remains to be seen and it also remains to be seen whether such a technology actually is a realistic option at all.

An interesting change is a reorganization of the MOA. Previously, the Animal Production Division and the Crop Production Division were both located in the Department of Agricultural Field Services, which implemented ARAP. As noted in chapter 6, the amount of capacity taken by ARAP also took capacity away from livestock projects. Now the Animal Production Division has been transferred to the Department of Veterinary Services (MOA 1989: 193). This department has its own field staff, and relates only to livestock. The details of this reorganization are unclear, but it seems that it will protect the livestock programmes against future political interventions of the ARAP type which resulted in neglect of programmes which the MOA saw as important.

A final question relates to how important modernization of agriculture after all is, in political terms. The rationale behind demands for a new agricultural policy was political, to ensure that farmers saw themselves as catered for by the regime. The modernization did not materialize, but a tremendous subsidy and relief did, and the BDP did fare quite well in the 1989 elections. Relief might be a more rational strategy for the BDP leadership than modernization. The organizational preconditions for that are improved. The field staff has improved capacity and expertise to handle large scale relief programmes, and the livestock development which is so important for wealthy cattle owners is organizationally transferred so as to be sheltered from such use of implementing capacity in the future.

The poor peasantry is increasingly becoming dependent on government assistance, and the government machinery for meeting such needs is improved. This can be a promising situation, because it might enable Botswana to organize the absorbing of people into other sectors gradually, while maintaining the rural sector for as long as needed to prevent starvation and disintegration. But it might also be a problematic situation; it could be tempting for a regime under pressure to maintain an obedient rural socio-economic structure with its dependence and poverty longer than

what is needed, and it might be tempting to utilize the dependence for illegitimate purposes.

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Appendix 1

Interview data

In this appendix the interview techniques and some problems will be outlined in more detail.

1. Selection

In total, the interview data contain 45 interviews with 34 persons. The names of them and their institutional affiliation can be found in appendix 2.

They were selected gradually, as my insight into the specialization and hierarchy of the administration developed. The criteria for selection were: 1. As many as possible of those who had taken part in the planning and implementation of ARAP, but as noted, I had to leave out implementors on the regional and lower levels. 2. As many as possible of those who had their fields of responsibility influenced by ARAP, i.e. persons working with environment, women's affairs, other programmes in arable production. 3. Observers and the like who would know the workings of the political-administrative system, and the workings of the rural economy.

The list of potential informants according to these criteria was gradually made, by asking informants whom to contact about various issues, whom they cooperated with, and about what. There is a risk in this strategy, that important persons remain never discovered by me, but the Botswana central level bureaucracy is relatively small, and organized in an orderly. Thus, the chances of important persons being left out are small.

2. Access

Access is a problem on at least two levels.

1. Willingness to be interviewed. Most persons I approached were willing to let me have at least one interview. A few civil servants and politicians of high ranking did refuse, and the civil servant who was Permanent

Secretary in Ministry of Agriculture when ARAP was planned, refused to be interviewed, although numerous attempts were made.

2. Openness. This is difficult to assess, but repeatedly, I found people to be reluctant when it came to ARAP. ARAP was a very sensitive issue in general, because it had been politicized, and distorted into something that civil servants seemed to find it difficult to defend or admit to be involved in. An integrated part of the design for this study is to link planning and implementation processes in the case of ARAP to models of actions, routines and relations in general. The best way to get information about this sensitive issue was to link it very closely to more general questions about the organizations' tasks and relations. On the other hand, in some cases it was not possible to ask as direct and detailed questions about ARAP as I wanted, many informants answered very reluctantly the question about the planning of ARAP, and often answers were vague and fragmented. Pressing too far on a sensitive subject is difficult, and there are clear limits to what can be achieved that way.

3. In Botswana as in many other developing countries, the civil servants are overloaded with work. A natural implication of this is that they do not have much spare time for researchers. From their point of view, they have better things to do than to be interviewed. This sets limits on what can be achieved in one interview, especially as information about the process forming ARAP had to be elicited for in the rather cumbersome way described above.

3. Interview technique

1. The preparations included an attempt to assess what kind of person I was going to interview, what he might know, what he might dislike, what kind of interests he would have, what his normal duties were, what institution he belonged to and how that could affect him, and what professional training he had. They also included a choice of themes, and the formulation of questions, written down in a notebook as an interview guide. The interview guide, however, was only a broad structure of the interview. Follow-up questions had to be made as the interview developed, and new subjects which appeared could be followed up.

2. Most interviews had two basic components. The first was the institutional context, focusing on models of actions and relations to other persons and units. On this a fairly standardized guide gradually proved to

work well, focusing on tasks, cooperation, previous experience, professional training, problem worked on, projects implemented, goals for policies. In order to get hold of aspects of values and problem structures, I also used themes centred around the central concepts of self-sufficiency, social justice, future prospects, government responsibility, farmers and subsidies, trying to make informants relate their own work to these values or goals.

The second, related to this context, was how the informant had related to ARAP's planning and implementation. Most informants were reluctant to talk about this. Some were simply not willing to talk about it and told me that very clearly. What worked best was to relate ARAP to the general issues raised in the themes mentioned above; this gradually provided me with pieces of information. There were also some who were more willing to tell at least some things about ARAP fairly directly.

In addition to this, interviews were related to each other, as information from one interview could give guidance in another, because it was important to find the various points of view and perspectives across organizational divisions.

3. The formulation of questions of course had to take into account the well known problems, i.e. they had to be clear, they had to be formulated in terms that the informants would think in, and they had to be open for several answers. But in addition, a judgement had to be made about whether a particular question would work or not. With some experience these judgements became quite accurate.

4. I had planned to use tape recorder, but that soon proved to be a bad solution — informants were negative when asked. Besides, on sensitive issues such as ARAP proved to be, it was unwise to use a tape recorder. So when an interview was finished, the information existed only as notes in my notebook, and the associations these notes would give me for at least some time after. Much of the data analysis had to be done immediately. The report from the interview was usually written the same day.

Consequently, the evaluation of reliability, of how my way of interviewing had influenced, how I should perceive what was said, and the exclusion of things I was not sure I had understood had to be done at once, and some of the interpretation was also done then.

4. Interview technique and reliability

The way I carried out the interviewing will in most cases have influenced the information I got. Some problems should be focused upon.

1. It is obvious that the informant's perception of the interviewer influences his reaction to the questions. I was not an important person. This meant that there were limits on the time I could ask for. On the other hand, this also means that information was given without much pressure to be more cooperative than the informant might wish to be. Such information is more reliable than information given under some kind of pressure.

2. Detecting how concepts and values were defined and operationalized, what was meant by concepts and words is problematic, especially when going into areas which I knew little about in advance. The way I tried to compensate, was to ask several questions, controlling if I got it right.

3. Another serious problem was that in a lot of cases the informant showed interest in research as such, but not in administrative research, with its focus on the organizational aspects. It seemed to be more legitimate to do research on how policies worked than research on how policies were made.

4. Interviews were kept inside the framework of some themes. And usually it was no problem to control an interview. But it was important to be open to frame themes somewhat differently, to respond to surprises, and to follow up where relevant. The balance between control and flexibility is not an easy one, and some interviews had to be regarded as failures because of this.

5. Even if it is difficult to describe, in most interviews an atmosphere of communication, or lack of such, could be registered. I think it is legitimate to take such things into consideration when interpreting data afterwards.

5. Representation of interview data in the analysis

As emphasised above, ARAP proved to be a very sensitive subject for most informants. This I discovered very quickly, and I was not prepared for that. It was hard to assess how sensitive and why, and consequently I took it more and more for granted that it was sensitive simply because it was political and because it had been criticized. Thus, I was careful to assure informants that I did not have to quote them by name. Some did not

believe me. Others said that on this specific issue, they did not want to be quoted. Others said nothing, but on some points it seemed to be self-evident that it was off the record. These various factors make it difficult to find a consistent standard for the presentation of the interview data in the analysis. I have decided to be restrictive, not naming anyone, even if this also hides identities that are not necessary to hide. But it seems to be the best way, especially because it is an important principle to respect the interests of informants even if seen from the other side of the globe, fears of being quoted might seem over-exaggerated.

Appendix 2

List of persons interviewed

1. Ministry of Agriculture

Mr Mannathoko
Permanent Secretary

Mr Taukobong
Deputy Permanent Secretary

Mr Larsen
Division of Planning and Statistics

Mr Sigwele
Division of Planning and Statistics

Yvonne Merafe
Senior Rural Sociologist, Rural Sociology Unit

Elizabeth Muggeridge
Division of Planning and Statistics

Mr Mokgare
Division of Planning and Statistics

Mr Seleka
Division of Planning and Statistics

Mrs Tsimako
Rural Sociology Unit

Mr Memboa
Department of Agricultural Field Services

Mr K. Mmopi

ALDEP Coordinator

Mr Mpathi
Division of Land Utilization

Mr Dick
Department of Cooperatives

Mr Morapedi
Department of Cooperatives

Mr Alidi
Forestry Unit

Mr Modise,
ARAP coordinator, Crop Protection Unit

Mr Montshiwa
ARAP coordinator, Crop Production Division

2. Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Dianna Callear
Rural Development Unit

Mr Salkin
Macro Economic Unit

Mrs Kgari
Division of Economic Affairs

Mr S Mokone
Rural Development Unit

3. Ministry of Local Government and Land

Mr Hunter
Coordinator Land Use Planning

Mrs Molamu

Applied Research Unit

Mrs Bhebe
Department of Town and Regional Planning

4. Ministry of Home Affairs

Mrs Anderson
Women's Affairs Unit

5. NORAD

Mr Isaksen
Resident Representative

6. Consultants

Mr D. Cownie

Mr B. Egner


Mr P. Eskeli

7. Botswana National Front

Dr Kenneth Koma
MP, Leader of the Opposition


Appendix 3

Organizational charts




MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, STRUCTURE 1985

1. Headquarters.



*Source; National Development Plan 1985-91
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
Gaborone, 1985*

2. Department of Agricultural Field Services.



Source; Crop Production Division. Department of Agricultural Field Services
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- R 1991: 3 GULE, Lars
Islam, menneskerettigheter og utviklingsprosesser. Bergen, desember 1991.
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